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OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
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FROM THE LAW LIBRARY OF:
Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of
Law Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintain-
ing their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer
speakers and writers are not rendering legal or other professional services by their participation in
continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others using information obtained from UK/
CLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current sources of authority to
properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents contained in
our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the
professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether
a particular form or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is
believed to be accurate, but is not warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments
of speakers in presentation of these materials may contain expressions of opinion which do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal Education, the University of Ken-
tucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities. UK/CLE strives to
make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific
references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood
that in such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
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All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
COLLEGE OF LAW
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Suite 260 Law Building
Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0048
(606) 257-2921 or
(606) 257-CLEI
Facsimile
(606) 323-9790
PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY:
ACTING DEAN, COLLEGE OF LAW:
ASSOCIATE DEAN AND DIRECTOR OF CLE:
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVEIBUSINESS MANAGER:
STUDENT ASSOCIATE
Charles T. Wethington, Jf.
Robert G. Schwemm
Todd B. Eberle
Kevin P. Bucknam
Susan C. Saunier
Melinda E. Rawlings
J
J
J
J
J
j
j
j
j
J
j
J
j
J
J
J
J
J
J
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,.
r
r
r
r
r
i
r,
r
r
r
ABOUT...
The University of Kentucky College ofLaw, Office of Continuing Legal Education (UK/CLE) was organized in 1973
as the ftrst permanently staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures
with the threefold purpose to: 1) assist lawyers in keeping abreast of changes in the law; 2) develop and sustain pmctical
lawyering skills; and 3) maintain a high degree of professionalism in the practice of law. Revenues from seminar registmtions
and publication sales allow the Office to opemte as a sepamtely budgeted, self-supporting progmm of the College. No tax
dollars, bar dues or public funds are budgeted in the Office's ftnances.
Courses
UK/CLE provides a variety of workshops, conferences, and institutes to satisfy the continuing education needs of
lawyers and other professionals. Courses mnge from half-day progmms in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over
several days. While most courses are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UK/CLE has a longstanding statewide
commitment Since its ftrst year ofopemtion, beginning with a criminal law program in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has
continued to bring the highest quality continuing education to attorneys across Kentucky, the Midsouth, and the Midwest
Publications
Each course is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound materials are offered for
sale following courses and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers. In 1987, UK/CLE began
producing a series of publications which now consist of Practice Handbooks, Monogmphs, and Forms Compendiums. Each
Practice Handbook is an extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting of sepamtely authored chapters, se-
quenced for the comprehensive covemge of a distinct body of law. Their format allows for updating through supplements and
cumulative indexes. Each Monogmph is a concisely written practice guide, usually prepared by a single author, designed to
cover a topic of narrower scope than Practice Handbooks. Forms Compendiums contain both official forms and sample docu-
ments. Designed to assist the lawyer by suggesting speciftc structures and language to consider in dmfting documents, these
publications are beneftcial in the resolution of legal dmfting concerns. The Forms Compendiums are often used most effec-
tively in conjunction with UK/CLE Practice Handbooks and Monogmphs.
Professional Management
UK/CLE serves the needs of the bar from its offices on the University of Kentucky campus in Lexington. Its staff
manages course planning, publication content planning, course registmtions, publications sales, course and publication market-
ing, publication composition and printing, as well as budgeting, accounting, and ftnancial reporting. As an "income based"
progmm, UK/CLE's course tuitions and publications sales are budgeted to genemte sufficient revenues for self support.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UK/CLE is a member of the Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLE). As such, UK/CLE subscribes to the
Standards ofOpemtion for Continuing Legal Education Organizations, and the Standards ofFair Conduct and Voluntary Coop-
emtion administered under the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing
Professional Education. Throughout its existence UK/CLE has been actively involved in the activities and services provided by
ACLE. UK/CLE's association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity to continually
reassess instructional methods, quality in publications, and effective means of delivering CLE services at consistently high
levels of quality.
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition of Service
An enormous debt is owed to the judges, law professors, and pmctitioners who generously donate their time and talent
to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental components of our seminars and publica-
tions. Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to the legal profession, high quality continuing legal
education would not exist. As a non-proftt organization, UK/CLE relies upon the tmditional spirit of service to the profession
that attorneys have so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement in the continuing legal
education process. Ifyou would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and indicate your areas of
interest and experience.
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UKiCLE Is Self-Supporting J
The University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal Education (UKICLE) is a financially self- J.,'
supporting office of the University of Kentucky College of Law. As such, UKiCLE is income-based and "
separately budgeted. It operates in a manner similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all direct
expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues. No tax dollars or public funds are used in its
operations. Revenues for UKiCLE are obtained from registrant enrollment fees, and monies received j
from the sale of our publications. UKlCLE's sole function is to provide professional development services. "
Thus, in the event surplus funds become available, they are retained in our budget to improve the quality
and variety of services we provide. Compliments, and criticisms concerning our programs, publications, J
and other services are welcomed.
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COMPUTER LA\V INSTITUTE
May 7, 1999
University ofKentucky College ofLaw, Lexington, Kentucky
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT
FORMERLY PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2B
By CHARLES R. KEETON·
Background -- What is the Uniform Commercial Information Transactions Act (formerly
Article 2B)?
Copyright 1999 by Charles R. Keeton, reproduced in the UKJCLE Computer Law Institute with pennission.
• A.B. Summa Cum Laude Marshall Unh'ersity, 1971; J.D. with High Distinction Uniyersity of Kentuck"}' College of
Law, 1975. Member, Bro\\n, Todd & Heyburn PLLC, LouiS\ille. Kentucky.
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The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") began its life as
part of the Article 2 revision process.
The Article 2 revision project then split computer information offinto a "spoke" on
a proposed "hub and spoke" model.
The National Conference for Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
then jettisoned the" "hub and spoke" approach and created a completely separate
Article for computer information, Article 2B.
NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (the "ALI") just recently (April 7, 1999)
announced that what had been considered for introduction as Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code would not be a part ofthe UCC, but rather would be split
out as a free standing Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. (A copy of
the press release is attached).
According to NCCUSL, the purpose ofUCITA is to respond to the immense numbers
oftransactions in information and their dollar value, and the fact that the Internet and
information technology and commerce are major components ofthe future economic
prosperity of the United States. NCCUSL has seen what it describes as a dramatic
need for coherent and predictable legal rules to support the contracts that underlie
that information and Internet economy, and that lack ofuniformity and lack ofclarity
ofthese legal rules engender uncertainty, unpredictability and high transaction costs.
It says that, while the codification ofthose rules to provide that uniformity and clarity
is not possible in the Uniform Commercial Code, NCCUSL will propose uniform
legislation (now known as the Uniform Computer and Information Transactions Act)
to promote that uniformity and clarity. (See, again, the press release attached.)
A-I
II.
Ill.
Scope oiVe/TA.
A. What are "computer information transactions"?
1. How does one distinguish "computer" from other "information"? See
proposed Section 2B-l 03.
2. What is a "computer information transaction"? See the definitions of
"computer," "computer information," "computer informationtransaction, "and
"computer program" in proposed Section 2B-I02(a)(7), (8), (9) and (10)
respectively. See also the discussion of "support agreements" in proposed
Section 2B-616.
3. What is "infom1ation"? See the definitions of "information," "information
processing system," "informational content" and "information rights," at
proposed Section 2B-I02(a)(26), (27), (28) and (29).
4. UCITA would cover only licenses. See the definitions of"license," "licensee,"
"licensor," "mass-market license," and "mass-market transaction" at proposed
Section 2B-l 02(a)(30), (31), (32), (33) and (34).
B. Compare to the scope of proposed revised Article 2. See proposed Section 2-103.
Electro/lic cOll1racti/lg.
A. Formation of contracts in cyberspace could require special rules in some special
circumstances. For example, how are "electronic agents" to be dealt \vith? Is it like
or unlike the traditional UCC "battle of the forms"?
1. UCITA includes special rules regarding otTer and acceptance for electronic
agents. In general, UCITA authorizes formation of contracts by electronic
agents. See proposed Section 2B-204(a).
2. Special rules would exist for a contract formed between an electronic agent
and a human being. To some extent, UCITA would make the outcome turn
on the extent to which the human being can provide individualized responses
when the electronic agent cannot. See proposed Section 2B-204(b).
B. Many existing statutes require a "writing" of some sort. In general, UCITA would
statutorily mandate that a record or authentication not be discriminated against solely
because it is in electronic form. See proposed Section 2B-113. The section does not
address evidentiary or proofissues, including questions about to whom the record or
authentication can be attributed.
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One issue presented by contracts in cyberspace is the extent to which an electronic
record has been properly authenticated and whether the authenticated record can be
properly attributed to a particular person.
1. In general, UCITA does not prescribe an attribution procedure. Instead, it
relies primarily on the parties to select an appropriate procedure. It does,
though, provide guidelines for courts to determine the commercial
reasonableness ofan attribution procedure. See proposed Section 2B-114.
2. UCITA also provides for recovery of damages for an injured party who
reasonably relies upon a commercially unreasonable attribution procedure.
See proposed Section 2B-115.
3. UCITA also provides rules for determining the person to which an electronic
authentication, message, record or performance is attributed. See Section 2B-
116.
4. UCITA also provides standards for proof of authentication. See proposed
Section 2B-II9.
5. See also the definitions of "attribution procedure," "authenticate," and
"automated transaction," at proposed Section 2B-102(a)(3), (4) and (5).
Generally, a party adopts the terms ofa record, including a standard form, ifthe party
agrees to the record, by manifesting assent or otherwise. See Section 2B-207.
1. Generally, a person manifests assent ifthe person, acting with knowledge of,
or after having an opportunity to review the record, authenticates the record
or term or engages in conduct that the person has reason to knO\v would
allow the other party to infer assent to the record or term. In the case of an
electronic agent, the electronic agent manifests assent if it authenticates the
record or term after having an opportunity to review it. See Section 2B-III.
2. A person has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the record or
term is made a available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention ofa
reasonable person and permit review. In the case of an electronic agent,
opportunity to review occurs only if the record or term is made available in
a manner that would enable a reasonably configured electronic agent to react
to the record or term. See Section 2B-112(a) and (b).
3. If the record or term is available for review only after a person becomes
obligated to payor begins its performance, opportunity to review requires the
right ofretum. See Section 2B-112(c).
A-3
IV.
4. There are special rules for adopting terms in mass market licenses. See
Section 2B-208.
Warra111ies il1 computer il1jormatiol1tral1sactiol1s.
A. Express warranties.
1. UCITA generally follows current Article 2 and requires that an affirmation of
fact must become "part of the basis of the bargain" in order to create an
express warranty. See proposed Section 2B-402.
2. Compare to proposed Section 2-403 of proposed revised Article 2, which
continues a "basis of the bargain" test but effectively defines "basis of the
bargain." See proposed Section 2-403.
B. UCITA provides an implied warranty ofmerchantability ofa computer program. See
proposed Section 2B-403. UCITA differentiates between implied \varranties of
merchantability to end users and to distributors. The implied warranty of
merchantability does not generally apply to infonnational content. Compare to
proposed Section 2-404 of proposed revised Article 2.
C. UCITA provides an implied warranty with respect to informational content. See
proposed Section 2B-404. In general, no warranty arises with respect to published
information content or with respect to a person that acts as a conduit or provides only
editorial services in collecting, compiling or distributing informational content.
D. UCITA provides an implied warranty with respect to the licensee's proposed purpose
and with respect to system integration. See proposed Section 2B-405.
1. Generally, if the licensor knows of the particular purpose for which
information is required and that the licensee is relying upon the licensor's skill
or judgment in providing that information, an implied \varranty arises that the
information is fit for that purpose.
2. No warranty arises with respect to aesthetics, market appeal or the like, or
with respect to published informational content.
3. In general, if an agreement requires a licensor to provide or select a system.
and the licensor has reason to know that the licensee is relying upon the sk.ill
or judgment of the licensor in selecting the appropriate components of that
system, an implied warranty arises that the components will function together
successfully as a system.
A-4
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G.
Implied warranties can be disclaimed in appropriate circumstances through the use of
appropriate language, especially if that language is conspicuous (in the appropriate
cases). See proposed Section 2B-406.
Generally, a licensee that modifies a computer program does not invalidate any
warranty regarding performance of an unmodified copy, but does invalidate any
warranties regarding performance ofthe modified copy. See proposed Section 2B-
407.
In general, except for published informational content, a warranty to a licensee
extends to all persons for whose benefit the licensor intends to supply the information
or informational rights and who rightly use the information in a transaction or
application ofa kind in which the licensor intends information to be used. See Section
2B-409.
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National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws
American Law Institute
211 E. Ontario St., Suite 1300, Chicago, IL 60611
Chestnut Street
tel 312-915-0195, fax 312-915-0187
Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-243-1600, fax 215-243-1664
Contact: John M. McCabe
Elena A. Cappella
Legislative DirectorlLegal Counsel
tel 312-915-5976
215-243-1611
e-mail jnunccabe@nccusl.org
ecappella@ali.org
For Immediate Release
NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestallding Uniform Computer Informatioll Transactions Act
ALl and NCCUSL Announce t/tat Legal Rulesfor Computer
Information Will Not Be Part of UCC
April 7, 1999. The National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws
(Conference) and the American Law Institute (Institute) have announced that legal rules for
computer information transactions will not be promulgated as Article 2B ofthe Uniform
Commercial Code, but the Conference will promulgate the rules for adoption by states as the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.
The Conference, a 107-year-old organization whose purpose is to prepare statutes for
enactment uniformly among the states, and the Institute, a 76-year-old organization whose
purpose is "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
social needs," have long been partners in drafting the various articles of the Uniform Commercial
Code (Code or UCC). For the past several years the two organizations have worked cooperatively
on a UCC project to prepare a statute that would codifY evolving legal rules for computer
information transactions.
The information industry has grown exponentially in the last decade and already exceeds most
A-9
manufacturing sectors in size. The numbers of transactions in information and their dollar value
are immense. The Internet and information technology and commerce are major components of
the future economic prosperity of the United States. As the nation moves from an economy
centered around transactions in goods and services to an information economy, the need has
grown dramatically for coherent and predictable legal rules to support the contracts that underlie
that economy: Lack ofuniformity and lack ofclarity of the legal rules governing these
transactions engender uncertainty, unpredictability, and high transaction costs. Nonetheless, it
has become apparent that this area does not presently allow the sort ofcodification that is
represented by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Institute members will have an opportunity to discuss the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) at the Institute's annual meeting in San Francisco in May, but will not
have votes on it. The proposed statute is then scheduled to be completed and promulgated at the
annual meeting ofthe Conference in Denver this summer. It will be targeted by the Conference
for immediate introduction and enactment beginning this faIl in the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Conference believes that UCITA can
provide a framework in which sound business practices may further evolve in the marketplace
bounded by standards ofappropriate public policy.
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2 GENERAL PROVISIONS
3 [A. Short Title and Definitions]
4 SECTION 28-101. SHORT TITLE. This article may be cited as Uniform Commercial
5 Code -"'Software Contracts and Licenses ofInformation. [Computer Information Transactions]
r
6 Reporter's Note: The bracketed language indicates a change in title that might be considered in light of the new
7 scope. It has not been considered or approved by the relevant groups.
8
9 SECTION 28-102. DEFINITIONS.
10 (a) In this article:
11 (1) "Access contract" means a contract electronically to obtain access to, or
12 information in eleea:enie felHl from, an information processing system of another person.ftet.
13 awnea at' eontrollea 8)· tIle Iieeflsee, or the equivalent ofsuch access.
(2) "Access material" means any information. or material. such as a document,14
r
,..
,.
15 aatheri:cation, address, or access code, aek.eewletigment; €If other material necessary fer a pafty
r
r
16 to obtain authorized access to infonnation, or control or possession ofa copy.
17 (3) "Attribution procedure" means a procedure established by law, regulation, or
18 agreement, or a procedure otherwise adopted by the parties, to fer .ae flHlJlese ef verifyiHg that
19 an electronic message, authentication, record, or performance is that ofa specific person, or to fer
20 the flltFfJose ef detectieg changes or errors in the information.eomeet. TIle term includes a
r
r
r
21 procedure that requires the use ofalgorithms or other codes. identif}ing words or numbers.
22 encryption. callback or other ackllowledgment procedures. or any other procedures that are
23 reasonable under the circumstances.
24 (4) "Authenticate" means to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt a symbol or
25 sound, or to use encryption or another process with respect to a record, with intent ofthe
r
r
r A-13
1 authenticating person to:
2 (A) identify thate person;
3 (B) adopt or accept the tenus or a particular term ofa record that includes
4 or is logically associated with~ or linked to, the authentication, or to which refefeaeed ill a record
5 containing the authentication refers: or
6 (C) confinn the content establisH tile iBtegrity ofthe information in a record
7 that includes or is logically associated with~ or linked to, the authentication. or to which
8 fefef:eRe-ed-iB.-a record containing the authentication refers.
9 (5) "Automated transaction" means a contract formed or perfonned in whole or in
1 0 part by electronic means or by electronic messages in which the electronic actions or messages of
11 one or both parties that establish the contract are not intended to be reviewed in the ordinary
12 course by an individual
13 (6) "Cancellation" means the ending ofa contract by a party because ofa breach
14 by the other party. "Cancel" has a corresponding meaning.
15 (7) "Computer" means an electronic device that can perfonn substantial
16 computations, including numerous arithmetic operations or logic operations, without human
1 7 intervention during the computation or operation.
18 (8) "Computer information" means electronicinformation~
19 that is in a fonn directly capable ofbeing processed~y, or obtained from or through, a
20 computer, but does not include information referred to in Section 2B-I04(2).
21 (9) "Computer information transaction" means a license or other contract whose
22 subject matter is (i) the creation or development of;-inc4ooing4J.e..tflmsf~f.ifl.OOm:latien
23 iRte; computer infonnation or (ii) to provide access to, acquire, transfer, use, license, modify, or
24 distribute computer infonnation. The tenn does not include a contract roF-to distribut~en or
A - 14
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1 ('reate for pUlposes ofdistribution, ef.infonnation in printfonn~ ill a book,-newspaper--()£-
2 ::'agaZ:ine, €If ta eFea~ iBfuflliatien fer tIle pl:l~e.1e ofEiistri91itiea ia rAnt fuml e';ea iftlle
r
f
4 (l0) "Computer program" means a set of statements or instructions to be used
r
,.
I
5 directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result The term does not include
6 ~narately identifiable infonnational content &\iet:l: M a sep~el:1 iEieatit:iable metiea pietare er
9 r-my's general or particular requirements and needs ofwhich the other party at the time of
11 aggrieved party, and compensation for losses from injury to person or property proximately
10 CJDtracting had reason to know and which losses could not reasonably be prevented by the
12 ~lliting from any breach ofwarranty. The term does not include direct or incidental damages.
(11) "Consequential damages" include compensation for losses resulting from a8
,..
I
r
,.
13 (12) "Conspicuous", with reference to a tenn, means so written, displayed, or
14 o:herwise presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed
15 i:. A tenn in an electronic record intended to evoke a response by an electronic agent is
1 6 c.)nspicuous ifit is presented in a fonn that would enable a reasonably configured electronic agent
1 7 te' take it into account or react without review of the record by an individual. Conspicuous tenns
18 i=l.:lude, but are not limited to, the following:
1 9 (A) with respect to a person:
20 (i) a heading in capitals in a size equal or greater than, or in
21 cC1ltrasting type, font or color to, the surrounding text;
22 (iJ.) language in the body ofa record or display tltat~..in larger or
23 o::'er contrasting type, font, or color or is-set off from the surrounding text by symbols or other
24 rru..:ks that call attention to the language; and
A -15
1 (iv) otherwise incident to the breach; and
2 (B) do not include consequential or direct damages.
3 (2§S) "Information" means data, text, images, sounds, mask works, or works of
4 authorship. The term includes software.
5 (216) "Information processing system" means an electronic system ()rfaeiJity-for
6 creating. generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing eleetr<mie information.
7 (2~-7) "Informational content" means information that is intended to be
8 communicated to or perceived by an individual in the ordinary use ofthe information, or the
9 equivalent of such information. The term does not include computer instructions that control the
10 interaction ofa computer program with other computer programs or with a machine or device.
11 (228) "Informational rights" include all rights in information created under laws
12 governing patents, copyrights, mask works, trade secrets, trademarks, publicity rights, or any
13 other law that gives l'er-milS-a person, independently ofcontract, a right to control or preclude
14 another person's use ofor access to the information on the basis ofthe rights holder's interest in
15 that information.
16 QQ~) "License" means a contract within this article that authorizes access to or
1 7 use ofinformation or of informational rights that-aist or are-tG-be-«eated-and expressly limits the
18 contractual rights, permissions, or uses granted, expressly prohibits some uses, or expressly grants
19 less than all rights in the information. A contract may be a license whether or not the transferee
2 0 ha~ oetaiHs title to a licensed &-Copy. "License" includes an access contract and, for purposes of
21 [the Uniform Commercial Code], a consignment ofa copy. The term does not include a
22 reservation or creation ofa security interest
23 (310) "Licensee" means a transferee in a license or other &n-agreement under this
2 4 article;-wbeth~HlOt-tlltHlgr-eemeBt-is-a-OOeflSe-. A licensor is not a licensee with respect to rights
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1 reserved to it under the agreement
2 (32+) "Licensor" means a transferor in a license OT otller aa-agreement under this
3 artic1e;-wh~er-ef"-flet-the-agreeHtent-is-a-lieense-. As-bJ;!etween a provider ofaccess in an access
4 contract and its customer, the provider ofaccess is the licensor. As-&!!etween the provider of
5 access and a provider ofthe informational content to be accessed, the provider ofcontent is the
6 licensor. In lf~erfeanaRee eeBSists sf an exchange ofinformation or informational rights, each
7 party is a licensor with respect to the information, informational rights, or access it provides.
9 in a mass-market transaction.r
,..
t
8
10
11 that is~
(3~~) "Mass-market license" means a standard form that is prepared for and used
(39) "Mass-market transaction" means a transaction ...:itlHR under this article
r
,.
I
r
12 CA) a consumer transaction~...:()r
13 @) anv other that'-is-a-transaction with an end-user licensee if: wkie.h
14 (j) the -transaction is for i8velv~s information or informational
15 rights directed to the general public as a whole including consumers under substantially the same
16 terms for the same information~
1 B market-tmnsaetioo emy jf the licensee acquires the information or rights in a retail transaction
19 under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in the-a retail market: and
r 20 __________....,(i"..iD.........th""e:,... ,...A....transaction ether thaR a eSRSQRier tfaRsaetiea is not-a
r
21 mass market tFallsaetiea if it is:
22 Q.A) a contract for redistribution~ or (B)-;H;entmet-for
23 public performance or public display ofa copyrighted work;
r
r
r
r
24 _____01,(;) a transaction in which the information is customized
A-I7
1 or otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee other than minor customization
2 using a capability ofthe information intended for that purpose;
3 (III!» a site license; or
4 (lYE) an access contract
5 (3~4) "Merchant" means a person that deals in information or informational rights
6 ofthe kind or that otherwise by the person's occupation holds itself out as having knowledge or
7 skill peculiar to the practices or information involved in the transaction, whethe~foot-ttle-peF5O&
8 pfevioosly-engaged-iB.-saeh-tfaBsac-tleflS;-Or a person to which such knowledge or skill may be
9· attributed by the person's employment ofan agent or broker or other intermediary that by its
10 occupation holds itselfout as having such knowledge or skill.
11 (3§.$-) "Nonexclusive license" means a license that does not preclude the licensor
12 from transferring to other licensees the same information, informational rights, or contractual
13 rights within the same scope. For purposes ofthe [Uniform Commercial Code], the term includes
14 a consignment ofa copy.
15 (316) ''Present value" means the value, as ofa date certain, of one or more sums
16 payable in the future or one or more performances due in the future, discounted to a date certain.
1 7 The discount is determined by the interest rate specified by the parties in their agreement unless
18 that rate was manifestly unreasonable when the transaction was entered into. Otherwise, the
1 9 discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the
20 circumstances ofeach case when the transaction was entered into.
21 (3li+) "Published informational content" means informational content prepared for
22 or made available to recipients generally, or to a class ofrecipients, in substantially the same form ..
23 The term does not include informational content that is:
24 (A) -aRd-not customized for a particular recipient, by an individual that·4s-a
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1 enable the display and perfonnance of the motion picture or sound recording. Such transactions are, in any event,
2 exclude from the scope of this article by virtue of the combined effects of Section 2B-I04(I) and Section 2B-
3 104(6). The motion picture is excluded undei"subsection (6), while the program is excluded under subsection (1) as
4 a mere incident of the transfer of the motion picture product. The language in the defInition here merely
5 corresponds to and confIrms that result.
6 41. "Standard form." The defInition refers to forms, not standard terms. A form consists of record
7 containing a g[Q!!J! of terms prepared for frequent use as a group. Standard fonns in modern commerce are
8 ubiquitous. The definition does not cover a tailored contract comprised of "terms" selected from prior agreements.
9 The record must itself have been prepared for repeated use and actually have been used without negotiation other
10 than of"tbe ordinarily tailored terms noted in the defInition. If a standard fonn is offered but then negotiated or
11 changed other than with respect to the ordinanly tailored terms noted in the defInition, the resulting record is not a
12 standard fonn contract.
13 42. "Terminate." This defmition confonns to original Section 2-106.
14
15 [B. General Scope and Terms)
16
17 SECTION lB-t03: SCOPE
18 (a) This article applies to computer information transactions.
1 9 (b) Ifa transaction involves computer information and goods, the following rules apply:
20 (1) This article applies to the computer information and to copies ofcomputer
21 information, its packaging and documentation, but does not apply to a copy ofsoftware contained
22 in and transferred as part ofother goods tmless:
23 (A) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
24 (B) giving the purchaser ofthe goods access to or use ofthe software is a
25 material pwpose ofthe transaction.
26 (2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), Article 2 or 2A applies to goods in the
2 7 transaction.
28 .(c) Except as provided in subsection (b), ifanother article ofthe [Uniform Commercial
29 Code] applies to a transaction, this article does not apply to the subject matter ofthe other article.
30 (d) The parties may by agreement provide that all or part of this article, including contract
31 formation rules, governs a transaction in whole or in part or that other law governs the transaction
32 in whole or in part. An agreement that this article does or does not apply to some but not all ofa
33 transaction cannot alter a rule that otherwise applies and cannot be varied by agreement In all
A-19
1 other cases, following rules apply to the agreement:
2 (1) An agreement to opt out ofArticle 2B cannot alter standards ofgood faith,
3 unconscionability, or public policy invalidation, or the defense in Section 2B-118 and the
4 limitations in Section 2B-716. An agreement to opt into Article 2B is subject to any similar
5 restrictions in otherwise applicable law. Neither agreement can alter an otherwise applicable
6 consumer protection law referenced in Section 2B-IOS.
7 (2) In a mass market transaction, the following rules apply:
8 (A) An agreement to opt into or opt out ofArticle 2B is enforceable only
9 if the transaction involves subject matter governed by Article 2B and subject matter governed by
10 other contract law, or if there is good faith uncertainty about whether Article 2B or other contract
11 law governs.
12 (B) The agreement cannot alter law applicable to distnbution of
13 information in non-electronic form.
14 (3) Except for mass market transactions, the following rules apply:
15 (A) An agreement to opt out ofArticle 2B is not enforceable unless the
16 transaction involves subject matter not governed by Article 2B or there is good faith uncertainty
1 7 about whether Article 2B or other contract law governs.
18 (B) An agreement to opt into Article 2B is not enforceable unless the
19 subject matter ofthe transaction includes information or informational rights or there is good faith
20 uncertainty about whether Article 2B or other contract law governs.
21 Definitional Cross Reference:
22 "Agreement": Section 1-201. "Computer": Section 2B-I02. "'Computer information": Section 2B-I02. "Computer
23 information tIansaction": Section 2B-I02. "'Consumer": Section 2B-I02. "Copy": Section 2B-I02. "Goods":
24 Section 2-1-. "Electronic": Section 2B-I02. "Information": Section 2B-I02. "Party": Section 1-201. "Purchaser":
25 Section 1-201. "Software": Section 2B-I02.
2 6 Reporter's Notes:
27 I. General Structure. Section 2B-I03(a) states the affirmative scope of Article 2B. Unless a
28 transaction is a "computer information transaction," this article does not apply. See Section 2B-I02 (defining
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"computer infonnation transactionj. Subsections (b) and (c) deal with mixed transactions. Subsection (d) allows
the parties to opt into or out of the article bl agreement. An "agreement" does not require a signed writing, but
refers to the bargain of the parties in fact, including applicable usage of trade and course of dealing. Section 2B-
104 states several exclusions from the scope of the article. As a contract statute, Article 2B does not alter or even
deal with intellectual property rights law.
2. Scope ofthe Article. This article applies to "computer information transactions" as defmed in
Section 2B-I02. The article focuses on transactions involving creation or diS1ribution of computer software,
multimedia or interactive products, computer data, Internet, and online distribution of information. This leaves
unaffected the many transactions in the core businesses of other information industries (e.g., print, motion picture,
broadcast, sound recordings) whose business practices in their core businesses differ from those of the computer
software, online, and data industries. This article does not apply to print books, newspapers, or magazines.
Whether a magazine publisher can place contractual limitations on purchasers of copies of its magazines or books
is not addressed in Article 2B.
The scope ofArticle 2B is limited by the affumative scope statement in subsection (a ) which docs
not include:
• Sales or leases ofgoods, except as indicated in Section 2B-l03(b).
• Services contracts, except as in the defmition of"computer information transaction".
• Creation or distn'bution ofprint materials (books, magazines, newspapers).
• Still photography.
• Casual, non-contractual exchanges ofinfonnation.
• Creation or distn'bution ofmotion pictures, sound recordings, broadcast or cable programming.
• The subject matter ofother articles ofthe Uniform Commercial Code.
3. Transactions in Computer Informadon. Transactions in computer information are contracts
whose subject matter entails the acquisition, development or distn'bution of computer information. "Computer
information" is infonnation in a form directly capable ofbeing processed or used by, or obtained from or through,
a computer, but does not include information of a type or used in a manner refeIred to in Section 2B-I04(2). See
Section 2B-l02.
Transactions in computer information differ from sales or leases ofgoods because the focus ofthe
transaction is on the infonnation, its content or capability, rather than on the tangt'ble items that contain the
information is delivered. In a sale ofgoods, the buyer obtains ownership ofthe subject matter of the contract (e.g.,
the specific toaster or television). That ownership creates exclusive rights in the subject matter (e.g., the toaster). In
contrast, a person in a transaction whose subject matter involves obtaining the computer information and that
acquires a copy of computer information may obtain ownership of the copy but does not, and c:annot reasonably
expect to, own the information or the rights associated with it. Unlike a buyer of goods, the purchaser of a copy
often bas little interest in retaining possession or control of the original disk that contained the information unless
the information remains on that disk and nowhere else. Often, a purchaser copies the information into a computer,
rendering the original diskette largely immaterial.
Transactions in computer information differ from transactions in ot her information because of
the nature of the information involved. Information capable of being processed in a computer is more readily
susceptible to modification and to perfect reproduction than infoIDlation in other form such as printed books or
magazines. Indeed, to use computer information, one must copy it into a machine. See Stenograph v. Bossard, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (D.C. Cir. 1998); MAl Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer. Inc., 991 F.2d Sl1 (9th Cir. 1993). In
order to access and view computer information from a remote computer, one must copy it into the local computer.
This creates copyright law issues with which this article does not deal It also creates contract law issues addressed
in this act.
4. Computer. The term "computer" is defmed in Section 2B-I02. The definition comes from a
leading dictionary of terms related to the computer industry and conforms to ordinary definitions. It does not
include traditional televisions, VCR or similar systems whose automated functions are primarily intended to
receive or transmit broadcasts, or to perform or display motion pictures or sound recordings. In any event, this
article docs not apply to all information received or processed by a computer and does not apply to computers per
se. Whether or not received by a computer, motion pictures, broadcast and similar programming are excluded
from this article under Section 2B-I04.
5. Included Transactions. The scope of this article turns on the defmition of"computer in/ormation
transaction." "Computer information transactions" include transactions involving the creation, distribution, or
A- 21
1 license of computer information, including software. Section 2B-I02. Transactions for information not in a fonn
2 directly capable ofcomputer processing are q;cluded unless the parties agree to be governed by its provisions.
3 For a transaction to be included, acquiring the computer information, access to it, or its use must
4 be the subject matter of the transaction and not a mere incident of another type of transaction. The mere fact that
5 information is sent or recorded in digital fonn is not sufficient. Thus, for example, a contract for aiIplane
6 transportation does not become an Article 2B transaction simply because the ticket is in electronic form. The
7 subject matter of the transaction is not the computer information, but the service - air transportation from one
8 location to another. Similarly, an insurance policy prepared for a client and recorded in digital form is not a
9 computer information transaction. but simply a contract for insurance whose result or terms is evidenced in digital
1 0 form. A contJact for a digital signature certificate is a contract for digital certification or identification services, not
11 a contract whose subject matter is the computer information. This article does not apply to the many cases in which
12 a person provides information to another person for purposes of another transaction such as malcing an
13 employment or loan application.
14 Typically, a contJact included in this article is for commercial use or distribution of the computer
15 information. The article thus includes, for example, a license allowing a company to transform photographs into
1 6 digital form for re-licensing in that fonn to others. It also includes a contJact to compile in digital form a database
1 7 ofnames for use by a client as a product furnished to others for use as a mailing list.
1 8 a. Creation, Development lind Support. The article applies to contracts for the
1 9 development or creation of computer information, such as software development contracts and contracts for the
20 creation of computer databases. Contracts ofthis type have been subject to inconsistent court rulings, applying the
21 U.C.C. or common law contJact theories based on fine and not clear distinctions. Article 2B applies to all such
22 transactions. The article does not, however, cover contracts for development or creation ofmotion pictures, sound
2 3 recordings, or broadcast programs. These are excluded from the definition of "software.. and the definition of
2 4 "computer information." In any event, transactions of this type are excluded under Section 2B-I04. This article
2 5 also does not cover contracts for the creation or development of print books or articles which do not involve
2 6 computer information.
27 b. Computer informtztion TrllnstICnon. The article covers transactions for access to,
2 8 acquisition, transfer, use, or distnbution of computer information. This includes all transactions involving the
2 9 distnbution or use of computer programs. Such transactions are covered whether they involve a license or an
3 0 unrestricted sale ofa copy ofthe program.
31 This article also covers transactions involving access to or information from a computer system.
32 This encompasses Internet and similar SYStems that allow access to information databases. This form of
3 3 information distribution does not include broadcast of digital information involving motions pictures, sound
3 4 recordings or the like.
3 5 6. Kaed TTtIIIStICtions. Inevitably, as with Article 2 transactions in goods. some transactions in
3 6 computer information present questions about to what extent the transaction is governed by Article 2B and to what
37 extent it is governed by connnon law or law in another statute. Transactions that are governed by several sources of
38 contract law in a single transaction (i.e., "mixed transactions") are so common under current law as to be
3 9 unexceptional and, indeed, virtually universal. They routinely exist in all consumer transactions (e.g., videos, CDs,
40 and software) and all transactions involving copyrighted works. For consumer goods. transactions are governed by
41 connnon law, Article 2 (or 2A), and state or federal consumer law. For copyrighted works, transactions are
42 variously (and non-uniformly) governed by connnon law, copyright law, Article 2 (or 2A), and various state
4 3 statutes. While Article 2B provides more uniformity and clarity on the issues it addresses, it is supplemented by
4 4 common law (Section 1-103), copyright law, and consumer or other state law (Section 2B-IOS).
4 5 Here, the relevant issue is not whether a single or multiple sources of contJact-related law apply
4 6 (because multiple sources always apply), but whether Article 2B, rather than another source, is involved in $e
47 mix. On this issue, courts usc two distinct approaches under other U.C.C. provisions and under common law.
4 8 • A "gravamen of the action" standard: applies rules tailored to a subject matter only to that particular
4 9 subject, asking in effect to which subject matter does the particular dispute pertain.
5 0 • A "predominant pwpose" standard: makes a determination about the overall transaction and applies the
51 law applicable to the predominant subject matter to the "entire.. tJansaction.
52 Article 2B adopts a modified gravamen of the action approach in subsection (b) with respect to goods and in
53 subsection (c) with respect to the subject matter ofother articles of the U.C.C., but as discussed in a following note,
54 courts may to use a predominant purpose test with respect to non-U.C.C. subject matter.
55 7. Computer lnformtltion lind Goods. In a transaction in which computer information and goods
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are involved, Article 2B applies to the computer iliformation, while Article 2 (or Article 2A) applies to the goods.
This recognizes the differences in the two types of subject matter and the transactional differences that result from
the different subject matter. -
There are two exceptions. The first, in Section 2B-l03(b), is that Article 18 applies to goods that
are merely a copy, documentation, or packaging of the computer information covered by this article. In effect,
these "goods" are mere incidents of the computer information and, as such, should be incorporated into this article
to prevent unintended results through the interface of the U.C.C. transactional articles. Article 2B covers both the
computer software and the media on which the software is copied or documented.
The second exception in subsection (b) concerns copies of software contained in and sold or
leased as part ofgoods. Section 2B-I03(bXl) provides that, ifsoftware is embedded in goods, Article 18 applies to
the copy of the software only ifit is part ofa computer or a computer peripheral or if giving the purchaser access
to the functional attributes ofthe software is a "material purpose" of the transaction. In fact, however, in most mass
market transactions where the issues are most significant, which law applies often does not alter the outcome.
Article 2B governs con1ract issues for software embedded in goods other than a computer or a
computer peripheral only if a material purpose of the transaction is to provide the functional attributes of the
program. Thus, while a television may be operated by software, the material purpose of the a sale of an ordinary
television set is to acquin: the set and television reception. This is not an Article 18 transaction, but that result
may change if television sets evolve into computing systems in which a material purpose for the user is to obtain
software processing. Simil!lfly, while an automobile may have some functions operated by a computer program,
the program that operates the brakes or other functions is not a primary purpose of the transaction for the
purchaser. The transaction is within Article 2 or 2A. On the other hand, the development or supply contract for
the program that enables the manufacturc:c to use the program in its system, however, is in Article 2B. Similarly,
separately licensed software in a digital camera that enables the camera to be linked to a computer so that images
can be transferred back and forth and manipulated is within Article 2B. Factors suggesting that the program's
processing capacity is a material focus of the transaction include the extent to which the processing capabilities of
the software is a dominant focus of the product's appeal, the extent to which discussions of the parties focused on
that processing capacity in contrast to other attributes of the product, and the extent to which the agreement makes
those processing capabilities a separate focus for agreed terms.
8. Computer lnformtl/ion lind other UCC A.rticles. The articles of the U.C.C. control with
reference to their subject matter. For example, Article 8, and not this article, deals with investment securities and
rights or remedies with respect to that subject matter, even though in modern practice securities may be dealt with
through a computer. The same applies with respect to the subject matter of Article 4 and Article 4A: payment
systems, checks. and funds transfers. This follows the same role that applies under original Article 2 and 2A.
Similarly, if a provision of Article 9 conflicts with a provision of Article 2B, Article 9 controls. However, if a
computer information transaction is involved, such as a license of computer information, Article 2B applies to the
terms and enforcement ofthat license.
9. ComputeT InforllUltion and Other Contract Law. Where the issue does Dot involve goods or the
subject matter of other articles of the U.C.C.. courts should follow general inteJpretation principles to determine
the applicability of Article 2B. In most cases involving computer information and other subject matter, this will
entail application ofa form ofthe "predominant pwposc" test as used in most states with respect to original Article
2, but modified here to reflect the issues presented in reference to Article 18. The predominant purpose is judged
as ofthe time ofthe contracting.
If computer information is the predominant purpose of the transaction, Article 2B roles apply
instead ofother con1ract law (e.g., common law). The predominant purpose test has been applied by courts dealing
with the scope ofArticle 2 where goods and other subject matter (e.g., services) are involved in a transaction. The
basic test asks whether Article 2B or other subject matter constitutes the main intended focus of the contract Thus,
in a contract between an author and a publisher, ifthe author agrees to allow the publisher to diS1nbute the work in
"book, motion picture or digital form", the agreement is outside Article 2B if the predominant purpose is to give
the publisher the right of first publication in book (printed) form or the right to motion picture uses. This is true if,
for example, the intended primary exploitation of the contracted-for work is in print or motion picture form, both
of which are outside Article 18. The fact that "electronic rights" are also covered in the agreement does not result
in Article 2B coverage since the focus is on other rights. Similarly, a contract with a producer whose predominant
pwpose is to develop a motion picture for distribution as such does not come within Article 2B simply because the
grant includes secondary rights to use parts of the film in interactive contexts. The predominant purpose is
creation of a motion picture. On the other hand, a contract giving a software publisher the right to reproduce a
A-23
1 photographic image in "software and other works" is governed by Article 2B if the predominant purpose is to allow
2 use in computer infolU1ation even though usCi, in print folU1 is also permitted. Similarly, a license to acquire rights
3 to use software by a motion picture studio which may use the software as a tool in creating motion pictures is an
4 Article 2B transaction, while a license to use digital scenes or images in a motion picture is excluded.
5 In applying the predominant pmpose test to infOlU1ation transactions, the standard should be
6 refined to include consideration of the type of transaction envisioned in the parties' agreement. For example, in a
7 loan transaction a loan officer might deliver a diskette containing interest rate calculations for use by the borrower.
8 Under the predominant pmpose test, no part of the transaction is covered by Article 2B because the predominant
9 purpose of the agreement between the lender and borrower is the common law loan. Further, the transactional type
10 mirrors.oa common law loan tnmsaction and the mere presence of the software does not alter this fact. This type of
11 an approach is more appropriate than that of some courts which, under prior law, applied sale of goods rules to
12 software development transactions because, even though the bulk of the contract concerned development services,
13 the program was to be delivered on a diskette or tape. The proper analysis should have been whether the principles
14 ofArticle 2 (e.g., damage calculation rules, conforming tender rule, rules on timing of ownership transfer, rules on
15 duration of license, effect of negligence, contract modification, ctc.) fit the nature of the transaction in fact better
16 than would the rules available under other law (e.g., common law regarding services contracts). This more
1 7 nuanced analysis is more appropriate for new technology areas in order to avoid elevating folU1 over substance
18 ' While the cases undCl' Article 2 thus provide some guidance, it is appropriate to consider
1 9 additional factors. Thus courts should consider the extent to which the transaction as a whole corresponds to the
2 0 transactional framework involved in computer infOlU18tion transactions. If it does, Article 2B should apply to the
21 entire transaction, but ifnot, it is possible that Article 2B should not apply at all. Among the transactional factors
22 that courts should consider are: I) the nature of the underlying intellectual property rights involved, including,
2 3 with respect to copyrighted works, differences in the rights provided under the Copyright Act for different types of
24 works, 2) the extent to which regulatory regimes apply to the subject matter and were considered in the transaction,
25 3) the extent to which allocation of liability risk for inaccurate or improperly functioning information is a concan,
2 6 and 4) the extent to which the parties involved are performing sCl'vices rather than information-related
27 transactions.
28 The test applies at various levels ofose or distnbution, but the resu It may differ at each level. For
2 9 example, a couriCl' company that licenses communications software from a software publisher is engaged in an
3 0 Article 2B transaction. Thc subject matter of the a8reement a license in the software itself: If the courier company
31 provides the software to customers merely to access data on thc current location of packages, however, the
32 predominant pmpose may be the sCl'vices. If the software publisher enters into a license with thc end user, that
33 license is in Article 2B.
34 The predominant pwposc test can apply only if the parties have not othawise agreed as to
3 5 coverage by Article 2B or other law. In the foregoing illustrations, for example, if the parties clect coverage under
3 6 Articlc 2B, that agreement governs as would an agreement that Article 2B should not apply at all In any event,
37 Articlc 2B coverage or non-coverage does not create "mixed contracts." The only issue is whether Article 2B
3 8 supplants common law or other rules otherwise applicable to a transaction. Agreement here, as elsewhere in thc
39 U.C.C., can be found in the express tams of the contract as well as in the usage of trade or course of dealing
40 between the p;u1ies, or as inferred from the circumstances ofthe con1Iacting.
41 10. ContrtICt Choice. Subsection 2B-I03(d) follows the basic rule that contract choices control and
42 applies this principle to determining what law governs. The subsection distinguishes between decisions to opt
43 entirely into or out ofArticle 2B subsection (dXI-3), and decisions to do so only in part (subsection (d».
4 4 The parties can agree to have Article 2B apply to the entire transaction, part ofthc transaction, or
4 5 none of the transaction. These choices, of course, deal with applicability ofArticle 2B and not with whether other
4 6 law continues to apply to issues not dealt with in Article 2B. Also, a contract choice here is effective iIIespectivc of
47 any "predominant purposc" ofthe transaction. An enforceable decision to opt into or out of Article 2B may render
4 8 the "predominant pmpose" test moot
4 9 In determining whether the agreement to opt-into or opt-out of Article 2B was fOlU1ed and is
5 0 enforceable, a court will ordinarily apply the contract formation rules of this article and the general concept of
51 agreement in the U.C.C. This is especially true where thc transaction involves some subject matter governed by
52 Article 2B. Here, as elsewhere, an agreement can be found as easily in the express terms of the contract of thc
53 parties as in course ofdealing, usage oftrade, or as inferred from the circumstances.
54 For commercial parties, the ability to choose Article 2B or another body of state contract law
55 gives an important opportunity to avoid uncertainty and the cffects of potentially conflicting rules potentially
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applicable under multiple bodies of state contract law (e.g., Article 2B, Article 2, Article 2A, and common law).
This power of contract choice is especially..important in that Article 2B does not apply to all transactions in
infonnation. On the other hand, especially in contracts with no bargaining, there is an interest on the part of the
party who receives non-negotiable tenns that the choice not unfairly deprive it of protections mandated under the
other law that may not be varied by agreement This interest, of comse, does not validly apply to contract rules
that can be varied by agreement. The provisions ofsubsection (d) balance the interests in other contexts.
41. General Limits: Opting Entirely Ollt. Contract terms on this issue are subject to rules
on unconscionability and fimdamental public policy concerns. In addition, subsection (d) contains several
restrictions on enforcing the choice of the parties on whether Article 2B governs or not.
(1). Subject Matter Limitations. The ability to opt out of Article 2B exists only in
certain cases. In essence, in both a mass market and any other transaction, the parties by agreement can opt out of
Article 2B only if the transaction includes subject matter that would not otherwise be governed by Article 2B (a
"mixed transaction"), or if there is good faith uncertainty about whether Article 2B applies. Thus, in the latter
case, the parties may agree to opt out (or opt into) Article 2B to avoid the uncertainty of whether Article 2 or
Article 2B applies. The opt out is presumably into the law that governs the other subject matter or the one whose
application was uncertain.
A contract choice here is effective iIrespective of any "predominant purpose" of the transaction,
but may render the "predominant purpose" test moot. The "predominant purpose" test is applicable only if in fact
the transaction does involve Article 2B subject matter and other subject matter, at least in part, or if a contract
choice to opt out is ineffective in whole or in part under this section. In the latter event, a court could conclude
that under a predominant purpose test, particular law governs.
(2). Rilles A.ffected. Subsection (d)(l) states the general rule that a decision to opt
Ollt of Article 2B cannot alter certain fimdamental rules that wonld be applicable to the contract if Article 2B
applied to part of the transaction. These include standards of good faith, unconscionability and the public policy
rule in Section 2B-I05(b). For other than the listed Article 2B provisions, opt out is not substantively restricted,
but it is limited with respect to the transactions in which it can be used.
In reference to substantive rules, in most cases, Article 2B allows their variation by agreement
and, thus, these rules can be varied by a general opt-out. For those few Article 2B rules that cannot be varied by
agreement, except as listed in the subsection, the interest in allowing certainty prevails. An opt-out places the
entire contract under a different legal regime with its own applicable rules that deal with these topics. This is true,
for example, for limits on liquidated damage terms. Common law, Article 2 and Article 2A all contain provisions
dealing with this topic and, while somewhat similar, these rules make a balance attuned to those other legal
regimes. A rule which makes ineffective a general contract choice to the extent it affects this rule would create a
situation in which an agreement would be required to comply with Article 2B (for its subject matter), Article 2 (for
goods) and common law (for other subject matter) in the same transaction. The alternative concept, adopted here,
is that the opt-out brings with it both the positive and the restrictive parts of the other body of law in twl, and
results in the loss of both the positive and restrictive parts of Article 2B. This is also true, for example, in a
decision to opt out ofArticle 28 where Article 2 is the other law and governs as to the aeation and disclaimer of
warranties. It is also the case of the effect of an opt-out on the provisions of Section 2B-208 on both the
enf\>rCCability ofa mass market form and the return right. Ifthere is an opt- out, other law applies to both issues.
The basic theme is that a contract choice to opt out ofArticle 2B as a whole (see subsecti on (d)(4)
on partial opt out) should ordinarily be enforced and that the interests ofthe parties arc properly safeguarded under
the other law (U.C.C. or common law) as a whole. The issues listed in subsection (d)(l) represent exceptions
under current law or policies that arc so fundamental that their variance should not be permitted.
b. General Limits: Opdng In. Contract terms on this issue arc subject to standards of
unconscionability and public policy concerns. In addition, subsection (d) contains several restrictions on enforcing
the choice ofthe parties on whether Article 2B governs or not.
(1). SlIbject Matter Limitations. The ability to opt into Article 2B exists only in
certain cases. In a mass market transaction, the parties can opt in only if the transaction involves Article 2B
subject matter (along with other subject matter) or if there is good faith uncertainty about whether Article 2B
applies. In addition to simply recognizing the role ofcontract choice, the goal ofallowing this option to take effect
is to allow parties to reduce conflicting rules and uncertainty, some of which are caused by Article 2B itself
(because of the decision to focus on a narrow group of transactions). If there is no Article 2B coverage and no
good faith uncertainty, the transaction in the mass market should be governed under otherwise applicable law In
this respect, subsection (dX3)(B) further indicates that a decision to opt into Article 2B cannot alter the law
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32 clearance, settlement, or processing of:
30 apply to:
31 (1) a contract or a transaction that provides access to, use, transfer,
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(B) an instrument or other item;
33 (A) deposits, loans, funds, or monetary value represented in electronic
34 form and stored or capable of storage electronically and retrievable and transferable electronically,
35 or other right to payment to or from a person;
1 regarding distnbution of non-electronic copies, such as books and magazines, which are outside the scope of this
2 article.
3 Outside the mass marlcet, interests in allowing parties to make and enforce contractual
4 choices ·is even greater. Yet, even here, it seems inappropriate to allow a decision to opt into Article 2B where the
5 transaction involves subject matter entirely unrelated to the general nature of this article - transactions in
6 information. Subsection (d)(3) allows a decision to opt into Article 2B, but only if the transaction subject matter
7 includes information or informational rights. Thus, a decision by parties to a commercial trademark license to be
8 governed by Article 2B is enforceable, while the decision by parties to a real estate lease is not enforceable.
9 The overall effect of the subsection is as follows: Assume that three commercial parties
10 enter 3D agreement to create a product involving cable services (common law), software or multimedia (Article 2B)
11 and hardware (Article 2). The parties to the commercial agreement may agree that any of the three laws governs
12 and, thus, avoid inconsistent and overlapping rules. As to Article 2B subject matter, the agreement does not alter
13 good faith, unconscionability, public policy or self-help rules. If the resulting product is distnbuted in a mass
14 market transaction, if it involves Article 2B subject matter, the agreement may elect Article 2B or other law as
15 covering the deal, with the limits as stated above, but if there is no Article 2B subject matter in the product, Article
1 6 2B cannot be made to apply.
17 (2). Rules Affected. Subsection (d)(I) states the general rule that a decision to opt
18 in cannot alter any rule of otherwise applicable law similar to the listed rules: good faith, unconscionability, the
19 public policy rule in Section 2B-IOS(b), the self-help limitation, and the electronic consumer defense. In addition,
20 neither an opt-out, nor an opt-in can vary consumer protection laws desm"bed in Section 2B-IOS.
21 The discussion in the notes dealing with limits on the right to opt out are relevant here. In
22 reference to substantive rules, in most cases, contract law allows variation by agreement and these rules can be
23 varied by a general opt-in. For those few other rules, the interest in allowing contract choices that enhance
2 4 certainty prevails, especially where the rule does not involve a consumer protection that cannot be varied by
2 5 contract. Opting into Article 2B places the entire contract under this legal regime. The basic theme is that a
26 contract choice to opt into Article 2B as a whole (see subsection (dX4) on partial opt-in) should ordinarily be
2 7 enforced.
28
29 SECTION 2B-I04. EXCLUSIONS FROM THIS ARTICLE. This article does not
36
39 (D) a letter of credit, document oftitle, financial asset, investment
40 property, or similar asset held in a fiduciary or agency capacity; or
38 funds transfer, automated clearing house transfer, or similar wholesale or retail transfer of funds;
J
J
J
(C) a payment order, credit card transaction, debit card transaction, or a37
J
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Nimmerl Ring proposal
SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
Note:
This proposal builds on and refines the scope concept approved by the Committee at its last
meeting. Most importantly, the proposal clarifies definitions central to the scope of the article. It
also clarities the right of the parties to opt into or out ofArticle 2B coverage.
(8) "Computer information" means information in an electronic form that is obtained
from or through the use ofa computer, or that is in digital or equivalent form capable of being
processed by a computer, but does not include information referred to in Section 2B-I04(2).
(9) "Computer information transaction" means an agreement a purpose of which is to
create or modify, transfer, license, or provide access to computer information or informational
rights in computer information. The term includes support agreements to the extent covered in
Section 2B-616. .
(25) "Information" means data, te:\."t, images, sounds, mask works, software, or
collections or compilations thereof.
Notes:
I. The comments to "computer infonnation" will indicate that the reference to
"equivalent fonn" refers to analog and any future computational teclmologies, eliminating the
possibility that the reference to "digital" teclmology would otherwise lock the scope of the article
into a particular, current technology. They will also explain that the tenn does not cO"er infonnation
merely because it could be scanned or othen\'ise entered into a computer, but is limited to electronic
infonnation fonn or capable directly of being processed in a computer.
2. The comments to "computer infonnation tr.lDsaction·· will indicate that the concept
ob\iously does not cover transactions involving books, magazines or other print material Tlris is
true even though the infonnation provided under a contract for the distribution of infonnation in a
print publication is perfonned by the delivery of the tex1 on a computer diskette. The pUIpose of
such transactions is to engage in print publication and distribution, not in a computer transaction.
SECTION 28-103: SCOPE
(a) This article applies to computer information transactions.
(b) Ifa transaction involves computer information and goods, the following rules apply:
(I) This article applies to the computer information and to copies of it, its
packaging and documentation. However, ifa copy is contained in and sold or leased as part of
goods, this article applies to that copy only if:
(A) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
(B) giving the purchaser ofthe goods access to or use of the computer
information is a material purpose ofthe transaction.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), Article 2 or 2A applies to the goods in
the transaction.
(c) If this article and another article ofthe V.C.C. other than Article 2 or 2A, apply to a
transaction, the following rules apply:
(1) If there is a conflict between this article and Article 9, Article 9 governs.
(2) In all other cases, this article does not apply to the subject matter of the other
article.
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[(d) If a transaction involves computer information and other subject matter, but not
within subsection (b) or (c) and is not excluded under Section 2B-104, this article governs if the
computer information is the primary purpose of the transaction.]
(e) Except as provided in subsection (c)(I), the parties may agree that this article,
including contract formation rules, governs a transaction ("opt in") or that other law governs the
transaction and this article does riot apply ("opt out"). The agreement is subject to the following
rules:
(I) An agreement to opt into this article in a mass-market transaction:
(i) does not alter the applicability or effect of a consumer law referred to
in Section 2B-I05(d); and
(ii) is unenforceable with respect to a purchase of a tangible copy of
information in print form.
(2) An agreement to opt out of this article in a mass-market transaction:
(i) does not alter the applicability or effect of standards ofgood faith,
unconscionability, or public policy invalidation under this article, or the defense in Section 2B-
118; and
(ii) CaIUlot alter the limitations in Section 2B-716.
Notes:
1. Subsections (b) and (c) adopt approaches to over-lapping covernge among articles of
the D.C.C. The rules allow each article to apply to its own subject matter. TIle exception in
subsection (b) retains the approach to allocating coverage between Article 2 (or 2A) and Article 2B
which gives coverage of computer information embedded in goods to Article 2 (or 2A) except with
respect to the circumstances described in subsection (b), and gives coverage of copies and
documentation relating to computer information to Article 2B.
2. Subsection (d) adopts the principle discussed in notes to the prior draft, applying a
predominant purpose to ··mixed transactions" where the non-Article 2B subject matter is not within
another article of the code. TIlis would apply, for example, to a transaction involving computer
information and services, or involving computer information and print information.
3. Subsection (e) simplifies and clarifies the prior draft with respect to tbe ability of
parties to opt into or out of Article 2B. It follows a principle of contract choice, subject to relatively
limited exceptions intended to protect specific interests. Among the limitations is the rule that the
agreement cannot alter the rule relating to conflicts with Article 9 as stated in subsection (c)(1).
Subsection (e)(1) deals with opt in agreements and clarifies that this agreement cannot
alter the effect of otherwise applicable consumer protection rules. Subsection (e)(1) provides in
effect that the parties cannot opt into Article 2B in a mass market transaction involving a purchase
of information in print form. Within the D.C.e., the term "purchase" includes all forms of voluntary
transfers. The limitation applies only \vith respect to mass-market transactions and, thus, would not
preclude parties to a commercial agreement that does not occur in a retail market from electing to be
governed by Article 2B.
Subsection (e)(2) deals with agreements to opt out of Article 2B. Here, in agreeing to
opt out of Article 2B, the parties in effect agree to place themselves under a body of law developed
in common law or another D.C.e. article, each of which provides its own integrated set of rules
applicable to particular transactions. That being true, the provisions of that other law supplant
Article 2B rules with their own approach to fairness and other issues. TIlCre are two primary
exceptions. The first concerns mass-market transactions where it seems appropriate to preclude
alteration of fundamental protections in light of the nature of the agreement that is likely in a retail
market. The second concerns the limitations on electronic self-help.
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(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any te nn thereofmay be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, pwpose and effect to aid the court in making the detennination.
Uniform Law Source: Section 2-302.
Definitional Cross References:
"Contraet": Section 1-201. "Court": Section 2B-I02. "Term": Section 1-201.
Reporter's Note:
1. Scope ofthe Section. This section adopts the Article 2 doctrine that allows courts to invalidate
unconscionable contracts or tenDS. The use of the word "term," rather than "clause," is stylistic only with no
substantive change intended.
2. Bask Policy and Effect. This section allows courts to rule directly on the unconscionability of
the contract or a particular term therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability. The basic test
is whether, in light ofthe general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,
the terms involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract. Subsection (b) makes it clear that it is proper for the court to hear evidence on these
questions. The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of
allocation ofrisks because ofsuperior bargaining power.
3. Electronic commerce. While this article confums the enforceability of automated contracting
practices involving "electronic agents," in some cases automation may produce unexpected results because oferrors
in programs, problems in communication, or other unforeseen circumstances. When this occurs, common law
concepts of mistake may apply, as may the provisions of Section 28-118 and Section 2B-204. In addition,
unconscionability doctrine may apply to invalidate a term caused by breakdowns in the automated contracting
processes.
. 4. Remedy. The court, in its discretion, may refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it is
permeated by the unconscionability, or it may strike any single term or group of tenDS which are so tainted or
which are contrary to the essential pwpose ofthe agreement, or it may simply limit unconscionable clauses so as to
avoid unconscionable results.
S. Decision ofthe court. Unconscionability is a decision to be made by the comt. The commercial
evidence allowed under subsection (b) is for the court's consideration, not the jury's. Only the terms of the
agreement which result from the court's action on these matters are to be submitted to the general triers of fact for
resolution ofa matter in dispute.
SECI10N 2B-ll1. MANIFESTING ASSENT.
(a) A person or electronic agent manifests assent to a record or tenn L'l a record ifthe
person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record, term or a
copy of it, or ifthe electronic agent, after having had an opportunity to review:
(1) authenticates the record or term;
(2) in the case ofthe conduct or statements ofa person, the person intends to
engage in the conduct or make the statement and has reason to know that the other party may
infer from the conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or tenn; or
A-29
1 (3) in the case of operations ofan electronic agent, the electronic agent engages in
2 operations that the circumstances clearly indicate constitute acceptance.
3 (b) If this article or other law requires assent to a specific term, a pef5Ol\-"*el«~-enie,
4 ageftt does Ret manifest aSSeRt to that tenD 'lmtess it Baa aft El~fJaf1\Hlity tEl re....ie'H the tenD aua tl:le
5 manifestation ofassent mu~ relates- specifically.to the tenn.
J
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7 showing that a procedure existed by which a person or an electronic agent must have engaged in
6 (c) Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be proved in any manner, including a
J
8 the conduct or operations in order to obtain, or to proceed with use ofthe information or
9 informational rights. Proofofassent depends on the circumstances. Proofof compliance with
10 subsection (a)(2) is sufficient if there is conduct~t assents and subsequent conduct that
11 electronically reaffirms assent.
12 Uniform Law Source: Restatement (Second) ofContraets § 19.
13 Definitional Cross References.
14 "Authenticate". Section 2B-I02. "Electronic agent". Section 2B-I02. "Information". Section 2B-I02.
15 "Informational Rights": Section 2B-102. "Record". Section 2B-I02. '1'erm". Section 1-201.
16 Reporter's Notes:
17 1. Scope and Purpose. This section defmes "manifestation of assent." "Manifesting assent" has
18 several roles in contract law. The two primaJy roles treat manifested assent as 1) a way by which a party indicates
1 9 agreement to a binding contract, and 2) a standard to determine when a party adopts the terms of a record as the
2 0 terms of the contract. Often, the same conduct both adopts the terms of a record and constitutes agreement to the
21 relationship. In addition to these two primary roles, in some cases, this article requires agreement or assent to a
22 term to establish the enforceability ofthe term.
2 3 2. Source and General Theme. "Manifesting assent" as a term comes from the Restatement
24 (Second) 0/Contracts § 19. This section corresponds substantively to the Restlltement. While the concepts that
25 underlie the Restatement on this point are present throughout U.S. law, the concept is more fully explicated here
2 6 than in case law and codification lends itself to uniformity in terminology and application.
2 7 Manifesting assent does not require a signature, any specific type of language or conduct. It can
2 8 be shown by an appropriate authentication, by conduct including use or other performance with respect to the
2 9 subject matter, or by words. In electronic commerce, it especially important to clarify the conditions under which
3 0 conduct may establish contractual relationships and to expressly recognize the diverse alternatives that exist.
31 3. Three analyses. Determining whether a person manifested assent to a record under this article
32 entails analysis of three issues:
33 • fim, the person must have had knowledge of the record or term or an opportunity to review it
34 Opportunity to review requires that the record be available in a manner that ought to call it to the
35 attention ofan ordinaly reasonable person. Section 2B-112.
36 • Second. assuming an opportunity to review, the person must authenticate the record or term, orally
37 express assent, or engage in conduct with reason to know that in the circumstances 'the conduct
38 indicates assent Restatement (Second) o/Contracts § 19. Authenticating a record requires executing
3 9 or adopting a symbol or processing the record with intent to authenticate. Section 2B-I02. Conduct
40 manifests assent ifthe party acted with knowledge or reason to know that this would infer assent.
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• Third. the conduct or authentication must be attributable to the person to be botmd. General agency
law and Section 28-116 provictc standards for attribution.
4. A.ssent by Authentication. Under current law, a person indicates assent to a record or tenn by
signing the record or term. In this article. "authentication" replaces "signature", but the concept remains the same.
Signing a record containing contract terms in a setting that entails the fonnation of an agreement ordinarily
indicates the intent of the signing party to show assent to the terms or, at least, that a reason to know the act of
signing or authenticating can be inferred as an expression of assent to the contract and terms. In most cases, as
tmder current law on signatures, no question exist about the meaning ofa signature or authentication or the context
will clearly indicate the appropriate inference. In the few cases in which doubt exists, the authentication must be
made with intent to adopt or agree to the record. Section 2B-119 states a presumption generally true tmder prior
law on signatures: unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary, an authentication encompasses an intent to
identify the party, accept or adopt the record and its terms, and establish the integrity ofthe record's contents. The
intent pertains to the person to be botmd, not to the person receiving the authenticated record and confirming that
the authentication is that ofthe other party. See notes to Section 28-102(4).
5. Assent by Conduct or Words. Assent also occurs if a party acts (or fails to act), or makes a
statement, having reason to know these will be inferred as assent by the other party. Determining when this occurs
entails reference to the circumstances. The issue docs not involve proof of subjective intent, knowledge. or
pwpose. but objective characteristics of assent, including whether there was an act or a failure to act voluntarily
engaged in with reason to know the inference ofassent that would be drawn. Assent docs not requiIe that the party
have an ability to negotiate or alter terms. However, the person's conduct or failure to act must be voluntaJy. This
is satisfied if the alternative ofrefusing the contract existed even ifrefusal would leave no alternative source for the
refused deal. .
Of course, actual knowledge that the inference will be drawn from. particular conduct suffices.
More generally, "reason to know" can be indicated by one or more of the following: the nature of the conduct;
whether the context, including any language on a package, a container or in a record, indicates what actions
indicate assent; whether the actor could decline to engage in the conduct and return the information; what
infonnation was communicated to the actor before the conduct occurred; whether the conduct resulted in access to
and usc of information that was offered subject to contract terms; what are the ordiDaJy expectations of other
persons in similar contexts; what are the standards and practices of the business, trade or industry; or other
relevant factors. As in the Restatement. failure to act constitutes assent if the party that fails to act has reason to
know this win create an inference ofassent
No particular type of conduct or formality is required The section recognizes the wide range of
behavior and interactions that in modern commerce establish a contractual relationship between parties and the
terms of that relationship. However, subsection (c) makes clear that if the assenting party has an opportunity to
confirm or deny assent before proceeding to obtain or usc the information, the confirmation establishes assent. This
sets out one method ofmeeting the criteria of subsection (a)(2). In many cases. of course, a single indication of
assent by an electronic or other act. such as by opening a container or commencing to usc information, suffices if it
occurs under circumstances giving the actor reason to know that this signifies assent On the other hand, an act
that does not bear a relationship to a contract or a record would fail under the general standard. Similarly, acts
that occur in context ofa mutual express reservation ofthe right to defer agreement do not assent to a contract that
neither party intended
lUustration 1: The registration screen for NY Online prominently states: "Please read the
license. It contains important terms about your usc and our obligations with respect to the
information. Click here to review the License. If you agree to the license. indicate this by
clicking the "I agree" button. Ifyou do not agree to the license. click the "I decline" button."The
on-screen buttons are clearly identified The underlined text is a hypertext link which, if selected,
promptly displays the license. A party thal indicates "I agree" manifests assent to the license
and adopts the terms ofthe license
lUustradon 2: The first screen of an on-line stock-quotc service requires that the potential
licensee enter a name. address and credit card number. After entering the information and
striking the "enter" key, the licensee has access to the data and receives a monthly bill In the
center of the screen amid other language in small print. is the statement: "Terms and conditions
ofservice: disclaimers" indicating a hyperlink to the terms. The customer's attention is not called
to this sentence nor is the customer asked to react to it Even though entering name and
identifICation, coupled with using the service, assents to a contract, there is no assent to the
A- 31
1 "terms ofsen·ice" and disclaimer since there is no act indicating assent to the record containing
2 the terms. A court would detennine the contract terms on other grounds. including the default
3 rules ofthis article and usage oftrade.
4 6. Objective standard. Manifesting assent requires that. from all the facts known to it, a
5 reasonable person has reason to know that particular conduct will indicate that the actor assents to the record.
6 Actions objectively indicating assent are effective even though the actor may subjectively intend otherwise. This
7 follows traditional contract law doctrine of "objective" assent This concept is especially important in electronic
8 commerce where many transactions do not involve direct contact between individuals. InfoIUlation providers and
9 licensees must rely on actions confuming the existence of a contract. and the acceptance of contract tCIUlS.
10 Doctrines of mistake, supplemented by Section 2B-1l8, as well as doctrines invalidating the effects of fraud and
11 duress apply in appropriate cases.
12 7. Electronic Agents. Assent may occur through automated systems. In electronic commerce, there
13 is rapidly increasing use ofcomputer programs (described as "bots" or "intelligent agentsj programmed to search
14 for (on behalf of a potential purchaser) or make available (on behalf of a potential licensor) particular types of
15 information under set contractual terms or alternatives. Either or both parties may use electronic agents. The
1 6 reduced transaction costs are significant and the benefits that come from a technology that enables broad
1 7 comparative shopping and electronic shopping on terms set by the consumer are immense for consumers and for
18 providers of information. For an electronic agent, assent cannot be based on knowledge or reason to know. The
1 9 issue is whether the circumstances clearly indicate that the operations of the automated system indicate assent.
2 0 Safeguards exist under Article 2B through unconscionability doctrine and Section 2B-204.
21 8. Third Party Service Providers. Assent requires an act by the party to be bound or by its agents.
2 2 In many Internet situations, a party is able to reach a particular system because ofservices provided by a third party
2 3 communications or other service provider. In such cases, the services provider typically does not intend to engage
2 4 in a contractual relationship with the provider of the infonnation. While the "customer" activity may constitute
25 assent to terms, they do not bind the service provider since the service provider's actions are' in the nature of
26 transmissions and miling information access available by the user of the service, not assent to a contractual
27 relationship.
2 8 This article is clear that service providers - providers of online services, network access, or the
2 9 operation of facilities thereof - do not manifest assent to a contractual relationship from their provision of such
30 services, including but not limited to transmission, routing, providing connections, linking or storage ofmaterial at
31 the request or initiation of a person other than the service provider. ~ for example, a telecommunications
32 company provided the routing for a user to reach a particular online location, the user of the service would
33 potentially manifest assent to an agn:ement or record at that location. The service provider who provided the
34 routing to such online location would not
35 Of course, in some on-line systems, the service party provider has direct contractual relationships
3 6 with the content providers or may desire access to and use of the information on its own behalfand therefor assent
37 to terms in order to obtain access. In the absence of these circumstances, however, the mere fact that the third-
3 8 party service provider enables the customer to reach the information site does not constitute assent to the teIms at
3 9 that site.
4 0 9. Other Means ofAssent. Manifestation of assent to a record is not the only way in which parties
4 1 define their bargain. This article does not alter recognition of other methods ofagreement For example, a product
42 description can become part ofan agreement without manifestation of assent to a record repeating the description;
43 the product description can defme the bargain itselL Thus, a party that markets a database ofnames of consumer
44 attorneys can rely on the fact that the product need only contain consumer attorneys because this is the basic
45 bargain it is proposing; the provider is not required to seek manifest assent to a record stating that element of the
4 6 deal. Similarly, the licensee may rely on the fact that the database must pertain to consmner lawyers, not other
47 lawyers. The nature of the product defines the bargain if the party makes the purchase on that basis. If a product
4 8 is clearly identified on the package or in representations to the licensee as being for consumer use only, the tenns
4 9 are effective without requiring language in a record restating the description or conduct assenting to that record. Of
50 course, if the nature of the product is not obvious and there is no assent to a record defining that nature or other
51 agreement to it, the conditions may not become part of the agn:ement
52 In many cases, copyright or other intellectual property notices or restrictions restrict use of a
53 product, regardless of 'Q.ilether there is assent under this section. For example, common practice in video rentals
54 places a notice on screen of the limitations imposed on the customer's use of the video under applicable copyright
55 and criminal law, such as by precluding commercial public performances. The enforceability of such notices does
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1 not depend on compliance with this section.
2 10. Authority to Act. The person manifesting assent must be one that can bind the party seeking the
3 benefits or being charged with the obligationSor restrictions of the agreement. Ifa party proposing a record desires
4 to bind the other party, it must establish that the person that acted had authority to do so or, at least. that the entity
5 allegedly represented by that person accepted the benefits of the contract or othetWise ratified the individual's
6 actions. Concepts ofapparent authority may apply. If the person who manifested assent did not have authority and
7 the conduct was not ratified or otherwise adopted. there may be no license. If this is the case, use ofthe infonnation
8 may infringe a copyright.
9 There must be a connection between the individual who had the opportunity to review and the
1 0 one whose acts constitute assent Of course; a party with authority can delegate that authority to another. Thus, a
11 CEO may implicitly authorize her secretary to agree to a license when the CEO instIUets the secretary to sign up
12 for legal materials online or to install a newly acquired program that is subject to a screen license.
13 Questions of this sort arise under agency law as augmented in this article. In appropriate cases,
14 Article 2B rules regarding attribution playa role in resolving whether the ultimate party is bound to the contract
15 terms. Section 2B-116 deals with when. in an electronic environment. a party is bound to records purporting to
16 have come from that party. This article leaves to other law questions ofagency law. Section 1-103.
1 7 11. Assent to particular terms. The section distinguishes assent to a record and. if required by other
1 8 provisions of this article, assent to particular terms. Assent to a record involves conduct. expressions or an
1 9 authentication with respect to a record as a whole, while assent to a particular term, if required. encompasses acts
20 that relate to that particular tenn. One act, howevCr, may assent to both the record and the tenn only if the
21 circumstances, including the language ofthe record, clearly indicate to the party that doing the act is assent also to
22 the particular term.
23 12. ProofofTerms. A party that relies on the tenns of linked text or other electronic records must
24 prove the content of the text at the time of the licensee's assent. One way ofdoing so is to retain records of content
2 5 at all periods oftime or maintain a record ofchanges and their timing. Issues ofproofare matters of evidence law.
26
27 SECTION 2B-112. OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW; RETURN•
28 (a) A person er eleetreaie ageat has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the
29 record or term is made available in a manner that_:(l) in the ease era pefSeB, ought to call it to
30 the attention ofa reasonable person and permit review:.
31 (b) ;-eF{~ the ease efeAn electronic agent has an 0Im0rtunits to review a record or
32 term only ifthe record or ierm is made available in manner that ;-would enable a reasonably
33 configured electronic agent to react to the record or tenn.
35 review only after a person becomes obligated to payor begins its performance, the person has anr
34 (£b) Bxeert as ethetwise pl'&Vided iB 5Heseetiea (6), ilfa record or term is available for
.,.
t
r
r
r
36 opportunity to review only if the person has a right to a return if~t5 reject!..ieB-e.f.the terms
37 ofthe record. The right to a return may arise by law HHder Seetien 2B 2gg or 2B 617, by
38 agreement er etherwise. However,~ right to a return is not required for an opportunity to
A-33
2 (2) the record provides the particulars ofperformance 13l:lfSHQat to agt=eefHeat
1 (1) the record -ts-a-proposes a al~·modification ofy-a-contract;
J
J
3 under Section 2B-30S; or
4 (3) in a case that does not involve~mass=-market license.. bat is gO'lf'ersea
5 br-Seet~.()7;-aaG-the parties at the time ofcontracting had reason to know that ~the-i'ecord
6 or terms would Det-be presented at or prior to the initial use or access to the information. -:
7 Definitional Cross References:
8 "Contract". Section 2B-I02. "Electronic agent". Section 2B-I02. "Ucense": Section 2B-I02. "Record". Section
9 2B-I02. "Return": Scction2B-102. wrenn". Section 1-201.
10 Reporter's Notes:
11 1. Scope ofSection. This section gives content to the concept of "opportunity to review." An
12 "opportunity to review" is a precondition to manifesting assent to a record. Consistent with general contract law,
13 the concept requires an opportunity to review the record, not that the record actually be read.
14 2. General Cona!pL An opportunity to review in the case of a person requires that the record be
15 made available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and pcnnit review. This is
1 6 met if the person actually knows or has reason to know that the record or tenn exists and the circumstances permit
17 review. Of course, an opportunity to review a copy of the record or term suffices if the actual record or tenn is the
18 same as that made available for review.
19 a. Declining to Use the Opportunity to Review. An opportunity to review may exist even
2 0 though the person foregoes or ignores the opportunity. Contract terms presented in an over the counter transaction
21 or made available in a binder as required for some transactions under fcdcrallaw create an opportunity to review
22 even if the party docs not use that opportunity. This is not changed because the party desires to complete the
23 transaction rapidly, or is under external pressure to do so, or because the party has other demands on its attention,
2 4 unless one party intentionally manipulates the circumstances to ~duce the other party not to review the record
25 b. Permits Review. How a-record is made available for review differs for electronic and
26 paper records. In both settings, however, a record is not available for review ifaccess to it is so timc-consuming or
27 cumbersome as to effectively preclude review. It must be presented in such a way as to reasonably pcnnit review.
2 8 In an electronic system, a record that is promptly accessible through an electronic link ordinarily qualifies. Actions
2 9 that comply with federal or other applicable consumer laws that require making contract terms available or provide
3 0 standards for doing so, satisfy this section.
31 3. Retum. In modem commcrcc, there arc circumstances in which the terms of a record arc not
32 available until after there i .. a commitment to the transaction. This is often true in mail order transactions,
33 software contracts, insurance contracts, airline ticket purchases, and other common transactions. If the record is
34 available only after that commitment, there is no opportunity to review unless the party can return the product (or
35 in the case .of a vendor that refuses the other party's terms, recover the product) and receive reimbursement of any
3 6 payments if it declines the terms of the record. This return right, which docs not exist in current law absent
37 agreement, creates important protection for the party asked to assent to terms in these circumstances. In cases
3 8 governed by Section 2B-208, there is a statutory right to a return.
3 9 This right is also intended to provide a strong incentive for a provider of information to make the
4 0 terms of the license available up-front if commercially practicable. Doing so avoids the obligations regarding
4 1 return stated in this article, both in this section and in Section 2B-208. In addition to that incentive, deferring
4 2 when license terms arc presented may have implications on the application of other doctrines where the choice to
4 3 do so is not grounded in commercial judgment For example, the doctrine of unconscionability has a procedural
4 4 fairness aspect which might be affected by the method ofpresenting terms where the terms arc oppressive.
4 5 The return right exists only for the first U5Cr. Subsequent parties arc bound by the first contract.
46 Failure to provide an opportunity or a right to a return in cases of records presented after the
4 7 initial commitment to the transaction, does not invalidate the overall agreement, but means that the terms of the
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1 record have not been assented to by the party to which it was presented. The tenns of the agreement must then be
2 discerned by consideration of all the ~ccs. including the general expectations of the parties, applicable
3 usage of trade and course of dealing, and the informational property rights. if any, involved in the transaction. In
4 such cases, courts should be careful to avoid UDwananted forfeiture or lDljust enrichment in tenus of the conditions
5 or terms of the agreement. An agreement whose payment and other agreed terms reflect a right to use solely for
6 consumer ptupOscs can not be transformed into an unlimited right of commercial use by a failure of assent to the
7 terms ofa record.
8 4. ModifICations and Layered Contracting. The return provisions do not apply to or alter law on
9 modification ofan agreement or the law regarding the agreed right ofa party to specify particulars ofperformance.
10 The prdVisions also do not apply in the commercial context of Section 2B-207(a)(2) where parties begin
11 performance in the expectation that a record containing the contract terms will be presented and adopted later.
12
13 [B. Electronic Contracts: Generally]
14
15 SECTION 2B-113. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND
r
r
16 AUTHENTICATIONS.
1 7 (a) A record or authentication may not be denied legal effect solely because it is in
18 electronic form.
22 authentication or record acccmtable to it. ]
21 (c) In any transaction. a person may establish requirements regarding the tvpe of
20 sent Iece!ved. or othern-ise processed by electronic means or in electronic fonn.
23 Definitional Cross References:
2 4 "Authentication". Section 2B-l02. "Electronic". Section 2B-I02. "Record." Section 2B-I02.
25 Reporter's Notes:
2 6 1. General Concept. This section. states a fundamental principle of electronic commerce that
27 frames the remaining provisions of this article on electronic commerce. The fact that a message or record is
2 8 electronic docs not alter or reduce its legal impact. Of course, this principle applies only to transaction within
2 9 Article 2B. It does not apply to payment orders, documenu oftitle, or similar applications ofelectronic commerce.
30 2. Re1lltion to Evidence Issues. This section only states the affirmative principle that the electronic
31 nature of a record docs not allow denying legal validity to it This docs not address the difficulties of proof that
32 may exist, or the resolution ofquestions about to whom the record or authentication can be attributed.
33
34 SECTION 2B-114. COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS OF ATTRIBUTION
[(b) This article does not require that a record or an authentication be generated. stored.19
r
r
r
r
r
r
,.
r
r
35 PROCEDURE. The commercial reasonableness ofan attribution procedure is determined by the
36 court. In making this determination, the following rules apply:
37 (1) An attribution procedure established by statute or regulation is commercially
r
38 reasonable for transactions within the coverage of the statute or regulation.
r
r
A- 35
2 detennined in light ofthe purposes of the procedure and the commercial circcmstances at the time
1 (2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (1), commercial reasonableness is
J
J
3 the parties agree to or adopt the procedure.
4 (3) A commercially reasonable attnbution procedure may use any security device
5 or method that is reasonable under the circumstances.
6 Uniform Law Source: Article 4A-201; 202.
7 Defmitional Cross References:
8 "Attribution procedure": Section 2B-I02. "Court": Section 2B-I02.
9 Reporter's Note:
10 1. Scope ofthe Section. This section provides standards for determining if an attribution procedure
11 is commercially reasonable.
12 2. Effict ofa Commercially Reasonable Procedure. In this article, an attnbution procedure receives
13 enhanced legal effect only if it is commercially reasonable. Conforming to a commercially reasonable attnbution
14 procedure for authentication results in authentication as a matter of law. Section 2B-119. Complying with a
15 commercially reasonable procedure for identifying a party or detecting errors or changes creates a rebuttable
16 presumption of identity and the absence oferrors or changes in the record. Sections 2B-116; 2B-117. On the other
1 7 hand, failure to use a commercially reasonable attribution procedure does not preclude a finding that authentication
18 occurred or of the identity and integrity of the sender and the record itself. It leaves the parties with general
1 9 questions ofproof.
20 3. Nature ofan A.ttribution Procedure. This article does not dictate what constitutes an attribution
21 procedure. Evolving technology and commercial practice make it impractical to predict future developments and
22 unwise to preclude developments by a narrow statutory mandate. This article relies primarily on the parties to
2 3 select an appropriate procedure.
24 In most cases, an attribution procedure is established by agreement or otherwise adopted by both
2 5 parties. A procedure of which one party is not aware does not qualify. On the other hand, parties dealing for the
2 6 first time may adopt a procedure for authentication ofmessages. These requirements assure an important element
2 7 ofassent as a predicate for the creation ofprocedures that may affect substantive rights.
28 In some cases, statutes or regulations define a particular methodology as an appropriate
2 9 procedure. These laws, such as digital signature statutes, establish by law a procedure that complies with the
30 concept of an attribution procedure for purposes of this article. Under subsection (I), procedures established by
31 statute or regulation are per sc commercially reasonable within the scope oftheir coverage.
32 4. Commercially Reasonable. The general requirement of commercial reasonableness is that the
33 procedure be a commercially rea.c:onable method of identifying the party as compared to others, a commercially
3 4 reasonable method of detecting or preventing changes, or a commercially reasonable method of achieving any
3 5 other purpose relevant to this article and to which the procedure is addressed. This does not require state of the art
3 6 procedures. Rather, the requirement that a procedure be commercially reasonable in order to attain enhanced legal
37 recognition provides an incentive that encourages good practices and allows a court to provide a direct buffer
38 against over-reaching. It protects parties who lack: knowledge of technology and use procedures established by
3 9 others because if the procedure is found to be not commercially reasonable, it creates no presumption ofthe party's
4 0 identity.
41 What is a commercially reasonable procedure takes into account the choices of the parties and the
4 2 cost relative to value of the transactions. How one gauges commercial reasonableness depends on a variety of
43 factors, including the agreement, the choices of the parties, the then CWlCDt technology, the types of transactions
4 4 affected by the procedure, sophistication of the parties, volume of similar transactions engaged in, availability of
4 5 feasible alternatives, cost and difficulty of utilizing alternative procedures, and procedures in general use for
46 similar types of transactions. The concept is similar to that in Section 4A-202(c). The quality of the procedure
47 may reasonably be tailored to the particular transaction and the degree of risk: involved. Additionally, if a
4 8 procedure results from a fully negotiated agreement of the parties, it should receive deference in terms of its
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reasonableness applicable to their particular situations. This flows from the principle of assumed risk and that the
parties' agreement should ordinarily be enforced. The same principle may apply if the two parties, aware of the
risks of a particular procedure, nevertheless igree to use the procedure for a particular transaction. In effect, the
parties here have concluded that it is commercially reasonable in their context to accept the risks.
{SECTION 28-115. EFFECT OF REQUIRING COMMERCIALLY
UNREASONABLE ATIRlBUTION PROCEDURE.PROPOSED FOR DELETION
(a) Subject to subsection (b), between parties to an attribution procedure, a party that
conditions a transaction on feqaired use ofa commercially unreasonable attribution procedure is
liable for losses in the transaction for which the procedure was required caused by reasonable
reliance on that procedure.
(b) The recovery ofa party under subsection (a) is limited to losses in the nature of
reliance or restitution and does not include:
(1) loss ofexpected benefit;
(2) consequential damages;
(3) losses that could have been prevented by the exercise ofreasonable care by the
aggrieved party; or
(4) a loss the risk ofwhich was assumed by the aggrieved party.
(c) For purposes ofsubsection (a), a person does not require a commercially
unreasonable procedure ifthe person makes available a commercially reasonable alternative.}
Definitional Cross References:
"Attribution procedure": Section 2B-I02. "Consequential damages": Section 28-102. "Electronic": Section 2B-
102.
Reporter's Notes:
1. General Policy and ScOpL This section deals with cases whece one party Oicensor or licensee)
requires the other to use an attribution procedure that is not commercially reasonable and use of that procedure
causes a loss in a transaction between the parties either because ofundeteeted errors or because ofthird party fraud.
The section deals only with cases in which a party does in fact require use of the commercially umcasonable
procedure. This does not create a principle that loss is always placed on the party whose procedure is not
commercially reasonable. It deals with the more limited context whece one party demands use ofthe commercially
unreasonable procedure and prohibits alternatives.
The rule in this section is subject to Sections 2B-116 and 2B-117. Those sections establish
presumptions about electronic records subject to commercially reasonable procedures. A commercially
unreasonable procedure does not create those presmnptions, leaving the parties to general proof. In addition, if the
case is within this section. it may alter loss allocation.
A-37
1 2. Imposed as a OJndition. The loss allocation in this section requires two elements. The first is
2 that the commercially UIIJUSOI1able procedlltC be required as a precondition to entering the transaction. This
3 means more than that the procedure is merely made available. The party must insist on the particular procedure
4 and be in a position where no alternatives are available or allowed. A procedure negotiated or jointly selected by
5 the parties, selected by one from among alternatives that include a commercially reasonable option, or a mutually
6 designed procedure, does not fall within this section. Responsibility for loss in such cases and in cases where the
7 procedure allows a fraud in an unrelated transaction lies outside this article.
8 3. Reasonable Reliance in a Covered Transaction. The second element of allocating loss under
9 this section is that the loss result from reasonable reliance on the required procedure in a transaction to which the
1 0 requi.renient applies. The reliance must be reasonable. Thus. for example, a party that relies on an ordinary E-
II mail order for a multi-million dollar order may not be acting in reasonable reliance given the size of the
12 transaction. What constitutes reasonable reliance depends on the circumstances, including consideration of the
13 nature of the procedure. the size of the transaction involved, and the existence or non-existence of relevant
14 safeguards or alternatives.
15 The loss must occur in a transaction to which the requirement applies. This is a contract statute
1 6 that does not attempt to allocate all losses caused by fraudulent behavior. This section allocates loss within affected
1 7 transactions. For example, if the unreasonable attribution procedure requires use ofa bank account number and a
18 third party invades the system and misappropriates the number, the party requiring use of such a number is not
1 9 responsible for losses caused in unrelated transactions because the thiefobtained the number. This section does not
20 address the difficult problem of liability for misuse of important identifiers fraudulently to obtain goods and
21 services from other vendors. The answers to those issues lie in tort law, criminal law, and regulation
2 2 4. Party Responsible. The person that required the procedure is responsible for the loss. In some
2 3 cases the person imposing the requirement is the licensor and in other cases the licensee. The rule applies in either
2 4 case. The section does not necessarily create an affirmative right of recovery. In some cases, it merely bars the
2 5 responsible party from recovering from the other person. Thus, pursuant to a commercially unreasonable
2 6 attribution procedure a licensor might deliver information to a third party who used the inadequacies of the
27 procedure to impersonate the named licensee. If the licensor had required the procedure, this section allows the
2 8 licensee to resist any claim by the licensor to charge the licensee for the contract price. It is also likely in such case
2 9 that, not being entitled to the presumption stated in Section 2B-116, the licensor will be unable to show that the
3 0 order is attributable to the licensee. On the other hand, ifthe licensee had required the procedure, the licensor may
31 recover against the licensee for the losses in the nature ofreliance.
32 S. Type ofLoss, The loss must come from use ofthe procedure. Thus, ifan attribution procedure is
3 3 unreasonable, but the party to whom it attributes a message did actually engage in the transaction and suffered loss
34 due to a breach of contract, this section does not apply. The losses addressed here are from misattribution ofwho
35 sent a message or from tampering with the content, not losses caused by ordinary breach ofcontract.
3 6 The losses are limited to reliance and restitution recovery. This restriction is spelled out in
37 subsection (b). Subsection (b)(3) follows the general principle that a party cannot recover for losses that could have
38 been avoided. This mitigation principle corresponds to general common law and the restatement ofthe concept in
3 9 Section 2B-707. Subsection (b)(4) recognizes the concept ofassumption ofrisk. Application ofthat general equity
4 0 concept in the circumstances covered in this section, of course, must account for the fact that one party exercised
4 1 strong leverage to impose an unreasonable procedure on the other. An assumption of risk cannot be found merely
42 in acquiescing to this requirement
43 . 6. OIustrations.. The following suggest some applications ofthis section.
44 a. False Identity Cases: No Contract. Often, if a loss is suffered because a third party
4 5 fraudulently used an attribution identifier to order information, this section produces results that are parallel to the
46 results that could be inferred under other attribution rules ofthis article.
47 Illustration 1. LR (vendor) required and LE agreed to a procedure for identifying LE in placing orders
48 with LR. Thief, purporting to be LE, obtains a $10,000 electronic encyclopedia from LR. LR seeks the
4 9 license fee from LE. Under the general attribution sections, if the procedure is not commercially
50 reasonable, there is no presumption that the sender was LE. Since LE was not the sender, it has no
51 liability. The required attribution procedure caused a loss, but LR is responsible for that loss. It cannot
52 shift that loss to LE.
53 In some false identity cases, the party demanding the use of the attribution procedure may be responsible for
5 4 reliance losses in transactions to which the requirement applied.
55 Illustration 2. LE (purchaser) requires LR to use a procedure under which LE identifies itself when
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29 AUTHENTICATION, MESSAGE, RECORD,OR PERFORMANCE IS ATTRIBUTED;
30 RELIANCE LOSSES. [see proposed re,isionJ
32 person if:
1 placing orders with LR. Tbiefuses the procedure fraudulendy to obtain a $10,000 software system from
2 LR posing as LE. Since LE rcquiIqJ use of the procedure and it was commercially unreasonable, the loss
3 suffered may be recovered from LE. The amount of loss is measured by reliance, not lost profit The
4 recovCty is the cost (not license price) ofthe software shipped plus related expenses.
5 b. True Contract: Errors in Performance. If an actual contract exists and the error or fraud
6 relates to perfonnance, contract remedies will often provide the primary recovCty and, under the principle that
7 precludes double recovCty, the reliance loss allocation in this section does not create affirmative recovery.
8 IOustration 3. LR (ticeusor) and LE (licensee) agree to a $10,000 commercialliceuse. LR requires LE
9 to agree to a procedure for instructions as to where to traDsmit the software. LE pays the license fee. A
1 0 third party causes misdirection ofthe copy. LE demands its software. LR bears responsibility for reliance
11 or restitution loss. LE can recover the fee or enforce the unperformed contract.
12 Illustration 4. In Illustration 3, assume that LE did direct transmission of the software, but now denies
13 that it did so. If the procedure were reasonable, LR would have the advantage of a presumption of
14 attribution of the message. Since it was not, LR must prove that LE sent the message. If it can do so, it
15 can enforce the contract. LE suffered no loss due to the attribution procedure.
1 6 c. Errors in the Offer and Acceptance. Problems of garbled or otherwise mistaken offers and
1 7 acceptances are oflong-standing in commercial practice. This section allocates loss based on the reasonableness of
18 the procedure and independent ofarcane questions about what terms were accepted and when.
1 9 IUustration 5. LR (vendor) requires that LE use an unreasooable procedure for orders. LE agrees to the
2 0 procedure. It places an order for ten software widgets. Because the procedure is flawed, the message
21 arrives requesting 100. LR ships on that basis. LE desires to return the ninety excess widgets and not
22 pay. One could argue that no contract exists because ofmistake. Alternatively, a contract might be formed
2 3 on the offer as sent or as received. Case law support exists for each result. This section focuses on
2 4 reliance loss. Either LE or LR could be said to suffer reliance loss. Since LR required the procedure, it
2 5 bears responsibility for the loss and cannot demand the price for the ninety widgets unless LE decides to
2 6 retain them.
27
28 SECTION 28-116. DETERMINING TO WHICH PERSON AN ELECTRONIC
(a) An electronic authentication, message, record, or performance is attributed to a31
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33 (1) it was in fact the act ofthat person or the person's electronic agent; or
34 (2) subjeet ~e s&9SeetieB~, the person receiving it in accordance with a
35 connnercially reasonable attribution procedure for identifying a person, reasonably concluded that
r
36 it was the action ofthe other person or the person's electronic agent
3 7 (b) Attribution under subsection (a) (2) has the effect provided by the statute, regulation,
38 or agreement establishing the attribution procedure. If the statute, regulation, or agreement do es
r
39 not specify a different effect, attnoution under subsection (a)(2) creates a presmnption that the
r
r
r A-39
1 authentication, message, record, or performance was that ofthe person to which it is attributed -
2 [*Ju:op8Setl filterlta#,"e: Jllaees the hlH'C!ea efestablishiag oa the JlefSoa to ""iRish the
4 atitheflotisatioa, fHessage, Reere, or perfunnaBee].
5 (c) Ifsubsection (b) applies and ,the person to which the authentication, message, record,
6 or performance was originally attributed is found te-be-not responsible in fact, that person is
7 nevertheless liable for losses in the nature of r~flEe-thecost of performance of the other party if
8 the losses occur because:
9 (1) the person found not otherwise responsible failed to exercise reasonable care;
10 (2) the other party reasonably relied on the beliefthat the person found not
11 otherwise responsible was the source ofthe electronic authentication, message, record, or
12 performance; and
13 (3) the use of tile attribution procedure creating ae(leS5-fl\ateri~tel'
14 pFegrams, or the 1i1~e a:eateEl the appearance that it came from the~found not
15 otherwise responsible aBEl-resulted from acts ofa third person that obtained materials enabling it
16 to use the procedure that oetainee them from a source under the control ofthe-~
18 Uniform Law Source: 4A-202; 4A-20S; UNCITRAL Model Law.
1 9 Definitional Cross Refertllces.
20 "Access materials": Section 2B-I02. "AttnDution procedure: Section 2B-I02. "Computer program": Section 2B-
21 102. "Electronic": Section 28-102. "Electronic agent". Section 2B-I02. "Electronic message": Section 28-102.
22 "Good faith": Section 2B-102. "Party": Section 1-201. "Person": Section 1·201. "Presumption": Section 1·201.
23 "Record": Section 28-102.
24 Reporter's Notes:
25 1. Scope oj the Section. This section deals with when an authentication, message, record or
26 perfonnance is attributed to a particular person. AttnDution to a person means that the authentication, message,
27 record, or performance is treated in law as having come from that person. The section enables electronic
2 8 commerce in an open envin."DIIlent, while stating reasonable standards to allocate risk. The section does not apply
2 9 to funds transfers, bank accounts, credit card liability, or other subject matter outside Article 28. It deals with an
3 0 issue independent of whether the record has been authenticated. Authentication requires an act and an appropriate
31 intent. Attribution deals with determining to whom the act is charged.
32 2. Act oJtllL Person or Electronic Agent. Subsection (a)(I) makes a person responsible if it or its
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1 agent aetually created the authentication, message, or record, or provided the performance. Common law agency
2 rules govern for human agents. In addition, h,Pwcver, a person is responsible for the actions of its electronic agent
3 Section 2B-I02; 2B-I16(a)(I). Having decided to use an automated system, the person is responsible for its
4 operations. The rules ofsubsection (a)(I) parallel the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 13.
5 3. Use ofA.ttribution Procedure. In many cases in electronic commerce, proofof actual involvement
6 is not possible. Subsection (a)(2) makes an authentication, message, record, or performance attributable to a
7 person if there existed a commercially reasonable "attribution procedure" and the other party used the procedure,
8 reasonably concluding that the message came from the other person. "Attribution procedure" is a defined term,
9 referring to a procedure agreed to or adopted by the parties, or created by law, for the particular purpose of
1 0 attribution ofauthentication, messages, records, or performances.
11 This procedure yields the result in subsection (a)(2) only if the attnbution procedure is
12 commercially reasonable. Section 2B-114.
13 Unlike attnbution to a person under subsection (a)(I), however, the effect of attribution under
14 (a)(2) is detennined under subsection (b) which, in the absence ofother agreement, limits the effect to a [rebuttable
15 presumption] [shift of the burden of proof]. While giving legal relevance to a commercially reasonable attnbution
16 procedure creates benefits for electronic commerce, the uncertainties of modern commerce indicate that, as a
17 default rule, it is inappropriate to adopt an absolute rule that the person identified by the procedure is attnbuted
18 with its results for all purposes.
19 Subsection (b) recognizes that fact It provides that unless otherwise provided by agreement or by
20 other law or regulation, attribution through a commercially reasonable procedure creates a [rebuttable
21 presumption] [shift of the burden of proof] of the party's responsibility. Section 1-201(31). How this might be
22 rebutted in litigation, of course, depends on the circumstances. No general standard can be stated. However, since
23 this is a default rule, if the parties agree that following the procedure will have a different effect, that agreement
24 should be enforced. Similarly, ifanother statute or regulation provides for a different result, that law controls.
25 4. Reliance Losses. Subsection (c) deals with when the presumption in (b) is rebutted. If a
2 6 commercially reasonable procedure was used, but a third party actually sent the message, the relying party may
27 nevertheless recover reliance loss ifit proves that the loss was caused by the other party's negligence with reference
2 8 to the attnbution procedure and its use. What constitutes a lack of reasonable care depends on the circumstances,
2 9 including the nature of the risks involved and the sophistication of the party. A consumer with no experience in
30 attnbution methodology would be expected to take fewer precautions in the relatively small transactions in which
31 the consumer engages, than would a sophisticated company using the attnbution procedure in reference to high
32 value, large volume, or sensitive information transactions. In either case, the burden of proving a lack of
33 reasonable care by a party rests on the person asserting the right to recover under this subsection.
34 The loss allocation principle recognizes a form ofprotected relian ce where there was reliance on
35 an agreed or otherwise established and commercially ieasonable procedure. Since this is reliance-based liability, if
3 6 the message, performance or context indicates that the indicated source is incorrect or gives reason to doubt the
37 source, reliance may not be protected. This form of loss allocation adopts an intermediate position among the
38 other potentially available loss allocation theories. Unlike in credit card and funds transfer systems, one cannot
3 9 predict the relative nature of the sending and receiving parties, their economic strength, or technological
40 sophistication. Individuals with limited resources are as likely to be on either side of a transaction in electronic
41 commerce as are large corporations. Because of this, the rule creating a dollar cap for consumer risk for credit
42 cards and funds transfers is not viable in this open system, heterogeneous environment. This context requires a
43 more general structure because the problems will not routinely entail consumer protection or a licensor with better
44 ability to spread loss. .
45
46 SECTION 28-117. ATTRIBUTION PROCEDURE FOR DETECTION OF
47 CHANGES AND ERRORS: EFFECT OF USE.
49 record. or perfomlance.r
r
r
48 Ca) In this section. <"electronic record" means an electronic authentication. message,
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SECTION 2B-1I6. TO WHICH PERSON AN ELECTRONIC
AUTHENTICATION, MESSAGE, RECORD, OR PERFORMANCE IS
ATTRlBUTED; RELIANCE LOSSES.
(a) In this section, "electronic record" means an electronic authentication,
message, record, or performance.
(b) An electronic record is attributed to a person ifit was the act of that person or
its electronic agent, or if the person is otherwise bound by it under the law of agency.
The '»arty relying on attribution of an electronic record to another person has the burden
of establishing attribution.
(c) If an attribution procedure exists between the parties with respect to the
electronic record, the following rules apply: .
(I) The effect of compliance with an attribution procedure created by
other law or regulation is determined by that law or regulation.
(2) In all other cases, if the parties agree to, or otherwise adopt an
attribution procedure to verify the person from which an electronic record comes, the
record is attributable to the person identified by the procedure, if the party relying on that
attribution satisfies the burden of establishing that:
(i) the attribution procedure is commercially reasonable;
(ii) the party accepted or relied on the electronic record in good
faith and in compliance with the attribution procedure and any additional agreement with
or separate instructions of the other party; and
(iii) the attribution procedure indicated that the electronic record
was that of the person to which attribution is sought.
(3) If the electronic record is not binding on a person under subsection
(b) but is binding under subsection (c), that person nevertheless avoids attribution under
subsection (c) for the electronic record if the person satisfies the burden of establishing
that the electronic record was not caused directly or indirectly by a person:
(i) entrusted at any time with the right or duty to act for the person
with respect to such electronic records or attribution procedure;
(ii) who obtained access to transmitting facilities ofthe person; or
(iii) who obtained, from a source controlled by the person, infonnation
facilitating breach ofthe attribution procedure.
(d) The provisions of subsection (c) may not be varied by agreement in a
consumer transaction except in a manner that provides greater protection to the
consumer. In all other cases, the effect of an attribution procedure may be determined by
agreement if the attribution procedure is commercially reasonable.
(e) If an electronic record is not binding on a person under subsection (b) and is not
effective under subsection (c), the person identified as the source ofthe electronic record is
nevertheless liable for losses ofthe other party measured by the cost ofthat party's perfonnance
in reliance ifthe loss occurs because:
(I) the person identified as the source failed to exercise reasonable care;
(2) the other party exercised reasonable care and reasonably relied on the belief
that the person identified was the source ofthe electronic record because access materials,
computer programs or the like created the appearance that it canle from tllat person; and
(3) the appearance on which tile party relied resulted from acts ofa t1tird person
tllat obtained the capability to create that appearance from a source under tile control of tile
person identified as the source ofthe record..
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1 lUustration 2: Same facts as in Illustration I, except that Consumer did order 110 copies and merely
2 changed his mind. The conditions for application ofthis section are not met.
3 lUustration 3: Same as in Illustration I, but Jones' system before shipping sends a confumation, asking
4 Consumer to confinn an order of 110 copies. Consumer confirms. There was no "electronic error" since
5 the procedure reasonably allowed for correction of the error.
6 4. Non-consumer Transactions. This section does not alter common law in transactions that do not
7 involve consumers. The diversity of commercial transactions make a simple rule inappropriate because of the far
8 different patterns of risk and the greater ability of commercial parties to develop tailored solutions to this problem.
9 A court addressing electronic errors in these other contexts should apply general common law, including an
10 inquiry .about whether any contract was actually fonned. The existence of this remedy in this section for a
11 consumer does not indicate that other remedies under the law ofmistake are precluded.
12
13 SECTION 2B-119.PROOF OF AUTHENTICATIONjOPERATIONS OF
14 ELECTRONIC AGENT-GPERA-T.JQNS.
15 (a) A person that uses OpeliltKms of an electronic agent for are the authentication,
16 manifestation ofassent, or performance ofa person if the parseR \lsed the eleGkeflie ageR! fer·
17 sucll-fmrpose. A pafty-is bound by the operations of its-the electronic agent.. even ifno individual
18 was aware ofor reviewed the agent's operations aetioBs or their results.
19 (b) Subject to Section 2B-116, compliance with a commercially reasonable attribution
20 procedure for authenticating a record authenticates the record as a matter oflaw. Othep,'tise,
21 aAuthentication may be proven in any manner, including by showing that a party made use of
22 information or access whieh that could only have been available ifit engaged in conduct or
23 operations that authenticated the record or term.
24 (c) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, authentication is deemed to have been
2 5 done with the intent to establish:
28 term, or contract; and
27 (2) establish that person's adoption or acceptance ofthe authenticated record,
29 (3) confirm the content the integrity of the record or term as ofthe time ofthe
..
f
26 (I) establish a person's identity;
r
r
r
3 0 authentication.
31 Definitional Cross References.
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35 EFFECTIVENESS OF MESSAGE; ACKNOWLEDGING MESSAG~.
37 is effective when received even ifno individual is aware ofits receipt t
J
J
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and (c), an electronic record message
39 evokes an electronic message in response, a contract is fOImed:
3 8 (b) Ina tIeteRHiniftg ';';Rea a eaatfaet is [aImee, if an offer in an electronic message
1 "Atlribution procedure": Section 2B-I02. "Authenticate:" Section 2B-I02. "Contract". Section 1-201. "Electronic
2 agent". Section 2B-I02. "Information". S~ction 2B-I02. "Infmmational Rights": Section 2B-I02. "Record":
3 Section 2B-I02.
4 Reporter's Notes:
5 1. Scope of the Section. This section deals with authentication (subsections (b) and (c» and
6 electronic agent operations (subsection a).
7 2. Electronic Agents. Subsection (a) states the general principle that operations of an electronic
8 agent bind the party that used the agent for that pwpose. Section 2B-116(a)(I) states the analogous principle in
9 reference to attribution rules. Electronic agents arc automated systems that respond to or originate messages or
1 0 performances. They enable important savings in transactional costs in electronic commerce and this article
11 provides legal support sustaining their usc in commerce.
12 The concept embodies principles like those under ordinary agency law that the electronic agent
13 function within the scope of its intended purpose. In reference to human agents, this concept is often referred to in
14 terms of whether the human agent acted within the scope of its actual or apparent authority. Here, since the
15 concept deals with automation and the focus is more accW'ately placed on whether the agent was used for the
1 6 relevant purpose. Cases of fraud, manipulation and the like arc discussed in Section 2B-204.
17 3. ProofofAuthentication. In dealing with an authentication, two separable issues are (1) whether
18 the symbol or process was executed and intended as an authentication, and (2) to whom the authentication is
19 attributed. Under Subsection (b), compliance with an a commercially reasonable procedure for authentication
2 0 removes questions about whether an authentication was intended or occurred. It does not resolve attribution issues
21 under Section 2B-116. Subsection (b) deals with whether there was an authentication, while Section 2B-116
22 identifies who is responsible. Ordinarily, the two issues arc resolved in a single step. On whether an attnbution
23 procedure is commercially reasonable, see Section 2B-114.
2 4 Proof of authentication can occur in any manner. One of the mos t important involves showing
25 that a process existed that required an authentication in order to proceed in an automated system. To satisfy the
2 6 concept of authentication, however, it is not sufficient merely to show that some act was required to proceed. The
27 act must constitute an authentication (e.g., execution ofa relevant symbol).
2 8 4. Effect ofAuthentication. As with common law signatures, an authentication can be used with
2 9 several different intended effects. Section 28-102(1). . In the absence of contrary indications present in the
30 circumstances, the presumed intent encompasses all such effects. The contruy indications would be present if the
31 attnbution procedure was used solely for a single effect. Intention under this section must, as in other contexts, be
32 gauged by objective criteria.
33
34 SECTION 2B-120. ELECTRONIC MESSAGEI;: TIMING OF CONTRACT;
36
40 (I) when an acceptance is received; or
41 (2) if the response consists of furnishing or giving access to infoImation, when the
42 information or notice ofaccess is received or use is enabled, unless the originating message
J
J
43 required acceptance in a different manner. J
J
J
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1 contract. The fmt arises if one party agreed to the terms of the other. In that case, the terms of the accepted
2 record control subject to the limitations in Section 2B-207 and 2B-208. Agreement can be manifested in any
3 manner except that it cannot be found solely in the "acceptance" that contains a materially varying term. The
4 second is where the exchanged offer and acceptance materially conflict, but a contract is fonned solely by conduct.
5 This places the relationship under Section 2B- 209 which instructs a court to consider the entire context in
6 determining the terms ofthe contract.
7 b. Varying Terms: Non-Material Variance. If an offer and acceptance do not materially
8 vary, they fonn a contract The terms of the contract are the terms of the offer. Section 2B-209 does not apply
9 because the contract is fonned by offer and acceptance.
10 • Subsection [2B-203A(a)(2)] allows for inclusion of non-material additional terms from the
11 acceptance unless the offeror timely objects to those terms. This rule comes from existing Article 2 and follows the
12 basic principle that the offeror controls the terms of its offer. If the acceptance gives conflicting treatment of a
13 subject contained in the offer and the difference is not material, the offer controls. Standards of materiality in this
14 context include whether the additional terms involve unreasonable surprise when measured against the commercial
15 context, including usage of trade and course ofdealing, or whether they so change the effect of the other terms of
1 6 the offer and acceptance such as to significantly alter the bargain reached. In either context, the terms are not part
1 7 ofthe agreement
18 4. Conditional Offers andAcceptances. A person has a right to state and insist on preconditions for
19 acceptance of its offer. Subsection [2B-203B(a)] recognizes that principle. In commercial practice, the most
20 common conditional offer or acceptance limits its effect on the other party's adherence to all of its terms. No
21 principle in contract law precludes a party from enforcing such conditions. However, conditional language in
22 standard terms of a standard form creates special problems in "battle of forms" transactions where either or both
23 parties make an acceptance or offer expressly conditional on its specific terms, but perform irrespective of
24 acceptance of the condition. Subsection [2B-203B(b)] treats this as a question involving the effectiveness of the
2 5 conditional language. In a standard form, the party desiring enforcement of its conditional language is entitled to
2 6 that result only if its conduct corresponds to the condition. Conduct corresponds to the condition if the party
27 insisting on the condition precludes further performance unless the other party assents to its terms.
2 8 Illustration 1. Licensee sends a standard order form indicating that its order is conditional on
29 the Licensor's assent to the terms on the Licensee's form. Licensor ships with an invoice
3 0 conditioning the contract on assent to its terms. Purchaser accepts shipment Here, neither party
31 acted consistent with the language of condition. A contract exists based on conduct The terms
32 are governed by 2B-209.
33 Illustration 2. In ntustration I, assume that Licensor refuses to ship, but informs Purchaser that
34 agreement to the Licensor's terms is a condition of shipment It does not ship until Purchaser
3 5 agrees to terms. Until that occurs, there is no contract. If it occurs, the contract exists based on
3 6 the form agreed to.
37 D1ustration 3. In ntustration I, assume Licensor ships pursuant to a "conditional" form, but
3 8 when the shipment arrives, Purchaser refuses it In a telephone conversation, Licensor agrees to
39 Purchaser's terms. Until that agreement, there is no contract; Purchaser acted in a manner
4 0 consistent with its conditional language. When agreement occurred, that agreement sets out
41 tenns ofthe contract
42
43 SECTION 28-204. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE; ELECTRONIC AGENTSr-lfHm
44 alitaffiateEi traasaetiea, the reHe",¥iBg 1'Oles aprly:
45 (i!-l-) A contract may be formed by the interaction ofelectronic agents. -,' eentfaet is
46 feRileEi ilfthe interaction results in the electronic agents!. engaging in operations that confirm or
47 indicate the existence ofa contract a contract is formed unless the operations resulted from fyaud
48 or electronic mistake,..fi:aati or the like.
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1 @) A contract may be fonned by the interaction ofan electronic agent and an
2 individual. A contract is formed ifthe individual takes actions that it is free to refuse to take or
3 makes a statement that the individual has reason to know will:
4 (A) cause the electronic agent to perfonn. provide benefits, permit the use
5 or access that is the subject ofthe contract, or instruct a person or an electronic agent to do so; or
6 (B) indicate acceptance or an offer, regardless ofother expressions or
7 actions by the individual to which the electronic agent cannot react.
8 (£;) The terms ofa contract formed under subsection paragfaph-(h2) are
J
]
3
J
j
9 determined under Section 2B-207 or 2B-208, as applicable, but do not include terms provided by
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
the individual ifit had reason to know that the electronic agent could not react to the terms as
provided.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement": Section 1-201. "Automated transaction"; Section 2B-I02. "Contract": Section 1-201. "Electronic
agent": Section 28-102. "InfolUlation": Section 2B-I02. "Informational Rights": Section 2B-102. "Party":
Section 1-201. "Reason to know"; Section2B-102. Tenn": s...ctjon 1-201.
Reporter's Notes:
1. Scope of the Section. This section deals with two setting: 1) an interaction between two
electronic agents and 2) an interaction between a human and an electronic agent. Both interactions can create a
contract. In each case, however, contract formation rules take into accOWlt the fact that an electronic agent cannot
react to tenns outside the scope of its programming and, at le2St in most cases, that the party using the agent does
not, by virtue ofthat use, accept the possibility ofagreeing to other terms.
Modem systems enable the use of electronic contracting agents by consumers and other licensees
as wen as by licensors. Intelligent agents that search for infonnation or other products within predefined purchase
terms creates a significant new fonn ofcomparison shopping that is supported by the rules here.
1. Interaction ofE!ectronic Agents. An intenction of two clectroilic agents can create a contract
that bind the parties that used the agents to achieve that result if the operations of the electronic devices indicate
that a contract exists. This rule follows the basic principle tim conduct can create a contract. That would occur,
for example, if the interaction results in infonnation being sent by one and accepted in the system of the other. It
might also occur if the agents' operations result in recording within their respective systems that a contract bas
been created. The tenns of the contract that resuh from this interaction are detennined Wlder Section 2B-207 or
2B-208 as applicable.
3. Electronic Mistake and Fraud. Assent frOt:. the operations of the two electronic agents does not
arise ifthe operations are induced by mistake, fraud or the like. Fonnation ofa contract does not occur ifone party
or its electronic agent manipulates the programming or respon..--e of the other electronic agent in a manner akin to
fraud This, in essence, vitiates the inference of assent which would occur through the nonnal operations of the
agent. Similarly, the inference is vitiated ifbecause ofaberran: programming or through an unexpected interaction
of the two agents, operations indicating the existence of a COl:nct occur in circumstances that are not within the
reasonable contemplation of the person using either eleetrroic agent. In such cases, the circumstances are
analogous to mutual mistake. In some cases, especially if coe electronic agent is supplied by one party to the
purported agreement, it would be appropriate for a court to z..-oid results that are clearly outside the reasonable
A-46
J
J
J
]
J
]
r
r
r
!
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,..-
,.
1
r
r
r
1 expectations of the other party. The concept here is more akin to the law of unilateral. mistakes except that it
2 places the risk on the party that supplied the agent for and required its usc in a particular transaction.
3 Subsection (1) makes clear that restrictions analogous to common law concepts of fraud and
4 mistake are appropriate to prevent abuse or clearly unexpected results. Courts applying these concepts may refer to
5 cases involving mistake or fraud doctrine even though, in the case of electronic agents. the electronic agent cannot
6 actually be said to have been misled or mistaken. Ofcourse, parties may agree to reallocate the risk ofmistake or
7 fraud in a separately fonned agreement, such as an ED! agreement setting out a procedure for subsequent
8 electronic ordering.
9 This section does not address the liability of a supplier of the electronic agent whose
1 0 prograniming or lack of security causes loss. If such supply contract is within this article, allocation of liability is
11 handled as in any other contractual relationship. Liability under other law is not dealt with in this article.
12 4. Interaction ofHuman and Electronic Agent Contracts may be formed by an interaction of a
13 human and an electronic agent. The electronic agent's ability to bind the party using it derives from the choice of
14 that party to so usc an automated system. A contract is formed if the human makes statements or engages in
15 conduct that indicate assent. Consistent with the concept ofmanifesting assent, assent may be indicated by taking
1 6 actions with reason to know that they indicate agreement. Here, that occurs if the acts or statements will cause the
1 7 electronic agent to deliver benefits or pcnnit the access that is the subject matter of the contIact. Statements by the
18 individual purporting to alter or vitiate agreement to which the electronic agent caunot react are ineffective.
19 Dlustration 1. Tootie is an electronic system for placing orders with Home Shop. Ifa customer dials the
20 number, a voice instructs the customer to indicate a credit card number, the item number, the quantity, the
21 customer's location, and other data. Customer, after entering the data. vc:rl>al1y states that he will only
22 accept the information if there is a 120 day "no questions" return right. Otherwise: "I don't want the
2 3 damn things." Customer has reason to know that the electronic system cannot react to the verbal
24 condition. Tootie automatically orders shipment.
2 5 There is a contract. The verbal condition is ineffective. Stating conditions beyond the capability of the agent to
2 6 react does not vitiate agreement when there is reason to know that they cannot be dealt with by the electronic
2 7 system. Agreement is indicated by the steps that initiate shipment.
2 8 Illustration 2. User dials the AIT information system. A computerized voice states: "Ifyou would like
29 us to dial your number, press "1", there will be an additional charge of S1.oo. Ifyou would like to dial
30 yourself: press "2". User states into the phone that he will not pay the S1.OO additional charge, but will
31 pay .so. Having stated his conditions, User strikes "I." The ATT computer dials the number, having
32 located it in the database.
33 User's "counter offer" is ineffective. The charge includes the additional S1.OO.
34
35 SECTION 2B-205. FIRM OFFERS.
36 fa) An offer by a merchant te eater inte a eefttfaet whielt is made in an authenticated
37 record that by its terms gives assurance that the offer will be held open is not revocable for lack of
38 consideration during the time stated~': if Ifa time is not stated, the eifel is me..-eeasle for a
39 reasonable time not exceeding 90 days.
40 (b) An offer by a merchant containing a term providing assurance that the offer will be
41 held open which term is contained in a standard form supplied by the party receiving the offer and
42 ~~iHg-t~is ineffective unless the party making the offer authenticates
43 the term.
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34 the tcnns ofthe contract after beginning eemmeBeemeftt ef performance or use under theif
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-208, a party adopts the tenns ofa record,
(B. Terms of Records)
SECTION 2B-207. ADOPTING TERMS OF RECORDS.
including a standard form, if*'the party agrees to the record, by manifesting assent or otherwise.
Subsection [2B-206A(a)(3)] acknowledges the common practice of establishing a method for
receiving and reacting to submissions as a means of controlling risk and giving guidance. Under this subsection,
these procedures have impact in contract law if the submitting party is notified that they exist Undisclosed
procedures axe not relevant to a contract analysis. If the submitting party is notified of the procedure, decisions
about acceptance or rejection of the submission are funneled through that procedure or, in the case of acceptance,
an express decision to accept This protects both parties. The submitter and the recipient receive the benefit of a
more specific set ofchoices about taking on a contract or rejecting it
5. Idea Submissions: Consideration An agreement for submission of an idea carries with it, in the
absence~of contrary terms, the assumption that the idea has value or uniqueness. That value exists if the idea is
concrete, confidential and noveL It: for example, a party agrees for a fee to submit an idea for enhancing the
success ofaudiovisual works, the contract is not satisfied if the idea is "draw more attractive images." This adopts
New York taw and cases such as Oasis Music Inc. v. 100 USA. Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. 1994). A submission
that does not meet this standard does not breach the contract, unless the agreement gave express assurances that
the submission would be novel. The licensee cannot recover payments it already made. Rather, the default rule is
that the provider of the non-novel submission cannot enforce any future obligations as to the submitted idea. The
basic principle is that a non-novel idea is not adequate consideration for a contract and that a proponent of an idea
implicitly represents that the idea has value. This is not met in a case ofa non-novel idea.
This principle does not require that the idea rise to the level of novelty as that term i s used in
patent law. The information must not be something that is generally and widely known. Cases on combination
secrets and other situations in trade secret taw where information has sufficient uniqueness or secrecy to qualify as
a trade secret should inform decisions under this standard.
Nothing in this section precludes an agreement that docs not hinge on the uniqueness of the
proposed submission. Whether such agreement exists must be judged based on the fundamental notion that a party
docs not implicitly contract away its rights, without a fee, to use publicly known information merely because it
contracted for "disclosure" ofsuch material
---H(hlH)I-The Adeptiea ef the terms ofa record eetweea paRies me)' eeetH' may be adopted as33
35 agreement ifthe parties ¥-had reason to know that their agreement would be represented in whole
36 or in part by a later record to be agreed and , elit at the time perfel'fft8nee eF liSe eemmeaeea
32
37 there was no opportunity to review the record or a copy of it before pcrfol1Jlan~~
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39 (Qe) Ifa party adopts the terms of a record, th~ese-terms become part of the contract
4 0 without regard to the party's knowledge or understanding of individual terms in the record,
41 except for a term that is unenforceable because it fails to satisfy another requirement ofthis
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Definitional Cross Reference:
"Agreement". Section 1-201. "Conspicuous". Section 2B-I02. "Contract". Section 1-201. "lnfonnation":
Section 2B-I02. "Informational Rights": Section 2B-I02. "Manifest assent." Section 2B-l11 "Opportunity to
review." Section 2B-1l2. "Party". Section 1-201. "Record". Section 2B-I02. "Standard fonn". Section 2B-I02.
"Term". Section 1-201.
Reporter's Notes:
·1. Scope ofthe Section. Article 2B deals separately with forming a contract and the terms of that
contract This section is the primary section on adoption of terms of a record as terms of a contract Section 2B-
208 limits the creation of terms in mass-market licenses and the time over which they can be presented. Section
2B-209 deals with cases when records do not create contract tcnns, but a contract exists because ofconduct
This section states basic principles about when and how terms of a record are adopted and also
expressly recognizes that commercial deals often involve layered contracting, providing a standard for determining
when this type of contract term formation exists. Subsection (b) rejects the idea that a contract and all terms must
be fonned at a single point in time. It permits layered contracting that reflects commercial practice in cases where
the parties have reason to believe that tcnns will be proposed at some later time. The effect of a failure to agree
depends on whether the agreement on tenns was a condition .to the existence ofa contract. See Section 2B-202.
1. Adopting Terms. If a party agrees to a record, it adopts the terms of the record whether or not
the record is a standard form. Standard forms are common in commercial practice because they provide
efficiencies for both parties. Treating them in law as less than any other record ofa contract would put commercial
law in conflict with commercial practice and reduce the efficiencies such records provide. Because of the broad
opportunities allowed in the Internet, standard forms will increasingly not be the province of only one party to the
deal. This section rejects decisions which hold that a term that is not unconscionable or induced by fraud may still
be invalidated because a court holds, after-the-faet, that a party could not have expected it to be in the contract.
Absent unconscionability, fraud or similar conduct, commercial parties are bound by the records to which they
assent
a. Knowledge of Terms. It is not necessaI}' that the adopting party actually read,
understand, or negotiate the terms of a record. This role follows virtually universal law in the United States.
Assent to the record encompasses assent to its terms. Unconscionable terms remain unenforceable despite assent
b. Modes ofAssent. A party is bound by the tcnns of a record only if it agrees to the
record, by manifesting assent or otherwise. The party may authenticate (sign) the record. The party's conduct may
indicate assent to a record or a contract Section 2B-ll I. The latter focuses on objective manifestations ofassent
A party cannot manifest assent to a form or other record unless it bas bad an opportunity to review that form before
reacting. Finally, there are residual modes of assent that satisfy the idea that assent must be objectively expressed,
even though they do not fit the precise standards ofauthentication or manifesting asset
3. lAter Terms: Layered Contracting. In ordinaIy commercial practice, while some contracts are
formed and their terms fully defined at a single point in time, many commercial transactions involve a rolling or
layering process. An agreement exists. but terms are clarified or created over time. That principle is acknowledged
in various portions of original Article 2. for example in provisions allowing contracts formed with tenns left open.
Comments to original Section 2-207 note that later records presented to the other party are treated as proposed
modifications or confirming memorandum only in cases of "a proposed deal which in commercial understanding
bas in fact been closed." Section 2-207, comment 2. Where that is not true, the later terms are part of the primary
contracting process. SimIlarly, original Section 2-311 allows enforcement of agreements that permit one party to
later specify the particulars of performance (e.g., terms of the contract) after the initial agreement is reached.
Consistently, original Section 2-305 allows agreements in which one party later fIXes the price.
Often, the commercial expectation is that terms will follow or be developed after performance
begins. While some courts seem to hold that an initial agreement per se concludes the contracting as a single event
notwithstanding ordinaIy practice and expectations that tcnns will follow, other courts recognize layered contract
formation and term definition, correctly viewing contracting as a process, rather than a single event ProCD. Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7· Cir. 1996). Often, perfonnance commences with each party understanding that
terms will be provided for later agreement, or otherwise used to derme the contract. See Brower v. Gateway 2000.
Inc., - N.Y.S.2d - (N.Y.A.D. 1998). This section, along with the contract formation principles, explicitly accepts
the layering principle and provides a standard for distinguishing when the intent or expectations is to conclude the
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1 contract at the initial point as contrasted to an expectation that terms will be provided for later agreement In
2 infonnation commerce, the circumstances -often indicate that initial general assent assumes that tenns will be
3 developed or presented later to fill out the details of the transaction. Such circumstances include customary
4 practices in software licensing customs, but also will include use of electronic agents by licensees. For example, a
5 business or a consumer may instruct its electronic agent to search the Internet for car dealers willing to meet pre-
6 set terms and otTer prices within a pre-set range. Whl1e the business or consumer will expect to stand on the tenns
7 accepted by the dealer, both it and the dealer expect the contract to have more details. such as warranty,
8 maintenance, and other standard provisions, without having to consider all such terms in the first interaction of the
9 automated contracting system.
10 £ Section 2B-207(b) clarifies that contract tenns can be proposed and agreed to as part of
11 completing the initial contract even though proposed after the beginning of performance by one or both parties.
12 Such terms are treated as part of the initial contracting process if at the time of initial agreement, the parties had
13 reason to know and, thus, expected that this would occur and that terms of a record to be agreed would provide
14 elaboration of their contract. It: instead, the parties considered their deal to be closed at the outset, then
15 subsequently proposed terms from either party are treated as a proposed modification of the agreement, etTective
1 6 only \D1der concepts applicable to such modifications. The third alternative, ofcourse, is that the initial agreement
1 7 leaves terms open and allows one part to specify what those terms are at some later date. The act of specifying the
18 terms is, in effect, merely a performance of the contract
1 9 In layered contracting terms are created over time. Thus, for example, where the parties reach an
2 0 initial agreement about a multiple delivery contract and begin shipments before reducing that agreement to more
21 elaborate written terms, the record when agreed to does not modify the original agreement, but reflects an
22 expansion and elaboration as part of that contract Similarly, the parties might begin performance on a software
23 development agreement while terms are being developed and, ideally, agreed to by counsel and the representatives
2 4 of the parties. When a fmal, fully elaborated record is completed and agreed to, it does not amend the contract, but
25 simply becomes part of the now finalized contractual arrangement Of there is no assent to the record, whether the
2 6 parties have a contract hinges on whether they regarded assent to the record when developed as a condition to a
2 7 contractual relationship. If so, and if there is no such agreement, there is no contract and equitable principles
28 apply to avoid unjust enrichment and other etTects of the beginning ofperformance.
29 The concept in subsection (b) differs from Section 2B-30S and original Section 2-311, both of
30 which refer to agreements that give one party or its designate a contractual right to specify or particularize terms of
31 performance. In cases governed by those sections. the party receiving the later terms is not presented with a right
32 to agree to or reject the terms; the terms are in effect part of the original agreement. Where no further assent is
33 required under the agreement, 2B-30S indicates that the terms must be proposed in good faith and in accordance
34 with reasonable commercial standards.
35 Subsection (b) indicates that a layered contracting exists if the pa rties at the time of the initial
3 6 agreement had reason to know that this would occur. The "reason to know" standard parallels the standard for
37 determining when acts constitute assent to a contract. Reason to know does not require specific notice or specific
38 language in an original agreement, although such factors may playa role in determining reason to know. It can
3 9 also be inferred from the entire circumstances. including routine or ordinary practices ofwhich a party is or should
4 0 be aware. In some areas ofcommerce, such as many aspects ofsoftware contracting and many forms ofmail order
41 contracting, the circumstances of the agreement in ordinary commerce give reason to know that tenns may be
42 subsequently proposed. In Section 2B-207. the time over which the record can be proposed is referenced to the
4 3 expectations of the parties under the reason to know standard. At some point, the deal has been closed, but
4 4 specifying when this occurs in terms of a fixed time standard is impossible in general commerce. It requires an
4 5 analysis focused on the context and circumstances.
46 The standard set out in subsection 2B-207(b) also carries forward into similar transactions in the
47 mass market in Section 2B-208. Section 2B-208. however, places a time limit on when proposal of the terms must
4 8 occur and precludes the terms from alter terms that are expressly agreed to by the parties to the license. In
4 9 addition, of course. Section 2B-208 creates a right to a cost free refund if the proposed terms are unacceptable to
5 0 the receiving party. See also Section 2B-617.
51 4. Right to a Return. In many cases governed by subsection (b) and in mass-market licenses, if
52 assent is sought after the person paid or delivered or became obligated to payor deliver, the manifestation ofassent
53 is not effective unless the person had a right to a return if it chooses to refuse the license. Section 2B-112. This
54 return obligation applies in mass market contracts and in other contracts ifthe expectation is that the terms will be
55 provided at or before the fust use of the information, a typical fonnat in certain types of software contracting. It
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1 does not apply in the more open-ended commercial ammgements where there is merely an expectation that terms
2 will be agreed to (or rejected) at some point cjuring performance, such as in the software development agreement
3 mentioned in note S. In these contexts, general principles of equity apply to deal with the circumstances where
4 there is ultimately a failure to agree.
5
6 SECTION 2B-208. MASS-MARKET LICENSES.
7
8 (a) A party adopts the terms ofa mass-market license for purposes ofSection 2B-207
£
9 only if the party agrees to the license, by manifesting assent or otherwise, before or during the
10 party's initial performance or use ofor access to the information. A term is not part ofthe license
11 if:
12 (1) -if.the term is unconscionable under Section 2B-II0 or is unenforceable under
13 Section 2B-I05(a) or (b); or
14 (2) subject to Section 2B-30I, ifthe term conflicts with tenns to which the parties
15 to the license expressly agreed.
16 (b) Ifa licensee "my does not have an opportunity to review a mass-market license or a
17 copy ofit before becoming the party deli...eftld the iBfermetiea SF SeeaBle obligated to pay and the
18 ~oesnot agree, by manifesting assent or otherwise, to the license after having that
19 opportunity, the licensee ffiRe......iag Riles a~ly: (1) The party is entitled to a return and to:;
2 0 a~) The lieeR5ee is eBtitled ta: (A)-reimbmsement ofany reasonable expenses
21 incurred in complying with the licensor's instructions for return or destruction ofthe licensed
22 subject matter and docwnentation or, in the absence ofinstructions, incurred for return postage or
23 similar reasonable expense in returning them; and
24 UB) compensation for any reasonable and foreseeable costs of restoring an
25 information processing system to reverse changes in the system caused by the installation, if:
2 6 (Ai) the installation occms because information must be installed to enable
27 review ofthe license; and
2 8 (J;!it) the installation alters the system or information in it but does not
A- 51
1 restore the system or infonnation upon removal of the installed infonnation because ofrejection
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2 of the license.
3 (c) In a mass-market transaction, ifa licensor does not have an opportunity to review a
4 record proposing terms before the licensor delivers or becomes obligated to deliver the
5 information, and ifthe licensor does not agree, by manifesting assent or otherwise, to th ose tenns
6 after baving that opportunity, the lic.ensor is enti tied to a return.
7 Uniform Law Source: Restatement (Second) ofContracts § 211.
8 Definitional Cross Reference:
9 "Contract": Section 1-201. "Information": Section 28-102. "Information processing system": Section 28-102.
10 "lnfonnationa1 Rights": Section 2B-I02. "License": Section 2B-I02. "Licensor": Section 2B-I02. "Manifest
11 assent: Section 28-111. "Mass-maJket license": Section 2B-102. "Party": Section 1-201. "Retum": Section 2B-
12 102. "Term": Section 1-201.
13 Reporter's Notes:
14 1. Scope of the Section. This section deals with mass-market licenses, including consmner
15 transactions. It defines the circmnstances under which a party's assent to a mass-market license adopts the terms
16 of that record. The section places limitations on the effectiveness of mass-market licenses. The section should be
17 read in connection with Section 2B-207 and Section 28-111. While most cum:nt mass-market licenses are
18 presented by the licensor and accepted by the licensee. modem technology and contracting practices are not
1 9 necessarily so limited and the section would also apply to a mass-market license presented by a licensee and
2 0 accepted by a licensor in the mass market.
21 Many mass-market licenses are presented and agreed to at the outset of a transaction; some are
22 presented afterwards. This section deals with both. The costs ofrctum provided for in subsection (b) provide
23 strong incentives for tcnns ofthe license to be presented at the outset ofthe transaction when practicable.
2 4 Some mass-maJket licenses are between two parties. Others involve two separate agreements and
25 a three-party transaction. The two contracts in the three-party transaction are: 1) the mass-market license between
26 the publisher and the end user, and 2) the n:taiI agreement between the end user and the n:taiIer. These
27 agreements are not necessarily made at the same time. This section deals with both. The three-party arrangement
28 is also addressed in Section 2B-617.
29 2. GeneralMass-Market Rules.
30 There are a number of ways in which the tcnns of a mass market or other contract can be
31 specified. This can and does often occur by a general agreement of the parties unrelated to any record containing
32 specific terms. In other cases, as described in Section 2B·305, the parties may agree that the terms or particulars of
33 performance may be specified later by oDC party. Sec TI Brower v. Gateway 2000. Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569
34 (N.Y.A.D. 1998). Under Section 28-305, the later supplied terms an: enforceable without further agreement to
35 them if the tcnns are proposed in good faith and within bounds of commercial reasonableness. This section deals
3 6 with a third method of deriving the terms of a mass market agreement, obtaining assent to a record containing
37 those terms - either at the outset ofthe transaction or shortly after it is initially formed.
38 Three limiting principles govern adoption ofmass-market licenses regardless ofwhen the license
39 is presented and agreed to by the assenting party. In addition, as outlined in Section 2B-IOS, fundamental public
4 0 policy limit enforceability ofmass-market tcnns in some cases. See notes to Section 2B-IOS(b).
41 a. Assent and Agreement. A party adopts the terms of a record only if it agrees to the
4 2 record by manifesting assent or otherwise indicating its agreement. A party cannot manifest assent unless it had an
4 3 opportunity to review the record before that assent occurs. This means that the record must be available for review
44 and called to the person's attention in a manner such that a reasonable person ought to have noticed it. Section
4 5 2B-112. A manifestation ofassent requires conduct, including a failure to act, or its statements, indicate assent and
4 6 that it has rc8SOn to know that, in the circumstances, this will be the case. Section 2B-111 and related notes.
47 Adopting the tcnns of a record for purposes of this section occurs pursuant to Section 28-207.
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Under that section, if the terms of the record are proposed for assent by a party only after the party commences
performance ofthe agreement between the parties, the terms become effective under these sections only if the party
(e.g., the licensee) bad reason to know that terms would be proposed after the initial agreement Even if reason to
know exists, this section requires that the terms be presented not later than the initial use of the information and
that, if the mass-market license was not made available before the initial agreement, the person is given a right to a
return should it refuse the license.
b. Unconscionability. Even ifa party adopts the terms ofa record, a court may invalidate
unconscionable terms pmsuant to Section 28-110. Unconscionability doctrine invalidates terms that are bizarre
and oppressive and hidden in boilerplate language. For example, a term in a mass-market license that default on
the lD8SAJ18lket contract for $50 software cross defaults all commercial licenses between the parties may be
unconscionable if there was no reason for the licensee to anticipate that breach of the small license would
constitute breach of an unrelated larger license negotiated between the parties. Similarly, a clause in a mass-
market license that grants a license back ofall trademarks or 1rade secrets ofthe licensee without any discussion of
the issue between the parties would ordinarily be unconscionable. The principle is one of prevention of oppression
and unfair swprise and not ofdisturbance ofallocation ofrisks because ofsuperior bargaining power.
c. Conflict with Agreed Tenns. In addition to unconscionability doctrine, this section
provides that standard terms in a mass-market form cannot alter the terms expressly agreed between the parties to
the license. A term is expressly agreed by the parties ifthey discuss and come to agreement regarding an issue and
their agreement becomes part of their bargain. For example, in a consumer transaction where the consumer
requests software compatible with a particular type ofmachine aDd the vendor agrees to provide such software, the
standard terms ofvendor's mass-market contract cannot alter the vendor's agreement with the consumer to provide
compatible software. As is true with express warranties, this is subject to traditional parol evidence concepts which
bear on the provability of extrinsic evidence that varies the terms of the writing. Additionally, of course, under
Section 2B-617 the terms of any publisher's license cannot alter the agreement between the end user and the
retailer unless expressly adopted by them as their own agreement.
Paragraph (a)(2) preserves the essential bargain of the parties to a mass-market transaction. For
example, if a librarian acquires educational software for.children from a publisher's retail outlet under an express
agreement that the software may be used in its libraJy network, a term in the publisher's license that limits use to a
single user computer system conflicts with and is over-ridden by the agreement for a networlc license. This section
does not adopt Restatement (Second) ofContracts § 211(c), which has been adopted in only a small minority of
states. However, paragraph (a)(2) responds to some ofthe policy concerns on which that Restatement rule is based
3. Tenns Prior to Payment. Ifa mass-market license is presented before a price is paid, Article 2B
follows general law that enforces a standard form contract if the party assents to it. See. e.g.• Storm Impact, Inc. v.
Software ofthe Month Club, 44 u.S.P.Q.2d 1441 (N.D. fit 1997) (on-saeen license prevents waiver of copyright
and precludes fair use claim).
The fact that license terms are non-negotiable or that the contract may constitute a "contract of
adhesion" does not invalidate it under general contract law or this article. A conclusion that a contract is a
contract of adhesion may, however, requiIe that comts take a closer look at contract terms to prevent
unconscionability. See, e.g.. Klos v. Pold'e Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1998); Fireman's Fund Insurance
v. M.Y. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336 (9· Cir. 1998); Cluln v. Adventurer Crub'es. Inc., 123 F.3d 1287 (9· Cir.
1997). It should be recognized, however, that this article's concepts of manifest assent and opportunity to review
address concerns often relevant to this review. Nevertheless, when applicable, the closer scrutiny followed in
general commercial contract law may be appropriate here.
Many mass-marlcet transactions involve three parties and two contracts. The publisher's license
does not agree to license under terms other than those in the license and that choice should gencrally be enforced if
manifesting assent after an opportunity to review occurs. In digital commerce, the license terms often define the
product, for example, in distinguishing between single user and network use, consumer use and commercial use,
ordinary private use or rights to public display or performanCe. See ProCD v. Zeitknberg. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996). Market choices of this type provide an important commerce in this field Often, the license and its
enforcement benefit the licensee, giving it rights that would not be present in the absence of an enforceable license.
See, e.g., Green Book International Corp. v. Inrmity Corp.• - F. Supp. - (D. Mass. 1998) (shrink wrap granted
right to distribute an element ofthe software).
While this section follows general law in enforcing standard form contracts, it adds a significant
protection for the party presented with the form. As indicated in subsection (a)(2), the standard terms of the form
cannot contradict terms expressly agreed to by the parties to the license and which are admissible in court under
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1 parol evidence rules.
2 4. Terms after Initial Agreelfli!1lt. In modem commerce, licenses are sometimes presented after
3 initial general agreement between the ultimate licenscc and either the retailer or the licensor-publisher. These
4 transactions arc a form of layered, or open-term. contracting recognized under original Article 2 and this article. In
5 the software industry, such contracts are supported by both commercial expectations developed by standard practice
6 over several decades and, frequently, by enforcement of copyright or other intellectual property rights held by the
7 publisher. The contracting format allows contracts between end users and remote parties that control copyright or
8 other interest in the information. Enforceability of the license can be important to both parties because it allows a
9 non-infringing exercise of licensed rights by the licensee and the licensor to tailor licensed rights to particular
10 markerdemand. Such licenses are enforceable under this article, but to prevent abuse, in addition to the general
11 protection created for all mass-market licenses, this section creates additional rights for the licensee.
12 a. Distribution Methods. Commercial distribution ofcopies of digital information does not
13 necessarily parallel distribution involving sale of goods. The differences are grounded in the nature of the subject
14 maUer, the property rights involved, and the choices by the rights owner (publisher). In some cases, of course, the
15 publisher sells copies to a distributor for resale. That choice does create a distribution sequence similar to the sale
1 6 of goods. In other cases, the information is provided directly to the end user on-line and under an agreement
1 7 directly between the rights owner and the end user. In many cases, however, the publisher distributes through
1 8 third parties but docs not simply sell copies to a distributor for re-distribution. See. e.g.• Microsoft Corp. v. DAK
19 Indus.• Inc.• 66 F.3d 1091 (9 th Cir. 1995).
20 This is a different distribution system than that used in the sale of goods because the distributor
21 does not receive ownership, but merely a limited distnbution license which allows distnbution of the copies only if
22 that occurs subject to an end user license with the rights owner or licensor. This method may be used to provide
2 3 greater or lesser rights to eventual end users than would occur through simple sales of copies. For copyrighted
24 works, the distribution format is based on the rights oWner's exclusive right to distribute the work in copies. If the
2 5 distnbutor does not comply with the license, an eventual transfcrcc is not protected as a bona fide purchaser and is
26 subject to an infringement claim. Sec Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995);
27 Microsoft Corp. 'V. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc. a 846 F. Supp. 208 (ED NY 1994); Marsluzll v. New
28 Kids on the Block, 780 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Major League Baseball Promotion v. Colour-Tex, 729 F.
29 Supp. 1035 (D. NJ. 1990).
3 0 In this latter distn"bution system, the license presented to the end user after it acquires a copy
31 from a retailer is between the rights owner (or a distributor authorized to license to end users) and the end user,
32 rather than between the end user and the retailer. This license creates, for the first time, a contractual relationship
33 between the rights owner and the end user. In this three-party setting (end user, retailer, copyright owner or
3 4 authorized licensor), the enforceability of the license is important to both parties. It is important to the end user
3 5 because it is the first time it receives authorization to copy or otherwise use the work from the rights owner. It may
3 6 also be important to the end user because many mass-market licenses give the end user rights that would not arise
37 if it purchased a copy. A sale ofa copy ofa copyrighted work does not give the copy owner a number ofrights that
3 8 it may desire. It docs not convey a right to make multiple copies, to publicly display the work, to make derivative
39 works from the copy, or, in the case of computer programs, to rent the copy to others. The enforceability of the
4 0 IiCClJSe is also icportant for the rights owner because the terms of use and other conditions of the license help
4 1 define the product it transfers. There are also general marketplace benefits in that the licensing framework allows
42 price and market differentiation that allows product priced for and tailored to market demands of various forms,
4 3 such as in distinguishing pricing ofa consumer as compared to a commercial or educational license.
44 b. Timing ofAssent. Agreement to the mass-market record can occur before the initial usc,
4 5 but must occur DO later than during the initial use of the information. This places an outside limit on layered
4 6 contracting in the mass market and acknowledges customary practices in the software and other industries
47 applicable to the mass market. The time limitation enacts a potentially significant protection of the Iiceoscc's
4 8 expectations in this type of marketplace. Of course, this time limitation does not prevent subsequent modification
4 9 ofthe license at my point in time or performance by a party that defmes terms pursuant to agreement.
SOc. Cost Free Return Right In mass-market licenses presented after an initial agreement,
51 three issues arc important. One involves preventing unconscionable terms; that issue is identical in all mass-
52 market contracting. The second involves the relationship between the license terms and the express agreement of
53 the parties to the license. This issue also docs not clJ3nge based" on when the license is presented. The third issue
5 4 involves assuring the licensee an opportunity to review and an effective choice to accept or reject a license
55 presented after initial payment Subsection (b) addresses this issue. It creates a return right that places the end user
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in a situation whereby it can exercise a meaningful choice regarding licenses presented after initial agreement.
This article refers to a return right, rather than a right to a refund, because it recognizes that in the mass market,
under developing technologies, the concept of requiring this right may apply to either the licensee or the licensor,
whichever is asked to assent to a record presented after the initial agreement.
In cases where the form is presented to the licensee after it becomes initially obligated to pay, it
must be given a cost free right to say no. This does not mean that the end user can reject the license and use the
information. What is created is a right to return to a situation generally equivalent to that which would have
existed ifthe end user had reviewed and rejected the license at the time of the initial agreement. The return right
does not apply ifthe licensee agrees to the license. It is not a means by which a party may rescind an agreement to
which it has assented, but rather a method of ensuring that assent in this setting is real. Thus, if the licensee
manifests assent to the license because it has reason to know that opening the paclcct holding the disk of the
software constitutes assent to the license, the return right does not apply.
This return right also docs not arise if there was an oppor1UDity to review the license before
making the initial agreement. 10 subsection (b) the exposure to potential liability for expeoses of reinstating the
system after review creates an incentive for licensors to make the license or a copy thereof available for review
before the initial obligation is created. Subsection (b) does not apply to transactions involving software obtained
on-line if the software provider makes available and obtains assent to the license as part of the ordering process.
00 the other hand, in a mail order transaction, if the liccosC is first received along with the copy ofthe information
that was ordered, subsection (b) applies. The return right under this section includes, but differs from the return
right in Section 2B-1l2(b) as part of the opportunity to review. The return in Section 2B-208 is cost free in that
the end user receives reimbursement for reasonable costs of return and, in a case where installation of the
information was required to review the license and caused changes in the end user's system, to reasonable costs in
returning the system to its initial condition. Of course, the fact that this section states an affirmative right in the
mass market to a cost free refund docs not affect whether under other law outside of this article, a similar right
might exist in other contexts.
Subsection (b) contemplates that ifa licensor chooses to seck asse nt to a license after the initial
agreement, it has an obligation to reimburse the licensee's expenses incurred if it rejects the license. The expenses
incurred in return of the subject matter of the rejected license must be reasonable and foreseeable. The costs of
return do not include attomey fees or the cost of using an unreasonably expensive means of return or to airplane
tickets, lost income or the like uoIcss such expenses are required by instructioos of the licensor. The expense
reimbursement refer to ordinary expenses such as the cost ofpostage.
Similarly, in cases where expenses of restoring the system are incurred because the information
was required to be installed in order to review the license, expenses chargeable to the Iiceusor must be both
reasonable and foreseeable. The reference here is to actual, out-of-poclcet expeoses and DOt to compensation for
lost time or lost opportunity. The losses here do not encompass consequential damages. Moreover, they must be
foreseeable. A party may be reasonably charged with ordinary requirements of a licensee that are consistent with
others in the same general position, but caooot be held responsible for losses caused by the particular
circumstances of the licensee ofwhich it had no reason to know. A twenty dollar software license provided in the
mass market should not expose the provider to significant loss uoIcss the method ofpresenting the license can be
said ordin2ri1y to cause such loss. Similarly, it is ordinarily not reasonable to provide recovery ofdisproportionate
expenses associated with eliminating minor and inconsequential changes in a system that do not affect its
functionality. 00 the other hand, the provider is responsible to cover aetuaI expenses that are foreseeable from the
method used to obtain assent
SECTION 2B-209. TERMS WilEN OF CONTRACT FORMED BY CONDUCT.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c) and subject to Section 2B-
301, ifa contract is formed solely by conduct ofthe parties, in determining the terms ofthe
contract, a court shall consider the terms and conditions to which the parties expressly agreed,
course ofperfonnance, course ofdealing~or usage of trade, the nature of the parties' conduct, the
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1 in law, rather than in another con1raet.
2 4. International Issues. Intellectual property rights are territorial in character. They extend only
3 within the territory of the state that creates them, although some deference internationally occurs through multi-
4 lateral treaties. Subsection (c)(2) parallels this and provides that the obligations created about exclusivity and
5 infringement extend only within this countJy and to a country specifically referenced in the license or warranty.
6 Specification in the license of particular countries or "worldwide" in this sense refers only to specifications or
7 representations made with express reference to the non-infringement warranty, such as "Licensor warrants non-
8 infringement worldwide." Other references in a license may not be intended to create a warranty. For example, a
9 grant ofa license for worldwide use may in the circumstances be no more than a permission to use the infonnation
1 0 worldwide without risk of a lawsuit by the licensor, rather than a warranty that worldwide use will not infringe
11 other rights. In the case of a "worldwide" warranty, the obligation cxtends only to countries that have property
12 rights treaties with the United States. In the absence of such relationships, the rights created under United States
13 law cannot create rights in the other country and, thus, the warranty cannot extend there.
14 5. Disclaimer. As with all other warranties, the warranties in the section can be disclaimed. This
15 section provides for such disclaimer in language based on original Article 2. This requires specific language or
1 6 circumstances indicating that the warranties are not given. Consistent with the general approach ofcontract law as
17 a planning tool. illustrative language is provided. Subsection (d) limits the conditions under which the warranty of
18 this section can be disclaimed or modified, it does not limit or preclude avoidance or modification of the hold
19 harmless obligation that might arise under subsection (a). If the circumstances or language indicate no intent to
2 0 hold harmless, that agreement is enforceable and this subsection does not require proof that the language is
21 conspicuous.
22
23 SECTION 2B-402. EXPRESS WARRANTY.
2 4 (a) Subject to subsection (c), an express warranty by a licensor is created as follows:
25 (1) An affirmation of fact or promise made by the licensor to its licensee in any
26 manner, including in a medium for conununication to the public such as advertising, which relates
27 to the information and becomes part ofthe basis ofthe bargain creates an express warranty that
28 the information to be furnished under the agreement shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
29 (2) Any description ofthe information which is made part ofthe basis ofthe
30 bargain creates an express warranty that the information shall conform to the description.
31 (3) Any sample, model, or demonstration ofa final product which is made part of
32 the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the performance of the information shall
33 reasonably conform to the performance ofthe sample, model, or demonstration, taking into
34 account such differences as would appear to a reasonable person in the position ofthe licensee
35 between the sample, model, or demonstration and the information as it will be used.
36 (b) It is not necessary to the creation ofan express warranty that t he licensor use formal
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1 words such as "warrant" or "guarantee", or state a specific intention to make a warranty.
2 However, an express warranty is not created by~
4 informational rights;
6 aesthetics. market appeal, or the like, ofinformational content; or
5 (2) a display or description ofa portion ofthe information to illustrate the
r,
r
r
3
7
_____.....(1....) an affirmation or prediction merely ofthe value ofthe information or
_____....l.(,=.3J-,;)a statement pmporting to be merely the licensor's opinion or conunendation of
8 the information or informational rights.
11 Ifan express warranty or contractual obligation is created for published informational content
10 or an express contractual obligation for published infonnational content is created or not created.
12 and is breached, the remedies ofthe aggrieved party are those pursuant to this article and the
r
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9 (c) This article does not alter or establish any standards under which an express warranty
r
f
r
r
r
r
J
r
J
r
r
r
13 agreement
14 Uniform Law Source: Section 2A-210. Section 2-313.
15 Definitional Cross References.
16 "Aggrieved party": Section 1-201. "Agreement": Section 2B·I02. "Information": Section 2B-I02. "Informational
17 content": Section 2B-I02. "Licensee": Section 2B~102. "Licensor": Section 2B-I02. "Party": Section 1-201.
18 "Published infonnational content": Section 2B-I02 "Remedy": Section 1-201. "Value": Section 1-201.
19 Reporter's Note:
2 0 1. Scope arul Basis ofSection. This section adopts original Article 2 law on express warranties,
21 exCept with respect to published informational content, where it preserves current law. "Express" warranties rest
22 on "dickered" aspects of the individual bargain and go so clearly to the essence ofthat bargain that, as indicated in
23 Section 2B-406(a), words of disclaimer in a standard fonn cannot alter the dickered terms. "Implied" warranties,
24 on the other band, rest on a common factual situation or set of conditions so that no particular language is
25 ncccssmy to evidence them and they will exist unless disclaimed.
26 .2. Basis ofthe Bargain. Subsection <a) adopts the "basis of the bargain" originally created in
27 Article 2. This allows courts and parties to draw on a body ofcase law for distinguishing express wmanties from
2 8 puffing and other. unenforceable statements, representations or promises. While there are many factual issues, this
2 9 standard provides better guidance than would an entirely new standard. The "basis ofthe bargain" concept is that
3 0 express affirmations, promises and the like are enforceable as express warranties if they are within the matrix of
31 elements that constitutes and defines the bargain of the parties, but that they are not express warranties if they arc
32 not part of that basis for the contract. The standard does not require that a licensee prove actual reliance on a
33 particular statement, affirmation or promise in deciding to enter into the contract, but does require proof that the
34 statement, affinnation or promise played a role in reaching or defining the bargain. This standard enables the
35 creation of express obligations on the more general showing that statements about the information arc part of the
36 deal and basic to it On the other hand, express warranty law· deals with the elements of a bargain and is not a
37 swrogate for regulation. It does not support imposing liability in contract for all statements of a licensor made
3 8 about an infonnation product, even if not brought to the attention of the licensee. This holds as well for
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1 advertising. Ifthe licensee knows ofthe advertisement by the vendor and it became part ofthe basis of the bargain
2 with the vendor, the advertisement may~ an •
3 The question is whether statements of the licensor made to the licensee have in the circumstances
4 and in objective judgment become part ofthe basic bargain. No specific intention to make a wammty is necessary.
5 In actual practice affirmations of fact describing the information and made by the licensor about it during the
6 bargain are ordinarily regarded as part of the description of the information unless they are mere puffing,
7 predictions, or otherwise not an enforceable part of the bargain. No reliance on such statements need be shown in
8 order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, to take such affirmations, once made, out of the
9 agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact. This is true also of the question of
1 0 whetherproduct documentation may create an express wuranty. Whether the documentation is reviewed befon: or
11 after the initial deal, the test is the same. Ifit contains affirmations offact or promises that otherwise qualify and it
12 became part ofthe basis of the bargain, an express wamnty may arise.
13 The question is whether language, samples, or demonstrations are fairly to be regarded as part of
14 the contract Iflanguage is used after the closing of the deal, (as when the licensee on taking delivery asks for and
15 receives an additional assurance). the assurance may become a modification of the contract and does not need to be
16 supported by fiuther colISideration if it is otherwise reasonable. Section 28-304. Ahematively, under the layered
1 7 contract fonnulation established in Article 2 and employed here, that assurance may simply be treated as a fiuther
18 elaboration of the actual terms ofthe contract.
1 9 3. Relation 10 Disclaimers. The basic principle is that the pmpose of the law of wammty is 0
2 0 determine what it is that the licensor has in essence agreed to provide. A contract is nonnally a contract for
21 something describable and descn"bed. These descriptions, if part of the bugain, are an express warranty. This
22 article follows the general principle, as in original Article 2, that the obligations in a proven express wmanty
2 3 cannot other than in exceptional cases be materially deleted. A contract term generally disclaiming "aU warranties,
24 express or implied" cannot be given literal effect under Section 2B-406(a). This does not to mean that the parties,
2 5 if they consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as the desire, including a bargain that does not
2 6 encompass the purported express wamnty. But in determining what they have agreed upon consideration should
2 7 be given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanges for a pseudo-
2 8 obligation. Thus, for example, a contract for a "word-processing program" that contains the general disclaimer
2 9 noted above is nevertheless a contract for an information product that meets the basic description of a "word-
3 0 processing program."
31 4. Puffing and Expressions ofOpinion. Subsection (b) retains current law to the effect that puffing
32 or mere statements ofopinion do not fonn an express warranty. The law on the distinction between an actionable
3 3 representation and puffing is long and well-developcd. The distinction requires a determination based on the
34 circumstances of the particular transaction. It reflects that in common experience some statements and predictions
3 5 cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain. ~ transactions involving computer programs as with other
3 6 commercial information, the closer the statement relates to descn"bing the technical specifications, technical
37 performance or product description of the information, the more likely it is to be an express warranty when
3 8 communicated to the licensee, while the more the statement pertains to predictions about expected benefits that
3 9 may result fiom use of the information, the more likely it will be found to be puffing. Ofcourse. whether or not a
4 0 statement is an express wau-anty does not affect whether the statement in context might yield a remedy wder the
41 law offiaud or misrepresentation.
42 Subsection (b) also refers to statements or demonstrations pertaining to aesthetics and market
43 appeaL . Aesthetics, as used here, n:fers to questions of the artistic character, tastefulness, beauty or pleasing
4 4 character of the informational content, not to statements pertaining to how a person uses the information or to what
4 5 is the essential nature of the information itself. Thus, for example; a statement that a clip art program coutaillS
4 6 easily useable images of "horses" or images of "worlcing people," if it becomes part of the basis of the bargain,
4 7 creates an assurance that the subject matter of the clip art program is horses or working people and that the images
4 8 are usable. However, it does not purport to state that they are tasteful or artistically pleasing.
4 9 5. Advertising as a Source ofExpress Warranty. Paragraph (aXI) provides that advertising may
50 create an express wamnty if the advertising stateinents otherwise conform to the standards for creation of an
51 express wamnty under this section. This expands the scope of express wmanty law in some states. Statements
52 made in advertising, of course; often reflect puffing or mere expressions of opinion and do not create an express
53 warranty. As with other statements, a wari'anty arises only if the statement becomes part of the bargain and a
5 4 bargain actually occurs. The affirmation of fact made in the advertising must be known by the licensee, influence
55 and in fact become part of the basis ofthe bargain under which it acquired the information.
A-58
J
J
J
:1
,J
J
i
J
,.
1
2
r 34
5
6
r 78
9
r 1011
\\ 12
13
r 141516
17
". 18
19
20
21
r 2223
24
r 252627
28
r 2930
! 31
32
r 333435
36
r 37
I 38
39
40r 4142
43,. 44
45
J 46
47
fII& 48; 49
50
51
r 5253
54
r 55
I
r
r
-i
r
In the absence of that relationship, liability for false advertising, if any, would not be under
contract law, but under tort or advertising la"1Y rules. This section does not create a false advertising claim under
the guise ofcontract law.
6. Descriptions. Paragraph (aX2) makes specific some of the principles described above about
when a description of the information becomes an express warranty. The description need not be by words.
Technical specifications, blueprints and the like can afford more exact descriptions that mere language and, if
made part of the basis of the bargain, become express warranties. Ofcourse, all descriptions by merchants must be
read against the applicable trade usage and in light of the concepts of general rules as to merchantability resolving
any doubts about the meaning of the description. The description requires a commercially reasonable
interpretation.
7. Samples and Models. Subsection (a)(3) expands current Article 2 by expressly refening to
express warranties created by demonstrations of information. In addition, subsection (a)(3) carries forward the
Article 2 principle that express warranties may be created by descriptions, samples or models.
The basic treatment of samples, models and demonstrations is no different that the treatment of
statements. Although the underlying principles are unchanged, the facts are often ambiguous when something is
shown to be illustrative in nature. In merchantile experience, the mere exhibition of a "sample", a "model" or a
"demonstration" does not of itself show whether it is merely intended to "suggest" or to "be" the character of the
subject-matter ofthe contract.
Representations created by demonstrations and models must be gauged by what in ferences would
be communicated to a reasonable person in light of the nature of the demonstration, model, or sample.' In the
world of goods, showing a sample of a keg of raw beans by lifting out a cup-full communicates one inference,
while a demonstration ofa complex database program running ten files creates an entirely different inference if the
ultimate intended use of the system is to process ten million files. This difference also applies to beta models of
software which are used on a test or a demonstration basis and may contain elements that are not carried forward
into the ultimate product. In such cases, the parties ordinarily understand that what is being demonstrated on a
small scale or what is being tested on a beta model basis is not necessarily representative ofactual performance or
of what will eventually be the product. The basic rule, as with any other purported express warranty, is that any
affirmation model or demonstration must be interpreted in a reasonable fashion that reflects the circumstances of
the test or demonstration. The court's discussion in NMP Corp. \I. Parametric Technology Corp., 958 F. Supp.
1536 (S.D. Okla. 1997) illustrates the issue in respect to Software demonstrations.
8. Published InjOrmationtll Content. Subsection (c) preserves current law for published
informational cOntent This section does not create any express warranty for published infonnational content, but
does not preclude the imposition of any liability under other law or the creation of an express contractual
obligation. While there are many reported cases dealing with express warranties in goods and using the standards
adopted hen; no case taw for published informational content uses Article 2 standards. See Joel R. Wolfson,
&press Warranties and Published Informationtll Content under Article 2B: Does tire Shoe Fit ?, 16 John Marshal
Journal of Computer & Info. Law 384 (1997). This subject matter entails significant First Amendment interests
and general public policies that favor encouraging public dissemination of information. Courts that deal with
liability pertaining to published informational content must balance contract themes with these more general social
policies.
This section leaves undisturbed existing law dealing with how obligations are established with
reference to published informational content The cases tend to deal with obligations of this type as questions of
express contractual obligation, rather than in language relating to warranties. Thus, a promise to provide an
electronic encyclopedia obligates the party to deliver that type of work and is not fulfilled by delivery of a
computerized work of fiction. In other cases where the issues focus on the quality of the content or the Iikc, colDts
if inclined to find contract liability wiD do so under general contract law theory. Many, however, will conclude
that the level ofrisk in the published informational content situation and the potentially stifling effect that contract
liability might have on the dissemination of speech should lean toward limiting or excluding liability. See Daniel
\I. Dow Jones eft Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. City Ct 1987). In some other cases, liability may arise under
tort law theories, such as in Hansberry \I. Hearst, 81 CaL Rptr. 519 (Cal. App. 1968). However, this section rejects
the seemingly simple, but ultimately inappropriate step of merely adopting Article 2 concepts from sales of goods
to this much different context That would risk a large and largely unknown change of law and over-reaching of
liability in a sensitive area. It would create uncertainty that would in itselfchill public dissemination infonnational
content while colDts gmpple with adapting entire new standards of liability to this area.
Where there is a contract obligation that is breached, the remedies of this article" apply and
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1 replace remedies under common law for breach of contract. This includes all provisions of Part 7 of this article,
2 including standards that measure and exclude or limit damages.
3 9. Third Parties. This section deals with express warranties made by the licensor to its licensee. It
4 does not deal with the enforceability under contract or tort theory of representations made by remote parties and
5 relied on by an ultimate user of the information. The case law in tort dealing with such issues pertaining to
6 information does not generally parallel cases dealing with the manufacture and sale of goods. Information
7 providers have been held liable to third parties in only a few, atypical cases. This article does not expand or
8 exclude such third party liability, however it may develop under tort law.
9
10 .. SECfION 2B-403. IMPLIED WARRANTY: MERCHANTABILITY OF
11 COMPUTER PROGRAM.
12 (a) Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modified, a merchant licensor ofa computer
13 program warrants:
14 (1) to the end user that the computer program is reasonably fit for the ordimuy
15 purpose for which it is distributed;
16 (2) to a distributor that
1 7 (A) the program is adequately packaged and labeled as the agreement or
18 the circumstances may require; and
19 (B) in the case ofmultiple copies, the copies are within the variations
20 permitted by the agreement, ofeven kind, quality, and quantity, within each unit and among all
21 units involved; and
22 (3) that the program confonns to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
23 container or label, ifany.
24 . (b) Unless disclaimed or modified, other implied warranties may arise from course of
25 dealing or usage oftrade.
2 6 (c) A warranty created under this section does not apply to infonnational content,
27 including its aesthetics, market appeal, accuracy, or subjective quality, whether or not included in
28 or created by a computer program.
2 9 Uniform Law Source: Section 2-314; 2A-212. Revised.
3 0 Definitional Cross References.
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"Agreement": Section 1-201. "Computer program": Section 28-102. "Contract": Section 1-201. "Delivery":
Section 28-102. "Informational content": Se~ion 28-102. "Licensor". Section 28-102. "Merchant". Section 28-
102.
Reporter's Notes:
1. Background and Policy. This section genemly applies the Article 2 warranty ofmerchantability to
computer programs. Since it applies to all computer programs provided by a merchant, it cn:atcs a merchantability
warranty for cases that under prior law are sczvices contracts with no warranties or with obligations limited to making a
reasonable effort and c:x.ercising ordinary care. The merchantability wammty does DOt depend on how the program is
deliveled, whether it be electronically or in a tangible copy. It flows fiom the presumed nature of a commercial
undertaking in which the supplier of the program is a merchant dealing with that type of information. Disclaimer or
modification of the warranty ofmerchantability or any part of the warranty is dealt with in Section 2B-406.
Article 2B wananties stem from a combining of three different legal traditions. One is from Article 2
and focuses on the quality ofthe product. aeating an implied wamm1y that the result delivc:red will conform to ordinary
srandazds for products of that type. The second is ftom common law dealing with licenses, services and infonnation
contracts, which in many states focuses on the~ or performance effort, I3tb.er than the result The third is tiom
common law pertaining to services in some states and infonnation contracts. It disallows implied obligations ofaccuracy
in information transferred other than in a special relationship of reliance. In this and the following section, Article 28
distinctions are drawnbetween computerprograms, on the one hand, and infmmation or services, on the other hand.
The implied merchantability warratity and the warranty in Section 28-404 pertaining to the
accuracy of data may both apply to the same transaction and the same information product The one applies to the
program and its functions, while the other applies to the accuracy ofdata in an appropriate relationship.
2. Merchantability. The content ofthe merchantability obligation turns basically on the meaning of
the terms of the agreement as recognized in the applicable business, trade or industJy. A computer program
delivered under an agreement by a merchant must be of a quality fit for the pwpose for which it was distributed.
The implied warranty is made by all merchant-licensors. It does not apply to non-merchants. Non-merchants,
however, like merchants, are obviously subject in appropriate cases to claims gro\Ulded in fraud or other theories
premised on misrepresentation.
a. Concept ofMerchantability. Merchantability does not require perfection, but the concept
is that the subject matter of the warranty must fall generally within the average standards applicable in commerce
for information ofthe type.
In 1998, a popular operating system program for small computers used by both consumers and
commercial licensees contained over ten million lines of code or instructions. In the computer these instructions
interact with each other and with code and operations of other programs. This contrasts with a commercial jet
airliner popular in that year that contained approximately six million parts, many ofwhich involved no interactive
function. A typical consumer goods product contains fewer than one hundred parts. A typical book has fewer than
one htDldred fifty thousand worch. In the software enviromnent, it is virtually impossible to produce software of
complexity that contains no errors in instructions that intermittently cause the program to malfunction, so-called
"bugs." The presence of errors in general commercial products is fully within common commercial expectation.
Indeed, in programs ofcomplexity, the absence of errOrs would be unexpected. In this commercial environment,
the ~ontract law issue is whether the level of error exceeds the bounds of ordinary merchantability. This OCClUS
only if the significance of the errors or their number lies outside ordinary commercial c:x.pectations for the
particular type ofprogram.
b. Fit fOr OrdiNl1'J' Purposes. ·The program must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which
it is distributed. OrdinaIy pwposes focuses on expected end user applications of the type to which the product as
distnbuted was addressed. To an extent greater than in reference to sales of goods, computer programs are often
adapted to and employed in ways that go well beyond the uses c:x.pected when the distribution occurs. Use of
ordinary, mass-market database programs in the context of highly sensitive or commercial applications does not
change the warranty into one assuring fitness for ordinary pmposes of such use. The focus is to the market and
types of uses to which the program is directed. Ordinarily, of course. that also defines the ordinary actual use of
the program. In any event, to be fit for ordinary purposes does not require that the program be the best fit or the
perfect application for that use. If the transfer is to a person acquiring the program for re-distribution by sale, the
program must be honestly resellable because it is what it pUrports to be.
3. Aesthetics. Subsection (c) makes clear a tule that would apply in any event. Merchantability
does not apply to the aesthetics of a product under this article. Aesthetics, as used here, refer to questions of the
artistic character, tastefulness, beauty or pleasing nature of infonnational content. These are matters of personal
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taste, rather than elements of any standard of merchantability. On the other hand, merchantability standards are
appropriately addressed to whether the information is what its description pmports it to be and to whether it is or is
not useable by the transferee. Thus. for exai"nple, if the cOmplaint about the images created by a program is that
they are not attractive, merchantability does not apply. If the complaint is that the commands and images are
blurred and not useable, an issue ofmerchantability exists. A statement that a clip art program contains images of
"horses" creates an assurance that the subject matter of the clip art program is horses or working people and that
the images are usable. It does not pmport to state that they are tasteful or artistically pleasing or whether they are
brown, beige, white or green.
4. Cause ofActionfor Breach. In a cause ofaction for breach ofwarranty, as wi1h all products, it is
of course necessary to show not only the existence of the warranty, but that the warranty was broken and that the
breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained In such an action, in complex computer
systems involving different hardware and software, the loss must be connected to defects in the computer program
for which a breach ofwarranty is claimed ProOf that losses were caused by events after the program was installed
and unconnected to it operate as a defense.
SECTION 2B-404. IMPLIED WARRANTY: INFORMATIONAL CONTENT.
(a) Unless the warranty is disc1aim~ C?rmodified, a merchant that, in a special
relationship ofreliance with a licensee, collects, compiles, processes, provides, or transmits
informational content, warrants to its licensee that there is no inaccuracy in the informational
content caused by the merchant's failure to perform with reasonable care.
(b) A warranty does not arise under subsection (a) with respect to,;,
( I) published informational content: or
_____~(2!<L} a person that acts as a conduit or provides only editorial services in collecting,
compiling, or distributing informational content identified as that ofa third person.
(c) The warranty under this section does not come within Section 1-102(3).
Uniform Law Source: Restatement (Second) ofTorts 552.
Definitional Cross References.
"Informational content". Section 2B-I02. "Licensee". Section 28-102. "Merchant". Section 2B·I02. "Party".
Section 1-201. "Published informational content". Section 2B-I02.
Reporter's Notes:
1. Scope and Effect This section recognizes a new implied warranty present in some informational
content contracts, consulting, data processing or similar agreements. The warranty focuses on 1he accuracy ofdata,
but does not create an absolute liability or absolute assurance ofDO inaccuracy. Instead, it creates a protected assurance in
such contracts that DO inaa:uracies are caused by a fiWure of reasonable care. This section does not crca1e a DOD-
disclaimable dutyofrcasooable care.
2. Accuracy. A party that provides or processes information in a special relationship ofreliance warrants
that no inaccuracy exists due to 1he povider's lack ofreasonable care in performing its obligations under the contract.
a. Ordinary Stmu:Iardr as Described. The presence of an inaccuracy relates to c::xpeetations
gauged by ordinaIy standards ofthe relevant trade under the circumstances. Inmost large commercial databases, ordinary
expectations assume that some data will be inaccurate. Variations or error rates within the range of commercial
cxpectations of the business, trade or industry do not breach the warranty established in this section. If greater than
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ordinary accuracy is desinxl that desire must be expressed in the terms of the agreement and provide for greater than
nonna} expectations ofacancy. For exampl~ if in refcrmce to a particular type ofdatabase the nonnal expected error
rate is twenty percent, an error rate of fifteen PCICel1t does not aeate an iDacaJracy within this section and does not breach
the warranty. On the other hand, if in a database of thousands of medical treatments for various allergic reactions the
commercial expectation is that the error rate should be DO more than three percent, an error rate often percent may aeate
an inaccuracy that results in breach ofthis implied warranty ifcaused by a fiIilure to exercise reasonable care in compiling
the information.
In addition, inaa:uracy is gauged by refcn:nce to what the datapmport to be under the agreement. This
section follows cases such as Lockwood v. Srandard & Poor's Corp., 175 Ill.2d 529, 689 N.E.2d 1140, 228 Ill.Dec.
719 (ill. App. 1997). A contract to estimate the nUlIlbcZ' ofusers ofaproduct in Houston does not imply an obligation to
povide an accurate count, but merely requires an estimate. That estimate, ifhonestly made and given cannot breach this
warranty.
b. Accuracy and Aesthetics. The warranty is that information is not inaccurate because of
a lack of reasonable care. Informational content is accurate it: within applicable understandings of the level of
permitted errors, the informational content correctly porlrays the objective facts to which it relates. This warranty
is not a warranty about the aesthetics, subjective quality, or marketability of informational content These are subjective
issues. Assurances on these issues require express agreement to give such assurances.
c. Adequate Results. One who hires an expert for purposes of consultation or data-related
services relying on that expert's skills cazmot expect infallibility. As under common law, reasonable efforts, not
perfect results, provide the appropriate standard in the absence of express contract terms to the contrary. The
analysis of the New York court in an analogous setting indicates the policy for the rule adopted here for those who
collect, compile or process informational content. Milau Associates v. North Avenue Development Corp., 42
N.Y.2d 482,398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 368 N.E.2d 1242 (N.Y. 1977).
3. Mercha1lts in a Reliance Relationship. The implied warranty arises only if the licensor is a
merchant with respect to the particular activity. In addition, the information must have been provided in a "special
relationship of reliance" between the licensor and the licensee. If the absence of such relationship, the mere fact
that one person provides information to another creates no implied obligation beyond good faith.
a. Reliance Relationships. The requirement of a special relationship of reliance is
fundamental to the implied obligation and to balancing the interest ofprotecting client expectations while not imposing
excessive liability risk on informational content providczs in a way that might chiD their information-providing activities.
This stems in part from cases applying Restatenumt (SeCond) ofTorts § 552 The special element of reliance comes from
the relationship itselt: a relationship characterized by the provider's knowledge that the particular licensee plans to rely on
the data in its own business and expects that the provider wiD tailor the information to its needs. The obligation arises
only for those persons who possess unique or specialized expertise, or who are in a special position of confidence
and trust with the licensee such that reliance on the inac:curate information is justified and the party has a duty to
act with care. See Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Yold 266,682 N.E.2d 972 (N.Y. 1997).
The relationship also requires that the" provider make the information available as part of its own
business in providing such information. The licensor must be in the business ofproviding that type of information. This
adopts the rationale ofcases holding that information provided as part ofa diffc:rently focused commercial relationship,
such as the sale cr lease ofgoods, docs not aeate protected expeclatioos about accuracy except as might be created under
warrantylaw. The courtin.4..T. Kmrney v. IBM, 73 F.3d 238 (9110 Cir. 1997) descnbes many of the relevant issues.
See also Picker InterruztioMl, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation, 6 F. Supp.2d 685 (ND Ohio 1998).
An cquaIly fundamental aspect ofa special reliance relationship is that the information provider
is specifically aware ofand personally tailors information to the needs of the licensee. A special relationship does
not arise for information made generally available to a group in standardized form even if those who receive the
information subscn"bc to an information service they believe relevant to their commercial needs. The information
must be personally tailored for the recipient. The tr.msaction involves more thaD merely making information available.
It does not require a fiduciary relationship, but does require indicia ofspecial reIiancc.
b. Published Infomu:ztionaI Content. The implied wammty does not apply to published
informational content. By definition, published informational content is information transfcncd other than in a reliance
relationship. Published informational content is informational content made available to the public as a whole or to a
range ofsubsaibcrs on a standardized, rather than pc:rsooaDy tailored basis. This includes a wide variety ofcommercially
important general distribution or subsaiption services providing informational contenl It includes, for example, an
Internet Website listing information oflocal restaurants. their pices and their quality, as wen as services that provide data
about current stock or monetary exchange prices to subsaibcrs.
A-63
1 Published informational c:ontcnt is the subject matter ofgeocral commen:e in ideas, political, economic,
2 entertainmcat or the like, whose dis1ribution CIJtlIils fundamcatal public policy interests in supporting distribution and not
3 chilling this process lbrough liability risks. In the new technology era 10 which this article is addressed, many
4 information systems analogous to newspapers, magazines, or books and are made available digitally or in on-line
5 arrangements. Their traditional counterparts have never been exposed to contractual liability risks based on claims
6 of mere inaccuracy and treating the new systems differently would reject the wisdom ofprior law. A computerized
7 database is the "functional equivalent ofa traditional news service." These services have no contractual liability for
8 mere inaccuracies in data in part because ordinary expectations anticipate the presence of errors and in part
9 because of fundamental public policies supporting the free· flow of information and free expression. Creating and
1 0 applying a lower standard that creates greater liability for an electronic data provider than applies to a public
11 bbrary, book store, or newsstand would place an undue burden on the free flow of information. This policy
12 underlies the results in Cubby, Inc. Y. CompuSeTl', Inc., 3 CCH Computer Cases 46,547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and in
13 Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. City Cl 1987).
14 4. Reasonable Care. The primary obligation is that there is no inaccuracy in the data. An
15 inaccuracy in informational content, however, createS no liability unless the inaccuracy results from a failure to
1 6 exercise reasonable care. This corresponds to common law standards in many states for implied obligations in
17 contracts involving services or information content What constitutes reasonable care depends on the
18 circumstances. Where the nature of the subject matter involves significant risks of personal injwy if data are
1 9 inaCCW"ate, a higher degree ofcare can be expected than in situations in which the recipient reasonably should have
20 other sources and judgments that win influence its decision, rather than mere reliance on the specific information
21 provided in a transaction within this section.
22 s. Conduits and Editing_ The implied warranty applies only to information provided by the
23 licensor. Subsection (b) clarifies that there is no warranty with respect to third party content where the provider
2 4 identifies the information as coming from that third party. The implied warranty does not apply to parties engaged
25 in editing informational content of another person. See Doubleday & Co. Y. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cat.
26 dismissed, 474 U.S. 912 (1985); Windt v. Shepard's McGraw-Hili, Inc., 1997 WL 698182 (ED Pa. Nov. 5, 1997)
27 A person collecting. summarizing or transmitting the third party data acting as a conduit does
2 8 not create the same expectations about performance as does a direct information provider. Whatever expectations
2 9 arise focus on the third party identified as the originator of the information. In these cases, however, that third
30 party may not be contractually obligated to the licensee, Whether or not a contract exists, however, the conduit's
31 obligation and the licensee's reasonable expcctationswith respect to it do not entail an obligation regarding the
32 accuracy of the third party data. Concerning the policy issues in dealing with conduits, sec Zeran v. America On-
33 Line, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). Merely providing a conduit for third party data should not create an
34 obligation to ensure the care exercised in reference to the data provided by the third party. On the related issue of
35 tort liability for publishers who are not also authors, Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991)
3 6 (desc:nbcs policy interests that also support subsection (b».
3 7 6. Reialionship to Tort Law. Since this section" creates a new warranty analogous to the theory of
3 8 negligent misrepresentation, disclaimer or non-existence of the implied warranty should have a strong bearing on
3 9 potential existence of the tort claim in the same tranSaction. In cases involving economic loss, a disclaimer of this
4 0 warranty in most cascs forecloses a tmt claim based on the same facts. However, this section docs not foreclose
41 developmcat ofotherapproac:hcs to Jiability f(]l' information products under tort Jaw. Most cour1s have held 1hat published
42 informatioo products an: not products f(]l' purposes of ~ product liability daim and 1hat there is little or no duty of
43 reasonable care owed to third parties in saccning advertising or similar material f(]l' publication. See W"U11er v. G.P.
44 Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). Thc:Ie an: cases to Ihe cootrary on both points. however. Since 1hcsc are
4 5 issues under tort law, this article neitherprecludes nor c:ocouragcs further expkmdion ofthe tort law questioos.
46 7. Disclaimer. This warranty may be disclaimed pursuant to Section 2B-406. For an analogous
47 case under common law, sec Rosenstein Y. Standard and Poor's Corp., 636 N.E.2d 898 (Ill App. 1993). The
4 8 warranty is that there are no inacc:uracies in the information caused by a lack ofcare. It is, therefore, not subject to
49 the general nde that duties ofreasonable care cannot be disclaimed by contract Section 1-102. What is disclaimed
5 0 is a warranty related to the accuracy of the content, not the exercise of reasonable care with respect to the
51 information. That disclaimer is not affected by Section 1-102. No obligation of reasonable care is created under
52 this section.
53
54 SECTION 28405. IMPLIED WARRANTY: LICENSEE'S PURPOS~ SYSTEM
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1 INTEGRATION.
2 (a) Unless the warranty is disclaimed or modified. ifa licensor at the time ofcontracting
3 has reason to know any particular purpose for which the information is required and that the
4 particular licensee is relying on the licensor's skill or judgment to select, develop, or furnish
..
5 suitable information, the following rules apply:
7 that the information is be-fit for that purpose.r
6 (1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), there is an implied warranty
r
8 (2) If from all the circumstances, it appears that a licensor was to be paid for the
9 amount ofits time or effort regardless ofthe fitness ofthe resulting information, the implied
10 warranty is that the information will not fail to achieve the licensee's particular purpose as a result
11 ofthe licensor's lack ofreasonable care.
15 the licensor's selection among published informational content from different providers.
r
r
r
12
13
14
(b) There is no warranty under subsection (a) with regard to:
(1) the aesthetics, market appeal, or subjective quality ofinformational content; or
(2) published informational content, but there may be a warranty with regard to
r
r
r
r
r
r
J
r
16 (c) Ifan agreement requires a licensor to provide or select a system consisting of
1 7 computer programs and goods, and the licensor has reason to know that the licensee is relying on
18 the skill or judgment ofthe licensor to select the components ofthe system, there is an implied
19 warranty that the components provided or selected will function together as a system.
2 0 (d) The warranty under this section is not governed bv the limitations sees Het eaRle
21 within Section 1-102(3).
22 Uniform Law Source: Section 2-31~ 2A-213. SubstantiaDy revised.
2 3 Definitionai Cross References.
24 "Agreement": Section 1-201. "Computer program": Scction 2B-I02. "Information": Section 28-102.
25 "Informational content": Section 28-102. "Liccuscc": Sc:ction 2B-I02. "Licensor": Section 2B-I02. "Published
2 6 informational content": Section 2B-I02. "Reason to know": Scction 2B-I02
2 7 Reporter's Note:
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1 1. General Approach. This section reconciles diverse case law and, in subsection (c), recognizes a
2 new implied warranty. Subsection (a)(l) stites as a genc:rallUle that in some cases reliance creates an implied
3 warranty of fitness for the licensee's particular pwpose. Subsection (a)(2) applies the connnon law "efforts"
4 standard in other cases. This bifurcation deals with the issue of whether the appropriate implied obligation is an
5 obligation to produce a result (present in sales of goods) or an obligation to make an effort to achieve a result
6 (connnon law). Under prior case law in software and other fields, the decision is based on whether a cowt views
7 the transaction as a sale of goods (result) or a contract for services (effort). The reported decisions are split and
8 often lack a principled basis for distinction.
9 1. Warranty of FiJness. Subsection (aXl) follows original Section 2-315. Whether or not this
1 0 warranty arises in any individual case is basically a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances at the
11 time ofcontracting. A "particular pmpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the information is used in
12 that it envisages a specific use by the licensee which is peculiar to the nature of its business whereas the ordiIWy
13 purposes for which information products are used are those envisaged in the concept ofmerchantability. Although
14 normally this warranty arises only if the licensor. is a merchant with appropriate "skill or judgment," if the
15 circumstances justify the wananty it may be appropriate in the case ofa non-merchant licensor.
1 6 The warranty docs not exist if there is no reliance in fact or if the particular purposes are not
17 made known to the licensor. This wananty requires particularization of the needs of the licensee in the context
18 No express exclusion is made for cases where the information product is identified by a trade
1 9 name. The designation ofan item by a trade name, or indeed in any other definite manner, is only one of the facts
20 to be considered on the question ofwhether the licensee actually relied on the licensor, but it is not ofitselfdecisive
21 of the issue. However, if the licensee is insisting on a particular brand, it is not relying on the licensor's skill or
22 judgment is making the selection and DO wananty results. But the mere fact that the product acquired has a known
23 trade name is not sufficient in itself to indicate nonreliancc if it was reconnnended by the licensor. A similar
24 principle is expressly stated in subsection (b)(2) relating to the selection from among various publishers.
25 The warranty obligates the licensor to meet known licensee needs if the circumstances indicate
26 that the licensee is relying on the provider's expertise to achieve this result There are many development contract
27 and other situations where no reliance exists, including cases where the licensee provides the contract performance
28 standards, rather than relying on the provider to fill needs of the licensee. The express terms of the agreement
2 9 require that the product meet the specifications, but no reliance exists on whether fulfilling the specifications will
30 meet applicable needs.
31 3. Services Warranty. Subsection (aX2) applies to cases that more closely resemble services
32 conlracts and curies forward the type of implied obligation most appropriate in such cases. The subsection
33 recognizes that a skilled service provider docs not guaranty a result suitable to the other party unless it expressly
34 agrees to do so. Milau Associates v. North Avenue Development Corp•• 42 N.Y.2d 482, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 368
35 N.E.2d 1242 (N.Y. 1977). Subsectioo. (a)(2) provides a standani to detmnine when a contract calls for services and
3 6 effort, rather than result The test ccntC'zs on whether the ciIcumstances indicate that the sc:IVice provider would be paid
37 for time or effort, regardless ofthe fitness of the result Such payment tams typify a sc:IVices contract. Other standards
3 8 evolved UDder gcnc:ral c:ommon law may also indicate that the parties in1mded a services obligation as delineated in
39 subsection (aX2). What CODSlitutcs n:asooable care or effort depends on die project involved and other cin:umstanccs of
4 0 the relatiOllShip. Mu:ro Manager. Inc. v. Gregory, 147 WISC.2d SOO, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wise. App. 1988).
41 4. Aesthetics and Published Informatio1L Subsection (b) makes clear that the warranty docs not
42 apply to published informational content or to aesthetics associated with the information. Aesthetics, as used here,
4 3 refer to questions of the artistic character, tastefulness, beauty or pleasing nature of informational content These
4 4 are matters of personal taste, rather than elementS of any standard of implied warranty. On the other hand,
4 5 warranty standards are appropriately addressed to whether the information is what its description purports it to be
46 and to whether it is or is not useable by the transferee. Thus, for example, ifthe complaint about images created by
4 7 a program is that they are not attractive, no implied Warranty applies. If the complaint is that the commands and
4 8 images are blurred and not useable, a wammty issue may exist
49 5. SysJem Integration. Subsection (c) creates a new implied warranty that requires systems pcrfonnance
5 0 in cases ofsystems integration con1racts. While related to the implied fitness warranty, it expands that concept creating
51 new protection for licensees. The warranty is that the selected components will fimction as a system. This does not mean
52 that the system, other than as stated in subsection (a), will meet the licensee's needs. Neither does it mean that use of the
53 system docs not or may not infringe third party rights. This warranty simply aeates an assurance that the parts will
5 4 fimctiooally operate as a system. This is an additional assurance beyond die fact that each component must be separately
55 fimctionaL
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SECTION 2B-406. DISCLAIMER OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTY.
(a) Words or conduct relevant to the creation ofan express warranty and words or
conduct tending to disclaim or modify an ,express warranty must be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other. Subject to Section 2B-30I with regard to parol or
extrinsic evidence, the disclaimer or modification is inoperative to the extent that this construction
is unreasonable.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c), (d), and (e), to disclaim or modify an
implied warranty or any part ofit, but not the warranty in Section 2B-40I, the following rules
apply:
(1) To disclaim or modify an implied warranty arising under Section 2B-403
language must mention "merchantability",..m: "quality", or use words ofsimilar import. To
disclaim or modify an implied warranty arising under Section 2B-404, language must mention
"accuracy", or use words ofsimilar import.
(2) Language to disclaim or modify an implied warranty arising under Section 2B-
405 must be in a record. It is sufficient to state "There is no warranty that this information or
efforts will fulfill any ofyour particular purposes or needs", or words ofsimilar import.
(3) Language is sufficient to disclaim all implied warranties ifit individually
disclaims each implied warranty or, except for the warranty in Section 2B-401, if it states
"Except for express warranties stated in this contract, ifany, this [information] [computer
program] is being provided with all faults, and the entire risk as to satisfactory quality,
performance, accuracy, and effort is with the us~, or words ofsimilar import.
(4) Language that is sufficient under Article 2 or 2A to disclaim or modify an
implied warranty ofmerchantability is sufficient to diSclaim or modify the warranties under
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1 Sections 2B-403 and 2B-404. Language tbat is sufficient under Article 2 or 2A to disclaim or
2 modify an implied warranty offitness for a particular purpose is sufficient to disclaim or modify
3 the warranties under Section 2B-405.
4 (5) In a mass-market transaction, language in a record that disclaims or modifies
5 an implied warranty must be conspicuous.
6 (c) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties, but not the
7 warranty in Section 2B-401, are disclaimed by expressions like "as is" or "with all faults" or other
8 language that in common understanding call the licensee's attention to the disclaimer ofwarranties
9 and makes plain that there are no implied warranties.
1 0 (d) When the licensee before entering into the contract has examined the information or
11 the sample or model as fully as it desired or it has refused to examine the information, there is no
12 implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
13 revealed to the licensee.
14 (e) An implied warranty may eatralso be disclaimed or modified by course of
15 performance, course ofdealing, or usage oftrade.
16 (f) Ifa contract requires ongoing performance or a series ofperformances by the licensor,
1 7 language ofdisclaimer or modification which complies with this section is effective with respect
18 to all performances under the contract.
19 .(g) Remedies for breach ofwarranty may be limited in accordance with this article.
20 Uniform Law Source: Section 2A-214. Revised.
21 Definitional Cross References.
22 "Computer program": Section 2B-I02. "Conspicuous": Section 2B-I02. "Contract": Section 1-201. "Information":
2 3 Section 2B-I02. "Licenscc": Section 2B-I02. "Liccnsor": Section 2B-I02. "Mass-market license": Section 2B-
2 4 102. "Record": Section 2B-I02.
25 Reporter's Note:
2 6 1. General Structure and Policy. This section brings together various rules relating to the
27 disclaimer of warranties, except for the statutory warranties under Section 2B-401. The general approach
2 8 corresponds to existing Article 2 and Article 2A. This article docs not alter CODSlDDer protection statutes which in
29 some states preclude disclaimer of warranties in consumer cases. Scc Section 2B-I05. With respect to implied
30 wammties, this section follows fundamental policies ofU.S. law which recognize that parties may disclaim or limit
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warranties. Implied wananties are default rules whose contractual disclaimer and limitation is integral to the
contract choice paradigm under which commerce occurs and to the ability of a party to control the risk it elects to
undertake. -
2. Express Warranties. Subsection (a) restates original Article 2. It uses modem language of
"disclaimer" and "modification," rather than prior Article 2 language, without substantive change. General
language of disclaimer cannot alter or avoid express warranties. While courts should construe contract terms of
disclaimer and language of express warranty as 'consistent with each other whenever reasonable, in cases of
inconsistency, the express warranty language controls. In effect, express warranties cannot be disclaimed, but as
always, the partics' agreement controls. For example, the language of the agreement, including language styled as
a disclaimer, may indicate that a purported warranty did not in fact become part of the basis of the bargain and is
not, therefore, an express warranty.
Express warranties arise in various ways, including by description of the infonnation itself: Since
they cannot be disclaimed, express product descriptions are an important balance in contracts that comprehensively
disclaim all implied warranties. The information must conform to its express description. A word processing
system for a particular computer system that is delivered with a disclaimer of all implied warranties, must still
meet the express wmanty descn"bing it as a "word processing" program for a particular type of hardware.
However, that goes less to quality of the program than to the fact of the program if without content being a
program.
While express warranties survive general disclaimers, the licensor is protected against unfounded
claims oforal express warrantics by the provisions of this article on parol and extrinsic evidence and the terms of
its contract, and against unauthorized representations by the law of agency. Remedies for breach of an express
warranty arc dealt with in other sections ofthis article and may be modified in accordance with this article.
3. Disclaimers and Fraud. This article does not alter the law of fraud. In some cases, liability for
fraud may arise despite the presence of a general disclaimer of warranties. Thus. if the licensor makes an
intentional misrepresentation of an existing material fact on which the licensee reasonably relied, it may be liable
for fraud even though such disclaimer eliminates contractual warranty liability. A failure to disclose known
material problems in a product being provided pwsuant to a license may constitute fraud if an obligation to
disclose arises under that law. The court's discussion in Strarul v. Librascope, Inc.. 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich.
1961) illustrates one such circumstance. While general disclaimers do not foreclose liability for intentional fraud in
most states, disclaimers or other denials ofobligation specific to the particular facts may foreclose a claim in fraud
because they eliminate the clement offraud that requires reasonable reliance on a material misrepresentation.
4. Disclaimer o/Implied Warranties in a Record. Subsection (b) brings together various provisions
on disclaimer of implied warranties. These rules are subject to the provisions of subsections (c), (d) and (e).
a. When a Record is Required. This article follows original Article 2. Disclaimer of the
implied wmanty ofmerchantability is not required to be in a record, nor is a disclaimer of a warranty in Section
2B-404 required to be in a record. However, as in original Article 2, the rule is different for disclaimer of the
"fitness" warranty. This must be in a record, except in cases governed by subsections (c), (d) or (c).
b. Merchantability arul Accuracy Warranties. Under subsection (b)(l), to disclaim the
warranty of merchantability or accuracy of data, the disclaimer must mention merchantability or accuracy, or use
words of similar import. Use of the specific tc:rm "merchantability" is allowed, but not required. The use of
alternative words, of course, must in fact communicate the nature ofthe disclaimer. The other language suffices if
it reasonably achieves the pmpose ofclearly indicating that the warranty is not given in the particular case.
c. Conspicuousness. Subsection (b)(S) n:quires that if language of disclaimer is in a
record, that language must be conspicuous in cases involving a mass-market license. This provides additional
protection against surprise in such retail market environments. Article 2B does not require that the language be
conspicuous in other types oftransaction. Outside the massDwicct, benefits ofrequiring conspicuous language are
off-set by the trap created for persons drafting contracts and the difficulty of reliably meeting this requirement in
electronic commerce. Also, unlike what might have been expected when original Article 2 developed, implied
warranties are routinely disclaimed in modern commercial transactions. Original Article 2 requires a conspicuous
disclaimer only ifthe disclaimer is in writing.
d. Fitness Warranty. Subsection (bX2) provides language adequate to disclaim the
wmanty mder Section 2B-40S. The language is more explicit than under Article 2, but use of the specific
language is not mandatoIy. This language works, but other language may also be sufficient if it reasonably
achieves the purpose of indicating that the warranty is not given.
e. Disclaimer of All Warranties. Subsection (b)(3) recogni.zc:s that in some cases all
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1 implied warranties are disclaimed. The subsection sets out language sufficient for this purpose. The disclaimer of
2 all warranties using this language is, of COutSe, subject to the requirement of a record and, in the case of mass-
3 market transactions, the requirement that the disclaimer be conspicuous.
4 f Article 2 and 2A Disclaimers. Subsection (bX4) provides for cross-article validity of
5 .disclaimer language. The intent is to avoid requiring parties to make a priori determinations about Article 2B or
6 Article 2 (or 2A) coverage particularly when "mixed" transactions will be increasingly common. Language
7 adequate to disclaim a warranty under one of these articles is adequate to disclaim the equivalent warranty under
8 Article 2B. .
9 4. Disclaimers ofImplied Wan-anties By the Circumstances. Subsections (c), (d) and (e) deal with
1 0 commoli factual situations in which the circumstances of the transaction are in themselves sufficient to call the
11 licensee's attention to the fact that no implied warranties are made or that a certain implied warranty is being
12 excluded.
13 a. "As Is" Disclaimers. This provision follows original Article 2. Terms such as "as is"
14 and "with all faults" in ordinlllY commercial usage arc understood to mean that the licensee takes the entire risk as
15 to the quality of the information involved. The terms here arc in fact merely a particular application of subsection
16 (e) which provides for exclusion of modification of implied warranties by usage of trade. They provide an
1 7 important means of conducting business in many areas of commerce. They also accommodate electronic
18 commerce which may require in many contexts "short" or summary terms defining the contract because of limited
1 9 space in records. The language need not be in a record.
20 b. Excluding Wan-anties by Inspection. Subsection (d) also follows original Article 2.
21 Implied warranties may be excluded or modified by the circumstances where the licensee examines the information
22 or a sample or model of it before entering into the contract. "Examination" as used in subsection (d) is not
2 3 synonymous with inspection before acceptance or at any other time after the contract has been made. It goes rather
2 4 to the nature of the responsibility assumed by thi: licensor at the time of the making of the contract. Of course if
25 the buyer discovers the defect and uses the infomiation anyway, of if it 1.IDrC8SOnably fails to examine the
2 6 information before using it, resulting damages may be found to result from his own action rather than from a
27 breach ofwarranty. It goes to the nature ofthe obligation undertaken by the licensor at the time ofthe transaction.
2 8 In order to bring the transaction within the scope of the "refused to examine" language of this
2 9 subsection, it is not sufficient that the information merely be available for inspection. There must in addition be a
3 0 demand or offer by the licensor that the licensee examine the information. This puts the licensee on notice that it
31 is assuming the risk ofdefects which the examination ought to reveal.
32 Application of the doctrine of "caveat emptor" in all cases where the buyer examines the goods
3 3 regardless of statements made by the seller is, however, rejected. Thus, if the offer of examination is accompanied
3 4 by words as to their merchantability or specific attributes and the buyer indicates clearly that he is relying on those
3 5 words rather than on his examination, they may give rise to an "express" warranty. In such case the question is
3 6 one of fact as to whether a warranty of merchantability has been expressly incorporated in the agreement.
37 Disclaimer ofsuch an express warnmty is governed by subsection (a).
38 The particular Iicenscc's sk:ill and the normal method of examining information in the
3 9 circumstances determine what defects arc excluded by the ex8mination. A failure to notice defects which are
4 0 obvious cannot cxaJSC the licensee. However, an examination 1Uldcr ciIcumstances which do not permit extensive
41 testing would not exclude defects that could be ascertained only by such testing. A merchant licensee examining a
42 product in its own field will be held to have assumed the risk as to all defects which a merchant in the field ought
4 3 to observe, while a non-merchant licensee will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as an
4 4 ordinary person might be expected to observe.
4 5 c. Course ofDealing. etc. Subsection (e) is from original Article 2. It permits disclaimer
4 6 or other elimination of implied warranties by course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade. It is
47 consistent with the U.C.C. concept ofpractical construction ofcontracts established under Article 2 and continued
4 8 in this article.
4 9 d. Detailed Specifications. Ifa licensee gives precise and complete specifications, this is a
5 0 frequent circumstances by which the implied performance warranties may be excluded. The warranty of fitness
51 will not normally apply because there is usually no reliance on the licensor. The warranty of merchantability in
52 such a transaction must be considered in connection with Section 2B-408 on cumulation and conflict of warranties.
53 As in Article 2, in the case ofan inconsistency, the implied warranty ofmerchantability is displaced by any express
54 warranty that the information will conform to the specifications. Thus, if the licensee gives detailed specification
55 as to the information, neither the implied warranty of fitness nor the implied warranty of merchantability normally
A-70
J;.
.;I
<!t•
.?I
~
'~j•
rl
~
J
J
}.•
I
;;,
~
~
~
,I•
]
!
J
7
,.-;>
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
1 will apply unless consistent with the specifications.
2
3 SECTION 2B-407. MODIFICATION OF COMPUTER PROGRAM. A licensee
4 that modifies a copy ofa computer program, other than by using a capability ofthe program
5 intended for that purpose in the ordinary course, does not invalidate any warranty regarding
6 perfotmance ofan unmodified copy; but does invalidate any warranties, express or implied,
7 regarding performance ofthe modified copy. A modification occurs ifa licensee alters code in,
8 deletes code from, or adds code to the computer program.
9 Defmitional Cross References.
1 0 "Computer program". SectiOll 2B-I02. "Copy". Section 28-102. "Licensee". Section 2B-I02.
11 Reporter's Notes:
12 1. Scope ofSection. This section deals with the effect ofmodifications in computer program code
13 on the continued existence ofperformance warranties that might extend to the modified program. The role applies
14 only to the modified copy. If the defect existed. in the umnodified copy. the modifications have no effect.
15 Modifications other than changes made using an aspect of the program intended for that purpose eliminate any
1 6 performance warranties extending to the modified copy. This applies only to warranties related to the performance
1 7 ofsoftware. It does not apply to title and non-infringement warranties.
18 The basis for the rule in this section lies in the fact that because of the complexity of software
1 9 systems, changes may cause unanticipated and uncertain results. The complexity of software means that it will
2 0 often not be possible to prove to what extent a change in one aspect of a program altered its performance as to
21 other aspects. .
22 2. .Application. The section voids the warranties unless the agreement indicates that modification
2 3 does not alter performance warranties. The section covers cases where the licensee makes changes that are not part
2 4 of the program options. Thus, if a user employs the built-in capacity of a word processing program to tailor a
2 5 menu of options suited to the end usets use, this section does not apply. If, OIl the other band, the end user
2 6 modifies code in a way not made available in the program options, that modification voids any performance
27 wammties as to the altered copy.
2 8 This section does not apply where the parties jointly work on development of a program, with
2 9 each being authorized by the agreement to change code created by the other or created by both parties. Who
30 constitutes the licensor in such cases is not clear, but the joint project characteristic takes the case out of this
31 section. What warranties arise in the joint development context is detennined by whose is the licensor and by the
32 agreemcut ofthe parties, which agreement is defined and constIUed in light ofthe circumstances ofthe tranSaction,
33 including the course ofdealiDg and usage oftrade.
34
35 . SECTION 2B-408. CUMULATION AND CONFLICT OF WARRANTIES.
36 Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as
37 cumulative, but ifthis construction is unreasonable, the intention ofthe parties determines which
38 warranty is dominant In ascertaining that intention, the following rules apply:
39 (1) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or general
40 language of description.
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1 (2) A sample displaces inconsistent general language ofdescription.
2 (3) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied
3 warranty under Section 2B-405(a).
4 Uniform Law Source: § 2·317.
5 Definitional Cross Reference.
6 "Party": Section 1·102.
7 Reporter's Note: This section follows original Article 2.
8
9 SECTION 2B-409. TIDRD-PARlY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTY.
10 (a) Except for published infonnational content, a warranty to a licensee extends to
11 persons for whose benefit the licensor intends to supply the information or informational rights
12 and which rightfully use the infonnation in a transaction or application ofa kind in which the
13 licensor intends the infonnation to be used.
14 (b) A warranty to a consumer extends to each individual consumer in the licensee's
15 immediate family or household ifthe individual's use was reasonably expected by the licensor.
16 (c) A contractual term that excludes or limits third-party beneficiaries is effective to
1 7 exclude or limit a contractual obligation or contract liability to third persons except individuals
18 described in subsection (b).
19 (d) A disclaimer or modification ofa warranty or remedy which is effective against the
2 0 licensee is also effective against a-third person§.unc:ler this section.
21 Definitional Cross References.
22 "'Consumer 1ransaction". Section 2B-I02. "Information". Section 2B-I02. "Licensee". Section 2B-I02.
23 "Licensor". Section 2B-I02. "Party". Section 1-201. "Person". Section 1-201. "Published informational
24 content". Section 2B-I02. "Remedy": Section 1-201. "Rights": Section 1-201. "Term": Section 1-201.
25 Reporter's Notes:
2 6 1. Scope ofthe Section. This section utilizes third-party beneficiary concepts based on the contract
27 law theory of "intended beneficiary" and on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 dealing with the scope of
2 8 liability to third parties for a provider of information. It expands both where they apply to uses within the
29 household of the licensee. The section does not address products liability law, leaving that law and other forms of
3 0 tort law for development by the courts. .
31 2. Liability to Third Parties. Dealing with an informational content product, the California
32 Supreme Court in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 CaI.4th 370, 11 CaL Rptr. 2d 51, 834 P2d 745 (1992),
3 3 commented:
3 4 By confining what might otherwise be unlimited liability to those persons whom the engagement is
3 5 designed to benefit, the Restatement rule n:q~es that the supplier of infonnation have notice ofpotential
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third party claims, thereby allowing it to ascertain the potential scope of its liability and make rational
decisions regarding the undertaking...
To impose liability under contract-related theories, the information provider must have known of and clearly
intended to have an effect on third parties. This is a third party beneficialy concept and requires a conscious
assumption of risk or responsibility for particular third parties. Even within that standard, courts should not be
aggressive in finding the requisite intent
All of this relates to the unique role of information in our culture and to the uniquely difficult
nature of proving a causal connection between a release of information and barmful effects. The cases and this
section also reflect sensitivity to the risk that placing excessive liability exposure on information providers without
their express undertaking may chill the wilJingne5S ofthose providers to disseminate information.
3. Product LiIlbiliJy Law. This Section does not deal with products liability issues. It neither
expands nor restricts tort concepts that might apply for third party risk. Article 2B leaves development or non-
development ofany appropriate liability doctrine to common law courts. Indeed, few courts impose third party tort
liability in transactions involving information. The Restatement (Third) on Products LiabiliJy, recognizing this,
notes that informational content is not a product for that law. The only reported cases that impose product liability
on information involve air flight charts. The cases analogized the technical charts to a compass or similar,
physical instrument These cases have not been followed in other contexts. Most courts specifically decline to treat
information content as a product, including the Ninth Circuit, which decided two of the air flight chart cases, but
later connnented that public policy accepts the idea that information once placed in public moves freely and that
the originator does not owe obligations to those remote parties who obtain it. Winter v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 938
F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); Berlcert v. Petrol Plus ofNaugatudc, 216 Conn. 65, 579 A2d 26 (Conn. 1990).
While there may be a different policy for software embedded in tangible products, this article
does not deal with embedded software. Section 28-104. Contract issues regarding the software that operates the
brakes in an automobile sold to a consumer fall within Article 2.
4. Intended Effect Required. Subsection (a) derives from and should be inteIpreted in light ofboth
the contract law concept of "intended beneficiary" and the concept in the Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 552. In
both instances, liability is restricted to intended third parties and those in a special relationship with the
information provider. Intention requires more than that the person be within a general category of those who may
use the information (.e.g., all readers). There must be a closer and more clearly known connection to the particular
third party. The liability covers use in transactions that the provider of information intended to influence. The
section also must be considered in light of the scope of warranties under this article which create no implied
warranty ofaccuracy pertaining to published informational content
lUustratiOD: LR contracts for publication ofa text on chemical interactions. Publisher obtains an express
warranty that LR exercised reasonable care in researching. Publisher distributes the text to the general
public. Some data are incorrect. Neither Publisher (which makes no warranty for published infonnation),
nor LR (excluded under (a» makes a warranty to a general buyer ofthe book.
S. Household and Family Use. Subsection (b) modifies intended beneficiaJy concepts to per se
include the family ofan individual, consumer licensee. This covers both personal injury and economic losses and
applies to consumer use by the indicated persons. To apply, the use by the Wnily members must be authorized
under the license and the licensee must be an individual (with a family), not a corporation. The section assumes
that the licensor had some reason to anticipate that the information would be used in the licensee's household.
Thus, the mere fact that a household member in fact uses a commercial data compression system licensed to a
professional does not extend the warranty to the individual consumer in that person's household. On the other
band, the provider ofmass-market word processing software might reasonably expect acquisition ofit for use of the
software at home. Ordinarily, for this rule to apply, the software must be provided in a consumer transaction or be
such as is commonly used for consumer pmposes.
6. Limitation by Contract. The policy adopted here focuses on the information provider's original
intent with respect to third parties. Subsections (c) and (d) flow from the fact that the basis of this section lies in
beneficiary status, rather than product liability. A disclaimer or a statement excluding intent to effect third parties
excludes liability under this section. This followS' current law. Rosenstein v. Standard and Poor's Corp., 636
N.E.2d 898 (ro. App. 1993) applied a variation of this rule in the case ofan information product
PARTS
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available in a manner consistent with contract terms or industIy. .
a. General Standards_of Av,!iJability. .As indicated in subsection (a)(3), availability is
subject to contractual specification, but in the absence of contract terms, the appropriate reference is to general
standards of the industry involving the particular type of transaction. Thus, a contract involving access to a news
and information service would have different accessibIlity expectations than would a contract to provide remote
access to systems for processing air traffic control data. See Reuters Ltd. v. UP/, Inc., 903 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1990);
Kaplan v. Cablevision ofPa.• Inc., 448 Pa. Super. 306, 671 A.2d 716 (pa. Super. 1996).
b. Content Changes. The access agreement does not bind the provider of access to making
available particular information unless the express contract tenus require this. Access is granted to the
information or other resources provided as they exist at the time ofthe particular access. Databases may be added,
modified or deleted consistent with this core obligation.
4. Use ofReceivedInformation. The access contract mayor may not contain provisions that restrict
use of information obtained through the access. Ifth~ are no restrictions provided in the agreement, subsection
(aX2) indicates that the information is received on an Unrestricted basis, subject only to intellectual property rights
and any separate agreement concerning that information. For example, ifan access contract merely enables access
to news articles, but docs not limit their usc by the licensee. no limitation exists other than under copyright law.
In contrast, if a transaction allowing access or a separate agreement establish conditions or
limitations on the usc ofthe information obtained through the access, those license tenus would be governed under
Article 2B. They are interpreted and enforced pursuant to other provisions of this article and, ofcourse, the terms
of the agreement itself: Once the information is received by the licensee, however, it is ordinarily no longer
appropriate to construe the relationship as an access contract, but rather. it is simply a license. For example, if
licensee uses the access provided by its contract with ABC Corporation to acquire a copy ofa spreadsbeet program,
when the program is received by the licensee, the rights and remedies of the parties with respect to usc of the
program are governed by the agreement with respect te that program and, in the absence of agreed tenns, by the
default rules of this article regarding software licenses. As to the software, the relationship ceased to be an access
contract when the software was received by the licensee. Of course, the tenus of the license may be found in the
agreement establishing the access contract or in a separate agreement concerning the licensed information.
The restrictions that might arise are not necessarily based on creation ofa license. In some cases.
a m~ copyright notice may adequately restrict the right to usc the information obtained through the on-line
access. Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software ofthe Month Club, 1998 WL 456572 (N.D. Dt 1998) (On-screen limitation
precluding commercial usc of software enforced and resulting usc inftingcd; court did not clarify whether the
notice was a license or merely limited permission granted by posting the software on the Internet).
SECTION 2B-616. CORRECTION AND SUPPORT AGREEMENTS.
(a) Ifa person agrees to correct performance problems or provide similar services with
respect to information other than as an effort to cure its own breach of contract, the following
37 rules apply:
38 (1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), the person:
39 (A) shall perform at a time and, place and in a manner consistent with the
40 express terms ofthe agreement and, to the extent not stated in dealt ....lith by the express terms, at
41 a time and ;-place and in a manner that is reasonable in light ofordinary standards ofthe business,
42 trade, or industzy; and
43 (B) does not undertake that its services will correct all performance
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1 problems unless the agreement expressly so provides.
2 (2) If the services are provided by a licensor ofthe information as part ofa limited
3 remedy, the licensor undertakes that its performance will provide the licensee with information
4 that conforms to the agreement to which the limited remedy applies.
5 ~ (b) A licensor is not required to provide instruction or other support for the licensee's use
6 ofinformation or access. A person that agrees to provide support shall make the support
7 available in a manner and with a quality consistent with the express terms ofthe support
8 agreement and, to the extent not stated in the dealHviMy-express terms, at a time and; place and
9 in a manner that is reasonable in light ofordinary standards ofthe business, trade, or industry.
1 0 Uniform Law Source: Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 299A.
11 Definitional Cross Reference:
12 "Agreement": Section 1-201. "Contract": Section 1-201. "Information": Section 2B-102. "Licensee". Section 2B-
13 102. "Licensor": Section2B-102. "Person": Section2B-102. "Remedy": Section 1-201. "Term". Section 1·201.
14 Reporter's Notes:
15 1. Scope 01the Section. This section provides default IUles regarding contracts to correct errors or
1 6 to provide support in use of infonnation. A support agreement is an agreement to make available advisory or
1 7 consulting services relating to the use of the information. The default IUles do not apply if the parties have
18 otherwise agreed. Agreement altering these terms does not depend on express tenDs ofa record, but can be found
1 9 or inferred from the circumstances surrounding the contracting, applicable usage ofthe trades, in course of dealing
2 0 and the like.
21 2. Nature 01 the Error Correction Obligation. Obligations to correct performance problems are
22 different from an obligation to provide updates or new versions of software to remedy wammty breaches. In
2 3 modem prac:tice, contracts to provide updates are a source ofrevenue for software providers. The reference to error
2 4 correction coVetS contracts where, for example, a vendor· agrees to be available to come on site and comct or
2 5 attempt to correct problems in the software for a fee. This is a services con1md. An agreement to provide updates
2 6 or new versions, on the other hand, is more in the uaturc of an installment contract calling for deliveries as new
2 7 versions of the software arc developed and made avulable for general distribution. While the new versions often
2 8 cure problems in earlier versions aud the two types of contracts overlap, the update limII18cment deals with new
2 9 products. This article makes no attempt to set standards by which this distinction can be made in fact, but courts
30 faced with the issue must necessarily refer to the terms of the agreement of the parties and general industry
31 standards.
32 3. Services Obligation. Most agreements to correct problems arc services contracts. In most cases,
33 the obligation is as stated in subsection (a)(I). The obligation parallels the obligation that any services provider
34 undertakes: a duty to act consistent with the standards of the business to complete the task. A services provider
35 does not guaranty that its services yield a perfect result The standard measUres a party's performance by reference
36 to standards of tile relevant trade or industry.
37 4. Services in Lieu 01 Warranty. Subsection (a)(2) recognizes an alternative formulation of the
38 provider's obligations in contracts where the promissor agrees to a particular outcome. This obligation arises ifthe
3 9 repair obligation is part ofa limited remedy in lieu ofa·warranty. The prototype is the "replace or repair" warranty.
4 0 The obligation to correct errors in that context is to Complete a product that conforms to the contract. What
41 performance conforms to the contract, of court, binges on the terms of that agreement as interpreted in light of
42 usage of trade, course ofperfonnance and the like. Ifthe services performance fails to yield a conforming product,
4 3 what remedy is available depends on other IUles in this article, such as the conditions for cancellation and rules on
A-75.
perfect tender or substantial performance.
5. Support Agreements. Subsection (b) provides a default rule regarding support agreements. As a
form of services contract, the appropriate standard is an obligation consistent with reasonable standards of the
industry.
SECTION 28-617. CONTRACTS INVOLVING PUBLISHERS,DEALERS, AND
END USERS.
(a) In this section:
(1) "Dealer" means a merchant licensee that receives information directly or
10 indirectly from a licensor for sale or license to end users.
11 (2) "End user" means a licensee that acquires a copy ofthe information from a
12 dealer by delivery on a physical medium for the licensee's own use and not for sale, license,
13 transmission to third parties~ or fef:-public display or performance for a fee.
14 (3) "Publisher" means a licensor, other than a dealer, that offers a license to an end
15 user with respect to information distributed to the end user by a dealer.
16 (b) In a contract between a dealer and an end user. ifthe end user's right to use the
1 7 information or informational rights is subject to a license from the publisher and there was no
18 opportunity to review the license before the end user became obligated to pay the dealer, the
19 following rules apply:
20 (I) The contract between the end user and the dealer is conditioned on the end
21 user's agreement to the publisher's license.
22 (2) If the end user does not agree, by manifesting assent or otherwise, to the terms .
23 ofthe publisher's license, the end user has a right to a refimd on return ofthe information to the
24 dealer. A right to a refund under this paragraph is a return for putposes ofSections 2B-112 and
25 2B-208.
2 6 (3) The dealer is not bound by the terms, and does not receive the benefits, ofan
27 agreement between the publisher and the end user unless the dealer and end user adopt those
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Transition Notes
1. Further efforts to confoxm this definition with 2B-102(a)(12) are required. See Revised
1-201(11).
2. The Drafting Committee agreed that there should be a "safe harbor" for conspicuous
and that the safe harbor should vary depending upon the medium used in the record. Thus, sub
(B) proposes a safe harbor for a written record and sub (c) proposes a safe harbor for an
electronic record.
Questions to be resolved: (1) Should the definition be the same for Articles 2, 2A and
2B? (2) If so, what is the better defmition? (3) Should a common defmition for all be in
Article I?
SECTION 2-103. SCOPE.
(a) This article applies to transactions in goods, including remedial promises.
Alternative A [Article 9)
[(b) Ifa transaction involves both goods and software, this article applies to the goods and
not the software. However, ifgoods contain software embedded in the goods in such a manner
that the software is customarily considered to be part ofthe goods or that by becoming the owner
ofthe goods, the person acquires a right to use the software in connection with the goods. this
article applies to both the goods and the software.]
Alternative B [derived from Article 2B)
[(b) Ifa transaction involves a copy ofcomputer infoxmation that is contained in and sold
as part ofgoods. the following rules apply:
(1) this article applies to the goods; and
(2) this article applies to a copy ofthe computer infoxmation unless [the copy of
the computer infoxmation is separately licensed and];
(A) the goods are a computer or a computer peripheral. or
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(B) the predominate purpose ofthe transaction is to give the purchaser of
the goods access to or use ofthe computer in(ormation.]
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), to the extent that another article of
[the Uniform Commercial Code] applies to a transaction in goods, this article does not apply to
[the part ofthe transaction governed solely by the other article] [the subject matter or related
rights and remedies governed by the other article].
(d) lbis article does not apply to a foreign exchange transaction.
Comments
1. Source. Subsection (a) follows the first clause offonner 2-102 except that the phrase
"Unless the context otherwise requires" is deleted. Subsection (b), which is derived from 9-
102(a)(44), is new. Subsection (c) amplifies the second clause of former 2-102. Subsection (d) is
new.
2. Transactions in goods. The phrase 61:ransactions in goods" in subsection (a) usually
means a contract for the sale ofgoods, particularlY$ln sections where the word "contract" or the
phrase "contract for sale" are used. In sections whete those words are not used, 61:ransaction"
does not include a lease ofgoods, see Article 2A, or a security interest in goods,. see Article 9,
but could include a contract where both goods and services are provided, such as a contract to
deliver and install goods. When Article 2 applies to mixed goods and service transactions is left
for judicial inclusion or exclusion under the "predominant pwpose" test, where factors such as
the language ofthe contract. the usual business ofthe seller or supplier, and the relative cost of
the goods and the services and whether they are segregated assist to determine whether a sale of
goods predominates. See, e.g, Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 143 F.3d 828 (4th
Cir. 1998), reviewing the cases and applying the test. Ifgoods predominate, the transaction is
treated as a contract for sale and is within the scope ofArticle 2.
A "transaction in goods" could include a bailment or consignment ofgoods. These
transactions are not within the scope ofArticle 2. Article 2, however, may be extended by
analogy to transactions in goods not specifically covered.
3. Remedial promises. Article 2 does apply to remedial promises made by a seller in a
transaction in goods. 2-102(2). Thus, ifa seller makes and breaches a remedial promise, Article
2 governs enforcement by the buyer. See 2-408(b)(2), 2-408(f), 2-409(a), 2-409(c), 2-409(d), 2-
810(a)(3), 2-814(b)(3), and 2-827(c).
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4. Transactions involving goods and [software).
Alternative A to Subsection (b) follows 9-102(a)(44}.
Alternative B to Subsection (b) is derived from Article 2B.
Both definitions are under review.
The enactment ofArticle 2B should help to end recurring disputes over whether contracts
to develop or to license software should be treated as ''transactions in goods" for purposes of
Article 2. See, e.g., Micro Data Systems, Inc. v. Dharma Systems, Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (r" Cir.
1998). They are not.
5. Overlaps "ith other vee articles. Subsection (c) is new and replaces the language
in former 2-102 that Article 2 "does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of
an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a secured
transaction." This language, which applied to "either-or" transactions, did not deal with cases
where two or more articles applied to the same transaction.
There is no tension between articles i~ for example, the transaction is a contract for sale
and no security interest is created in the goods or ifthe transaction is exclusively a security
agreement. Similarly, if the transaction is a "true lease" rather than a sale ofgoods or a secured
transaction, Article 2A alone applies.
In a contract for sale, the most likely overlap is with Article 9. The seller, the buyer, or
some third person may create a security interest in the goods sold or a security interest may arise
under Article 2. In these cases, Article 9 not Article 2 applies to the creation, perfection, priority
and enforcement ofthe security interest. For ex~le,a security interest arising when the seller
ships under reservation, 2-604, is subject to Article. 9, but 9-113 {9-110} expressly refers some
aspects ofperfection and enforcement back to Article 2.
In cases where Article 2 gives the seller or buyer interests in the goods that are not
security interests, however, Article 2 rather than Article 9 govems the rights and remedies
between seller and buyer. These rights, however, may be subject to security interests in the same
goods perfected under Article 9 by third persons. For example, a reclaiming seller under 2-
816(b) is subject to the rights ofa good faith purchaser for value, including a secured party,
whose rights vest before the seller takes possession..~-816(c}.
[Ifpayment is by letter ofcredit, 2-308 and 2-605 deal with the duty ofthe buyer to
provide and the effect offurnishing or not ofthe letter ofcredit, but Article 5 defines the critical
terms and covers all aspects ofthe transaction until the letter ofcredit is paid or dishonored.]
6. Foreign exchange transactions. Sub~ection(d), which is new, excludes "foreign
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exchange transactions" from the scope ofArticle 2. Although a currency exchange is a sale of
goods, Le., a swap, see 2-301{a), an exchange where delivery is "through funds transfer, book
entry accounting, or other form ofpayment order, or other agreed means to transfer a credit
balance" is not governed by Article 2. Rather, Article 4A or other applicable federal law applies.
2-102{a){21). On the other hand. if the parties agree to a forward transaction where, ultimately,
dollars are to be physically delivered in exchange for the delivery ofEuros, the transaction is not
within the exclusion and Article 2 applies.
7. International sales. CISG applies to "contracts ofsale ofgoods" where the
jurisdictional requirements ofthe Convention are.satisfied. Art. l{l). Article 3 excludes
transactions where a party who orders goods to be manufacturer or produced supplies a
"substantial part ofthe materials necessary for such manufacture or production," Art. 3(1), or
where the "preponderant part" ofthe obligation ofthe party furnishing goods "consists in the
supply oflabour or other services." Art. 3(2).
CISG does not apply to sales ofconsumer goods, certain obligations to pay money,
"ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft," and electricity. Art. 2.
Cross References:
Definitional Cross References:
SEcrION 2-104. TRANSACTION SUBJEcr TO OTHER LAW.
(a) A transaction subject to this article is also subject to:
(I) [list any certificate oftitle statutes covering automobiles, trailers, mobile
homes, boats, farm tractors, or the like], except as to the rights ofa buyer in the ordinary course
ofbusiness under Section 2-S04{c) whose rights arise before a certificate oftitle covering the
goods is effective in the name ofany other buyer;
(2) any applicable law that establishes a different rule for consumers; or
(3) any other law ofthis State to which the subject matter ofthis article is subject,
such as laws dealing with:
(A) the sale ofagricultural products;
(B) the transfer ofblood. blood products, human tissues, and organs;
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6. Statute of limitations. Subsection (d) states that a cause ofaction for breach of
warranty of title or against infiingementaccrues for pwposes of the statute of limitations as
detennined under 2-814(c). The accrual time is when the buyer "discovers or should have
discovered the breach" not when the goods are tendered. Thus, the buyer has four years from
that discovery to bring a law suiL 2-814(a). No tolling period is imposed. Thus, if the buyer
should have first discovered the breach 10 yeaisafter delivery, the cause ofaction accrues then
and the buyer still has 4 years to bring suiL On this issue, no distinction is drawn between the
warranty..oftitle and the warranty against infringemenL
Without subsection (d), a cause of action for breach ofwarranty under subsection (a)
would accrue when the breach occurred even though the plaintiffdid not have lmowledge of the
breach. 2-814(b)(1). Under the Unifonn Sales Act the statute ran from the time ofdelivery or
when quiet possession was disturbed.. See Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). Fonner
Article 2 did not impose a warranty ofquiet possession. Thus, ifthe warranty was breached
upon tender ofdelivery but the owner did not replevy the goods until five years later, the statute
oflimitations had run unless the seller made an express warranty explicitly extending to future
perfoImance. Some courts have stretched to achieve this resulL See Balog v. Center Art
Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D.Haw. 1990)(warranty that art work "genuine"
explicitly extended to future perfonnance). Subsection (d) resolves this problem.
7. International sales. CISG ArL 41 provides simply that the seller "must deliver goods
which are free from any right or claim ofa third party, unless the buyer agreed to take the goods
subject to the right or claim." Art. 42(1), a motel-complex provision, gives the buyer some
protection against goods delivered by the seller which are subject to claims ofa third party
"based on industrial property or other intellectual property" ifthe seller "lmew or could not have
been unaware" ofthe claim and the claim is based on the law ofa State where the parties
contemplated that the goods would be used or resold. There is no obligation, however, if the
buyer "1cnew or could not have been unaware ofthe right or claim" or the buyer furnished
technical drawings or designs ofthe goods with which the seller complied. Art. 42(1).
SECfION 2-403. EXPRESS WARRANTY TO IMMEDIATE BUYER.
(a) Any representation made by the seller to the immediate buyer, including a
representation made in any medium ofcommunication to the public, including advertising, which
relates to the goods and becomes part ofthe basis ofthe bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods will conform to the representation or, with respect to a sample or model, that the whole
ofthe goods will conform to the sample or model.
(b) It is not necessary to create an express warranty that the seller use formal words such
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as "warranty" or "guaranty" or have a ~ecific intention to make a warranty. However, a
representation merely ofthe value ofthe goods or an affinnation purporting to be merely the
seller's opinion or commendation ofthe goods does not create an express warranty under
subsection (a).
(c) A representation, including a representation made in any medium ofcommunication
to the public, including advertising, which Was made to the immediate buyer and which relates to
the goods becomes part ofthe basis ofthe bargain unless:
(1) the immediate buyer knew that the representation was not true;
(2) a reasonable person in the position ofthe immediate buyer would not believe
that the representation was part ofthe agreement; or
(3) in the case ofa representation made in any medium ofcommunication to the
public, including advertising, the immediate buyer did not know ofthe representation at the time
ofthe sale.
(d) A right of action for breach ofwarranty under this section accrues as provided under
Section 2-814.
Comments
1. Source: Fonner Section 2-313.
2. Representations. Under subsection (a), express warranty obligations are created
through representations, including advertising, made by sellers to immediate buyers that become
part ofthe basis ofthe bargain. The assumption is that the bargain between the parties is
otherwise enforceable as a contract and is subject to other requirements ofthis Article, such as
the statute of frauds, 2-201, and the parol evidence rule, 2-202, 2-406(a). For the extent to which
representations protect others besides the immediate buyer, see 2-408, 2-409.
The definition ofrepresentation in 2-401(5) iiiciudes a promise by the seller about the
quality or the performance ofthe goods. Thus, a seller may either affinn to the buyer that the
A-82
j
:~•
J
;~
.,"r,.·<'
tt•
":i'
"J
4
J
I'·;"
I
j
f
]
~iii
J
;11
"•;
J
,.
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r•
r
r
r
r
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
;3
;4
,5
6
7
8
9
goods are X or may promise that the goods v.:,hen delivered will be X, or may promise that the
goods will perfolll1.like X after delivery. AIl'are telll1.S in the contract, but are treated as
representations under Part 4.
3. Puff"mg. Subsection (b) follows 2-313(2) ofcurrentArticle 2. Although preserving
the distinction between express warranty and puffing, subsection (b) does not provide a clear test
to distinguish the two. Presumably a buyer must first be reasonable under the circumstances in
believing~that a representation rather than puffing was made, and then argue that the
representation became part ofthe basis ofthe bargain.. See 2-408(b) and (c). However, a
representation or affirmation that is "puffing" is not a representation under subsection (a) that can
become part ofthe basis ofthe bargain.
There are a number of factors relevant to drawing the line between representations and
puffing. For example, the buyer might be unreasonable ifthe seller's representations taken in
context (1) were verbal rather than written, (2) were general rather than specific, (3) related to the
consequences ofbuying rather than the goods themselves, (4) were "hedged" in some way, (5)
related to experimental rather than standard goods, (6) concerned some aspects ofthe goods but
not a hidden or unexpected non-conformity, (7) were phrased in terms ofopinion rather than fact,
or (8) were not capable ofobjective measurement. See Federal Signal Corp. v. Safety Factors,
Inc., 886 P.2d 172 (Wash. 1994), where the court held that the trial court erred in not making
findings offact where the seller stated that a new product was "better than" an earlier,
comparable model. See also, Jordan v. Pascar, Inc., 37 F.3d 1181 (6th Cir. 1994)
(representations about strength offiberglass ro~twhich shattered and caused personal injury
when the truck rolled over were "puffing" as a matter oflaw). See also, Ivan L. Preston,
Regulatory Positions Toward Advertising Puffery ofthe Uniform Commercial Code and the
Federal Trade Commission, 16 J. Public Policy & Marketing 336 (1997).
4. Basis of the bargain. The "part ofthe basis ofthe bargain" requirement stated in 2-
313(1)(a) is retained in subsection (a). Unlike current 2-313, however, subsection (c) states when
a representation becomes part of the basis ofthe bargain and this should help to resolve the
disagreement over what that phrase means. See e.g., Holdych & Mann, The Basis ofthe Bargain
Requirement: A Market and Economic BasedAnalysis ofExpress Warranties, 45 De Paul L.
Rev. 781 (1996). There is no intention to change the interpretation offormer 2-313 and the
comments that an affirmation offact becomes part ofthe basis ofthe bargain unless one of the
exceptions in subsection (c) is established. Buettner v. ~W. Martin & Sons, Inc., 47 F.3d 116
(4ch Cir. 1995) (Virginia law); Tomie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot, Inc., 862 P.2d 299 (Idaho
1993); Torres v. Northwest Engineering Co., 949 P.2d 1004 (Hawaii App. 1998); Weng v.
Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254 (Ill.App. 1997); Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. App.
1985)..
Subsection (c) states that a representation, including representations by advertising,
becomes part of the basis ofthe bargain unless one or more of the three conditions are satisfied.
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Subsection (c)(l) excludes ifthe immediate buyer to whom the representation was made
knew that the representation was not tnie. If, however, the buyer had doubts about the truth or
accuracy ofthe representation but the seller continued to affirm, an express warranty can be
created. See Rogath v. Siebenmanna 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997) (buyer's doubt about accuracy
of representation does not preclude express warranty).
Subsection (c)(2) states another defense, that a "reasonable person" in the position ofthe
immediate buyer would not believe that the representation was part ofthe agreement. Thus, the
buyer can know ofand believe the representation but still be unreasonable in that belief. For
example, if the buyer brings its own expert to the bargaining table and relies upon her judgment
that the goods are ofquality X, it is unlikely that the buyer was influenced by or relied upon the
seller's affirmation that the quality was Y rather than X. Such an assertion or belief, under the
circumstances, would be unreasonable.
[Proposed Explanatory Comment
A reasonable person in the position of the immediate buyer would not believe that a
seller's representation became part of the basis of the bargain uno such reasonable person
would have been influenced by or relied on the representation in entering the contract or
any modification thereof.)
Subsection (c)(3) states that when the immediate buyer claims an express warranty
created by advertising there is no express warranty ifthe immediate buyer did not know ofthe
representation at the time ofthe sale. This gives a bit more protection to sellers who represent
through advertising than when other representations are involved.
5. Temporal issues. "Agreement" is defined as the "bargain ofthe parties in fact." 1-
201(3). So "basis ofthe bargain" is another way of saying "basis ofthe agreement." Since
agreements can be made both before and after a Contract is formed, there is no artificial time at
which an express warranty must be made. Thus, a representation, including those made by
advertising, made before or after contract formation can become part of the basis of the bargain.
Ifa representation is made after the contract is folined, the requirements for a modification in 2- 1
209(a) must be satisfied. See Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (lOch Cir. 1984). ....!
6. When a cause ofaction accrues under this section for purposes ofthe statute of
limitations is stated in 2-814.
7. International sales. CISG covers express warranty problems with spare language that
does not mention the word "warranty." Article 35(1) provides that the seller "must deliver goods
which are ofthe quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are
contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract." Article 35(2)(c) provides that
unless the parties have agreed otherwise, goods do not conform to the contract unless they
''possess the qualities ofgoods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample or model."
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SECTION 2-404. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY; USAGE OF
TRADE.
(a) Subject to Sections 2-406 and 2-407, a warranty that goods m merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods ofthat kind.
Under this section, the serving for value offood or drink to be consumed on the premises or
elsewhere is a sale.
(b) Goods, to be merchantable, at a minimum must:
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract agreed description;
(2) in the case offungible goods, be offair, average quality within the description;
(3) be fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description are used;
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, ofeven kind, quality,
and quantity within each unit and among all units.ihvolved;
(5) be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement or
circumstances may require; and
(6) conform to any representations made on the container or label.
(c) Subject to Section 2-406, other implit:d warranties IDay arise from course ofdealing or
usage oftrade.
Comments
1. Source: Follows former Section 2-314.
2. Scope. Subsection (a) conforms to former 2-314(1). The seller must be a merchant
<<with respect to goods of that kind" before a warranty ofmerchantability is implied in a contract
for sale. This is the most exacting definition ofmerchant See 2-102(a)U. The serving for
value offood or drink for consumption on the premises or elsewhere is treated as a sale. Thus,
both the patron in a restaurant and a buyer of"take out" food are protected by the implied
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warranty ofmerchantability.
Note that the implied warranty ofmerchantability may be disclaimed or modified to the
extent provided in 2406, and may be subordinated by an express warranty, see 2407(3).
Moreover, certain transactions, such as the furnishing ofblood or body parts, may be regulated
by so-called state "'blood shield" statutes. See 2-104(a)(3).
2: Content. Subsection (b) follows 2-314(2) with the following changes: (a) The phrase
"agreed description" rather than "contract description" is used in (b)(1); (b) The phrase "goods of
that description" rather than ""for which such goods" is used in (b)(3). This emphasizes the
impo$I1ce ofthe agreed description in determining fitness for ordinary purposes; (c) The phrase
"'or cIrcumstances" is added after "the agreement" in (b)(5). The "circumstances" may indicate
to the seller that the buyer might be mislead about the goods and require an adequate label; and
(d) The word ""any"replaces "'the" in the first line and the phrase ""ifany" is deleted.
Subsection (b) states the minimum standards ofmerchantability which are derived, in
large part, from the agreed description ofthe goods. These standards supplement 2403(a),
where a description ofthe goods may be a rePresentation that creates an express warranty. For
example, suppose that the seller describes the goods as a ""3 horse power lawn mower that will
start on the first pull and cut grass up to five inches tall." More than a core description is
involved here. The seller represents the ease ofstarting and the capabilities ofthe mower. On
the other hand, suppose the agreed description is simply "'power lawn mower" and there are no
other representations. Ifthe power mower does not start on the first pull or will only cut grass up
to two inches tall, the buyer cannot rely on 2-403 for recovery and must fall back on 2-404.
Note, however, that many ofthe merchantability standards still overlap with representations that
could be express warranties under 2-403.
For the ''power mower to be merchantable:
(a) It must pass without objection in the trade under the agreed description. Would sellers
and buyers in the trade and familiar with trade descriptions object to goods described as a power
mower that would not start on the first pull? See Agoos Kid Co., Inc. v. Blumenthal Import
Corp., 184 N.E. 279 (Mass. 1933) (trade description under UnifoIm Sales Act).
(b) In a lot of50 identical lawn mowers, it must be of"fair average quality" within the
description. Thus, if49 lawn mowers ofthe same description started on five pulls or less and
one took 20 pulls, that ""one" would, arguably, be ~erchantable.
(c) The goods must be fit for the "ordinary purposes for which goods ofthat description
are used." This is one ofthe most important and frequently invoked standards. Here, evidence of
ordinary purposes is required. What do goods described as a ''power lawn mower" do and what
would a reasonable buyer expect it to do? A power mower that would not start in less than 20
pulls or would not cut an ordinary lawn or created a danger ofinjury to the operator might be
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unmerchantable.
(d) If the agreement pennits variations ofland or quality, the particular goods must be
within those variations. Thus, ifa commercial buyer buys 20 power lawnmowers and the
agreement states that the seller can furnish three different makes and that all makes must start in
five pulls or less, a lawnmower ofa different make or a lawnmower that won't start in less than
10 pulls is probably unmerchantable.
(e) The goods must be adequately contained, packaged or labeled as required by the
agreement or the circumstances.
(t) The goods must conform to any representation made on the container or label.
3. Subsection (c) follows 2-314(3). An implied warranty may arise from a course of
dealing or usage oftrade.
4. Personal injuries
Suppose that an unmerchantable lawn mower caused personal injuries to the buyer, who
was operating the goods. Without more, the immediate buyer can sue the seller for breach ofthe
implied warranty ofmerchantability and recover for injury to person or property "proximately
resulting" from the breach. 2-806(2).
~I
This opportunity does not resolve the tension between warranty law and tort law where
goods cause damage to person or property. The primary source ofthat tension arises from
disagreement over whether the concept ofdefect in tort and the concept ofmerchantability in
Article 2 are coextensive where personal injuries are involved, i.e., ifgoods are merchantable
under warranty law can they still be defective under tort law and ifgoods are not defective under
tort law can they be unmerchantable under warranty law? The answer to both questions is yes
only ifthe contract standard for merchantability, e.g., reasonable expectations, and the tort
standard for defect are different. Even though the outcome under different standards will be the
same in most cases, i.e., unmerchantable goods are frequently defective and defective goods are
frequently unmerchantable, there are a few exceptions, especially where design defects are
involved. See Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (goods not defective in
tort may be unmerchantable in warranty underN~ York law).
The tension between merchantability in warranty and defect in tort where personal
injuries or damage to property are involved should be resolved as follows:
When recovery is sought for injury to person or property, whether goods are
merchantable is to be determined by applicable state products liability law.
When, however, a claim for injury to· person or property is based on an implied
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warranty of fitness under Sectton 2-405 or an express warranty under Sections 2-
403 or 2-408, this Article determines whether an implied warranty of fitness or an
express warranty was made and breached, as well as what damages are recoverable
under Section 2-806.
To illustrate, suppose that the seller makes a representation about the safety ofthe lawn
mower that becomes part ofthe basis ofthe buyer's bargain. The buyer is injured when the gas
tank cracks and a fire breaks out. Ifthe lawnmower without the representation is not defective
under applicable tort law, it is not unmerchantable under 2-404. On the other hand, if the
lawnmower did not conform to the representation about safety, the seller has made and breached
an express warranty and the buyer may sue under Article 2.
5. International sales. Article 35(2) ofCISG provides that unless the parties have
agreed otherwise, goods do not conform with the contract unless they are "fit for the purposes for
which goods ofthe same description would ordinarily be used" or are adequately contained and
packaged. CISG, however, "does not apply to the liability ofthe seller for death or personal
injury caused by the goods to any person." Art. 5.
SEcrION 2-405. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. Subject to Section 2-406, ifa seller at the time ofcontracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is an implied warranty that the
goods are fit for that purpose.
Comments
1. Source: Follows former Section 2-315.
2. Scope and content. This section covers the case where the buyer has particular
purposes or needs for goods and there is no express warranty that the goods will meet those
purposes or the particular purposes are not ordinary purposes for which goods ofthat description
are used. The requirements, however, a somewhat exacting.
Although the seller need not be a merchant (any seller can make an implied warranty of
fitness) the seller at the time ofcontracting must have reason to know ofany particular purpose
for which the goods are required. Normally, this purpose is communicated by the buyer to the
seller.
The seller at the time ofcontracting must also have reason to know that the buyer is
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relying on the seller's skill or judgment to selectpr furnish suitable goods. Thus, if the buyer
furnishes detailed specifications for goOOs that satisfy particular pwposes and asks the seller to
follow them. the buyer is not relying on the seller's skill and judgment and the seller has reason
to know it.
The buyer's particular and ordinary pwpose usually are different. Goods that are
merchantable may not be fit for particular pwposes. In some cases, a buyer may claim a breach of
the fitness warranty when the goods, in fact, are unmerchantable. In these cases , the elements
ofboth warranties must be properly plead and proved. See Van Wyck v. Norden Laboratories,
Inc., 345 N.W.2d 81 (Iowa 1984).
Finally, the implied warranty offitness may be disclaimed under 2-406.
Example. S manufactures and sells iron products. B, a state conservation agent, wants to
purchase iron collars to attach the steel blade ofa hoe to a wooden handle. The pwpose ofthe
hoe is to plant pine seedlings and the strength ofthe collar required depends upon the type ofsoil
involved. Most collars will work in sandy or clay soil but a stronger collar and blade is required
in rocky conditions. After some discussion, S agreed to supply B with 2,000 "hoe dad" collars
for $10 each. After delivery, B learned that the hoedads worked well in sandy and clay soil but
that 80% ofthe hoedads broke when used in rocky soil. On these facts, it is unlikely that S made
and breached a warranty: (1) There was no express warranty that the collars were fit for use in
rocky soil; (2) The collars were fit for the ordinary pwposes for which the collars were used, i.e.,
sandy or clay soil; and (3) B did not reveal to S 06fely upon S to furnish goods that met the
particular pwpose required, i.e., effective use in roeky soil.
2. CISG. Article 35(2)(b) provides that unless the parties have otherwise agreed, goods
do not conform with the contract unless they are ""fit for any particular pwpose expressly or
impliedly made known to the seller at the time ofthe conclusion ofthe contract, except where the
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the
seller's skill and judgement."
SECfION 2-406. DISCLAIMER ORMODIFICATION OF WARRANTY.
(a) Words or conduct relevant to the creation ofan express warranty and words or
conduct tending to disclaim or modify an express warranty must be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other. Subject to. Section 2-202 with regard to parol or
extrinsic evidence, words or conduct disclaiming or modifying an express warranty are
ineffective inoperathe [style] to the extent that this construction is unreasonable.
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Y2K LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
With predictions of litigation costs of as much as one trillion dollars and images of
volumes upon volumes of lawsuits crowding the courts, legislative efforts to cope with
the Y2K problem have been plentiful at both the state and federal level. While some
legislation has already been enacted, most is either pending or soon to be filed. Much of
the legislation at the state level has focused on the exposure of state and local
governments, while the federal effort has focused on limiting the liability of potential
defendants. What follows is a general overview of the efforts to date.
I. State Efforts at Legislation
Many states have been quick to initiate legislation protecting both private
businesses and state and local governments from liability for Y2K related issues. Most
of the measures which afford protection to the private sector do so through a "good faith"
defense, limitations on damages, and other means also seen in the federal proposals
discussed later.
At the same time, many states are pushing litigation to protect the state itself. At
least one attorney general has advised that current immunity protection would be
sufficient to shield that attorney general's state from any Y2K liability exposure, but most
state legislatures are undertaking an effort to pass new laws which specifically address
B-1
state and local government immunity for Y2K-related lawsuits.
Nevada was the frrst state to pass legislation addressing the liability of state
government in 1997. Since then, at least six other states have passed legislation
addressing liability of state government, including California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
South Dakota, and Virginia. Approximately another thirty states and the District of
Columbia have some sort of legislation introduced which would curb the ability to seek
damages from state or local governments. Some of these different efforts include
complete immunity, damages limited to actual damages, immunity from punitive
damages, and immunity from all actions except personal injury and death.
II. Federal Efforts at Legislation
The attempts at federal legislation regarding the litigation of Y2K-related suits has
certainly been a hot topic of late. Five separate bills have been introduced in the Senate
and House of Representatives which address the litigation aspects of Y2K failures. Even
as this update was being drafted, Congress continues to battle over the key features of
such a bill. As of May 3, 1999, none of these efforts had been passed by either house.
Legislation regarding litigation aspects has not been the only topic for Congress
related to Y2K, however. Several bills relating to government preparedness and funding
for particular agencies and commissions have been enacted. Two bills have already been
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acted which address concerns of the private sector. Several more are possibly
forthcoming in the next few months as well.
The following review of federal legislative efforts is broken down into three
sections: i) enacted legislation; ii) pending legislation; and iii) potential future legislation.
This review should cover the two bills already enacted, the handful of bills currently
pending, and the possible forthcoming bills.
III. Enacted Legislation
To date, two Y2K bills dealing directly with the private sector have been enacted.
The first, the Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act, addresses the need for businesses
to disclose their efforts at prevention and remediation without fear of exposure to liability.
The second, the Small Business Year 2000 Readiness Act, provides means of assisting
small businesses in their efforts to cure and cope with any Y2K failures.
A. Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act
The Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act, Senate Bill 2392, was signed into
law by President Clinton on October 19, 1998. Its stated purpose is to promote the free
disclosure and exchange of information regarding Y2K readiness. The Act was generally
a response to the hesitancy of many businesses to respond to Y2K questionnaires out of
B-3
fear that they would only be exposing themselves to liability by any representations made
in response to those questionnaires. The main effect of the Act is to prohibit Y2K
readiness disclosure statements from being admissible to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein.
Section 4 of the Act expressly makes readiness disclosure statements inadmissible
to prove the accuracy or truth of any year 2000 statement therein, with two exceptions.
First, a readiness disclosure statement is admissible as the basis for a claim of anticipatory
breach. Second, the court shall have discretion to admit the statement if it determines that
the maker's use of the readiness disclosure statement amounts to bad faith or fraud or is
otherwise beyond what is reasonable to effect the purposes of the Act.
The Act also addresses the standard for liability for providing false, misleading,
and inaccurate Y2K statements. The maker is not liable for a false, misleading, or
inaccurate statement unless a plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
(l) the year 2000 statement was material; and
(2)(A) to the extent the year 2000 statement was not a
republication, that the maker made the year 2000 statement--
(i) with actual knowledge that the year 2000 statement
was false, inaccurate, or misleading;
B-4
JI
II
a
I
,j•
Ii,,;;
;1•
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I,''\.
I~"'.
I
Ii..'.'
I
I
r
r,.
;
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
(ii) with intent to deceive or mislead; or
(iii) with a reckless disregard as to the accuracy of
the year 2000 statement; or
(B) to the extent the year 2000 statement was a
republication, that the maker of the republication made the year
2000 statement--
(i) with actual knowledge that the year 2000 statement
was false, inaccurate, or misleading;
(ii) with intent to deceive or mislead; or
(iii) without notice in that year 2000 statement that--
(I) the maker has not verified the contents of the
republication; or
(II) the maker is not the source of the
republication and the republication is based on
information supplied by another person or entity
identified in that year 2000 statement or republication.
The Act also addresses the standard for defamation suits based on Y2K disclosure
statements. The maker of a disclosure statement is not liable for defamation unless, in
addition to all other elements for defamation under applicable law, the plaintiff
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was made with
B-5
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
The Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act also states that a disclosure
statement will generally not be interpreted as an amendment to a contract or warranty
unless allowed for by the contract itself or if made as part of a contract or amendment
thereto. In addition, it provides for a Year 2000 Internet Website for posting readiness
disclosure statements. Posting of such statements on the website is deemed as adequate
notice of the statement in certain situations.
A copy of the Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act is attached as Exhibit A.
B. Small Business Year 2000 Readiness Act
While the efforts of large corporations and government have garnered much of the
attention regarding Y2K readiness, many commentators agree that it is the small business
that it is the most at risk and the most likely to be unprepared. A small business often has
very little surplus capital and must operate on a positive cash flow basis. As such, a Y2K
failure has much greater consequences for a small company since it could literally destroy
the company. At the same time, small companies also have fewer resources to use in
addressing potential Y2K problems and, as a general rule, are far behind in preparation.
As a result, Congress enacted the Small Business Year 2000 Readiness Act, Senate
Bill 314, to assist small businesses in fighting the Y2K battle. The Act directs the Small
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Business Association to set up a limited-term loan guarantee program through December
31, 2000. The loan program will allow eligible small businesses to obtain additional
funds from the SBA for use in addressing potential problems and to provide relief for
substantial economic injuries which occur as a direct result of Y2K problems. The SBA
is expected to guarantee approximately $500 million dollars in loans through the end of
the program.
Normally, SBA-guaranteed loans allow for 80% of capital for loans up to
$100,000 and 75% for loans in excess of $100,000. Under the Act, the percentage of
capital on SBA-guaranteed loans is raised to 90% on loans up to $100,000 and 85 % in
excess of $100,000. It also allows the SBA to guarantee the total outstanding loans for a
business up to one million dollars for Y2K, while the normal maximum is $750,000.
A copy of the Small Business Year 2000 Readiness Act is attached as Exhibit B.
IV. Pending Federal Legislation
Five different bills have been introduced in Congress which address the litigation
aspects of the Y2K problem. To date, none have been passed, although several have
come very close over the last several weeks. The five proposed bills are as follows:
• The Y2K Act, Senate Bill 96 (McCain)
• Year 2000 Fairness and Responsibility Act, Senate Bill 461 (Hatch,
Feinstein)
B-7
• Y2K Fairness in Litigation Act, Senate Bill 738 (Dodd)
• The Year 2000 Consumer Protection Act of 1999, House Bill 192
(Manzullo)
• Year 2000 Readiness and Responsibility Act, House Bill 775 (Davis-
Moran)
Each of these bills has touched on the idea of easing the litigation burden on potential
defendants and the court system through various means.
The bills as initially proposed all seem to agree on a waiting period before a
claimant could file suit. The consensus seems to require notice to the potential defendant
which allows the potential defendant thirty days to respond to the complaint and an
additional sixty days to correct the problem. The bills also all seem to emphasize the use
of alternative dispute resolution, either through voluntary or required mediation or
arbitration.
Where the bills seem to differ is in weighing the protection for business against the
needs of consumers. While most of the bills started with at least some form of cap on
damages, the bill proposed by Senator Dodd, and backed by President Clinton at the time,
contained no caps whatsoever. Others limit the amount of damages other than actual
damages, limit punitive damages, and limit liability for individual officers and directors.
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In addition, House Bill 775 proposed to limit attorneys' fees.
Over the last few weeks, the Senate has seen considerable debate and compromise
in attempting to forge a bill which will gamer enough votes to pass the Senate. On April
26, 1999, Senate Bill 96 came before the Senate for debate. Several of the key provisions
of Senate Bill 96 as it went before the Senate included:
• 90 day cooling off period
• damages not recoverable where plaintiff could have avoided failure
• Punitives capped to $250,000 unless fraud wi intent to injure plaintiff
• Non-economic loss damages limited to 3 times actual loss or $250,000,
whichever is greater
• Non-economic loss damages limited to $50,000 for businesses with
fewer than 25 full-time employees and individuals with a net worth
no greater than $500,000
• a defendant could avoid liability for plaintiffs economic loss if it showed
due diligence and reasonable care was taken to prevent or fix the Y2K
problem
• Directors' and officers' liability limited to $100,000 unless a material
misstateQ.1ent was made or information was withheld
• Federal and state governmental immunity from punitive damages
• All claimS are treated as a breach of contract claim, regardless of how
stated
B-9
• The Bill would not cover personal injury or wrongful death cases
Needless to say, the proposed bill sparked much heated debate. Much of the complaint
set forth by Democrats was that the bill looked more like tort reform than a bill designed
to reduce Y2K costs. Senator Dodd also continued his strong stance, and presumably the
position of the White House, in opposing a bill with any form of caps whatsoever.
By the afternoon of Tuesday, April 27, 1999, key players in the Senate effort to
craft a Y2K bill met behind closed doors in an attempt to find compromise. Included in
the meetings were Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona), chief sponsor of Senate Bill 96; Sen.
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-California), sponsors of Senate Bill
461; and Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Connecticut), sponsor of Senate Bill 738, among
others.
On Wednesday, April 28. 1999, it seemed as though a compromise had been
reached. The compromise offered the following changes:
• eliminates punitive damage caps for businesses with more than 50
employees
• retains the punitive damage cap for businesses with fewer than 50
employees
• eliminates personal liability caps for officers and directors
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• preserves state evidentiary standards for certain claims, such as fraud
• allows for proportional liability (rather than joint and several) to ensure that
defendants will not pay for more than the damages for which they are
responsible, with exceptions when a plaintiff has a modest net worth who
cannot collect from one or more defendants and the defendants have
intentionally injured the plaintiff
The Bill would continue to not cover personal injury and wrongful death claims, would
not interfere with parties who have already agreed on Y2K terms and conditions, and
would require mitigation of damages.
By Thursday, April 29, 1999, however, the compromise bill stalled. The bi-
partisan group which forged the compromise quickly became partisan again. The Bill
was scheduled to come to the floor for approval, but a new debate arose as Senate
Democrats suggested several amendments to the Bill. Republicans balked at the
amendments stating that they were unrelated, criticizing most notably an amendment that
would increase the minimum wage. Senators John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and Charles
Robb (D-Virginia) were also crafting an alternative bill which eliminates liability caps
altogether. While the Clinton administration has threatened to veto Senate Bill 96, it
apparently would endorse such an alternative bill with no liability caps.
B-ll
While the Senate compromise locked up, the House began to take action again.
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-California) offered a substitute bill to House Bill 775. The main
difference would be that Lofgren's substitute would eliminate corporate and personal
liability caps. Lofgren's substitute would apparently include the 90 day cooling off
period, require pleading with specificity, and proportionate liability, among other
provisions. The House was scheduled to resume debate on May 4, 1999. President
Clinton has endorsed Lofgren's proposal while threatening to veto House Bill 775.
In summary, as of May 3, 1999, the concept of Y2K litigation legislation is a very
real one, but the details of a final bill are sketchy. The key features could be ironed out
soon and could greatly affect lawsuits brought for damages from Y2K failures.
v. Potential Future Legislation
At least two additional pieces of legislation are possibly forthcoming in the future
months. First, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has suggested that it
may seek additional funding and possibly legislation from Congress to aid local housing
authorities and business partners. While the Department has reported that its own
preparations are advancing smoothly, it has expressed concern that some local housing
authorities may not have the resources for full preparation. The Department is also
concerned with the level of readiness for many of the business partners on which the
Department and local authorities rely.
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Representative Tom Davis (R-Va.) has also publicly stated that he is drafting a bill
to assist state and local governments in purchasing Y2K products and services. The bill,
tentatively named the Year 2000 Compliance Assistance Act, would allow state and local
governments to purchase such products and services through the multiple awards
schedule administered by the General Service Administration's Federal Supply Service.
Such an option would give state and local governments more flexibility through
cooperative purchasing.
B-13
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EXHIBIT A
YEAR 2000 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
S. 2392 •• ENACTED AND SIGNED INTO LAW
105th Congress, Second Session
Date Introduced: 07/30/98
Version Date: 1% 1/98
Version type: Enrolled (finally passed both houses)
Sponsor: Bennett R. (R-UT)
ANACf
To encourage the disclosure and exchange of infonnation about
computer processing problems, solutions, test practices and test
results, and related matters in connection with the transition to
the year 2000.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Year 2000 Infonnation and
Readiness Disclosure Act".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.-Congress fmds the following:
(1 )(A) At least thousands but possibly millions of
infonnation technology computer systems, software programs, and
semiconductors are not capable of recognizing certain dates in
1999 and after December 31, 1999, and will read dates in the
year 2000 and thereafter as if those dates represent the year
1900 or thereafter or will fail to process those dates.
(B) The problem described in subparagraph (A) and resulting
failures could incapacitate systems that are essential to the
functioning of markets, commerce, consumer products, utilities,
government, and safety and defense systems, in the United States
and throughout the world.
(C) Reprogramming or replacing affected systems before the
problem incapacitates essential systems is a matter of national
and global interest.
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(2) The prompt, candid, and thorough disclosure and
exchange of information related to year 2000 readiness of
entities, products, and services-
(A) would greatly enhance the ability of public and
private entities to improve their year 2000 readiness; and
(B) is therefore a matter of national importance and a
vital factor in minimizing any potential year 2000 related
disruption to the Nation's economic well-being and security.
(3) Concern about the potential for legal liability
associated with the disclosure and exchange of year 2000
readiness information is impeding the disclosure and exchange of
such information.
(4) The capability to freely disseminate and exchange
information relating to year 2000 readiness, solutions, test
practices and test results, with the public and other entities
without undue concern about litigation is critical to the
ability of public and private entities to address year 2000
needs in a timely manner.
(5) The national interest will be served by uniform legal
standards in connection with the disclosure and exchange of year
2000 readiness information that will promote disclosures and
exchanges of such information in a timely fashion.
(b) PURPOSES.--Based upon the powers contained in article I,
section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States, the
purposes of this Act are--
(1) to promote the free disclosure and exchange of
information related to year 2000 readiness;
(2) to assist consumers, small businesses, and local
governments in effectively and rapidly responding to year 2000
problems; and
(3) to lessen burdens on interstate commerce by
establishing certain uniform legal principles in connection with
the disclosure and exchange of information relat~d to year 2000
readiness.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) ANTITRUST LAWS.-The term "antitrust laws"--
(A) has the meaning given to it in subsection (a) of
the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a»,
except that such term includes section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent such
section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition; and
(B) includes any State law similar to the laws referred
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to in subparagraph (A).
(2) CONSUMER.-The tenn "consumer" means an individual who
acquires a consumer product for purposes other than resale.
(3) CONSUMER PRODUCT.--The tenn "consumer product" means
any personal property or service which is nonnally used for
personal, family, or household purposes.
(4) COVERED ACTION.--The tenn "covered action" means a
civil action of any kind, whether arising under Federal or State
law, except for an action brought by a Federal, State, or other
public entity, agency, or authority acting in a regulatory,
supervisory, or enforcement capacity.
(5) MAKER.--The tenn "maker" means each person or entity,
including the United States or a State or political subdivision
thereof, that-
(A) issues or publishes any year 2000 statement;
(B) develops or prepares any year 2000 statement; or
(C) assists in, contributes to, or reviews, reports or
comments on during, or approves, or otherwise takes part in
the preparing, developing, issuing, approving, or publishing
of any year 2000 statement.
(6) REPUBUCATION.-The tenn "republication" means any
repetition, in whole or in part, of a year 2000 statement
originally made by another.
(7) YEAR 2000 INTERNET WEBSITE.--The tenn "year 2000
Internet website" means an Internet website or other similar
electronically accessible service, clearly designated on the
website or service by the person or entity creating or
controlling the content of the website or service as an area
where year 2000 statements concerning that person or entity are
posted or otherwise made accessible to the general public.
(8) YEAR 2000 PROCESSING.--The tenn "year 2000 processing"
means the processing (including calculating, comparing,
sequencing, displaying, or storing), transmitting, or receiving
of date data from, into, and between the 20th and 21st centuries,
and during the years 1999 and 2000, and leap year calculations.
(9) YEAR 2000 READINESS DISCLOSURE.--The tenn "year 2000
readiness disclosure" means any written year 2000 statement--
(A) clearly identified on its face as a year 2000
readiness disclosure;
(B) inscribed on a tangible medium or stored in an
electronic or other medium and retrievable in perceivable
fonn; and
(C) issued or published by or with the approval of a
person or entity with respect to year 2000 processing of
that person or entity or of products or services offered by
that person or entity.
(10) YEAR 2000 REMEDIATION PRODUCT OR SERVICE.--The tenn
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"year 2000 remediation product or service" means a software
program or service licensed, sold, or rendered by a person or
entity and specifically designed to detect or correct year 2000
processing problems with respect to systems, products, or
services manufactured or rendered by another person or entity.
(11) YEAR 2000 STATEMENT.--
(A) IN GENERAL.--The term "year 2000 statement" means
any communication or other conveyance of information by a
party to another or to the public, in any form or medium-
(i) concerning an assessment, projection, or
estimate concerning year 2000 processing capabilities of
an entity, product, service, or set of products and
services;
(ii) concerning plans, objectives, or timetables
for implementing or verifying the year 2000 processing
capabilities of an entity, product, service, or set of
products and services;
(iii) concerning test plans, test dates, test
results, or operational problems or solutions related to
year 2000 processing by--
(I) products; or
(m services that incorporate or utilize
products; or
(iv) reviewing, commenting on, or otherwise
directly or indirectly relating to year 2000 processing
capabilities.
(B) NOT INCLUDED.--For the purposes of any action
brought under the securities laws, as that term is defined
in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47», the term "year 2000 statement" does
not include statements contained in any documents or
materials filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
or with Federal banking regulators, pursuant to section
12(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
781(i», or disclosures or writing that when made
accompanied the solicitation of an offer or sale of
securities.
SEC. 4. PROTECTION FOR YEAR 2000 STATEMENTS.
(a) EVIDENCE EXCLUSION.-No year 2000 readiness disclosure, in
whole or in part, shall be admissible against the maker of that
disclosure to prove the accuracy or truth of any year 2000 statement
set forth in that disclosure, in any covered action brought by
another party except that-
(1) a year 2000 readiness disclosure may be admissible to
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serve as the basis for a claim for anticipatory breach, or
repudiation of a contract, or a similar claim against the maker,
to the extent provided by applicable law; and
(2) the court in any covered action shall have discretion
to limit application of this subsection in any case in which the
court determines that the maker's use of the year 2000 readiness
disclosure amounts to bad faith or fraud, or is otherwise beyond
what is reasonable to achieve the purposes of this Act.
(b) FALSE, MISLEADING AND INACCURATE YEAR 2000 STATEMENTS.--
Except as provided in subsection (c), in any covered action, to the
extent that such action is based on an allegedly false, inaccurate,
or misleading year 2000 statement, the maker of that year 2000
statement shall not be liable under Federal or State law with
respect to that year 2000 statement unless the claimant establishes,
in addition to all other requisite elements of the applicable action,
by clear and convincing evidence, that-
(1) the year 2000 statement was material; and
(2)(A) to the extent the year 2000 statement was not a
republication, that the maker made the year 2000 statement--
(i) with actual knowledge that the year 2000 statement
was false, inaccurate, or misleading;
(ii) with intent to deceive or mislead; or
(iii) with a reckless disregard as to the accuracy of
the year 2000 statement; or
(B) to the extent the year 2000 statement was a
republication, that the maker of the republication made the year
2000 statement--
(i) with actual knowledge that the year 2000 statement
was false, inaccurate, or misleading;
(ii) with intent to deceive or mislead; or
(iii) without notice in that year 2000 statement that--
(I) the maker has not verified the contents of the
republication; or
(m the maker is not the source of the
republication and the republication is based on
information supplied by another person or entity
identified in that year 2000 statement or republication.
(c) DEFAMATION O'R SIMll..AR CLAlMS.--In a covered action arising
under any Federal or State law of defamation, trade disparagement,
or a similar claim, to the extent such action is based on an
allegedly false, inaccurate, or misleading year 2000 statement, the
maker of that year 2000 statement shall not be liable with respect
to that year 2000 statement, unless the claimant establishes by
clear and convincing evidence, in addition to all other requisite
elements of the applicable action, that the year 2000 statement was
B -19
made with knowledge that the year 2000 statement was false or made
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
(d) YEAR 2000 INTERNET WEBSITE.-
(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in
any covered action other than a covered action involving
personal injury or serious physical damage to property, in which
the adequacy of notice about year 2000 processing is at issue,
the posting, in a commercially reasonable manner and for a
commercially reasonable duration, of a notice by the entity
charged with giving such notice on the year 2000 Internet
website of that entity shall be deemed an adequate mechanism for
providing that notice.
(2) EXCEPTION.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply if the court
finds that the use of the mechanism of notice-
(A) is contrary to express prior representations
regarding the mechanism of notice made by the party giving
notice;
(B) is materially inconsistent with the regular course
of dealing between the parties; or
(C) occurs where there have been no prior
representations regarding the mechanism of notice, no
regular course of dealing exists between the parties, and
actual notice is clearly the most commercially reasonable
means of providing notice.
(3) CONSTRUCfION.-Nothing in this subsection shall--
(A) alter or amend any Federal or State statute or
regulation requiring that notice about year 2000 processing
be provided using a different mechanism;
(B) create a duty to provide notice about year 2000
processing;
(C) preclude or suggest the use of any other medium for
notice about year 2000 processing or require the use of an
Internet website; or
(0) mandate the content or timing of any notices about
year 2000 processing.
(e) LIMITATION ON EFFECf OF YEAR 2000 STATEMENTS.--
(1) IN GENERAL~-Inany covered action, a year 2000
statement shall not be interpreted or construed as an amendment
to or alteration of a contract or warranty, whether entered into
by or approved for a public or private entity.
(2) NOT APPLICABLE.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-This subsection shall not apply--
(i) to the extent the party whose year 2000
statement is alleged to have amended or altered a
B-20
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contract or warranty has otherwise agreed in writing to
so alter or amend the contract or warranty;
(ii) to a year 2000 statement made in conjunction
with the formation of the contract or warranty; or
(iii) if the contract or warranty specifically
provides for its amendment or alteration through the
making of a year 2000 statement.
(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection
shall affect applicable Federal or State law in effect as of
the date of enactment of this Act with respect to
determining the extent to which a year 2000 statement
affects a contract or warranty.
(f) SPECIAL DATA GATHERING.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-A Federal entity, agency, or authority may
expressly designate a request for the voluntary provision of
information relating to year 2000 processing, inCluding year
2000 statements, as a special year 2000 data gathering request
made pursuant to this subsection.
(2) SPECIFICS.--A special year 2000 data gathering request
made under this subsection shall specify a Federal entity,
agency, or authority, or, with its consent, another public or
private entity, agency, or authority, to gather responses to the
request.
(3) PROTECTIONS.--Except with the express consent or
permission of the provider of information described in paragraph
(1), any year 2000 statements or other such information provided
by a party in response to a special year 2000 data gathering
request made under this subsection-
(A) shall be exempt from disclosure under subsection
(b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United States Code,
commonly known as the "Freedom of Information Act";
(B) shall not be disclosed to any third party; and
(C) may not be used by any Federal entity, agency, or
authority or by any third party, directly or indirectly, in
any civil action arising under any Federal or State law.
(4) EXCEPTIONS.--
(A) INFORMATION OBTAINED ELSEWHERE.-Nothing in this
subsection shall preclude a Federal entity, agency, or
authority, or any third party, from separately obtaining the
information submitted in response to a request under this
subsection through the use of independent legal authorities,
and using such separately obtained information in any
action.
(B) VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE.--A restriction on use or
disclosure of information under this subsection shall not
apply to any information disclosed to the public with the
B-21
express consent of the party responding to a special year
2000 data gathering request or disclosed by such party
separately from a response to a special year 2000 data
gathering request.
SEC. 5. TEMPORARY ANTITRUST EXEMPTION.
(a) EXEMPTION.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the
antitrust laws shall not apply to conduct engaged in, including
making and implementing an agreement, solely for the purpose of and
limited to--
(1) facilitating responses intended to correct or avoid a
failure of year 2000 processing in a computer system, in a
component of a computer system, in a computer program or
software, or services utilizing any such system, component,
program, or hardware; or
(2) communicating or disclosing information to help correct
or avoid the effects of year 2000 processing failure
(b) APPLICABILITY.-Subsection (a) shall apply only to conduct
that occurs, or an agreement that is made and implemented, after the
date of enactment of this Act and before]uly 14, 2001.
(c) EXCEPTION TO EXEMPTION.-Subsection (a) shall not apply
with respect to conduct that involves or results in an agreement to
boycott any person, to allocate a market, or to fix prices or
output.
(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--The exemption granted by this
section shall be construed narrowly.
SEC. 6. EXCLUSIONS.
(a) EFFECT ON INFORMATION DISCLOSURE.--This Act does not affect,
abrogate, amend, or alter the authority of a Federal or State entity,
agency, or authority to enforce a requirement to provide or disclose,
or not to provide or disclose, information under a Federal or State
statute or regulation or to enforce such statute or regulation.
(b) CONTRACTS AND OTHER CLAIMS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as may be otherwise provided in
subsections (a) and (e) of section 4, this Act does not affect,
abrogate, amend, or alter any right established by contract or
tariff between any person or entity, whether entered into by a
public or private person or entity, under any Federal or State
law.
(2) OTHER CLAIMS.--
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(A) IN GENERAL.--In any covered action brought by a
consumer, this Act does not apply to a year 2000 statement
expressly made in a solicitation, including an advertisement
or offer to sell, to that consumer by a seller, manufacturer,
or provider of a consumer product.
(B) SPECIFIC NOTICE REQUIRED.--In any covered action,
this Act shall not apply to a year 2000 statement,
concerning a year 2000 remediation product or service,
expressly made in an offer to sell or in a solicitation
(including an advertisement) by a seller, manufacturer, or
provider, of that product or service unless, during the
course of the offer or solicitation, the party making the
offer or solicitation provides the following notice in
accordance with section 4(d):
"Statements made to you in the course of this sale
are subject to the Year 2000 Information and Readiness
Disclosure Act (XX U.S.C. XX). In the case of a dispute,
this Act may reduce your legal rights regarding the use
of any such statements, unless otherwise specified by
your contract or tariff. fl.
(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to preclude any claims that are not based exclusively
on year 2000 statements.
(c) DUTY OR STANDARD OF CARE.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--This Act shall not impose upon the maker
of any year 2000 statement any more stringent obligation, duty,
or standard of care than is otherwise applicable under any other
Federal law or State law.
(2) ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE.-This Act does not preclude any
party from making or providing any additional disclosure,
disclaimer, or similar provisions in connection with any year
2000 readiness disclosure or year 2000 statement.
(3) DUTY OF CARE.-This Act shall not be deemed to alter
any standard or duty of care owed by a fiduciary, as defined or
determined by applicable Federal or State law. .
(d) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.--This Act does not affect,
abrogate, amend, or alter any right in a patent, copyright,
semiconductor mask work, trade secret, trade name. trademark, or
service mark, under any Federal or State law.
(e) INJUNCTNE RELIEF.-Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to
preclude a claimant from seeking injunctive relief with respect to a
year 2000 statement.
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SEC. 7. APPLICABILITY.
(a) EFFECTNE DATE.--
(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as othetwise provided in this
section, this Act shall become effective on the date of
enactment of this Act.
(2) APPLICATION TO LAWSUITS PENDING.--This Act shall not
affect or apply to any lawsuit pending on July 14, 1998.
(3) APPLICATION TO STATEMENTS AND DISCLOSURES.--Except as
provided in subsection (b)-
(A) this Act shall apply to any year 2000 statement
made beginning on July 14, 1998 and ending on July 14,2001;
and
(B) this Act shall apply to any year 2000 readiness
disclosure made beginning on the date of enactment of this
Act and ending on July 14,2001.
(b) PREVIOUSLY MADE READINESS DISCLOSURE.--
(1) IN GENERAL.-For the purposes of section 4(a), a person
or entity that issued or published a year 2000 statement after
January 1, 1996, and before the date of enactment of this Act,
may designate that year 2000 statement as a year 2000 readiness
disclosure if--
(A) the year 2000 statement complied with the
requirements of section 3(9) when made, other than being
clearly designated on its face as a disclosure; and
(B) within 45 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the person or entity seeking the designation--
(i) provides individual notice that meets the
requirements of paragraph (2) to all recipients of the
applicable year 2000 statement; or
(ii) prominently posts notice that meets the
requirements of paragraph (2) on its year 2000 Internet
website, commencing prior to the end of the 45-day
period under this subparagraph and extending for a
minimum of 45 consecutive days and also uses the same
method of notification used to originally provide the
applicable year 2000 statement.
(2) REQUIREMENTS.--A notice under paragraph (1)(B) shall--
(A) state that the year 2000 statement that is the
subject of the notice is being designated a year 2000
readiness disclosure; and
(B) include a copy of the year 2000 statement with a
legend labeling the statement as a ttYear 2000 Readiness
Disclosure".
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(c) EXCEPTION.--No designation of a year 2000 statement as a
year 2000 readiness disclosure under subsection (b) shall apply with
respect to any person or entity that--
(1) proves, byclear and convincing evidence, that it
relied on the year 2000 statement prior to the receipt of notice
described in subsection (b)(1)(B) and it would be prejudiced by
the retroactive designation of the year 2000 statement as a year
2000 readiness disclosure; and
(2) provides to the person or entity seeking the
designation a written notice objecting to the designation within
45 days after receipt of individual notice under subsection
(b)(l)(B)(i), or within 180 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, in the case of notice provided under subsection
(b)(l)(B)(ii).
SEC. 8. YEAR 2000 COUNCn... WORKlNG GROUPS.
(a) IN GENERAL.--
(1) WORKlNG GROUPS.--The President's Year 2000 Council
(referred to in this section as the "Council") may establish and
terminate working groups composed of Federal employees who will
engage outside organizations in discussions to address the year
2000 problems identified in section 2(a)(I) to share information
related to year 2000 readiness, and otherwise to serve the
purposes of this Act.
(2) UST OF GROUPS.--The Council shall maintain and make
available to the public a printed and electronic list of the
working groups, the members ofeach working group, and a point
of contact, together with an address, telephone number, and
electronic mail address for the point of contact, for each
working group created under this section.
(3) BALANCE.--The Council shall seek to achieve a balance
of participation and representation among the working groups.
(4) ATTENDANCE.-The Council shall maintain and make
available to the public a printed and electronic list of working
group members who attend each meeting of a working group as well
as any other individuals or organizations participating in each
meeting.
(5) MEETINGS.--Each meeting of a working group shall be
announced in advance in accordance with procedures established
by the Council. The Council shall encourage working groups to
hold meetings open to the public to the extent feasible and
consistent with the activi~ies of the Council and the purposes
of this Act.
(b) FACA.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.)
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shall not apply to the working groups established under this
section.
(c) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.--This section creates no private
right of action to sue for enforcement of the provisions of this
section.
(d) EXPIRATION.--The authority conferred by this section shall
expire on December 31, 2000.
SEC. 9. NATIONAL INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE AND WEBSITE.
(a) NATIONAL WEBSITE.-
(1) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator of General Services
shall create and maintain until July 14,2002, a national year
2000 website, and promote its availability, designed to assist
consumers, small business, and local governments in obtaining
information from other governmental websites, hotlines, or
information clearinghouses about year 2000 processing of
computers, systems, products, and services, including websites
maintained by independent agencies and other departments.
(2) CONSULTATION.--In creating the national year 2000
website, the Administrator of General Services shall consult
with--
(A) the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget;
(B) the Administrator of the Small Business
Administration;
(C) the Consumer Product Safety Commission;
(D) officials of State and local governments;
(E) the Director of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology;
(F) representatives of consumer and industry groups;
and
(G) representatives of other entities, as determined
appropriate.
(b) REPORT.--The Administrator of General Services shall submit
a report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
of the House of Representatives not later than 60 days after the
date of enactment of this Act regarding planning to comply with the
requirements of this section.
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EXHIBITB
SMALL BUSINESS YEAR 2000 READINESS ACT
S. 314 • ENACTED AND SIGNED INTO LAW
106th CONGRESS, 1st Session
S 314
Enrolled Bill
March 24, 1999
ANACf
S 314
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, the sixth day of January, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-nine
To provide for a loan guarantee program to address the Year 2000 computer problems of small
business concerns, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECfION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Small Business Year 2000 Readiness Act'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that-
(1) the failure of many computer programs to recognize the Year 2000 may have extreme negative
financial consequences in the Year 2000, and in subsequent years for both large and small
businesses;
(2) small businesses are well behind larger businesses in implementing corrective changes to their
automated systems;
(3) many small businesses do not have access to capital to fix mission critical automated systems,
which could result in severe financial distress or failure for small businesses; and
(4) the failure of a large number of small businesses due to the Year 2000 computer problem
would have a highly detrimental effect on the economy in the Year 2000 and in subsequent years.
SEC. 3. YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM.
(a) PROGRAM ESTABLISHED- Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act (> 15 U.S.C. 636(a» is
amended by adding at the end the following:
'(27) YEAR 2000 COMPUTER PROBLEM PROGRAM-
'(A) DEFINITIONS- In this paragraph-
'(i) the term 'eligible lender' means any lender designated by the Administration as eligible to
participate in the general business loan program under this subsection; and
'(ii) the term 'Year 2000 computer problem' means, with respect to information technology, and
embedded systems, any problem that adversely effects the processing (including calculating,
comparing, sequencing, displaying, or storing), transmitting, or receiving of date-dependent data--
'(I) from, into, or between--
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'(aa) the 20th or 21st centuries; or
'(bb) the years 1999 and 2000; or
'(m with regard to leap year calculations.
'(B) ESTABUSHMENT OF PROGRAM- The Administration shall--
'(i) establish a loan guarantee program, under which the Administration may, during the period
beginning on the date of enactment of this paragraph and ending on December 31, 2000, guarantee
loans made by eligible lenders to small business concerns in accordance with this paragraph; and
'(ii) notify each eligible lender of the establishment of the program under this paragraph, and
otherwise take such actions as may be necessary to aggressively market the program under this
paragraph.
'(C) USE OF FUNDS- A small business concern that receives a loan guaranteed under this
paragraph shall only use the proceeds of the loan to--
'(i) address the Year 2000 computer problems of that small business concern, including the
repair and acquisition of information technology systems, the purchase and repair of software, the
purchase of consulting and other third party services, and related expenses; and
'(ii) provide relief for a substantial economic injury incurred by the small business concern as
a direct result of the Year 2000 computer problems of the small business concern or of any other
entity (including any service provider or supplier of the small business concern), if such economic
injury has not been compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
'(D) LOAN AMOUNTS-
'(i) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding paragraph (3)(A) and subject to clause (ii) of this
subparagraph, a loan may be made to a borrower under this paragraph even if the total amount
outstanding and committed (by participation or otherwise) to the borrower from the business loan
and investment fund, the business guaranty loan financing account, and the business direct loan
financing account would thereby exceed $750,000.
'(ii) EXCEPTION- A loan may not be made to a ,borrower under this paragraph if the total
amount outstanding and committed (by participation or otherwise) to the borrower from the business
loan and investment fund, the business guaranty loan financing account, and the business direct
loan financing account would thereby exceed $1,000,000.
'(E) ADMINISTRATION PARTICIPATION- Notwithstanding paragraph (2)(A), in an
agreement to participate in a loan under this paragraph, participation by the Administration shall not
exceed-
'(i) 85 percent of the balance of the financing outstanding at the time of disbursement of the
loan, if the balance exceeds $100,000;
'(ii) 90 percent of the balance of the financing outstanding at the time of disbursement of the
loan, if the balance is less than or equal to $100,000; and
'(iii) notwithstanding clauses (i) and (ii), in any case in which the subject loan is processed in
accordance with the requirements applicable to the SBAExpress Pilot Program, 50 percent of the
balance outstanding at the time of disbursement of the loan.
'(F) PERIODIC REVIEWS- The Inspector General of the Administration shall periodically
review a representative sample of loans guaranteed under'this paragraph to mitigate the risk of fraud
and ensure the safety and soundness of the loan program.
'(G) ANNUAL REPORT-The Administration shall annually submit to the Committees on Small
Business of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the results of the program
carried out under this paragraph during the preceding 12-month period, which shall include
information
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relating to--
'(i) the total number of loans guaranteed under this paragraph;
'(ii) with resPeCt to each loan guaranteed under this paragraph-
'(I) the amount of the loan;
'(m the geographic location of the borrower; and
'(ill) whether the loan was made to repair or replace information technology and other
automated systems or to remedy an economic injury; and
'(iii) the total number of eligible lenders participating in the program.'.
(b) GUIDELINES-
(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall issue guidelines to carry out the program
under section 7(a)(27) of the Small Business Act, as added by this section.
(2) REQUIREMENTS- Except to the extent that it would be inconsistent with this section or
section 7(a)(27) of the Small Business Act, as added by this section, the guidelines issued under this
subsection shall, with resPeCt to the loan program established under section 7(a)(27) of the Small
Business Act, as added by this section-
(A) provide maximum flexibility in the establishment of terms and
conditions of loans originated under the loan program so that such loans may be structured in a
manner that enhances the ability of the applicant to repay the debt;
(B) if appropriate to facilitate repayment, establish a moratorium on principal payments under
the loan program for up to 1 year beginning on the date of the origination of the loan;
(C) provide that any reasonable doubts regarding a loan applicant's ability to service the debt be
resolved in favor of the loan applicant; and
(0) authorize an eligible lender (as defined in section 7(a)(27)(A) of the Small Business Act, as
added by this section) to process a loan under the loan program in accordance with the requirements
applicable to loans originated under another loan program established pursuant to section 7(a) of the
Small Business Act «> IS USCA 636» (including the general business loan program, the Preferred
Lender Program, the Certified Lender Program, the Low Documentation Loan Program, and the
SBAExpress Pilot Program), if-
(i) the eligible lender is eligible to participate in such other loan program; and
(ii) the terms of the loan, including the principal amount of the loan, are consistent with the
requirements applicable to loans originated under such other loan program.
(c) REPEAL- Effective on December 31,2000, this section and the amendments made by this
section are repealed.
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r I. INTRODUCTION
A. Insurance
II. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
~ Every company should check the status of their insurance coverage to
make sure it has appropriate Y2K coverage. Insurance companies have
responded to the potential Y2K litigation explosion in three different
ways:
The Y2K problem, in some manner, has or will impact virtually every business
enterprise. In order to identify and properly address the legal risks associated with Y2K, you
should have an understanding of Y2K related claims and defenses. Armed with that
understanding, you can take the steps that will help your company either avoid or prevail in
Y2K litigation.
Some insurance companies are offering riders or separate policies
that expressly provide Y2K coverage. Each business should do a
risk analysis and determine whether to purchase such coverage.
2.
1. A number of insurance companies have "added" exclusions to
their policies in an effort to exclude coverage for Y2K problems.
If a business receives an "endorsement" that purports to exclude
Y2K coverage, common sense steps should be taken - depending
on the applicable language - to make sure the business does not
waive its rights. For example, if the business believes that the
original policy should cover Y2K matters, then a letter to that
extent may be of significant evidentiary value.
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In order to avoid any misunderstandings and coverage disputes, insureds
should check with their insurers now to determine the status of coverage.
Their respective positions should be documented in writing, with a view
that those documents may be necessary court exhibits.
r
r
~.
3. Some insurance companies are doing nothing with their policies
and are taking the position that Y2K is a foreseeable event that is
implicitly excluded from business interruption coverage.
r
r
B. Directors and Officers Liability
As a general rule, directors and officers are legally bound by the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care to manage the corporation in the
best interest of its shareholders. If a corporation fails to address Y2K
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problems successfully, and the business is significantly impacted,
shareholders may seek to hold the directors and officers liable.
The general defense to such claims is the "business judgment rule, "
which provides that directors and officers are insulated from liability if
they can make a showing that they acted in good faith, were reasonably
diligent in informing themselves of the facts, and relied upon
knowledgeable experts. The following basic steps should be taken and
documented by the board:
1. Designate a company Y2K committee that includes
representatives from all management areas.
2. Mandate and document a company Y2K compliance and
contingency plan.
3. Consult with knowledgeable experts and budget a realistic line
item for Y2K expenditures.
4. Require regular Y2K progress reports to the board.
If a Y2K claim is brought, the entire process in which the company
handled Y2K issues will be the subject of discovery in the litigation.
Therefore, you should involve the proper technical and legal experts to
make sure nothing is overlooked or can be misconstrued under the
scrutiny of an opposing litigator.
Securities Claims
Various federal and state securities statutes import a duty to public
companies to disclose material facts. Counsel and company
management should make sure that reasonable care is exercised in
making appropriate Y2K disclosures.
The general spectrum of common defenses to securities actions may
apply, including: lack of materiality, Y2K exposure is common
knowledge, and lack of intent to mislead.
Intellectual Property and Consultant Claims
• Numerous intellectual property and trade secret issues arise with respect
to Y2K remediation measures. Commonly litigated issues are whether
existing software can be accessed to outside remediation companies in
violation of license agreements, and whether software can be reversed
engineered for remediation purposes.
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Counsel should be fully aware of the company's rights and duties before
enlisting outside assistance for preventative and remediation measures.
It may be necessary to extend, modify, or renegotiate applicable
agreements - or to obtain a Court approved protective order - in order to
achieve the desired result of avoiding the often conflicting nature of
intellectual property claims and Y2K claims.
Compliance Letters
~ The economy has been flooded with compliance requests and response
correspondence between vendors and purchasers. Purchasers send
compliance requests in order to determine whether they are reliant on
vendors who are not Y2K complaint. The end result is a massive paper
trail of contractual rights, duties, warranties, representations and
disclaimers.
It is imperative that counsel thoroughly review the contents of
compliance request and response letters. Many of these documents will
become court exhibits and serve as the evidentiary cornerstone of the
rights and duties between claimants.
In the fall of 1998, the federal Y2K Readiness and Disclosure Act was
signed into law. The Act significantly impacts the enforceability of
compliance letters. The Act requires a company to include certain
"magic language" in compliance letters in order to enjoy the protection
of the Act.
Contract Claims
~ Y2K contract claims usually arise when a business is unable to fulfill its
obligations because of a computer failure somewhere in the supply chain.
Each contract claim is governed by the terms of the particular contract,
as reflected in written agreements, compliance letters, purchase orders
and invoices.
Typically these types of disputes are viewed as "sales of goods" which
are governed by the UCC. (It should be noted that the courts are split on
whether software sales or license agreements are governed by Article 2
of the UCC.)
Within the normal business context, most companies have at some time
had their contract forms reviewed by counsel so they are protected under
the UCC. It is important to recognized that some vendors are expressly
disclaiming Y2K liability in their purchase documents. Counsel should
C - 3
r
Tort Claims
Statutory
review the status of the contract forms being received and generated by
the company to make sure DCC protections remain in place.
~ Depending of the particular fact situation, Y2K tort claims have or will
run the gambit of tort claims ranging from fraud, misrepresentation,
negligence, and strict liability.
A tort claim requires more than "economic injury." There must be
injury to property or to a person. Some courts have held that the
requisite "property damage" must occur to the property of another,
rather than to the property itself. Hence, the failure of computer
software has not been viewed as "property damage" - even though the
business lost valuable information as a result of the failure.
It is believed that Y2K tort claims for personal injury will arise from the
failure of imbedded chips in equipment such as medical devices,
elevators, traffic control devices, motor vehicles, and environmental and
electrical support systems. Such claims will follow the traditional
analysis of negligence, and strict liability claims.
In order to avoid such claims, each business should review its equipment
and systems. It is noteworthy that the FDA has assembled a lengthy list
of types of medical equipment that 'have embedded chip problems.
Counsel and company management should realized that with the
bombardment of Y2K publicity, the "foreseeability" of Y2K defects has
been heightened and the applicable "standard of care" has risen.
Some states (such as California) have consumer protection statutes under
which Y2K actions have been brought.
Particular attention should be paid to whether the writings are creating or
disclaiming expressed or implied warranties, and whether the writings
limit remedies by excluding indirect or consequential damages, or
require only repair or replacement.
~
~
~ Numerous federal acts are being considered by Congress to address what
is perceived to be a flood of Y2K litigation that could seriously disrupt
the global economy. The acts presently under consideration seek to
curtail Y2K suits, require "cooling off periods", and limit punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, and class actions.
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III. THE REALITY OF Y2K LITIGATION
No one knows whether Y2K will lead to a litigation explosion. But one thing is certain
- Y2K defects are real, and litigation has begun. Suits have already been filed in Michigan,
California, and even in Kentucky over equipment that either is not Y2K compliant, or which
has already failed. Computer failures have caused the temporary closure of an airport in the
Orient, and of a manufacturing plant in Europe. Damages in those case have been calculated
as running in the millions of dollars.
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Reprinted with permission from Business First of Louisville, Inc.
WEEK OF AUGUST 10,1998
IRS!:
1. Mark Grund\' is an attorney and member ofthe
Y2K team with 'Greenebaum Doll & McDonald
PUC in Louisville.
made of predicted litigation in the following illus-
trative areas:
• Pension and fund computers that miscalculate
or fail to process benefits for panicipants;
• Health care sellings where drug inventory and
distributions systems miscalculate the delivery and
expiration dates of medicines and supplies;
• Banking systems that provide improper
accountings and fail to allow the filing of timely
regulatory reports;
• Companies that have interfaced their computer
systems with defective systems from other compa-
nies;
• Insurance companies that reject claims because
their systems inaccurately reflect that the time
allowed for the claims has expired;
• Businesses and individuals who are at the
mercy of computer systems that operate transits.
traffic devices. environmental controls for build-
ings. elevators. telephone switches. and countless
other industrial and commercial activities.
What can your company do to avoid or to pre-
pare forY2K litigation? Although not an exhaustive
list. some basic steps to consider include the fol-
lowing:
• Put together a Y2K "team" and evaluate your
exposure.
• Prepare a contingency plan in the event a Y2K
emergency arises.
• Consider measures such as keeping hard copies
of critical records.
• Institute a Y2K compliance audit program.
• Work with certified and bonded specialists to
correct existing Y2K problems.
• Review not only your company's systems. but
also require your suppliers and vendors to certify that
their systems are Y2K compliant and that they will
reimburse or indemnify you for any related losses.
• Educate your customers and revenue sources
about Y2K issues so they do not experience busi-
ness interruption.
• Have an expert review your business forms and
contracts to make sure you have protection in the
event Y2K problems arise.
• Check your insurance coverage. It has been
widely reported that insurance companies may deny
Y2K claims on the grounds that the problem should
have been foreseen by the insured and timely reme-
died. Consider purchasing a separate rider for cov-
erage ofY2K-related losses.
Finally, if a Y2K problem requires you to
upgrade your system or interrupts your business.
immediately speak to a knowledgeable consultant
or allorney who can advise you as to your rights and
duties and assist you with mitigating your losses.
On
Addressing
Y2K Problems
J. Mark Grundy
a task force in the event the Y2K problem leads to a
severe disruption of our economy.
Accounting firms are now including Y2K audits
as an exception in their audit reports. Law firms
have begun to include Y2K audits as due diligence
mailers in acquisitions.
Many businesses are requiring that vendors and
suppliers provide certification that they are Y2K
compliant.
Many business owners face a wide range of legal
and business issues as a result of the Y2K problem.
As evident by the Michigan and California law-
suits. the initial round of litigation consists of two
types of cases. Businesses are suing either to recoup
their remediation costs. or in the worse case scenar-
ios, an interruption of their businesses' operations
has actually occurred. and they have sued to recov-
er lost profits and other consequential damages.
By all accounts. a second round of lawsuits soon
will be under way that will seek to spread the lia-
bility for the Y2K problem - and its "chain reac-
tion" in the economic world.
Potential targets of such litigation include business
advisers who failed to timely address the need for
Y2K audits; accountants who failed to make adequate
disclosures in audit reports; corporate officers and
directors who failed to take reasonable and prudent
measures to avoid or timely remedy Y2K problems;
software consultants; and insurance companies.
Speculation suggests that the Y2K problem may
even lead to personal injury or medical malpractice
claims.
For example. it was recently reported that a hos-
pital had to postpone an operation because a Y2K
glitch in a hospital computer system incorrectly told
the doctors that swabs needed during the surgery
were out of stock.
The legal theories that most likely will be assert-
ed to spread the Y2K liability range from basic con-
tract and breach of warranty claims to negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation. Claims have also
been filed under state and federal consumer protec-
tion statutes.
It is even contemplated that disgruntled share-
holders will bring actions against corporate officers
and directors in the event Y2K glitches cause a
reduction in the value of the company stock.
If the Y2K problem is as extensive as has been
initially predicted, the potential scenarios for litiga-
tion are numerous. For example. reports have been
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USINESS
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 1
c -6
Are you ready for Y2K litigation?
Year 2000 has yet to arrive. but the litigation has
already begun over widespread defects in many
computer programs that fail to process data related
to the year 2000 and beyond.
The "Y2K" problem - and potential litigation
- threatens virtually every business.
Either the business has a computer system that
may be at risk or the business is faced with the
potential failure of computer systems at the compa-
nies that it relies upon for materials. supplies. serv-
ices or revenue.
Has your business adequately addressed the Y2K
problem? Are you reliant on suppliers and cus-
tomers who have not addressed the problem?
Word to the wise - in most instances. it is not
enough to simply rely on an "opinion" that your
system is Y2K "compliant."
For example. a Michigan grocery store chain
bought computerized cash registers in 1995 based
on assurances that the registers were "free of prob-
lems" and would enhance customer service and
profitability.
After the registers were put into operation. the
store learned that the registers do not process credit
cards with expiration dates of the year 2000 or
beyond. As a result. the system repeatedly fails, shuts
down and needs to be "rebooted" at least once a day.
The grocery has filed suit against the register
vendor seeking to recover its lost profits and reme-
diation costs.
Many businesses have been somewhat "luckier"
in that they have performed Y2K audits and have
upgraded their systems to avoid any such business
interruptions.
A large number of those businesses have discov-
ered that their software vendors are charging sub-
stantial fees for the upgrade. however.
Irate over such practi~. a group of businesses in
California recently filed a class action suit seeking
to recoup their upgrade costs. The lawsuit alleges
that as recently as last year. the software companies
sold systems that are not Y2K compliant and are
improperly requiring the businesses to pay substan-
tial fees to purchase upgrades.
As has been widely reported. the heart of the Y2K
problem is a defect in software programs that express
the year in two digits on the assumption that the first
two digits of the year are always going to be "19."
Therefore. those programs are not geared to
address data that relate to the year 2000 and
beyond. When data for that time period is entered.
such computer programs either incorrectly roll back
to the year 1900, shut down. or experience other
technical difficulties.
The problem is so significant that the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission has adopted
strict disclosure requirements. and public corpora-
tions - including their management personally -
can be subjected to liability if they fail to make the
disclosures. Similarly. Congress is selling in motion
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Y2K: LITIGATION AND INSURANCE
As we approach the year 2000, the mysteries surrounding the Millennium Bug are
beginning to unfold. There are two issues that remain virtually unknown: (1) the economic
costs, including the costs for remediation and economic damages resultant from failures, and
(2) who will be responsible for these costs. The intent ofthis text is to generally discuss the
theories of liability that may arise in the inevitable litigation that will seek to answer the
Y2K issues and to discuss the relationship of insurance in the Y2K context.
LITIGATION
To date, there have been relatively few lawsuits filed (approximately 80 known to this
author) and virtually no reported decisions to offer strong guidance on the issues. The best
guidance comes from reported decisions in analogous situations such as environmental torts,
asbestos cases, breast implant cases, matters involving intrauterine devices, fen-phen cases,
and tobacco litigation. With the exception of the environmental claims and remediation
claims pertaining to asbestos, these cases pertain to personal injury and therefore do not
address some of the complex issues which will be faced in the anticipated Y2K litigation.
The present dearth ofcases may be attributable to some or all ofthe following factors:
resources are being prioritized for remediation and compliance; damages have not been
incurred or have not been quantified; legislative matters pertaining to rights ofrecovery are
still pending; and, potentially responsible parties and theories of recovery are still being
identified and developed.
Although the absence ofdamages due to failure may presently preclude some actions,
the failure to pursue prompt and timely litigation may prove detrimental or fatal to some
actions. In many jurisdictions, actions such as negligence and product liability have short
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statutes oflimitations. Frequently, the statute oflimitations begins to run whenthe cause of
action was known or should have been known. The notoriety of the Y2K issues may
therefore cause an early triggering of the limitations period. Additional problems may be
caused by the potential insolvency ofdefendants, legislatively imposed limitations, aggregate
insurance loss limits and decisions regarding insurance coverage. In short, although it is
sometimes costly and risky to be the pioneer in new litigation issues, the early birds in the
Y2K litigation may indeed be the only ones to get the worm.
In addition to the expected insurance litigation, the Y2K issues are expected to
produce tort and contract litigation in two potential categories. If remediation efforts are
successful and the Year 2000 computer "disaster" is avoided, there will be litigation seeking
reimbursement for remediation costs and other consequential damages, such as business
interruption. If there are computer failures, then there will likely be claims for any resultant
losses, including lost data, business interruption, property damage, personal injury and other
consequential damages. Under either scenario, the parties will need to consider the facts
under the following legal theories:
(1) Breach of Express Warranties.
Claims for breaches of express warranties will most likely exist on the basis of the
language contained in purchase and service contracts or license agreements; however, such
warranties may also exist on the basis of advertising, trade publications, verbal
representations, product specifications, and the parties' course ofdealing.
Of course, the potential application of the Uniform Commercial Code may have a
significant influence on the determination regarding express warranties in any particular case.
According to the Uniform Commercial Code, the terms "guarantee" or "warranty" do not
have to be used in order to create an express warranty. Likewise, it is not necessary that the
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seller have the specific intent to create a warranty. In some situations, representations,
whether oral or written, made prior to the written agreement, even in the presence of an
integration clause, can create express warranties.
The express warranties governed by the Uniform Commercial Code pertain to the
sales of "goods". There is still significant debate regarding the classification of computer
software as "goods". Similar debates have previously occurred in the realm of the
intellectual property issues surrounding computer software. The prevailing thought is that
software is generally classified as "goods" rather than services. There may be special
situations where a better argument exists that the product purchased is an intellectual
application by the programmer rather than the software itself, and thus, a purchase of a
service rather than "goods".
(2) Breach of Implied Warranties:
Implied warranties are created as a matter of law by the Uniform Commercial Code
in sales ofgoods unless explicitly disclaimed.
(A) Implied Warranty of Merchantability.
In all sales of goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods will be fit for the
ordinary purpose for which they are typically used. The sellers' implied warranty of
merchantability extends to subsequent users and there is no requirement of privity of
contract.
In the Y2K context, it is expected that users will assert that software which is not Y2K
compliant cannot be used for its ordinary purposes. On the other hand, ifthe software is used
for a period oftime prior to any failure, the seller can argue that the goods were used for their
ordinary purpose.
(B) Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose.
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An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises when the seller has
reason to know of the particular purpose for which the goods are required and the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods. This warranty
obviously arises in situations where the software is customized to the needs ofa particular
client. This implied warranty is not likely to apply to general consumer software.
Obviously, assurances that the product is Y2K compliant may create a potential claim for
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if there is subsequent failure.
(C) Limitations and Disclaimers of Warranties.
Both express and implied warranties can be significantly limited or disclaimed by the
seller. Historically, courts have construed disclaimers and limitations more strictly against
the sellers and in favor ofretail consumers but have been less forgiving to more sophisticated
purchasers who may be on an equal or superior economic basis to the seller. Express
warranties, stated in the contract, are enforced, even if there is disclaimer language also in
the contract. For this reason, most express warranties are carefully worded and the scope,
duration and available remedies to the purchaser are usually limited.
Implied warranties may be disclaimed with blanket disclaimers using common words
s\.Jch as "as is". Conspicuous language which informs the purchaser that the product is being
sold with no implied warranty is sufficient to disclaim such warranties.
Rather than totally disclaiming any warranties, a seller may limit recovery to a
specific liquidated amount. The seller may also provide a specific and exclusive limited
remedy such as repair or replacement ofthe goods. The seller may also limit its liability to
the buyer by excluding liability for incidental or consequential damages. The seller may also
limit the time in which a remedy may be sought by the buyer. The limitation of liability and
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more specifically, the limited and exclusive remedies contained In many computer
agreements are expected to be topics ofmuch debate and litigation.
(3) Breach of Contract.
The primary actions for breach ofcontract by the purchasers of computer goods will
be the breaches ofwarranty provisions discussed above. It is expected that other breach of
contract actions will arise out ofthe anticipated failures ofnon-compliant computer goods.
Any provider of services or goods who relies upon a computer system for the provision of
those services or goods may be subject to such a claim. If a Y2K failure occurs which
prevents the provider from supplying the goods and services under the terms ofa contract,
a Y2K related breach will occur. Contract providers of goods and services are now
frequently limiting liability for contract breaches due to Y2K problems. Contractual
purchasers of goods and services, or their auditors, are well advised to pay close attention to
such limitations ofcontractual liability.
(4) Product Liability/Strict Liability.
In situations where a Y2K failure results in property damage, personal injury, or
death, there may be an action pursued for product liability. Such actions typically include
claims for personal injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the
manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of standards, preparation,
processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising,
packaging or labeling ofany "product". For product liability cases brought as a result of a
Y2K failure, the courts must first grapple with the issue of whether the computer software
or application constituted a "product". As noted above in the discussion ofwarranties, some
situations may be more appropriately described as a provision of services rather than a
"product".
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In most jurisdictions, in order to establish that the produce is "defective" and to
recover under strict liability, it must be established that the product was sold in a condition
which constitutes an unreasonably dangerous threat of injury when the product is used in a
manner intended. An important factor is how safe or dangerous the product is, when used
as it was intended or should reasonably have been anticipated to be used. Additionally,
liability depends on what a product manufacturer would have anticipated had the
manufacturer been aware ofthe condition ofthe product and potential incidents which could
occur when the product was placed on the market. These factors are ofcritical importance
when considering the sale and use of software products which are not Y2K compliant after
a point in time when the Y2K issues were known and generally understood by the industry.
It is expected that issues pertaining to recalls, the provision of retrofit or remediation
services, warnings, and failures to warn, will result in substantial litigation regarding product
liability claims.
(5) Negligence/Professional Malpractice.
Persons or entities who design, manufacture or sell computer software, remediation
services or computer consulting services are subject to claims for negligence or professional
malpractice for Y2K failures. Additionally, persons or entities who utilize computer systems
for the provision of services may be subjected to claims for negligence or professional
malpractice if their services are affected by Y2K failures. Typically, such claims are
expected to be asserted against professions which rely heavily on computer systems such as
accountants, stockbrokers, attorneys, banks and so forth. Although these are perhaps the
most obvious potential defendants, virtually any person or entity who relies on a computer
for the provision of services is vulnerable to such claims.
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Additionally, companies which depend on computers for the production ofproducts
or the management of inventory may be subjected to negligence claims if their systems fail
and there are certain resultant damages.
(6) Fraudulent InducementlUnfair Trade or Business Practices.
A party may obviously be accountable in fraud for knowing misrepresentations of
Y2K compliance or similar matters. Many jurisdictions also have statutes which may create
actions for unfair business practices. For example, in a California case against multiple
retailers, the plaintiffs claim that the retailers are guilty of"unfair business practices" because
they sold computer products without advising consumers as to whether the products were
Y2K compliant.
(7) Shareholder Derivative Suits/Directors' and Officers' Liability.
This topic is discussed in a separate section of the seminar.
(8) Copyright Infringement and Breach of Licensing Agreement.
This topic will be discussed in a separate section of the seminar..
(9) Miscellaneous.
There are a number ofissues which are applicable to several of the above theories or
which may impact the Y2K litigation. For example, it is relatively unusual to have
significant economic damages to multiple parties without personal injury or property
damage. Typically, courts have limited tort actions for negligence and product liability to
instances where the damaged parties have suffered personal injury, death or property
damage. Likewise, many jurisdictions preclude punitive damages for claims related to
breaches of contracts. Because of the unique nature of the Y2K claims, it is expected that
litigants will attempt to create exceptions to these and other general conventions.
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The potential insolvency or bankruptcy ofmany defendants is a matter that must be
carefully considered by litigants and the courts. Such matters are likely to be considered in
the certification ofclass actions and the establishment ofmulti-district litigation.
Statutes oflimitation will present a particularly complex quagmire for litigants. Most
theories ofliability present different statutory limitations and may be triggered by different
circumstances. For example, the same facts which might limit a primary cause ofaction for
negligence or product liability because of a shortened statutory period may allow an
indemnity action which has a longer statute of limitations.
Importantly, costs or damages incurred for remediation may trigger the running ofthe
statutory period under the "discovery rule" and damages may be limited if the party waits to
see ifthere is an eventual failure. Contributory negligence for failure to remediate and issues
regarding disclosures of readiness and compliance are also likely to contribute to the
litigation issues.
It is expected that many parties to litigation will be both plaintiffs and defendants. In
situations involving Y2K failures, the person or entity suffering the failure is likely to be a
defendant if the failure effects the provision ofgoods or services to others. Likewise, that
same party is likely to be a plaintiff to recover damages against the manufacturer or seller of
the software product. Additionally, that party is likely to be involved in litigation with one
or more insurers regarding the coverage ofclaims against the party and losses incurred by
the party. Multi-party actions are a certainty and litigators must be wary of compulsory
claims which may need to be asserted against various parties.
INSURANCE
It is axiomatic that a claim under an insuring agreement must involve a fortuitous
event. In other words, insurers do not provide insurance for intended or expected events.
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Undoubtedly, as claims for Y2K losses are presented, insurers will argue that some of those
claims were not the result of a fortuitous event. Because of the pervasive awareness of the
Y2K problem and the anticipated failures, insurers will argue that the failures were expected
and not fortuitous. Such arguments may be more credible where the products were
manufactured after the acquired knowledge ofpotential Y2K problems or users fail to make
efforts to obtain Y2K compliance.
Claims for losses under insuring agreements will be either first party claims or third
party claims. First party claims involve damages to the insured. Third party claims involve
claims against the insured by other damaged or injured parties.
1. First Party Claims
As a result of Y2K problems, an insured may have costs of repairing or replacing a
defective computer system. Additionally, an insured may have costs or damages, such as lost
inventory or equipment damage, due to a computer failure. The insured may have a first
party claim against their insurer for either or both of these types ofdamages.
First party policies are usually either an "all risk" or a "named peril" policy. An "all
risk" policy provides coverage for losses occurring as a result of any risk. A "named peril"
policy provides coverage for losses occurring only as a result of specifically stated events.
First party policies frequently contain significant exclusions pertaining to interruption of
power or utility services, extreme temperature variations in controlled environments, and
mechanical breakdowns. First party policies also usually exclude or offer very limited
coverage for electronic data processing losses or losses related to the replacement and
restoration ofinfonnation stored electronically. These exclusions may significantly impair
the ability ofan insured to recover for Y2K failures.
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Generally, first party policies also require direct physical loss or damage to covered
property in order to invoke coverage. Insureds who incur costs for remediation but do not
sustain any physical loss from a Y2K failure may incur substantial difficulties in recovering
under a first party policy.
Typically, business interruption coverage is an endorsement to a property policy but
may occasionally constitute a separate first party policy. Business interruption coverage is
provided to protect the insured from losses incurred during an interruption of its business as
a result ofsome fortuitous event. Once again, physical loss is usually required to invoke the
coverage.
Ordinarily, the applicable policy for first party claims is the policy in effect at the time
ofthe physical loss or damage. Because ofthe predicted Y2K problems, many insurers have
included exclusions for Y2K losses in their first party policies. As a result, it is expected that
insureds may attempt to "trigger" coverage in prior policies, similar to the tactics that have
been used successfully in third party claims. Because ofnotice limitations contained in all
policies, it is essential that the insured provide notice of the loss or claim to every possible
or potential insurer as soon as possible.
2. Third Party Claims
As in the case of first party policies, most third party policies (usually a commercial
general liability (CGL) policy) require physical damage to property or personal injury to
invoke coverage. Claims related to economic losses without a concomitant physical damage
may not constitute covered claims. Significant debate is expected over the issue ofwhether
a physical loss or damage has occurred when a computer is rendered useless and ofno value
due to a Y2K problem or failure. The insurers ofmanufacturers and sellers ofcomputers are
certainly expected to argue that the claims made by purchasers and users cannot constitute
D - 10
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physical loss claims and thus do not constitute covered claims. It is important to note that
there is a significant distinction in most third party policies between the insurers' duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify for claimed losses. The duty to defend has been broadly
construed and is frequently applicable even though there may be no duty to indemnify. Thus,
many insureds may obtain the benefit ofa defense while litigating the issues ofthe indemnity
coverage.
Undoubtedly, insurers will argue that an occurrence has not taken place during the
applicable coverage period and that some other insurer must provide the coverage. These
issues have arisen in many other situations and the courts have developed multiple theories
for determining the "trigger" ofcoverage. These theories include the following:
A. Exposure Theory: Coverage is triggered by exposure to the injury causing
product.
B. Manifestation Theory: Coverage is triggered at the time of the manifestation
of the injury or damage.
C. Continuous Trigger: Coverage is triggered continuously from the time of the
exposure to the manifestation of the damage or injury.
D. Injury In Fact: Coverage is triggered by a showing of an actual injury
producing or damaging event during the policy period.
E. Double Trigger: Coverage is triggered at both the time of exposure and the
time ofmanifestation ofdamages or injury but not in the interval between the exposure and
manifestation.
These theories are not particularly applicable to the Y2K claims because continuous
injury causing events are not likely. There could possibly be latent injuries that manifest at
subsequent dates; however, it is anticipated that most damages and injuries will be readily
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known. The triggering theories which have been developed are indicative ofthe willingness
ofcourts to adopt new theories to invoke insurance coverage and may suggest appropriate
triggering theories for Y2K coverage. In the Y2K litigation, it is not yet known whether
coverage will be applied at the time of the sale of the product, the time of failure, the time
of actual injury of damage, all of these times or some other time created by the courts.
Without question, claimants will present creative and persuasive arguments to establish
trigger dates that will invoke applicable coverage. As with first party claims, insureds must
provide prompt notice ofclaims and should provide all possible insurers with notice since
the triggering dates are not established.
3. Errors and Omissions Claims
Errors and omissions (E&O) policies apply to claims arising out oferrors or omissions
in the provision of professional services. As discussed above with respect to warranty
claims in litigation, if the services involve the provision of software, a significant point of
debate will be whether the professional was involved in providing services or selling goods.
If the services are characterized as the sale of goods, warranty claims will apply; however,
the E&O coverage will likely be avoided.
4. Directors and Officers Insurance
This topic is covered in a separate section of the seminar.
5. Y2K Exclusions and Y2K Policies
Exclusions for Y2K problems are rapidly being developed and incorporated into
policies. The Insurance Services Office (ISO) has several standard exclusions which are now
being utilized frequently within the industry. Additionally, some companies are now
providing Y2K policies to insure against specific Y2K losses; however, because of the
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uncertainty regarding the Y2 litigation and potential damages, there does not appear to be
any consistency between the coverages provided or the premiums charged.
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Y2K
The Year 2000 Cri sis
Sources of litigotion
• Federal Securities and Anti-Fraud
Laws
• Contract, Tort and Other State Law
Claims
• Copyright Infringement Claims
• ERISA Claims
• Derivative Suits
• Breach of Duty Claims
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Reducing Directors &Officers Exposure
• The Most Effective Defense to Most
Y2K Claims Is Successful
Remediation
- Directors and Officers Must Be Able to
Document
• They Took All Reasonable Steps to Attempt
Remediation and
• They Made All Required Legal Disclosures
Reducing Directors &Officers Exposure
• Legal Defenses:
Business Judgement Rule
• Be Disinterested
• Act In Good Faith
• Make Informed Decision Only After
- Making a Reasonable Effort
- To Ascertain and Consider
- All Relevant Information
- Reasonably Available
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Reducing Directors &Officers Exposure
• Legal Defenses: Reliance
• Ability to Rely Upon Persons With
Specific Expertise In the SUbject
Matter
- Board Committees
- Other Officers
- In-House or Outside Experts
- Counsel
Reducing D&O's Potentiol Liobility
• Determine the Extent of the Issue
- Examine the Company's Own Systems
• For Y2K Compliance
• For Leap-year Compliance
• For Ability to Deal With "Magic Dates"
• Formulate, Implement, Track and Test
a Remediation Plan
• Control Future Transactions
E - 3
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
!
r
r
r
r
r
r
f
r
Reducing O&O's Potential Liability
• Get Representations of Y2K
Compliance From Outside System
Vendors
• Clarify Who Pays for Any Upgrade
Necessary for Y2K Compliance
• Seek Y2K Compliance Certifications
From Key Suppliers and Vendors
• Certify Key Suppliers', Vendors' and
Customers' Systems
Reducing O&O's Potential Liability
• Consider Direct Testing and
Evaluation for Truly Crucial Third-
parties
• Identify Alternative Solutions,
Respective Costs and Time
Schedules
• Select and Promptly Implement the
Most Favorable Alternative(s)
• Adopt Appropriate Time Schedule
• Adopt Contingency Plans
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Create ADue Diligence Record
• To Document Your Successful
Remediation Effort
• To Defend The Company In Litigation
• To Support A Business JUdgement
Defense For D & a's
• To Reassure Third Parties - e.g.
Customers, CPAs and Regulators
• To Support A Due Diligence Defense
Under Securities Laws
Apply Due Diligence Standards
• Act In Good Faith
• Act With Due Care
• Act In The Best Interests Of The
Company
• Act Upon Due Inquiry
• Exercise Fiduciary Duties Properly
• Avoid Corporate Waste
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Monitor Responses By
Compelition
-To Be Aware of Emerging
Best Practices
-To Gain/Maintain
Competitive Advantage
Invesligole Cloims Agoinsl Third Porlies
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Identify Exposures to Third Porties
Questions?
Ken Tuggle
502-568-0269
ken@lou.bth-pllc.com
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13 DATES TO CHECK FOR Y2K COMPLIANCE
r
DATE REASON
r April 9, 1999 9999 on the Julian calendar, incorporated into many computer programs. The 99th day of the
Year 1999. 9999 denotes "end of input" in many computer programs.
r September 9, 1999 9999 on the Gregorian calendar. 9999 denotes "end of input" in many computer programs.
December 31, 1999 Last day in year 1999.r
r
January 1, 2000
January 3, 2000
Beginning of the Year 2000.
First business day in the Year 2000.
December 31,2000 End of Year 2000.
February 29, 2000 Leap year day.
January 31,2000 End ofthe first month of2000.
March 31, 2000 End offirst quarter of2000.
Beginning of Year 2001
January 10,2000 First date to require a 7-digit date field (1/10/2000).
October 10, 2000 First date to require an 8-digit date field (10/10/2000).
December 31,2001 Check that year has 365 days.
January 1,2001
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DOMAIN NAMES, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE
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Introduction
{I} Use ofthe global Internet computer network is rising exponentially.II] As Internet subscription
increases disagreements between users are expected to arise, just as where any sizeable number of
human beings interact, disagreements may be expected to arise. To date, on-line disputes have been
primarily dealt with via informal solutions, such as the polite conventions of "netiquette" shared by
Internet users.[~] However, as the community ofInternet users grows increasingly diverse, formal
dispute resolution mechanisms, embodied as law and legal institutions, may be called upon by the
parties to resolve disagreements. For example, several acrimonious disputes have already arisen over
the use ofparticular "domain names" on the Internet This paper discusses how established principles
of trademark law may be applied to resolve such controversies. Such a discussion properly begins
with a review of the nature and function ofthe global Internet.
The Internet Experience
{2} The Internet has been called a network ofnetworks - local computer systems hooked to regional
systems hooked to national or international high-capacity "backbone" systems.DJ Each link or node
in this web is a computer or computer site connected together by a variety ofconnections: fiber optic
cable, twisted-pair copper wire, microwave transmission, or other communications media. Each
computer in the network communicates with the others by employing machine-language conventions
known as Internet Protocols ("IP").fAI Indeed, these protocols define the network; the Internet is the
linked mass ofmachines which use IP to communicate.
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{3} Smart Communications: Unlike other communications media that tie up the entire channel
during transmission, the Internet breaks information into discrete packets that can be transmitted as
capacity allows. The packets follow any ofa number ofdifferent routes from computer to computer
until they reach their destination, where they are reassembled by the recipient machine. Each
computer in the network assesses whether to temporarily hold packets or send them on, so that
maximum use is made ofthe available carrying capacity at any given time.[~
{4} Decentralization: There is no centralized control ofthe Internet. From a technical standpoint,
each computer acts autonomously, coordinating traffic with its nearest connected neighbors, and
guided only by the "invisible hand" that arises from the sum ofmillions ofsuch independent
actions.[6] From a management standpoint, each node is similarly autonomous, answering only to its
own systems administrator. This means that there is no central authority to govern Internet usage, no
one to ask for permission to join the network, and no one to complain to when things go wrong.
{5} Telepresence: The Internet protocol provides geographically extended sharing ofscattered
resources. An Internet user may employ her Internet link to access computers, retrieve information, or
control various types ofapparatus from around the world. These electronic connections are entirely
transparent to the user; the "virtual machine" created by the connection appears to be the one at the
user's fingertips. Indeed, the user may be completely unaware ofthe geographic location ofthe
resource being accessed.
{6} These features make available a vast array ofinterconnected information, including digitized
text, graphics, and sound. The totality ofthis international information structure is commonly referred
to as "cyberspace," a cognitive realm that is conceptually separate from the real space that we
physically inhabit. "Cybernauts" who traverse this digital landscape find that virtual relationships
with other electronic pilgrims blossom into collaboration, friendship, and even romance. Virtual
communities coalesce from all comers ofthe globe to exchange information and reinforce shared
values. And, increasingly, the universal human proclivity toward arbitrage and commerce is
becoming an important component ofon-line interaction.
Virtual Commerce
{7} The Internet began as a product ofCold War military technology, linking together researchers
involved in a research program sponsored by the U.S. Department ofDefense.[7l This system for
communicating and sharing computer resources became increasingly important to the scientific
community; much ofthe funding, as well as management ofthe net's high speed backbone
connection became the responsibility ofthe National Science Foundation ("NSF").[SJ There was little
opportunity for commercial Internet traffic in the days ofgovernment sponsored research usage.
Indeed, the NSF promulgated an acceptable use policy ("AUP"), forbidding such use ofthe public1y-
funded Internet backbone connections.[2]
{8} As the benefits ofInternet access became better known, the usefulness ofcomputer networking
was not lost on business, or for that matter, on consumers. A crop ofprivate Internet access providers
developed, offering network access and facilities for customers outside the research community.[)0]
In order to route traffic around facilities restricted by the NSF's AUP, these providers formed the
Commercial Internet Exchange ("CIX"), which sponsored high-speed links for commercial
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traffic.[II] In the meantime, NSF slowly began to edge its way out ofthe Internet management
business: first, by funding regional networks; then by contracting oversight duties out to private
firms; and finally by encouraging the regional networks to find paying customers.illJ By early 1995,
NSF's sole duty will be to fund a few Network Access Points, or NAP's, to act as data traffic
exchanges.[lJ]
{9} Consequently, although the academic and scientific research communities remain an important
part of the Internet community as a whole, private and commercial traffic is becoming a dominant
force in the development and growth ofthe "electronic frontier." Businesses ofall types routinely use
the Internet for a variety ofcommercial transactions, and consumer services have begun to appear. It
is presently possible to access a variety ofmail-order catalogs on-line, and arrange for the purchase of
music, books, fast food delivery, and even flowers. The variety and availability ofsimilar consumer
services is likely to grow. But in order for customers to order commodities, they must first be able to
locate and recognize the commodities among the sprawling data connections ofcyberspace.
r Internet Locators
r
{I O} In order for the Internet to function, there must be some manner ofdistinguishing and locating
all the various computers, users, files, and other resources attached to the net. Host machines must
know which information packets are intended for a particular machine; which packets must be passed
on; and the ultimate destination ofpackets that are passed to the next machine. Machines must also
be able to differentiate themselves from other machines. This is accomplished via Internetworking
Protocol Addresses ("IP addresses").[l4l Assignment ofIP addresses to users is the responsibility of
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("lANA"), a private entity with ties to international
standard-setting bodies such as ANSI. lANA delegates the administration of IP address applications
and registrations via InterNIC Registration Service, operated by a private firm called Network
Solutions.[15}
{12} IP addresses are represented as strings ofdigits divided into parts, or fields. By convention, the
fields in the IP address are separated by periods. For example:
124.33.45.112
might be a typical Internet address. Each address contains a network portion, the IP network address,
and a local portion, called the local address. The network portion begins on the left, the local portionr ends on the right; the exact division between these portions is determined by the class of the
i address.[li?1 The combination ofthese local and network portions uniquely identifies and specifies
the location ofsome interface on the Internet. Unfortunately, using these numerical strings is
r somewhat inconvenient and cumbersome; Internet users may find it difficult to routinely remember
.. and use such addresses. Consequently, the IP Address system has been overlaid with a more "user-
r {II} At the time ofthis writing, IP addresses are divided into classes A, B, and C; this system may
change somewhat with the introduction ofthe next anticipated version ofthe Internetworking
r Protocols. Classes A and B are, much like certain frequencies ofthe electromagnetic spectrum,.. reserved for special uses. Class C addresses are assigned to network access providers in blocks of
numbers; these blocks may then be divided and subdivided among that provider's users. Each addressr within a block is potentially a unique designator for some entity on the network.
r
r
r
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friendly" system ofdomain names.U1] This overlay allows Internet resources to be assigned a
mnemonic designation that is more easily remembered. Internet applications have been designed to
automatically look up the IP Address corresponding to mnemonic designations; this is done through a
facility called the Domain Name Service ("DNS") which operates invisibly to the Internet user.[I8]
{13} Like IF addresses, domain names are divided into fields separated by periods. An example
would be:
dickens.oliver.twist.com
Read from right to left, fields designate the computer, subdomains, and domains ofthe address in
proximity to the user. The rightmost field is the top-level domain, a standardized designation
showing the type oforganization or the country to which the address belongs.[l.9J There are a variety
of such top-level designators. For example, the designation".com" indicates a commercial
organization, ".gov" indicates a governmental organization; ".net" indicates an organization running a
computer site or network; and ".org" is a classifier for miscellaneous organizations. Country
designators include".uk" for the United Kingdom; ".nl" for the Netherlands; and ".ca" for
Canada.[2Q]
{14} As with IP addresses, lANA is responsible for assigning domain names, and has delegated the
operation ofa name registry to the InterNIC.I21] InterNIC acts merely as a recorder; domain names
may be requested by electronic mail and are assigned on a first-come, first-served basis.[22] Once an
organization or a person has registered a domain name, it may do as it wishes with that name: they
can use it, reassign it, or simply hold it unused. Because domain names are simply mnemonics, and
because there is no logical connection between them and the IP address that in fact locates an Internet
resource, domain names are fully portable, and can be transferred to a new machine or site ifthe
name holder moves.
{15} Given that domain names were instituted as mnemonics to aid recollection of Internet resource
locations, one might expect that the use of such names will become critical where remembering a
resource is critical - as for example, where money is at stake in Internet commerce. The importance
ofsuch names for commerce on the Internet has been demonstrated most recently by a series of legal
and quasi-legal disputes over possession and use ofcertain domain designations. For example, in one
early scuffie, Wired magazine, which maintains the Internet site "wired.com," objected to the use of
the domain name "wire.net" by an organization called "Women's Wire." That dispute was quickly
settled when Women's Wire changed its domain name to "wwire.net" in order to avoid a legal
confrontation.[23] However, subsequent disputes such as those discussed below have been more
protracted.
MTVv.Curry
{16} Perhaps the most notorious Internet trademark dispute to date is that involving Adam Curry and
the MTV cable television channe1.[24] Curry was formerly employed as a video jockey, or "VJ" host
on MTV. Curry organized an Internet site registered as "mtv.com" during his employment period,
apparently with the knowledge and approval ofMTV. The site was devoted to discussion of topics
related to Curry's vocation, including popular culture, entertainment, and celebrities.[:!5] He also
established a considerable net presence by writing and circulating the "Cybersleaze Rep-oTt,: an
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electronic newsletter devoted to celebrity gossip.[26] Cuny's fame both on and off the Internet
generated a high volume oftraffic at the mtv.com site.[~ll
{17} In 1993, Cuny and MTV parted ways, apparently with some rancor. Among other items of
dispute, MTV demanded that Cuny surrender or disable the mtv.com site because it carried the
designation "mtv."[28J Cuny, who had registered the site's domain name under his own name,
refused to do so. The parties moved their dispute to court. Pending trial, Cuny suspended his
operations at mtv.com and moved to a new and equally chic site registered as "metaverse.com."[29]
The parties quietly settled the dispute on March 24, 1995,[30] and it appears that MTV is now in
control of the mtv.com domain.
Kaplan v. Princeton Review
{18} Another Internet trademark dispute involved the Princeton Review, a purveyor ofcourses and
materials to prepare students for standardized aptitude tests such as the SAT, LSAT, and GRE. In
1994, Princeton Review determined that its business could benefit from establishing Internet services
where students could discuss test-taking strategies, acquire infonnation and materials concerning
aptitude tests, and most importantly, obtain promotional literature about Princeton Review's
services.[31] The company subsequently established such an Internet site, and registered several
domain names with the InterNIC, including "princeton.com" and "review.com."
{19} Princeton Review also registered the domain name "kaplan.com," and established an Internet
site under that name.[3_?1 Not surprisingly, the "Stanley Kaplan Review" is Princeton Review's chief
competitor in the market for standardized test preparatory courses. The chiefexecutive ofthe
Princeton Review cheerfully admitted that his company registered its chief rival's name in order to
mock and annoy the other company.[.u.] Additionally, Princeton Review hoped that cybernauts
hoping to contact the Kaplan Review company would sign on to the kaplan.com site. Individuals who
mistakenly did so were offered electronic materials disparaging the quality ofKaplan Review's
services and extolling the comparative advantages ofthe Princeton Review courses.[34]
{20} The Kaplan Review had no on-line presence but became aware of the rogue Internet site in
relatively short order. Kaplan ReView demanded that Princeton Review cease using the Kaplan name
in conjunction with the site. Princeton Review offered to surrender the domain name in exchange for
a case ofbeer -- either domestic or imported. Kaplan Review declined the settlement, opting instead
to pursue a legal remedy. The President ofPrinceton Review quipped in response that his rivals had
"no sense ofhumor, no vision, and no beer."[3S] A lawsuit was initially filed but the dispute was
subsequently removed to binding arbitration. The arbitrators detennined that Princeton Review
should surrender the site to Kaplan Review.[36] Princeton Review did so, but vowed to register
instead the domain name "kraplan.com," which, like the kaplan.com during Princeton Review's
control, would be devoted to comparative advertising disparaging Princeton's competitor.[37]
McDonald's v. Quittner
{21} The most recent Internet trademark dispute was created by a magazine writer attempting to
generate material for his column on the Internet. In the course ofwriting about businesses that fail to
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register their names as Internet domains, writer Joshua Quittner reviewed the list ofregistered domain
names and noted that no one had registered the name of"McDonald's," the renowned fast food chain.
Quittner then contacted McDonald's corporation to get a statement regarding their failure to protect
their famous name. No statement appeared forthcoming, so Quittner generated the story by
registering "McDonalds.com" himself, activating the site, and circulating his new e-mail address as
"ronald@mcdonalds.com." Some messages urged him to use the site to promote vegetarianism, other
messages urged him to offer the domain name back to McDonalds in return for an exorbitant
price.[3S1
{22} Quittner did indeed offer the name back to McDonald's in one ofhis magazine columns, but not
in exchange for money. In a manner reminiscent ofthe Princeton Review, he instead offered to
surrender the domain name ifMcDonald's corporation would underwrite some Internet equipment for
a grade school.Lm This and other provoking articles caught the corporation's attention; they
responded not by funding grade school computer access, but by pressuring the InterNIC to revoke
Quittner's registration ofthe name. Although the registry had stayed out ofprevious disputes such as
the Adam Curry litigation, sticking tenaciously to its "first-come, first-served" policy, it wavered
before this new corporate threat. InterNIC first resisted McDonalds' demands, then eventually agreed
to revoke the registration, then changed its mind again, leaving the registration with Quittner.[40]
McDonald's ultimately agreed to donate $3,500 to purchase the equipment.[4JJ
Trademark Law
{23} The disputes described above all involve some disagreement over the use ofa distinguishing
business name. This type ofdisagreement is by no means limited to the Internet, and in real space has
generated a substantial body oflaw regarding the use; ownership, and infringement oftrademarks.
Trademarks comprise a type ofintellectual property used to identify the source ofgoods or
services.[42] Technically, marks used to identify goods are referred to as "trademarks," and marks
used to identify services are referred to as "servicemarks." Generally, however, trademarks and
servicemarks are treated as equivalent under federal trademark law.H3] Such rights serve both to
protect the public by preventing fraud and confusion regarding the origin ofgoods, and also to protect
the goodwill and name recognition ofbusinesses that have invested in improving and distinguishing
their products.[44]
{24} Trademark rights exist at common law, and most states recognize and enforce such rights. The
United States Congress has also recognized and extended these rights via federal statute, and this
source oftrademark rights has become paramount in the United States.[ru The federal trademark
statute, or Lanham Act, provides a national registry for trademarks, generating nationwide protection
for registered marks. The statute also provides for enforcement ofeither registered or unregistered
marks.[4(j] Trademark owners who wish to sue for trademark infringement under the statute must
first show that they have a protectable mark. Protectability is largely a function ofthe strength ofthe
mark; some marks are highly distinctive, or "strong" marks, others are less distinctive or "weak."
Some marks may be accorded no protection at all.
{2S} Trademark strength is usually assessed by reference to five categories: arbitrary, fanciful,
suggestive, descriptive, and generic. As listed here, they range in descending order of strength, with
arbitrary or fanciful marks receiving the greatest protection. Arbitrary marks are well-known words
that are used to identify goods or services to which they have no relation -- "Apple" computers, for
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example.[4Z] Fanciful marks are invented words, such as "Exxon," applied to goods or services.[48]
Each ofthese types ofmarks is considered inherently distinctive because their only association with
the marked goods or services is the association gained in the marketplace.
{26} Suggestive marks are also inherently distinctive, but are weaker than an arbitrary or fanciful
mark because a consumer with some thought or imagination could discern the nature of the goods
from the suggestive mark.[:l2] Descriptive marks require little imagination to discern the nature of
their associated goods, and are not considered inherently distinctive.[~Q] As such, descriptive marks
are not protectable unless the holder can show "secondary meaning," that is, an association in the
minds ofconsumers between the mark and that particular source of the product or service. Where
secondary meaning can be shown, the law declines to allow competitors to "free ride" offof a
business' goodwill and recognition by using an otherwise descriptive mark.[:iJJ
{27} Generic terms are terms commonly descriptive ofa class ofgoods or services, and are
unprotectable.[~~J They simply name the good or product. Generic terms are not recognized as
protectable marks because they are terms that all competitors in that market require in order to
describe their products. Allowing one business to monopolize the term would hamstring the
competitive efforts ofall other such businesses.[S11 Some terms, such as "toothpaste" are born
generic; others such as "escalator," have genericness thrust upon them by becoming a common
descriptive name in the mind ofthe public.
{28} If the plaintiff in a trademark suit can show that she has a protectable mark, she must then
demonstrate that the use ofan infringing mark is likely to result in consumer confusion as to the
source of the marked goods. Courts evaluating the likelihood ofconfusion may review a variety of
factors, none ofwhich are dispositive. Factors that a court may review include the similarity between
the marks, the strength ofthe plaintiffs mark, the defendant's intent or bad faith in adopting a similar
mark, the "proximity" of the goods in advertisement, marketing and distribution, instances ofactual
confusion, and the sophistication ofconsumers of the goods.[54J Remedies that may be awarded to a
plaintiff who successfully demonstrates trademark infringement include injunctive relief, recovery of
unjust profits, damages and costs.L~J
Names and Addresses
{29} The fit between trademark law as developed in real space and domain names used in cyberspace
may to some extent depend on the ability to classify domain names as either names or addresses. In
general, names are thought ofas discrete emblems used to establish or designate identity; addresses
are thought ofas emblems designating location. Trademarks and servicemarks are clearly names;
they designate or identify goods and services. They are not used to locate a good or service, or even
to indicate the producer's place oforigin - they indicate the source or affiliation of the item.
Trademarks also have the portability associated with an individual designator or name -- when a
business moves, the trademark goes with it; the mark is not tied to the particular location.[S6]
{3D} Domain names might seem to be unusual because they appear to be both names and
addresses; they both locate and identify Internet resources.[m Yet even in real space, this division is
not pristine. People's personal names, for example, establish identity, and such identifiers travel with
the individual rather than changing when the person changes location. Street addresses or geographic
names, by contrast, are more static in order to establish location. Yet such addresses and geographic
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names also serve to identify the physical place, differentiating it from other places.
{31} Geographic names and street addresses also change; indeed, there is no particular reason why a
person who moves from one house to another could not take his street address with him -- this might
be undesirable in cities, where the address scheme frequently follows some order. But in rural
settings, where the address may simply be "Chatham Farm," the name/address could certainly move
with its user. Geographic names ofall kinds -- street addresses, zip codes, counties -- are in fact
overlays on an unchanging numerical system of longitude and latitude, which is a universally
recognized designator and locator for a particular place on the earth's surface. In this sense,
geographic names are much like Internet domain names, which are an overlay on the "real" IP
number designations.
{32} Telephone numbers share the same dual nature. At one time, telephone numbers were "hard-
wired" and a particular number was associated solely with a particular telephone line. However, as
switching technology advanced, numbers became more portable. Telephone numbers are no longer
necessarily tied to one place -- it is common for a person or business to take their telephone number
with them when they move, especially within the same area code. In this respect, the number seems
more like a name. Yet, a telephone set, fax machine or modem that is plugged into a new telephone
line changes "address," that is, a different number must be dialed to establish a connection to the
instrument. Thus the number establishes the location ofa particular endpoint on the telephone
network.
{33} If trademark law contemplates only the use ofa designator as a name, then application of
trademark law to domain names, with their dual nature, might be problematic. However, it appears
that a fair number ofdesignators in "real space" share this dual nature of acting as both a name and an
address. Domain names may be analogous to real space designators such as geographic names or
telephone numbers. To the extent that trademark law recognizes such real space designators as
trademarks, it may be readily applicable to domain names as well.
Geographic Names
{34} One real space analogy to domain names might be geographic place name; trademark law
relating to names such as street addresses might be instructive in determining the proper legal
treatment for domain names. As the discussion above suggests, domain names and geographic names
share an amenability to be used as either names or addresses. However, trademark law generally
seems to assume that geographic names are in fact addresses, and so, like generic terms, are
unprotectable because everyone needs them to locate the place in question.[~8]Geographic names
may be entitled to legal protection ifthey attain secondary meaning as to the source ofgoods, but not
if they are merely descriptive of the goods' place oforigin.[i9J As a consequence, under the Lanham
Act, geographic place names as such cannot be registered as trademarks, and this has led some
experts to opine that street addresses could not be registered as trademarks.rPQ]
{35} However, this rule assumes that the good or service takes its name from the place or address.
This is not the case in the Internet trademark disputes encountered so far. To the contrary, the
cyberspace "address," the Internet domain, has been named after goods or services that are well-
known in real space. This phenomenon ofusing an established trademark to name a location is not
entirely unknown off-line. Consider the following addresses taken from Standard & Poor's
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McDonald's Corp.
One McDonald Plaza
Oak Brook, IL 60521-1900
Coca-Cola Corp.
One Coca-Cola Plaza
Atlanta, GA 30313
Mohawk Tools Co.
One Precision Plaza
Crystal Lake, IL 60014-8263
Wolfennann's
One Muffin Lane
P.O. Box 15913
Shawnee Mission, KS 66285
{36} In each of these examples, the geographic address of the business has incorporated some
distinctive name or mark associated with the business located at that address. Thus, the mark appears
to have preceded the address. This is quite the inverse of the law cited above - far from the mark
containing a geographic name indicating the source ofthe goods or services, the geographic name
instead contains an indicator ofgoods or services located there! This seems closely analogous to
naming an Internet domain after the business that locates itself at that site.
{37} The marks in the addresses above run the gamut from arbitrary or fanciful to generic. The name
"McDonald's" in no way suggests or describes food services, except that it has gained that association
in commerce. In the case ofMohawk tools, the address name is significant only ifone knows the
finn's motto, "A Precision Twist Drill Company," in which case the tenn "precision," found in the
address, appears to be descriptive and protectable if it has secondary meaning with regard to Mohawk
tools. Finally, the address for Wolfennann, a purveyor ofbaked goods well known for their english
muffins, carries the term "muffin," which would probably be considered generic. Interestingly
enough, this address appears to be a pure mnemonic for Wolfennann's mail order catalogs, and the
P.O. Box is the true postal address.
{38} The protectability ofsuch addresses will likely be dependant on the strength of the mark given
being employed as a postal or physical locator. But it is not hard to envision situations in which
adoption ofa similar address would constitute unfair competition. For example, ifPepsi-Cola were to
set up an office in the same zip code as the Coca-Cola headquarters, and designate the address as "10
Coca-Cola Plaza," Coca-Cola might well have cause for complaint. This would especially be true if,
much like Princeton Review on the Internet, Pepsi-Cola did so in the hopes ofintercepting misrouted
mail intended for Coca-Cola's headquarters, or perhaps even intercepting confused Coca-Cola clients
or customers who had intended to visit"1 Coca-Cola Plaza."
{39} In such an instance, the factors indicating the likelihood ofconfusion would seem to translate
well into an analysis indicating infringement by Pepsi: the name adopted as a postal address is a
strong mark associated with a competitor's product, and the addresses differ by only a zero. The
locations are in close physical proximity, and more importantly, in close logical proximity. Pepsi's
motivation for adopting the address, to capture its rival's mail or clients, seems to be in bad faith, and
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any misrouted mail or mistaken individuals would supply evidence ofactual confusion. This analysis
seems equally applicable to confusingly similar designators in cyberspace, particularly where the
designation appears to have been adopted to specifically capitalize on anticipated confusion.
Broadcast Designators
{40} Trademark parallels to Internet designators are also found in the identifying names or addresses
for broadcast services, albeit subject to the peculiarities ofthe broadcast medium. Two broad classes
of disputes emerge in the area ofbroadcasting identification marks: those involving call letters, and
those involving frequency designations. Each broadcaster carries a designator, similar to the IF
addresses and domain names of the Internet. An additional similarity is that domain names and IF
addresses are assigned by a central authority, the InterNIC, much like the way the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") assigns call letters and frequencies to broadcasters. However,
unlike the designators on the Internet, the two types ofbroadcast designators are somewhat
uncoupled: there is no equivalent to the Domain Name Service utility for radio or television. If there
were, listeners or viewers could enter a station's call letters and have the receiver automatically tune
to that station's frequency.
{41} As a consequence of this separation, the naming and locating functions ofbroadcast designators
have become somewhat discrete, unlike Internet domain name functions. Call letters in broadcasting
tend to function as names rather than as addresses. Radio and television station call letters are
assigned by the FCC, with each station receiving a distinctive set ofletters.[6l] However,
broadcasters are able to request particular call letters, subject to the constraint that call letters of
stations east of the Mississippi must begin with a "W" and call letters ofstations west of the
Mississippi must begin with a "K."[6.JJ Much like the assignment ofdomain names by the InterNIC,
call letters are assigned by the FCC on a "first-come-first-served" basis.[Q~J Stations frequently
employ homonyms to identify their call letters, such as "Kiss" for a soft-music station bearing the
letters WKSS,[(HJ or "Warm" for a soft-music station bearing the letters WRMM.(6)] Acronyms
such as WBCS for "We're Boston's Country Station"[6.J'-l are also sought. This is somewhat similar to
the way Internet domain names may indicate the domain site operator, but lacks a similar locating
function.
{42} Call letters have been treated for the most part as arbitrary marks. The letters chosen tend not to
describe or even suggest the nature ofthe service designated. Instead, they indicate only broadcast
music ofone sort or another. This tends to put the junior user ofa similar call letter set at a severe
disadvantage when a court assesses the likelihood ofconfusion. For example, where a new radio
station adopts the letters "WMEE" and an existing station already uses "WMCZ,"[67] or where an
established television station uses the letters "WBOC" and a new station attempts to use
"WBOT,"IQ8J the factor of trademark strength has tended to favor the prior user.[69l
{43} However, this factor is not necessarily determinative. In addition to the strength of the mark,
courts deciding these cases apply the other likelihood ofconfusion factors. Depending on the
particular facts, these factors may either aid or hinder the junior user.
{44} Similarity of marks: Opinions analyzing the likelihood ofconfusion between call letters have
devoted considerable space to evidence on the phonetic and visual similarity of letter combinations.
Much ofthis evidence comes from a particular expert witness who appears to specialize in testifying
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for plaintiffs in such trials.[70] Some courts find an analysis ofcall letter similarity persuasive, while
others discount it entirely.flU Courts discounting similarity studies rely on the fact that call letters
are frequently used in the context ofslogans, phrases, or logos that would distinguish them, and
because stations in a given region frequently share two or more of their call letters, listeners are
accustomed to distinguishing stations with such overlapping letters.[12.l
{45} Similarity of product: In call letter cases, courts have also looked to the similarity ofbroadcast
format when assessing the likelihood ofconfusion in call letter cases. Stations with similar formats
are more likely to be confused with one another, such as the case oftwo radio stations that each
broadcast a "top-forty" music format.[I31 Where one station broadcasts a family-oriented country-
western music format, and another broadcasts a "bad-boy, iconoclastic" rock n' roll format, listeners
are unlikely to confuse the two.[74J Certainly a listener who mistakenly tuned to one of the stations
would soon realize her mistake.U,s.] Medium, too, tends to prevent listeners from confusing stations:
one court has held that a television and radio station with almost identical call letters are unlikely to
be confused in part because of the clear differences between radio and television.[76]
{46} Area of use: Generally, conflicts between stations with similar call letters only occur when the
territories reached by their broadcast signals overlap.[Z1.l However, there seems to be no reason that
stations with similar call letters but separate geographic territories might come into conflict. Such a
case would present great difficulties for a plaintiffattempting to show a likelihood ofconfusion: the
plaintiffwould presumably need to show consumer recognition ofhis call letters outside his
broadcast area.
{47} Sophistication of consumers: The nature ofbroadcasting has produced an odd twist in
analyzing the factor ofconsumer sophistication: courts have recognized advertisers, rather than
listeners, to be the true consumers ofbroadcast services.rI8] Indeed, it has been suggested that
consumers are in some sense the "product" ofbroadcast, by which the courts appear to mean that
delivery ofmessages to a certain audience is the product.I19.l Radio broadcasters in fact target their
programming to appeal to particular niche populations.r.s.m The cases discussing call letter disputes
suggest that advertisers are very sophisticated in selecting broadcast services that are oriented toward
the particular demographic market that the advertiser wishes to reach.LSU Consequently, this factor
tends to favor defendants, since it seems unlikely that advertisers will mistakenly recruit the wrong
station to deliver their messages, even ifone station's call letters closely resemble those ofanother
station.
{48} Degree of Care: Given the analysis ofconsumer sophistication above, it stands to reason that
the degree ofcare exercised by advertisers, the true consumers ofbroadcast services, is very high.
However, in contrast to the "sophistication ofconsumers" factor, courts assessing the "degree ofcare"
factor tend to apply it to the audience rather than to the advertisers.[8~JIn general, the courts have
postulated that the degree ofdiscrimination between radio stations with similar broadcast formats is
not high because, first, the consumer has no direct fmancial stake in the choice ofstations, and
second, listeners often play the radio as "background" while engaged in other activities.[S3] One
court has extended this analysis from the "purely aural"L8.41 medium ofradio to the audiovisual
medium oftelevision.{SS.J This extension is somewhat questionable. Even though television
consumers also have no real financial stake in tuning to a particular channel, television clearly
requires a greater investment ofattention than does radio.
{49} Intent in adopting mark: The existence of "bad faith" or an intent by the junior user to "free
ride" offofmistaken association with the prior user's mark is not ostensibly determinative of the
outcome ofa trademark infringement suit, but courts seem to weigh the question of scienter heavily.
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Infringers are usually not foolish enough to admit or leave evidence ofan intent to appropriate a prior
user's reputation, but in instances where the junior user knew ofthe prior user and showed an
awareness of the possibility ofconfusion, the court was willing to infer an intent to trade on the prior
user's goodwill.[86J
Frequency Identifiers
{50} A second type ofdispute over broadcast identifiers involves frequency designations, which
carry the location function for broadcast services. It may seem surprising that the latter disputes could
arise: each broadcaster is assigned a particular frequency within a geographic area by the Federal
Communications Commission; otherwise, stations would interfere with one another by broadcasting
over each other's signals.I~7J However, because FM tuners were analog until recently, radio stations
developed the habit ofrounding their designators to the nearest whole number on the FM dial in
advertisements or for identification purposes.[8£1 FM frequency assignments lie between 88.1 and
107.9 Megahertz; the FCC has divided this portion ofthe spectrum into 100 channels 0.2 Megahertz
apart - since the channels begin at 88.1, no station could be assigned to a whole number
frequency.(85)] Given that only 21 whole numbers are available on the FM spectrum, and since
stations can elect to round up or down, several conflicts developed between stations that rounded to
the same number.
{51} In deciding these disputes, the courts tend to treat frequency designators as addresses -- that is,
as a term describing the approximate location of the broadcast service on the FM dial.[9DJ This
utilitarian function of facilitating frequency location throws the designator into the category of
descriptive terms.[91] As such, the designators have been treated much like geographic terms in other
trademarks: they lack inherent distinctiveness, and are protectable only upon a showing of secondary
meaning.[921 The rounded frequency designator therefore might be distinctive if a plaintiff could
show that it was associated in the minds ofconsumers with the source of a particular broadcast
service, rather than as an aid to locating the broadcast frequency. However, as a practical matter,
plaintiffs in reported cases have shown a marked inability to offer such proof, perhaps because of the
uncoupling ofcall letters and frequency numbers: distinctiveness is easily shown for call letters
because they act almost exclusively as a name, whereas distinctiveness is difficult to show for
frequency numbers, because they act almost exclusively as an address.
Telephone Mnemonics
{52} A third real space analogy to cyberspace domain names might be that oftelephone numbers,
which act both as names and logical addresses. Several trademark cases have recently been decided
involving the use of "vanity" telephone numbers, which correspond to alphanumeric designators that
are easy for consumers to remember and associate with the business at that number. For example, "L-
A-W-Y-E-R-S" serves as a mnemonic for 529-9377, the number ofa law firm.[9.31 Such telephone
mnemonics bear a close resemblance to the mnemonic domain names associated with IP addresses,
and legal decisions regarding their status as trademarks suggest that domain names may be
protectable.
{53} Courts have almost unanimously held that telephone mnemonics may be protectable as
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trademarks, and have readily applied the law regarding the likelihood ofconfusion to such marks.[94]
In Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar ,I2.SJ plaintiffs who used the telephone mnemonic "INJURY-I"
to advertise their personal injury legal services sought an injunction against defendants who used the
mnemonic "INJURY_9" to advertise their legal services. The trial court denied the motion, holding
that the plaintiffs marks was generic or at best descriptive without having been shown to have
secondary meaning.[9Ql The appellate court partially agreed, reasoning that the term "INJURY" was
so commonly descriptive ofpersonal injury representation that it must be generic.[27J
{54} However, the appellate court in Dranoff-Perlstein noted that marks must be assessed "as a
whole," and the marks in question differed in their numerical suffixes.[2~] It further noted that where
two marks share generic portions but differ in non-generic portions, it is presumed that the public
tends to distinguish the marks on the basis ofthe non-generic portions.[991 Thus, any confusing
similarity between the marks "INJURY-I" and "INJURY-9" would depend on the likelihood of
confusion between the marks, taking each as a whole, with particular emphasis on the likelihood of
confusing the suffix "1" with "9." The case was remanded for findings on the likelihood of such
confusion, taking into account the familiar factors ofconfusion analysis.[lQQJ
{55} In some instances, however, there may be no question that a single digit difference will be
confusing. In Holiday Inns v. 800 Reservations ,[Un] plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant's use ofa
telephone mnemonic that differed from plaintiff's "1-800-HOLIDAY INN" mnemonic by one critical
digit. The defendant was aware that telephone users routinely confuse the letter "0" with the numeral
"zero" when dialing mnemonic telephone designators. The defendant therefore secured the
"complementary" number, 1-800-H-[zero]-LIDAY, that is 1-800-405-4329, expecting that some
number ofcallers intending to contact Holiday Inn reservations would instead dial his number.f102]
Callers who did so would be connected to defendant's hotel travel agency, which offered booking for
not only Holiday Inn, but other hotel chains. The defendant's business received a fee for placement of
reservations.[lQ3.1
{56} The court held that this use ofa similar telephone mnemonic was "parasitic."IIQ4] The
defendant admittedly attempted to avoid passing his service offas that ofHoliday Inns" and arranged
to have the "complementary" number answered with a recording stating that the caller had not
reached Holiday Inns, but a reservation service that would assist in finding the lowest hotel rate at
Holiday Inns or elsewhere. This was not persuasive to the court, which found that the recording was
in fact likely to increase customer confusion by offering new options at the moment the customer is
most confused, having attempted to contact one service and mistakenly contacted another.[l 05] The
court noted further that, "Defendant's use ofplaintiff's [I-800-HOLIDAY INN] mark involves more
than the likelihood ofconfusion - our present technology allows defendants to use plaintiff's mark in
such a way that they can anticipate actual confusion with absolute accuracy and can profit
accordingly."[J~The injunction was issued against 800 Reservations.[IQ7]
Generic Mnemonics
{57} As might be supposed from the analysis in Dranojf-Perlstein ,the problem of generic terms
runs throughout the telephone mnemonic cases. The fear that a common term might be monopolized
by granting it trademark status is in fact exacerbated by the fixed correspondence between numerals
and letters on the telephone keypad.fIOS] There is some redundancy in this code since there is a three
to one correspondence between letters and digits. For example, the letters A, B, and C are all assigned
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to the numeral 2. Thus, although there is redundancy in the code, it is with regard to words, not
numbers. Within a given area code, there is only one telephone number that corresponds to a given
mnemonic word. Control of that telephone number is tantamount to control of the word as a
mnemonic device.
{58} The exception to this exclusivity is, ofcourse, the availability of toll-free "800" numbers, which
transcend area codes since they are accessible nationwide. Thus, in the telephone cases, the clash
between mnemonics is frequently between a local number and an "800" number with the same or
similar mnemonic. In Dial-a-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page ,(J021 the plaintiffheld a local
exchange number corresponding to the mnemonic "mattres"; the plaintiff successfully enjoined a
competitor's use of the analog "800" number within that area code. The trial court's finding that the
competing "800" mnemonic could be confusingly similar was upheld on appeaL[JJOJ
{59} In contrast, the case ofBell v. Kidan LUI] involved the use ofa similar "800" number. This
was found unlikely to confuse consumers, in part because it was not a toll call.LlJ2.J Plaintiff used
the mnemonic "CALL-LAW' in advertising their legal services; they sought to enjoin use of
defendant's mnemonic "1-800-LAW-CALL" in the same area.llU] In assessing plaintiffs likelihood
ofsuccess on the merits, the trial court reviewed the factors indicating likelihood ofconfusion, and
noted that the difference between a toll call and an "800" call was likely to be ofsignificance to
consumers, who would expect even a slight difference in numbers to yield a different
connection.[ll4l This analysis similarly weighed the consumer sophistication factor against the
plaintiff; the court reasoned that consumers are familiar with the difference between local toll calls
and "800" calls.IllS] The court denied injunctive relief.f116]
Transplanted Marks
{60} The emergence of Internet trademarks offers a clear opportunity to come to grips with the issue
ofnames and addresses inherent in the use ofdesignators as trademarks. The real space examples
reviewed here show that cyberspace is not unique in harboring designators that function as both
names and addresses, and these designators will frequently be employed as trademarks or
servicemarks. In the case ofgeographic place names, the distinction between naming and addressing
appears to have gone entirely unrecognized. In the case ofbroadcast designators, where the two
functions have come almost completely uncoupled, the failre to recognize the distinction between
naming and addressing has generated a highly idiosyncratic and somewhat confused body ofcases. In
neither instance have the courts considering these real world designators articulated broad principles
that might be readily transferred to new fact patterns, such as those arising on the Internet.
{61} Neither has the distinction between naming and addressing been expressly articulated in the
cases considering telephone mnemonics. However, in these cases, factual and technological
similarities to the Internet domain name incidents offer a ready comparison from which some general
principles may be drawn. As the telephone mnemonic cases reviewed above indicate, the dual nature
ofa designator such as a telephone number or domain name is no bar to rational application of
established trademark law. Such cases are exceptionally helpful in charting the likely progression of
trademark law on the Internet. The telephone cases suggest: first, that domain names, like telephone
mnemonics, are potentially protectable as trademarks; and second, that domain names, like telephone
mnemonics, should be susceptible to the accepted infringement analysis applied to other types of
trademarks.
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{62} However, this is not to say that consideration ofdomain names as trademarks will not entail its
own idiosyncracies. The calculus ofmark strength in the kind ofInternet dispute encountered thus far
may not be as straightforward as one might initially assume. To date, the domain names in dispute
have drawn much oftheir recognition and goodwill from their use as trade or service marks in real
space. This may in some instances tum the usual classification ofmarks on its head, as they are in
essence being applied to a new service. Considered in the abstract, there is no particular reason to
suppose that cybernauts happening upon a domain designated "McDonalds.com" or "Kaplan.com"
would associate those sites with a source ofhamburgers or testing services in real space -- the world
is full of individuals named McDonald and Kaplan, any ofwhom might have registered such domain
names with the InterNIC. This seems to weaken the presumption ofdistinctiveness for arbitrary
marks transported to the new medium. By contrast, a site designated with a fanciful name such as
"Exxon.com" seems inherently distinctive whether in real space or cyberspace. And a generic mark
from real space may become arbitrary when used to designate a domain name such as "muffin.com."
{63} This carry over from real space to cyberspace suggests that a key factor in analyzing the
likelihood ofconsumer confusion will be the "proximity" of the marks. Use of the name
"McDonald's" to peddle hamburgers in real space may not necessarily overlap with the use of the
same name for a resource locator in cyberspace; the two uses may be in distinctly different markets.
They may also involve very different services, as the major commodity on the Internet is information,
rather than hamburgers. This is beginning to change, however, as companies begin to use their net
presence to allow customers to order products including fast food delivery ofpizzas. [JJ7]
Consequently, the real and virtual markets may eventually converge.
{64} By contrast, the use ofmarks like "MTV" or "Kaplan" on the Internet may already entail a high
likelihood ofconfusion, as they are associated with entertainment or information in both real space
and cyberspace. In such instances, the use of the Internet becomes a natural extension of the service
offered in real space. This increases not only the prospect that the marks overlap in proximity but also
the occasion for parasitic or bad faith use ofthe mark. It seems relatively clear, for example, that at
least some ofthe notoriety ofthe "mtv.com" site was generated by Curry's real space association with
the MTV broadcast channel. Similarly, there is no question, indeed the Princeton Review openly
admits, that their use of "kaplan" in their domain name was designed to capture potential rivals of
their customer. Additionally, such cases appear to use the technology to anticipate actual confusion,
as in the Holiday Inns case.
Emerging Cybermarks
{65} Although the Internet's present trademark disputes appear imported from real space, this will
not always be the case; eventually the disputes will be home-grown. The dispute between Wired and
Women's Wire is an early precursor to such conflicts: the heart of the dispute was not the
appropriation ofa well-known mark from real space, but the confusing similarity between two marks
in cyberspace. As Internet commerce becomes more common, we may expect that certain domains
will acquire a reputation based entirely on their Internet activities -- as Adam Curry's
"metaverse.com" site seems to be doing. Development ofa competing site with a similar mnemonic,
such as "metaverse.net" or "multiverse.com" would raise the possibility ofconfusing similarity
between two cyberspace-based marks -- "cybermarks" ifyou will.
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{66} Such disputes need not be divorced from the law ofreal space, however, and precedent such as
the telephone mnemonic cases will continue to be helpful, so long as it is realized that, at some
points, the correspondence between telephone numbers and IF addresses will break down. For
example, although the strength of the cybermark will likely be assessed as much as any trademark,
the problem ofgeneric terms may be of lesser concern than in the telephone mnemonic cases.
Generics in general go unprotected because they are words necessary to all competitors in a given
market. At least part of the rationale underlying the policy toward generic telephone mnemonics is
the static correspondence between telephone numbers and their associated letters on the telephone
key pad -- only one telephone number in an area will correspond to the term. However, unlike
telephone mnemonics, domain name mnemonics are entirely separable from their underlying IP
addresses, and completely portable to a new Internet resource site. Thus, there is no necessary
monopoly ofa mnemonic when an IF address is assigned; any alphanumeric string may be chosen as
the corresponding domain name.
{67} The problem of confusion between domain names may also be lessened if, as in Dranoff-
Per/stein ,the domain name must be taken as a whole when assessing the likelihood ofconfusion.
Imagine for example competing computer program vendors who have registered, respectively,
"software.net" and "software.com" as their domain sites. Under the analysis ofDranoff-Per/stein ,
the word "software" must surely be generic as it is a common descriptive term, and likely essential to
the advertising and business operations ofany purveyor ofcomputer programs. This does not
necessarily render the competing domain names unprotectable, however; the analysis will simply
shift to whether or not there is a likelihood ofconfusion between the top-level domain designations
".com" and ".net" when used as part ofthe full domain names.
{68} Such an analysis suggests that the factor ofconsumer sophistication may also prove important:
a result that is problematic, as the computer literacy ofcybernauts is currently in flux. Until very
recently, the majority ofInternet users were relatively experienced in the use of the medium; like
consumers who can readily distinguish an "800" telephone number from a toll call, Internet users
would likely distinguish a "wired.com" from ··wire.net" simply by recognizing the top-level domain
designation. However, the recent and burgeoning influx ofcomputer neophytes or "newbies," onto
the Internet may have drastically altered the likelihood ofdomain name discrimination. Ironically,
this flood ofnew net citizens, which appears to have greatly diluted the mean level ofuser
sophistication, is also driving the movement toward commercialization. A large pool ofsuch
cyberspace consumers is critical to the viability ofany electronic business venture, and in time they
will likely become discriminating cybermarket patrons. In the interim, however, their appearance on-
line may increase the chances that a court will find a likelihood ofconfusion between similar domain
designations.
Conclusion
{69} As commercial use ofthe Internet becomes increasingly common, designation ofgoods and
services by on-line trademarks, or "cybermarks" will gain in significance. Businesses that are willing
to venture out into cyberspace will wish to advertise and differentiate their services; lack of settled
trademark rights may deter them from investing in such ventures. However, the established law of
trademarks appears admirably suited to providing such surety. Although cybermarks may in some
cases function as both names and addresses, established trademark doctrines are well able to
accommodate such designators. As a consequence, doctrines applied to decide disputes in real space
over marks such as telephone number mnemonics will be extended to resolve disputes over
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trademarks in cyberspace.
{{END}}
wi See the related readings
Journal staffmembers have compiled a list ofhypertext links of information contained on
the Internet that may be of interest to you.
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[65] Cox Communications v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 620 F. Supp. 143, 145 (N.D. Ga.
1985).
[66] See Infinity Broadcasting, 1993 WL 343679, at *6.
[67] See Pathfinder Communications v. Midwest Communications Co., 593 F.Supp. 281, 286
(N.D. Ind. 1984).
[68] See Draper Communications v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, 505 A.2d 1283, 1295 (Del. Ch.
1985).
[69] But see Virginia Tech Foundation v. Family Group Limited V, 666 F. Supp. 856, 858 (W.D.
Va. 1987) (suggesting that call letters ass~gned by the FCC are not a "strong mark").
[70] See, e.g. ,Draper Communications, 505 A.2d at 1290-91 (testimony ofDaniel A. Dinnsen,
Professor ofLinguistics, University ofIndiana); Pathfinder Communications, 593 F. Supp. at 283-
84 (testimony ofProfessor Dinnsen); Infinity Broadcasting, 1993 WL 343679, at *6 (testimony of
Professor Dinnsen).
[71] See, e.g. , Virginia Tech Foundation, 666 F. Supp. at 858 (tiThe experts, in my opinion, did
more to obfuscate the problem than they did to clarify it. ... In my judgment, this is a classic misuse
ofexpert testimony, and I give very little weight to any ofit.") (Kiser, J.).
[72] See Infinity Broadcasting, 1993 WL 343679, at *5-6.
[73] See Pathfinder Communications, 593 F. Supp at 285.
[74] See Infinity Broadcasting, 1993 WL 343679, at *3.
[75] Id .
[76] See Virginia Tech Foundation v. Family Group Limited V, 666 F. Supp. 856, 859 (W.D. Va.
1987).
[77] See, e.g. ,Draper Communications v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, 505 A.2d 1283, 1294
(Del. Ch. 1985); Pathfinder Communications, 593 F. Supp at 285.
[78] Pathfinder Communications ,593 F. Supp. at 283.
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[79] Infinity Broadcasting , 1993 WL 343679, at *10.
[80] Id . at *3.
[81] Id . at *4.
[82] See Pathfinder Communications ,593 F. Supp at 286.
[83] Id .
[84] Id .
[85] See Draper Communications v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, 505 A.2d 1283, 1294 (Del. Ch.
1985) (citing Pathfinder Communications, 593 F. Supp. at 286).
[86] See Draper Communications ,505 A.2d at 1295-96; Pathfinder Communications ,593 F.
Supp. at 286.
[87] 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.201-203 (1994).
[88] See Walt-West Enters. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1982); Covenant Radio
Corp. v. Ten Eighty Corp., 390 A.2d 949, 952 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1977).
[89] Walt-West Enters. ,695 F.2d at 1052 n.t.
[90] Id . at 1059; Cox Communications v. Susquehannah Broadcasting Co., 620 F. Supp. 143, 146
(N.D. Ga. 1985); Covenant Radio, 390 A.2d at 952.
[91] See Cox Communications, 620 F. Supp. at 146 (noting that numerical identifiers indicating
frequency location act like geographical identifiers).
[92] Walt-West Enters. ,695 F.2d at 1059; Covenant Radio, 390 A.2d at 953-54.
[93] See, e.g. ,Murrin v. Midco Communications, 726 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Minn. 1989) (trademark
suit to enjoin allegedly infringing use of telephone mnemonic "Dial L-A-W-Y-E-R-S"); see
generally , Terry Ann Swift, Comment, Telephone Numbers That Spell Generic Terms: A
Protectable Trademark or An Invitation to Monopolize a Market? ,28 U.S.F. L. REv. 1079 (1994)
(discussing trademark protection oftelephone mnemonics).
[94] See 3 ALTMAN, supra note 50, § 18.23. But see Cytanovich Reading Ctr. v. Reading
Games, 208 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1984) (declining to recognize telephone mnemonic as a trademark).
[95] 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Jaqueline Pasquarella, Note, Trademark Law - Confusion
Over the Likelihood ofConfusion? Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar (1993) ,38 VILL. L. REv.
137 (1993).
[96) Dranoff-Perlstein ,967 F.2d at 853.
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[97] Id . at 860.
[98] Id .
[99] Id . at 861.
[100] Id . at 862.
[101] 838 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Tenn. 1993).
[102] Id . at 1250-51.
[103] Id . at 1251, 1253.
[104] Id . at 1255.
[105] Id . at 1253, 1255.
[106] Id . at 1255.
[107] ld .
[108] See Dranoff-Perlstein v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852,859 (3d Cir. 1992).
[109] 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
[110] Id . at 678.
[111] 836 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
[112] Id . at 127.
[113] Id . at 126.
[114] Id . at 127.
[115]Id.
[116] Id . at 128.
[117] Pizza Hut Testing Internet Delivery, UPI, Aug. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Cmpcom.
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As a new medium ofcommunication and commerce, the Internet has become a
battleground for a variety of trademark issues. The importance ofthose issues has increased with
the rapidly increasing volume ofcommerce on the Internet. One particularly fertile area of
dispute has concerned the use of Internet domain names where two or more parties seek to use
the same domain name, and at least one of them claims trademark rights in the name.·
WHAT IS A DOMAIN NAME?
Domain names are the now-familiar devices typically ending in ".com," ".org," and a
handful ofother suffixes. In combination with other elements (typically http://www), they create
the uniform resource locator (URL) that serves as an Internet address. The domain name is
linked with a numerical Internet address known as the Internet Protocol (IP) address.
The domain name consists oftwo parts: the "top level domain" (TLD) and the "second
level domain" (SLD).J There are currently three so-called generic TLD's (gTLD's), which are
available to entities in any country throughout the world. They are .com, .org, and .net. Other
TLD's include .gov for governmental entities and .edu for educational entities, and identifiers for
individual countries such .ca (Canada), .ft (France), and .de (Germany).
There is currently a plan, known as the Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum of
Understanding (gTLD-MoU) that calls for creation ofseven new gTLD's, each ofwhich would
be dedicated to a specific type ofwebsite. They are: .firm (businesses), .shop (businesses selling
goods), .web (entities whose activities emphasize use of the world wide web), .arts (entities
emphasizing cultural/entertainment activities), .rec (entities emphasizing recreational activities),
.info (sites offering information services), and .nom (individuals' sites). The gTLD-MoU is
currently scheduled to take effect later this year, although its effective date has already been
postponed once.
The SLD is the part of the domain name preceding the TLD. It may consist ofup to 24
alphanumeric characters. SLD's often consist ofwords that indicate either the operator of the
website or the type ofcontent to be found at that site.
Like a physical address or a telephone number, each Internet address must be unique. A
difference ofone character in the SLD is enough to make the technical distinction. Further, two
entities could have identical SLD's as long as they are in different TLD's. Thus the Yale
Equipment company can maintain a website at <yale.com> while Yale University maintains one
at <yale.edu> without causing any technical problems.
DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION
To operate a website at a particular domain name, you must first register that name. The
entity that currently registers names in the .com, .org, and .net TLD's is Network Solutions, Inc.
(NSI) (corporate slogan: "We're the dot com people™"). NSI registers names on a first-come,
first-served basis. Only one entity may be registered for any particular combination of letters in
. Copyright 1998, John Scruton
I In the world of the Internet, no term is worth having ifit cannot be reduced
to a confusing abbreviation.
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any given TLD. NSI will not register essentially identical domain names to different users, so,
for example, ifDisney had already registered <disneyworld.com>, NSI probably would not allow
another entity to register <disney_world.com>. NSI considers such matters on a case-by-case
basis.
Domain name registration is normally (ifnot exclusively) done on-line. The person
seeking to register the domain name goes to the NSI website at <www.netsol.com> and types in
the desired domain name. NSI's computer will compare that name with its database ofexisting
names. If the desired name is available, the registrant clicks through various other screens. Ifthe
requested name is not available, the would-be registrant is asked to choose another. According
to information brought out in published cases, NSI registers a new domain name about every 20
seconds (on average), for a total ofabout 100,000 new registrations each month. About 90
percent of those registrations are done without any human intervention.
Registration with NSI requires the registrant to verify that "the registration of the selected
domain name, to the best of the registrant's knowledge, does not interfere with or infringe upon
the rights ofany third party. The registrant also represents that the domain name is not being
registered for any unlawful purpose."
The registration ofa domain name gets you nothing more than the ability to use that
domain name. It does not, by itself, provide access to the Internet. To actually create a website
using the domain name, the registrant must contract with an Internet service provider.
DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
Domain name disputes occur when somebody has registered a domain name that another
company thinks it has a superior right to use. That typically happens when the owner ofa
trademark seeks to register a domain name including the mark and learns that that name is taken.
The battleground for trademark purposes is the SLD. Most businesses on the Internet are
found in the .com TLD, and it has become the most familiar to consumers. Consequently, a
business establishing a new Internet presence typically wants its domain name to be in the .com
TLD. To allow customers and potential customers to easily remember its domain name, the
business normally wants its SLD to be its mark. A single company may have multiple sites
devoted to its different products, each at a domain name designated by the product's mark with
the .com suffix. For example, the toy and game maker Hasbro has a general site at
<hasbro.com>, and game-specific sites at <monopoly.com>, <risk.com>, <battleship.com>, and
others (but not, as we shall see, <clue.com>).
Domain name disputes differ from typical trademark disputes in at least one fundamental
way. In a standard trademark case, two entities are using the same name, or similar names, and
the issue is whether that concurrent use creates a likelihood ofconfusion. The court will assess a
number of factors to determine whether confusion is likely, and it is entirely possible that the
combatants will both be able to use the identical mark because differences in the types ofgoods,
the marketing channels, and other particulars prevent confusion. Nobody buys a Delta faucet
because they think it was made by Delta Airlines.
Domain name disputes arise, at least in part, because the concurrent use of identical
domain names by two parties is not possible. Once one entity gets <delta.com>, the next one
wanting the same domain name must either wrest it from the first, or choose another. It remains
to be seen whether the introduction ofnew TLD's will diminish the perceived importance of the
.com suffix.
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Parties: Cybersquatters and Other Malefactors
One person may begin using another's trademark as a domain name for various reasons.
The registrant and the complainant may be legally using the same trademark for different goods,
and the registrant may simply have gotten there first. Or the registrant may have chosen a
domain name that it liked with no knowledge that it was being used as a trademark at all.
Many disputes have arisen from baser motives: Perhaps the most egregious cases are
those involving so-called "cybersquatters," who register domain names including famous
trademarks with the specific intent ofreselling them to the trademark owners. To date,
cybersquatters have invariably lost in litigation, so it is likely that this tactic will become less
popular as time goes by.
Other disputes have arisen where a competitor or other antagonist has registered a domain
name consisting ofthe "enemy's" trademark. For example, the Princeton Review registered the
domain name <kaplan.com> to use as a site dedicated to complaints about Stanley Kaplan's
review courses. Similarly, an antiabortion activist registered <plannedparenthood.com> and
used it with a site promoting antiabortion literature.
Procedures for Addressing Domain Name Disputes
An entity wishing to institute a challenge to an existing domain name has two options.2 It
may initiate a dispute under the NSI policy or it may file a lawsuit.
NSI's Dispute Resolution Policy
NSI is on the third revision ofits dispute resolution policy. The following is an outline of
the current NSI policy, which became effective February 25, 1998 (a copy ofwhich is attached).
In general, the policy allows, but does not require, NSI to follow the outlined procedures.
Dispute initiation: A challenger initiates a disp.ute by providing NSI with (1) an original,
certified copy ofa certificate ofregistration on any country's principal register (or equivalent) of
a word mark which is identical to a second-level domain name; and (2) a copy ofwritten notice
sent to the domain name registrant stating the claim ofviolation of trademark rights and the legal
and factual bases for that claim.
Dispute procedures: NSI will review the materials submitted by the complainant. If the
domain name was registered before the complainant's trademark registration, NSI will take no
further action. If the domain name was registered after the complainant's trademark registration,
NSI will ask the domain name registrant to submit proof that it had a trademark registration
before the date of the complainant's notice ofdispute. If so, NSI will take no further action. If
no such proof is provided within thirty days, and the domain name registrant cooperates by
asking for a new domain name, NSI will help register a new name and give up to ninety days of
simultaneous use of the old and new names for a transition period. After 90 days the old name
will be put on hold and unavailable until resolution of the dispute. If the domain name registrant
fails to cooperate within 30 days ofnotification ofa dispute, NSI will put the domain name on
hold pending resolution of the dispute. When the name is in hold status, neither the domain
name registrant nor the complainant can use it. NSI will not place the name on hold, or will
Ofcourse, before a dispute is initiated, the potential challenger has the options of
asking nicely to have the domain name assigned, offering to pay money for the domain name,
threatening, wheedling, cajoling, etc.
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reinstate the name, upon satisfactory evidence ofresolution of the dispute.
Litigation: If either party initiates a lawsuit against the other relating to the domain
name, NSI will maintain the status quo pending the court's decision: ifthe name is on hold, it
will stay on hold; ifnot, it will not be put on hold. NSI will deposit "control of the domain
name" into the court's registry by giving the plaintiff the registry certificate for deposit.
NSI reserves the right, "in its sole discretion to revoke, suspend, transfer or otherwise
modify a domain name registration" upon thirty days' written notice or upon court order or
arbitration award requiring such action.
NSI's dispute resolution procedure does not correspond to U.S. trademark law. The NSI
policy specifically provides that NSI does not resolve domain name disputes. NSl's policy is
heavily based on priority and registration, and -- perhaps understandably -- pays little heed to the
likelihood ofconfusion analysis that is standard in trademark disputes. NSI's policy has the
virtue of simplicity: ifyou had a registration ofa mark that is identical to your domain name
before you got notice ofa dispute about your domain name, you win under NSI's system.
Options Other Than NSI Dispute
A trademark owner who finds that its mark is being used as somebody else's domain
name is likely to have two objectives: to stop the other person's use and to obtain control of the
domain name. The NSI policy only addresses the first of those objectives: NSI will put an
"improper" domain name on hold. However, a successful complaint under the NSI policy will
not result in the domain name being transferred to the trademark owner. Transfer of the domain
name will require either negotiation with the domain name registrant or filing a lawsuit.
Negotiation
Like any other, a dispute concerning a domain name can be settled, and many have been.
Indeed, the business of the cybersquatter is based on transfer ofdomain names for a ransom
payment in lieu of litigation. A trademark owner considering negotiating a settlement should
consider whether to institute an NSI dispute or lawsuit before beginning negotiations. A lawsuit
will cause NSI to maintain the status quo, which the trademark owner may not want. If the
trademark owner wants to shut down the website, it should avoid making threats of litigation that
would provide the domain name registrant a basis for filing a declaratory relief action. It is not
clear whether an NSI dispute is by itselfenough to satisfy the "actual dispute" requirement of the
declaratory relief statute.
Litigation
Many lawsuits have been filed as a result ofdomain name disputes. As is typical, they
have resulted in many settlements and a few reported decisions. I have found no appellate
decisions to date, so it is hard to say how good the law is, but the basic thrust of the trial court
decisions seems to be correct. Because they are normally based in trademark law, domain name
lawsuits are normally filed in, or removed to, federal court. Most lawsuits have involved the
adverse domain name claimant, and many have also involved NSI.
The fact that a domain name registrant has prevailed in a challenge under NSl's dispute
policy does not mean that it will be able to continue using the domain name indefinitely. As the
court held in Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F.Supp. 737,42 USPQ2d 1850 (E.D. Va.
1997),
[NSI's policy] cannot trump federal law. Holders ofvalid trademarks under
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federal law are not subject to company policy, nor can the rights of those
trademark holders be changed without congressional actions. If trademark laws
apply to domain names, anyone who obtains a domain name under [NSI's] policy
must do so subject to whatever liability is provided for by federal law.
The following is an analysis ofmany ofthe reported cases dealing with domain name disputes.
Lawsuit Against NSI
Lawsuits against NSI have rarely been successful. Based on the caselaw to date, the
trademark owner who finds that its trademark is someone else's domain name has little to gain by
suing NSI. NSI's policy provides that NSI will abide by court decisions, so there is no apparent
need to involve NSI. The reported actions against NSI have been brought under the following
theories:
Direct Trademark Infringement
Infringement claims against NSI have not fared well because ofthe plaintiffs' inability to
show that NSI was using the disputed mark "in commerce" as required for liability under the
Lanham Act. In Academy ofMotion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., 45
USPQ2d 1463 (C.D. Cal. 1997), the Academy contended that NSI unlawfully registered to others
the domain names <academyaward.com>, <academyawards.net>, <theoscars.net>, and
<oscar.net> and moved for a preliminary injunction to preclude NSI from registering domain
names that are similar to the Academy's registered marks OSCAR and ACADEMY AWARDS.
The court held that NSI's registration of the domain names was not a use of the marks "in
commerce," precluding a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits on the infringement claims.
Similarly, in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 44 USPQ2d 1865 (C.D. Cal.
1997) the court held that NSI's "use" of the disputed mark was limited to a pure machine-linking
"address" function, which is not a trademark use and hence cannot be a trademark infringement.
Dilution
The court in Lockheed Martin rejected Lockheed's dilution claim, holding that NSI's
acceptance of domain name registrations is not a "commercial use." Although NSI makes money
by registering domain names, unlike a cybersquatter who trades on the value of the domain name
as a trademark by trying to sell it to the trademark owner, NSI's money comes from the technical
function ofregistering the domain names. NSI makes no more from a domain name that is also a
trademark than from one that is a random string of letters.
Contributory Infringement/Dilution
NSI's passive role in the registration process has typically doomed any attempts to hold
NSI liable under theories ofcontributory infringement or contributory dilution. The court in
Academy ofMotion Picture Arts and Sciences held that NSI lacked the "knowledge of
infringement" necessary to support a claim ofcontributory infringement. In Lockheed Martin,
the court held that NSI's activity was too remote to support contributory infringement liability
because ofNSI's passive role in the registration and lack of involvement with the actual use of
the domain name.
The court in Academy ofMotion Picture Arts and Sciences held that the absence ofany
authority supporting a contributory dilution claim precluded a likelihood of success on that
claim. The court in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 44 USPQ2d 1521 (C.D.
Cal. 1997)3 allowed the possibility ofa contributory dilution claim, but rejected Lockheed's
There are three published decisions in the Lockheed-Martin v. NSI action.
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claim. It held that, like contributory infringement, contributory dilution requires t.lJ.at the
defendant have "either induced another's conduct or continued to supply a product after the
defendant knew or should have known that it was being used to dilute the plaintiff's trademark."
The court found it unlikely that Lockheed could meet the "narrow standard" required to prove
such a claim.
Other Theories
The only litigant that has achieved a modicum ofsuccess against NSI is Clue Computing,
a small Colorado company that is battling Hasbro for the right to use the <clue.com> domain
name. Hasbro filed a challenge under the NSI dispute policy. Within its thirty-day period to
respond, NSI filed a breach ofcontract action against NSI in Colorado state court. The court
granted an injunction precluding NSI from changing the status ofthe <clue.com> domain name,
thereby precluding NSI from putting it on hold.
In an attempt to extricate itself from the dispute, NSI filed a federal interpleader action.
The court dismissed that action on the ground that the state court injunction prevented NSI from
depositing control ofthe res as required by the interpleader statute. Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Clue Computing, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 858,41 USPQ2d 1062 (D. Colo. 1996). Meanwhile, Hasbro
has filed an infringement action against Clue Computing in Massachusetts district court. See
Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 45 USPQ2d 1170 (D. Mass. 1997). At least under the
current NSI policy, Clue Computing might have been able to achieve the same result--
maintenance of its domain name until resolution ofits dispute with Hasbro - and litigate the
trademark action in its "home court" by filing a declaratory reliefaction against Hasbro in federal
court in Colorado.
The court in Panavision International v. Toeppen, 41 USPQ2d 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
granted summary judgment on Panavision's claim against NSI for negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage. Although the claim survived a motion to dismiss, Panavision
failed to create a factual issue because it establish that NSI owed it a duty ofcare under
California negligence law.
Lawsuit Against Domain Name Registrant
Many trademark owners have successfully sued domain name registrants to obtain the
right to use the domain name. Although the best theory will differ from case to case, courts have
accepted both trademark infringement and trademark dilution arguments.
Trademark Infringement
In analyzing a claim that use ofa domain name is a trademark infringement or unfair
competition, the courts have used the standard test to determine whether use of the domain name
creates a "likelihood ofconfusion" with a prior mark. See, e.g., Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee,
950 F.Supp. 737,42 USPQ2d 1850 (E.D. Va. 1997). Under this test, the court must analyze a
number of factors. Although the factors vary somewhat between the federal circuits, the
following list used in the Sixth Circuit is typical: 1) the strength ofthe plaintiff's mark; 2) the
relatedness of the goods; 3) the similarity of the marks; 4) any evidence ofactual confusion; 5)
the marketing channels used; 6) the likely degree ofpurchaser care; 7) the defendant's intent in
selecting the mark; and 8) the likelihood ofexpansion ofthe product lines. Frisch's Restaurants
v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642,648,214 USPQ 15,20 (6th Cir. 1982).
Because of the unique nature of the Internet, the analysis ofthe factors tends to differ
somewhat from the standard analysis. For example, the "similarity of the marks" factor looms
especially large in the analysis. See, e.g., Cardservice (finding a likelihood ofconfusion based
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primarily on the similarity of<cardservice.com> domain name to the registered
CARDSERVICE INTERNATIONAL mark); Planned Parenthood Federation ofAmerica, Inc. v.
Bucci, 42 USPQ2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that an antiabortion activist's use of
<plannedparenthood.com> created a likelihood ofconfusion, based on various factors including
actual confusion). But use ofa registered mark as a domain name does not guarantee that an
infringement claim will be successful. In Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.Supp. 1227,40
USPQ2d 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1996), the court refused to grant summary judgment on the claim that
defendant's use of the <intermatic.com> domain name infringed plaintiffs registered
INTERMATIC mark because of the dissimilarity of the products and the lack of evidence on
various other factors. Although the defendant's intent is often an important factor, the court in
Intermatic found that defendant's bad faith was not established because there. was no law
indicating that cybersquatting, by itself, was illegal.
The courts seem to be struggling somewhat with precisely how to analyze some of the
factors in the context ofdomain names and websites. In some cases, the analysis ofsome factors
seems to be skewed in an attempt to fmd liability where a domain name registrant is intentionally
misusing the plaintiff's mark. In Planned Parenthood, for example, the court found that the
"competitive proximity ofthe services" was close, because the parties compete for the same
audience, i.e. "Internet users searching for a web site that uses plaintiff's mark as its address."
To prevail on an infringement claim, the plaintiffmust show that the defendant "used" the
disputed mark "in commerce." In Planned Parenthood, the court held that the use of the
<plannedparenthood.com> domain name as a site promoting antiabortion literature and
viewpoints was a "commercial use" for Lanham Act pwposes. In Juno Online Services L.P. v.
Juno Lighting, Inc., 44 USPQ2d 1913 (N.D. Ill. 1997), the court held that the mere
"warehousing" ofa domain name -- registering the name without actually using it in connection
with a website -- is not a "use" ofthe mark. There, the defendant had reserved the <juno-
online.com> name, apparently with the intent ofensuring its availability to swap for the
<juno.com> name that it desired. Had the defendant been a cybersquatter, the holding ofa
domain name for ransom might well have been found to be a sufficient "use in commerce." See
Panavision International v. Toeppen, 945 F.Supp. 1296,40 USPQ2d 1908 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding that registration, without more, is not commercial use, but holding marks for sale is), cf
Intermatic (holding that the mere registration ofa domain name incorporating a famous mark,
without actual use on the Internet, causes dilution in that it precludes the mark's owner from
using its mark as a domain name).
Trademark Dilution
To date, plaintiffs in reported cases have had the greatest success with dilution claims.
Such a claim requires the plaintiffto prove that it has a "famous mark" and that the defendant is
making "commercial use in commerce" ofa mark that "causes dilution of the distinCtive quality
of the [plaintiff's] mark." Lanham Act §43(c). The general purpose ofdilution law is to protect
the trademark owner's rights in a famous mark by preventing others from using similar marks
even when such uses would not be likely to cause confusion, and even in the absence of
competition between the parties. A "Xerox Donut Shop" would violate section 43(c).
Dilution is the theory that most closely fits domain name disputes. In Panavision, the
court held that a cybersquatter, by preventing Panavision from using its mark as a domain name,
not only diluted the mark but eliminated the marks' capacity to identify and distinguish
Panavision's goods on the Internet, in violation of federal and state anti-dilution law. See also
Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 USPQ2d 1479 (W.O. Wash. 1996)
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(plaintiff showed likelihood ofsuccess on claim that defendant's use of<candyland.com> for
explicit sex site diluted the registered CANDYLAND mark for children's game), Intermatic
(cybersquatter's use of<intermatic.com> diluted INTERMATIC mark).
The defendant in TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. v. Tele-Tech Co., 1997 WL 405898,
42 USPQ2d 1913 (C.D. Cal. 1997) began using the TELE-TECH mark before the plaintiffbegan
using the TELETECH mark, but the plaintiffhad obtained a federal registration of its mark
before the defendant registered the <teletech.com> domain name. The court granted a
preliminary injunction on TeleTech's dilution claim, finding that plaintiffhad shown at least
"serious questions which go to the merits" plus a balance ofhardships favoring plaintiffbecause
defendant could use <tele-tech.com> as its domain name but absent an injunction, plaintiff could
not use its mark in its domain name. Had the case gone to a trial on the merits, TeleTech might
have had serious problems showing dilution given the defendant's prior use ofan almost identical
mark.
The courts have had no trouble finding that use by a cybersquatter -- obtaining a domain
name registration with the intent ofselling it to the owner of the mark - is a "commercial use in
commerce." See, e.g., Intermatic, Panavision. The Intermatic court found that the use ofa mark
on the Internet automatically constitutes use "in commerce."
Other Theories
Plaintiffs have tried theories other than infringement and dilution, so far without success
in the reported cases.
Trademark Misuse: In Juno Online, to avoid being placed on hold status, the registrant
ofa challenged domain name brought a declaratory relief action based in part on a theory of
trademark misuse. The court rejected this as an affirmative claim, holding that it is recognized as
a defense only.
Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage: The court in
Panavision granted summary judgment on plaintiffs intentional interference claim. The owner
of the mark will not normally be able to identify with specificity the prospective relationship that
was not consummated because of the domain name registrant's actions, precluding liability on
this or similar theories.
Contract: The Panavision court also granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim
that it was a third-party beneficiary ofthe contract between the domain name registrant and NSI.
Although the registrant represents in that agreement that it is not knowingly violating any third-
party rights, the court held that those terms were for N~I's protection, not for the benefit of third-
party trademark owners.
Problems
The difficulty with existing theories is that there are many potential cases that they do not
reach. Currently, the owner ofa non-famous mark may be unable to avoid the need to payoffa
cybersquatter, because a successful dilution claim requires the mark to be famous, and courts
may be unwilling to find a likelihood ofconfusion arising solely from registration (or even use)
ofa domain name. Either the courts or the legislatures may have to invent a new claim to deal
with this gap in existing law.
Relief Available Through Litigation
Injunctive Relief
Courts commonly grant injunctive relief in domain name cases. Typically, a prevailing
plaintiffwill obtain an injunction precluding the defendant from making further use of the
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disputed domain name or a confusingly similar name (sometimes after a brief transition period)
and requiring the defendant to transfer the domain name to the plaintiff. Preliminary injunctions
are common.
The Cardservice case probably represents the outer boundary ofplaintiff success in an
injunction action. Because the defendant appeared in pro per, the case also stands as a
monument to the importance ofobtaining competent trademark counsel in these disputes.
Despite potential for legitimate descriptive uses in connection with defendant's merchant credit
card service business, the court there entered an injunction essentially precluding the defendant
from using the words "card" and "service" together in any way on the Internet.
Monetary Relief
Damages, Profits, Costs: Although I have found no reported domain name case granting
a damage award, there is a good possibility that such an award will eventually be granted. The
Lanham Act authorizes courts to award profits, damages, and costs. See Lanham Act, §35. A
domain name registrant who has obtained the name in an attempt to trade off the value of the
mark contained in the name, or to dilute the value of that mark, would be a likely candidate for a
monetary award.
Attorneys' Fees: The Lanham Act authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in "exceptional" cases. The court in Cardservice granted attorneys' fees where
the defendant was aware ofCardservice International before registering the disputed domain
name. The defendant made that award more likely by posting statements at <cardservice.com>
vilifying Cardservice International and threatening to use the website to divert potential business
away from Cardservice International. The court understandably saw this as an attempt to use
Cardservice International's mark to hann the company~s reputation. Other plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to recover fees, largely because of the novelty ofthe issue. See
Panavision. As the law becomes better established, attorneys' fee awards are increasingly likely.
REGISTRATION OF DOMAIN NAMES AS TRADEMARKS
Many companies have taken to registering their domain names as trademarks or service
marks. Like any other word, phrase, or symbol, a domain name can function as a mark. The
mere fact that a company is using a particular domain name, however, does not make it
registrable as a mark.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office will require an applicant for trademark registration
to submit specimens ofuse of the claimed mark. Those specimens must show that the domain
name is being used as a mark -- that is, as an identifier of the source ofgoods or services -- in
commerce.
The PTO has stated that "use ofan Internet domain name as a mere directional reference,
similar to use ofa telephone number or business address on stationery, business cards, or
advertisements, is not use of the name as a source identifier." The PTO will examine the
specimen to see whether the domain name is presented in a distinctive manner and removed from
other informational material in determining whether the domain name is being used as a mark.
The advantage ofa trademark registration for a domain name is debatable and will
depend upon the circumstances. If the applicant already owns a domain name using its mark,
and the mark itself is registered, it will be a rare case where the registration ofthe domain name
itself adds anything.
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[Use your browser's back button (if available) or close this window to return to the previous screen.]
A. AGREEMENT. In this Service Agreement ("Agreement") "you" and "your"
refer to each customer and "we", us" and "our" refer to Network Solutions, Inc.
("NSI"). This Agreement explains our obligations to you, and explains your
obligations to us for various Network Solutions services. By selecting our
Network Solutions service(s) you have agreed to establish an account with us for
such services. When you use your account or permit someone else to use it to
purchase or otherwise acquire access to additional Network Solutions service(s)
or to cancel your Network Solutions service(s) (even ifwe were not notified of
such authorization), this Agreement covers such service or actions. By using the
service(s) provided by NSI under this Agreement, you acknowledge that you
have read and agree to be bound by all terms and conditions of this Agreement
and any pertinent rules or policies that are or may be published by NSI. The
terms and conditions marked with an (*) apply to customers of the Network
Solutions E-mail Service only. The terms and conditions marked with an (**)
apply only to the Network Solutions dot com biz card™ service. The terms and
conditions marked with an (***) apply only to the Network Solutions dot com
forwarding™ service.
B. FEES, PAYMENT AND TERM. As consideration for the services you have
selected, you agree to pay Network Solutions the applicable service(s) fees. All
fees payable hereunder are non-refundable. As further consideration for the
Network Solutions service(s), you agree to: (1) provide certain current, complete
and accurate information about you as required by the registration process and
(2) maintain and update this information as needed to keep it current, complete
and accurate. All such information shall be referred to as account information
("Account Information"). You hereby grant NSI the right to disclose to third
parties such Account Information.
*C. DESCRIPTION OF E-MAIL SERVICE. NSI is providing you with a
capability to send and receive electronic mail ("Network Solutions E-mail
Service") via the World Wide Web ("Web") and on NSI's system. You must: (1)
provide all equipment, including a computer and modem, necessary to establish a
connection to the Web; and (2) provide for your own connection to the Web and
pay any telephone service fees associated with such connection. NSI has set no
fixed upper limit on the number ofmessages you may send or receive through
the Network Solutions E-mail Service; however, NSI retains the right, at NSI's
sole discretion, to determine whether or not your conduct is consistent with this
Agreement and NSI's operating rules or policies and may terminate the Network
Solutions E-mail Service ifyour conduct is found to be inconsistent with this
Agreement, such rules or policies. Your right to use the Network Solutions E-
mail Service is personal to you. You agree not to resell the E-mail Service,
without the prior express written consent ofNSI.
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*D. PRIVACY POLICY. E-mail is private correspondence between the sender
and the recipient. It is NSI's policy to respect the privacy ofits customers.
Therefore, NSI will not monitor, edit or disclose the contents of your private
communications unless required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that
such action is necessary to; (l) conform to the law or comply with legal process
served on NSI; (2) protect and defend the rights or property ofNSI; or (3) act
under exigent circumstances to protect the personal safety of its customers or the
public.
You acknowledge and agree that NSI neither endorses the contents ofany of
your communications nor assumes responsibility for any threatening, libelous,
obscene, harassing or offensive material contained therein, any infringement of
third party intellectual property rights arising therefrom or any crime facilitated
thereby. You acknowledge and agree that certain technical processing ofe-mail
messages and their content may be required to: (1) send and receive messages;
(2) conform to connecting networks' technical requirements; (3) conform to the
limitations ofthe Network Solutions E-mail Service; or (4) conform to other
similar requirements.
*E. CUSTOMER CONDUCT. You are solely responsible for the content ofyour
transmissions through the Network Solutions E-mail Service. Your use ofthe
Network Solutions E-mail Service is subject to all applicable local, state, national
and international laws and regulations. You agree: (1) to comply with U.S. law
regarding the transmission oftechnical data exported from the United States
through the Network Solutions E-mail Service; (2) not to use the Network
Solutions E-mail Service for illegal purposes: (3) not to interfere with or
disrupt networks connected to the Network Solutions E-mail Service: and (4) to
comply with all regulations, policies and procedures ofnetworks connected to
the Network Solutions E-mail Service.
The Network Solutions E-mail Service makes use of the Internet to send and
receive certain messages. Your conduct is therefore subject to applicable Internet
regulations, policies and procedures.
You agree not to use the Network Solutions E-mail Service for chain letters, junk
mail, spamming or any use ofdistribution lists to any person who has not given·
specific permission to be included in such a process. You agree not to transmit
through the Network Solutions E-mail Service any unlawful, harassing, libelous,
abusive, threatening, harmful, vulgar, obscene or otherwise objectionable
material ofany kind or nature. You further agree not to transmit any material that
encourages conduct that could constitute a criminal offense, give rise to civil
liability or otherwise violate any applicable local, state, national or international
law or regulation. Attempts to gain unauthorized access to other computer
systems are prohibited. You agree not to interfere with another customer's use
and enjoyment of the Network Solutions E-mail Service or another entity's use
and enjoyment of similar services. NSI's contractor, Critical Path, Inc. shall be an
intended third party beneficiary of the Network Solutions E-mail Service
customers' obligations under this Agreement and thus shall be entitled to enforce
those obligations against such customers as ifa party to this Agreement. NSI
http://www.networksolutions.com/legallservice_agreement.html
F - 36
j
~
1':$".
I
t
I
I;,/'"
I
I
~
I
'~
!~--
i
I
it
I
..
II
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
may, at its sole discretion, immediately tenninate Network Solutions E-mail
Service ifyour conduct fails to confonn with these tenns and conditions. You
agree that NSI shall under no circumstances be held liable on account ofany
action it takes, in good fai~ to restrict access to or availability ofmaterial that it
or any user of the Network Solutions E-mail Service considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.
*F. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS TO CONTENT. You acknowledge that content,
including but not limited to text, software, music, sound, photographs, video,
graphics or other material contained in either advertisements or e-mail-
distributed, or other commercially produced infonnation presented to you by the
Network Solutions E-mail Service(..Content.)byNSIorNSI.sadvertisers.is
protected by copyrights, trademarks, service marks, patents or other proprietary
rights and laws. You therefore agree to use this content as expressly authorized
by the Network Solutions E-mail Service or the advertiser. You agree not to
copy, reproduce, distribute or create derivative works from this content without
express authorization to do so by NSI or the advertiser.
G. MODIFICATIONS TO AGREEMENT. You agree, during the period of this
Agreement, that we may: (1) revise the tenns and conditions of this Agreement;
and (2) change the services provided under this Agreement at any time. Any such
revision or change will be binding and effective immediately on posting of the
revised Agreement or change to the service(s) on NSI's homepages, or on
notification to you bye-mail or United Sates mail. You agree to review NSI's
homepages, including the Agreement, periodically to be aware of any such
revisions. Ifyou do not agree with any revision to the Agreement, you may
terminate this Agreement at any time by providing us with notice bye-mail or
United States mail at the addresses listed on the cover page ofthis Agreement.
Notice of your tennination will be effective on receipt and processing by us. You
agree that, by continuing to use the Network Solutions services following notice
ofany revision to this Agreement or change in service(s), you agree to abide by
any such revisions or changes.
H. MODIFICATIONS TO YOUR ACCOUNT. In order to change any ofyour
account infonnation with us, you must use your Account Number and Password
that you selected when you opened your account with us. Please safeguard your
Account Number and Password from any unauthorized use. In no event will we
be liable for the unauthorized use or misuse ofyour Account Number or
Password.
I. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE POLICY. Ifyou reserved or registered a domain
name through us you agree to be bound by our current Domain Name Dispute
Policy ("Dispute Policy") which is incorporated herein and made a part of this
Agreement by reference. The current version of the Dispute Policy may be found
at our web site: http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/dispute-policy.htmI.
Please take the time to familiarize yourselfwith such policy.
J. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE POLICY MODIFICATIONS. You agree that we,
in our sole discretion, may modify our Dispute Policy at any time. You agree
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that, by maintaining the reservation or registration ofyour domain name after
modifications to the Dispute Policy become effective, you have agreed to these
modifications. You acknowledge that ifyou do not agree to any such
modifications, you may request that your domain name be deleted from the
domain name database.
K. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES. You agree that, if the registration or
reservation ofyour domain name is challenged by a third party, you will be
subject to the provisions specified in the Dispute Policy in effect at the time of
the dispute. You agree that in the event a domain name dispute arises with any
third party, you will indemnify and hold us harmless pursuant to the terms and
conditions contained in the Dispute Policy.
L. AGENTS. You agree that, if an agent for you (Le., an Internet Service
Provider, employee, etc.) purchased our Network Solutions service(s) on your
behalf, you are nonetheless bound as a principal by all terms and conditions
herein, including the Dispute Policy.
M. ANNOUNCEMENTS. We reserve the right to distribute information to you
that is pertinent to the quality or operation ofour services and those ofour
service partners. These announcements will be predominately informative in
nature and may include notices describing changes, upgrades, new products or
other information to add security or to enhance your identity on the Internet.
N. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. You agree that our entire liability, and your
exclusive remedy, with respect to any Network Solutions services(s) provided
under this Agreement and any breach of this Agreement is solely limited to the
amount you paid for such service(s). NSI and its contractors shall not be liable
for any direct, indirect, incidental, special or consequential damages resulting
from the use or inability to use any ofthe Network Solutions services or for the
cost ofprocurement ofsubstitute services. Because some states do not allow the
exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages, in
such states, our liability is limited to the extent permitted by law. We disclaim
any and all loss or liability resulting from, but not limited to: (1) loss or liability
resulting from access delays or access interruptions; (2) loss or liability resulting
from data non-delivery or data mis-delivery; (3) loss or liability resulting from
acts ofGod; (4) loss or liability resulting from the unauthorized use or misuse of
your Account Number or Password; (5) loss or liability resulting from errors,
omissions, or misstatements in any and all information or services(s) provided
under this Agreement; (6) loss or liability relating to the deletion ofor failure to
store e-mail messages; and (7) loss or liability resulting from the development or
interruption ofyour Web site.
O. INDEMNITY. You agree to release, indemnify, and hold NSI, its contractors,
agents, employees, officers, directors and affiliates harmless from all liabilities,
claims and expenses, including attorney's fees, of third parties relating to or
arising under this Agreement, the Network Solutions services provided hereunder
or your use of the Network Solutions services, including without limitation
infringement by you, or someone else using the Network Solutions E-mail
Service with your computer, of any intellectual property or other proprietary
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right ofany person or entity, or from the violation ofany NSI operating rule or
policy relating to the service(s) provided. You also agree to release, indemnify
and hold us harmless pursuant to the tenns and conditions contained in the
Dispute Policy. When NSI is threatened with suit by a third party, NSI may seek
written assurances from you concerning your promise to indemnify NSI; your
failure to provide those assurances may be considered by NSI to be a breach of
your Agreement.
P. BREACH. You agree that failure to abide by any provision of this Agreement,
any NSI operating rule or policy or the Dispute Policy, may be considered by us
to be a material breach and that we may provide a written notice, describing the
breach, to you. Ifwithin thirty (30) calendar days ofthe date ofsuch notice, you
fail to provide evidence, which is reasonably satisfactory to us, that you have not
breached your obligations under the Agreement, then we may delete the
registration or reservation ofyour domain name or terminate your e-mail account
without further notice. Any such breach by you shall not be deemed to be
excused simply because we did not act earlier in response to that, or any other
breach by you.
Q. NO GUARANTY. You agree that, by registration or reservation ofyour
chosen domain name, such registration or reservation does not confer immunity
from objection to either the registration, reservation, or use ofthe domain name.
R. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES. You agree and warrant that the
infonnation that you provide to us to register or reserve your domain name or
register for other Network Solutions service(s) is, to the best ofyour knowledge
and belief, accurate and complete, and that any future changes to this infonnation
will be provided to us in a timely manner according to the modification
procedures in place at that time. You agree that your use ofour Network
Solutions service(s) is solely at your own risk. You agree that such service(s) is
provided on an "as is," "as available" basis. NSI EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS
ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
NON-INFRINGEMENT. NSI MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT THE
NETWORK SOLUTIONS SERVICE(S) WILL MEET YOUR
REQUIREMENTS, OR THAT THE SERVICE(S) WILL BE
UNINTERRUPTED, TIMELY, SECURE, OR ERROR FREE; NOR DOES NSI
MAKE ANY WARRANTY AS TO THE RESULTS THAT MAY BE
OBTAINED FROM THE USE OF THE SERVICE(S) OR AS TO THE
ACCURACY OR RELIABILITY OF ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED
THROUGH THE NETWORK SOLUTIONS E-MAIL SERVICE OR THAT
DEFECTS IN THE NETWORK SOLUTIONS SERVICE(S) SOFTWARE
WILL BE CORRECTED. YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT ANY
MATERIAL AND/OR DATA DOWNLOADED OR OTHERWISE
OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF THE NETWORK SOLUTIONS E-
MAIL SERVICE IS DONE AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION AND RISK AND
THAT YOU WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSmLE FOR ANY DAMAGE TO
YOUR COMPUTER SYSTEM OR LOSS OF DATA THAT RESULTS FROM
THE DOWNLOAD OF SUCH MATERIAL AND/OR DATA. NSI MAKES NO
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WARRANTY REGARDING ANY GOODS OR SERVICES PURCHASED OR
OBTAINED THROUGH THE E-MAIL SERVICE OR ANY TRANSACTIONS
ENTERED INTO THROUGH THE E-MAIL SERVICE. NO ADVICE OR
INFORMATION, WHETHER ORAL OR WRITTEN, OBTAINED BY YOU
FROM NSI OR THROUGH THE E-MAIL SERVICE SHALL CREATE ANY
WARRANTY NOT EXPRESSLY MADE HEREIN. SOME JURISDICTIONS
DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN WARRANTIES, SO
SOME OF THE ABOVE EXCLUSIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.
S. REVOCATION. You agree that we may delete your domain name or
tenninate your right to use other Network Solutions service(s) if the infonnation
that you provided to register or reserve your domain name or register for other
Network Solutions service(s), or subsequently to modify it, contains false or
misleading infonnation, or conceals or omits any infonnation we would likely
consider material to our decision to register or reserve your domain name.
T. RIGHT OF REFUSAL. We, in our sole discretion, reserve the right to refuse
to register or reserve your chosen domain name or register you for other Network
Solution service(s), or to delete your domain name within thirty (30) calendar
days from receipt ofyour payment for such services. In the event we do not
register or reserve your domain name or register you for other Network Solution
service(s), or we delete your domain name or other Network Solution service(s)
within such thirty (30) calendar day period, we agree to refund your applicable
fee(s). You agree that we shall not be liable to you for loss or damages that may
result from our refusal to register or reserve, or delete your domain name or
register you for other Network Solution service(s).
U. SEVERABILITY. You agree that the tenns of this Agreement are severable.
If any tenn or provision is declared invalid or unenforceable, that tenn or
provision will be construed consistent with applicable law as nearly as possible
to reflect the original intentions of the parties, and the remaining tenns and
provisions will remain in full force and effect.
V. ENTIRETY. You agree that this Agreement, the rules and policies published
by NSI and the Dispute Policy are the complete and exclusive agreement
between you and us regarding our Network Solutions services. This Agreement
and the Dispute Policy supersede all prior agreements and understandings,
whether established by custom, practice, policy or precedent.
W. GOVERNING LAW. You agree that this Agreement shall be governed in all
respects by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, United States ofAmerica, excluding its conflict of laws rules. You and
we each submit to exclusive subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and
venue of the United States District Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia,
Alexandria Division. Ifthere is no jurisdiction in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District ofVirginia, Alexandria Division, then jurisdiction shall
be in the Circuit Court ofFairfax County, Fairfax, Virginia.
**X. dot com biz card Content. You are solely responsible for the content you
furnish for inclusion in your dot com biz card. NSI cannot and does not design,
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review or screen content provided in dot com biz cards by you and does not
assume any obligation to monitor such content. HOWEVER, YOU AGREE
THAT WE MAY REVIEW YOUR DOT COM BUSINESS CARD IN
RESPONDING TO A THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, AND NSI RESERVES
THE RIGHT AT ITS SOLE DISCRETION TO REMOVE ANY DOT COM
BUSINESS CARD, WITHOUT NOTICE AND WITH NO OBLIGATION TO
REFUND FEES PAID, WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT WE DETERMINE TO
BE UNSUITABLE OR OTHERWISE UNLAWFUL OR HARMFUL. The
content in your dot com biz card may be deemed by us to be unsuitable if, in our
view, it:
a. contains, promotes or links to sexually explicit or violent material;
b. promotes, depicts or links to material that promotes or depicts
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, national origin, physical or
mental disability, sexual orientation, or age;
c. contains unlawful material, including but not limited to materials that may
violate another's intellectual property rights, or links to a site that contains
such material;
d. contains infonnation regarding, promotes or links to a site that provides
infonnation or promotes illegal activity;
e. is considered by us or any person with access to such content to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected; or
f. is deemed by us to be unsuitable for any other reason.
You understand that we reserve the right to conclude that your dot com biz card
has content that is unsuitable in accordance with our standards, and we may
come to such a conclusion even if it is based upon our opinion or mere suspicion
or belief, without any duty to prove that our opinion or suspicion is well-founded
and even ifour opinion or suspicion is proven not to be well-founded or ifwe
provide other customers dot com biz cards despite such web pages having the
same or similar characteristics as your dot com biz card. You also understand
that by providing you the Network Solutions service for the dot com biz card,
NSI in no way endorses your dot com biz card or deems your content to be
suitable under the tenns of this Agreement.
***Y. dot com forwarding. You represent and warrant that you have the
necessary rights to use the dot com forwarding service to forward, point, alias or
resolve your domain name(s) to the other domain name designated by you in
ordering such services.
z. Infancy. You attest that you are oflegal age to enter into this Agreement.
This is NSI Service Agreement Version Number 3.0. This Service Agreement is
for all Network Solutions services offered by NSI.
[Use your browser's back button (if available) or close this window to retum to the previous screen.]
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[Close this window or use your browser's back button to return to the previous screen.]
NETWORK SOLUTIONS'
DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE POLICY
Revision 03
Effective February 25, 1998
1. Network Solutions, Inc. ("Network Solutions") is responsible for the
registration of second-level Internet domain names in the top level COM, ORG,
NET, and EDU domains. Network Solutions registers these second-level
domain names on a "first come, first served" basis. By registering a domain
name, Network Solutions does not determine the legality of the domain name
registration, or otherwise evaluate whether that registration or use may infringe
upon the rights of a third party.
2. The entity applying for a domain name ("registrant") is solely responsible for
selecting its own domain name ("domain name") and maintaining for the
continued accuracy of the registration record. The registrant, by completing and
sUbmitting the Domain Name Registration Agreement ("Registration
Agreement"), represents that the statements in its application are true and that
the registration of the selected domain name, to the best of the registrant's
knowledge, does not interfere with or infringe upon the rights of any third party.
The registrant also represents that the domain name is not being registered for
any unlawful purpose.
3. Network Solutions neither acts as arbiter nor provides resolution of disputes
between registrants and third party complainants arising out of the registration
or use of a domain name. This Domain Name Dispute Policy ("Policy") does not
confer any rights, procedural or substantive, upon third party complainants.
Likewise, complainants are not obligated to use this Policy.
4. This Policy does not limit the administrative or legal procedures Network
Solutions may use when third party conflicts arise, or when Network Solutions is
presented with information that a domain name violates the legal rights of a third
party, including, but not limited to, information that the display or use of the
domain name is expressly prohibited by a United States federal statute or
regulation.
5. Modifications. The registrant acknowledges and agrees that Network
Solutions may modify or amend this Policy from time to time, and that such
changes are binding upon the registrant. Network Solutions will post the revised
Policy at http://www.netsol.comlrs/dispute-policy.htmlat least thirty (30)
calendar days before it becomes effective.
6. Indemnity. The registrant hereby agrees to defend, indemnify and hold
harmless (i) Network Solutions, its officers, directors, employees and agents,
and (ii) the National Science Foundation ("NSF"), its officers, directors, and
employees (collectively, the "Indemnified Parties"), for any loss or damages
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/dispute-policy.htmlr F-~
awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction reSUlting from any claim, action, or
demand arising out of or related to the registration or use of the domain name.
Such claims shall include, without limitation, those based upon trademark or
service mark infringement, tradename infringement, dilution, tortious
interference with contract or prospective business advantage, unfair
competition, defamation or injury to business reputation. Each Indemnified Party
shall send written notice to the registrant of any such claim, action, or demand
against that party within a reasonable time. The failure of any Indemnified Party
to give the appropriate notice shall not affect the rights of the other Indemnified
Party. Network Solutions recognizes that certain educational and governmental
entities may not be able to provide complete indemnification. If the registrant is
(i) a governmental or non-profit educational entity, and (ii) not permitted by law
or under its organizational documents to provide indemnification, the registrant
must notify Network Solutions in writing and, upon receiving appropriate proof of
such restriction, Network Solutions may provide an alternative provision for
such a registrant.
7. Revocation. The registrant agrees that Network Solutions shall have the
right in its sole discretion to revoke, suspend, transfer or otherwise modify a
. domain name registration upon thirty (30) calendar days prior written notice, or
at such time as Network Solutions receives a properly authenticated order from
a court of competent jurisdiction, or arbitration award, requiring the revocation,
suspension, transfer or modification of the domain name registration.
8. Dispute Initiation. Registrant agrees that while Network Solutions can
neither act as an arbiter nor provide resolution of disputes arising out of the
registration and use of a domain name, Network Solutions may be presented
with information that a domain name possibly violates the trademark rights of a
trademark owner. Network Solutions may apply the procedures described in
Section 9 when a third party complainant ("complainanr) presents Network
Solutions with satisfactory evidence of both trademark ownership and written
notice to the domain name registrant describing the legal harm the trademark
owner is incurring. The documents required in support of a complainant's written
request that Network Solutions invoke Section 9, Dispute Procedures, must
include:
(a) An original, certified copy, not more than six (6) months old, of a
trademark registration ("certified registration"), which is in full force and
effect and is identical to a second-level domain name (i.e., not including
COM, NET, ORG, or EDU) on the principal or equivalent registry of any
country (copies certified in accordance with 37 CFR 2.33(a)(1 )(viii) or its
successor will meet this standard for registrations in jurisdictions other
than the United States). Trademark or service mark registrations from
the supplemental or equivalent registry of any country, or from individual
states or provinces of a nation, will not be accepted. Trademarks
incorporating a design will not be accepted; and
(b) A copy of the written prior notice sent to the domain name registrant
by the complainant, and a representation by the complainant indicating
the mode of delivery of the notice (e.g., first class mail, overnight
delivery) and the factual basis for believing that the domain name
registrant received the notice. Notices must be sent to the mailing
address of the domain name registrant as provided in Network Solutions'
WHOIS database. The notice to the domain name registrant must clearly
state that the complainant believes the registration and use of the
disputed domain name violates the trademark rights of the complainant;
the notice must also clearly allege the factual and legal bases for the
belief. Network Solutions will not undertake any separate investigation of
http://www.networksolutions.com/legaVdispute-policy.html
F - 44
;JI
I
1::4:;.~~-{~"
I
I'·'·'·····?
I
I
I·
···········f
I
I
I
,,:~
4
I···~
"
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
t
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
the statements in such notice.
9. Dispute Procedures. In those instances where a third party claim is based
upon and complies with Section 8(a and b), Network Solutions may apply the
following procedures, which recognize that trademark ownership does not
automatically extend to the right to register a domain name and which reflect no
opinion on the part of Network Solutions concerning the ultimate determination
of the claim:
(a) Network Solutions shall determine the creation date of the registrant's
domain name registration ("domain name creation date").
(b) If the registrant's domain name creation date precedes the effective
date of the valid and subsisting certified registration owned by the
complainant, Network Solutions will take no action on the complainant's
request.
(c) If the domain name creation date is after the effective date of the valid
and subsisting certified registration owned by the complainant, then
Network Solutions shall request from the registrant proof of ownership of
registrant's own registered trademark or service mark by submission of a
certified registration, of the type and nature specified in Section 8(a)
above. The certified registration must be owned by the registrant and the
effective date must be prior to the date of any third party's notice of a
dispute to the registrant. If the registrant satisfies the requirements of this
Section 9(c), Network Solutions will take no further action on the
complainant's request.
(d) If the domain name creation date is after the effective date of the valid
and subsisting certified registration owned by the complainant, and the
registrant fails to provide a certified registration as specified in Section 8
(a) to Network Solutions within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of
Network Solutions' dispute notification letter, Network Solutions will assist
the registrant with registration of a new domain name, and will allow the
registrant to maintain both names simultaneously for up to ninety (90)
calendar days to allow an orderly transition to the new domain name.
Network Solutions will provide such assistance to a registrant if and only
if, within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of Network Solutions' dispute
notification letter, the registrant (1) submits a Registration Agreement
requesting the registration of a new domain name; and (2) submits an
explicit written request to Network Solutions' Business Affairs Office,
including an identification of the registrant's desired new domain name
and the NIC tracking number (for example, NIC-981125.1234) assigned
by Network Solutions in response to the new Registration Agreement. At
the end of the ninety (90) calendar day period of simultaneous use,
Network Solutions will place the disputed domain name on "Hold" status,
pending resolution of the dispute. As long as a domain name is on "Hold"
status, that domain name registered to the registrant shall not be
available for use by any party.
(e) In the event the registrant fails to select~ of the following options
by a written response, received by Network Solutions' Business Affairs
Office within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of Network Solutions'
dispute notification letter, Network Solutions will place the domain name
on "Hold" (wherein the domain name will not be available for use by any
party) pending resolution of the dispute:
(1) Provide the documentation required by Section 9(c) of this
http://www.networksolutions.comflegal/dispute-policy.htmlr F-~
Policy.
(2) Relinquish the domain name and transfer it to the complainant.
(3) Register a new and different domain name pursuant to Section
9(d) ofthis Policy.
or
(4) File a civil action and provide a copy of a file-stamped
complaint pursuant to Section 10 of this Policy.
(f) Network Solutions will'reinstate the domain name placed in "Hold"
status. or will not place it in "Hold" status. (i) upon receiving a properly
authenticated temporary or final order by a court of competent
jurisdiction. or arbitration award. stating which party to the dispute is
entitled to the domain name. (ii) if Network Solutions receives other
satisfactory evidence from the parties of the resolution of the dispute, or
(iii) the complainant requests that the domain name not be placed on
"Hold.
(g) A domain name registrant involved in Dispute Procedures remains
subject to the terms and conditions of the Registration Agreement.
including fees.
10. Litigation. Independent of the provisions of Section 9 of the Policy, in the
event that:
(a) The registrant files a civil action related to the registration and use of
the domain name against the complainant in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and provides Network Solutions with a copy of the file-
stamped complaint. Network Solutions will maintain the status quo ante
of the domain name record pending a temporary or final decision of the
court. For example. if the domain name is not on "Hold." it will not be
placed on "Hold;" if the domain name is already on "Hold," it will remain
on "Hold." In such cases. Network Solutions will deposit control of the
domain name into the registry of the court by supplying the registrant
with the registry certificate for deposit. While the domain name is in the
registry of the court. Network Solutions will not make any changes to the
domain name record unless ordered by the court. The registrant also
shall promptly provide copies of any and all pleadings filed in the action
to Network Solutions upon Network Solutions' request.
(b) The complainant files a civil action related to the registration and use
of the domain name against the registrant in a court of competent
jurisdiction. and provides Network Solutions with a copy of the file-
stamped complaint. Network Solutions will maintain the status quo ante
of the domain name record pending a temporary or final decision of the
court. For example. if the domain name is not on "Hold." it will not be
placed on "Hold;" if the domain name is already on "Hold." it will remain
on "Hold." Network Solutions will deposit control of the domain name into
the registry of the court by supplying the complainant with the registry
certificate for deposit. While the domain name is in the registry of the
court. Network Solutions will not make any changes to the domain name
record unless ordered by the court.
(c) In both instances. under Section 10(a and b), Network Solutions will
abide by those provisions of temporary or final court orders. or arbitration
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/dispute-policy.html
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awards, directing the disposition of the domain name, without being
named as a party to the civil action. The civil action must include the
domain name registrant as a party. If named as a party to a civil action,
Network Solutions shall not be limited to the above actions, but reserves
the right to raise any and all defenses deemed appropriate, and to take
any other action necessary to defend itself.
(d) A domain name registrant involved in Litigation remains subject to the
terms and conditions of the Registration Agreement, including fees.
11. DISCLAIMER. THE REGISTRANT AGREES THAT NETWORK
SOLUTIONS WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS OF REGISTRATION
AND USE OF REGISTRANrS DOMAIN NAME, OR FOR INTERRUPTION OF
BUSINESS, OR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND (INCLUDING LOST PROFITS)
REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF ACTION WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF NETWORK
SOLUTIONS HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES. IN NO EVENT SHALL NETWORK SOLUTIONS' MAXIMUM
LIABILITY EXCEED FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS.
12. Notices. Ail notices between Network Solutions and its registrants permitted
or reqUired under this Policy shall be in writing and shall be delivered by
personal delivery, courier delivery, facsimile transmission, and/or by first class
mail, and shall be deemed given upon delivery, transmission, or seven (7)
calendar days after deposit in themail.whicheveroccursfirst.lnitial notices
shall be sent to the domain name registrant at the address of the domain name
registrant listed in Network Solutions' WHOIS database.
13. Non-Agency. Nothing contained in this Policy shall be construed as
creating any agency, partnership, or other form of joint enterprise between the
parties.
14. Non-Waiver. The failure of Network Solutions to require performance by the
registrant of any provision hereof shall not affect the full right to require such
performance at any time thereafter; nor shall the waiver by Network Solutions of
a breach of any provision hereof be taken or held to be a waiver of the provision
itself.
15. Breach. The registrant's failure to abide by any provision under this Policy
may be considered by Network Solutions to be a material breach and Network
Solutions may provide a written notice, describing the breach, to the registrant.
If, within thirty (30) calendar days of the date of such notice, the registrant fails
to provide evidence, which is reasonably satisfactory to Network Solutions, that
it has not breached its obligations, then Network Solutions may revoke
registrant's registration of the domain name. Any such breach by a registrant
shall not be deemed to have been excused simply because Network Solutions
did not act earlier in response to that, or any other, breach by the registrant.
16. Invalidity. In the event that any provision of this Policy shall be
unenforceable or invalid under any applicable law or be so held by applicable
court decision, such unenforceability or invalidity shall not render this Policy
unenforceable or invalid as a whole. Network Solutions will amend or replace
such provision with one that is valid and enforceable and which achieves, to the
extent possible, the original objectives and intent of Network Solutions as
reflected in the original provision.
http://www.networksolutions.com/legalldispute-policy.htmlr F-~
17. Entirety. This Policy, as amended, and the current Registration Agreement
together constitute the complete and exclusive agreement between Network
Solutions and the registrant, and supersede and govern all prior proposals.
agreements. or other communications. The registrant agrees that registration of
a domain name constitutes an agreement to be bound by this Policy, as
amended from time to time.
This file last modified 2/25/98.
[Close this window to return to the previous screen.)
Questions? Please email M1R@networksoMions.com
~ Copyright 1999 Network Solutions, Inc. All rights reserved.
Please read our Disclaimer.
http://www.networksolutions.com!1egalldispute-policy.html
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Object to the use of a domain name
Object to a domain name that is the same or similar to an individual's name
Have received a cease and desist letter or a letter of complaint
Object to a domain name that is the same or similar to a phone number
J
General I Reservation I Registration I Make Changes
HELP
Have any questions related to your legal rights or your trademark rights
Have a dispute between the Internet Service Provider and the domain name
registrant
Have questions about what are legal or illegal activities
Require information on case law, Le. related court cases and relevant court orders
Object to a domain name that is similar to your domain name
Object to a domain name that is the same or similar to your company name or
copyright
Object to the use of your copyright or trademark on a web site
Object to the content of a web site
Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy (Rev. 03)
The Domain Name Dispute Policy is incorporated by reference into the Domain Name
Registration Agreement. Section 8 of the Policy describes what documents Network
Solutions requires from a trademark owner complainant, while Section 9 outlines the
actions we would take upon receipt of the complaint. Section 10 covers Network
Solutions' procedures when we receive notice of litigation. All other Sections are not
subject to review and/or enforcement by third parties. In other words, we decline all third
party requests to apply any Section other than 8, 9 or 10 of the Domain Name Dispute
Policy.
As a private company, Network Soluti.ons cannot provide legal advice. We suggest that
you contact an attorney if you:
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r 1. Iflt:H;tr~gLs-t.@nt isn'tjJ§ingJhe dom~l[Ul~-'JJe._[egist.[atiQn,_§tlQYJQnljtbe_madeavailableto...SQme.QIle.._w!1Qw.ant$_J~HJ§e_lt7.
2. Ihe contact information in WHOIS isn't valid. Do you hav.~tany__~dJmionaJjnfQImaJiQ!1?
r
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3. CaJ:LYOlllet me know when a domain name will be deleted for non-paym~llt?
4. Can I be next in line if the domain name registration is deleted?
5. A vendor registered my domain name in its own name, then promised to transfer it
backtome,_IhaLba~n't hmmene.d__Y~1. Can YQILh~!P-?
6. How. dO .. 'c::t.iSPY1~uu:fom~.i!l1l"ameLe-9j~teI~g_IlI}c::t.~_LaJQP:-JeYeL<~OJlntryCoc::t.~?
7. Lwant to change my domain name registration to another one. Can you switchJJ1-Y
payment?
8.1::!51~~JJY.one else complained about this domain name registrgtio..n?
'yVOyJd-YQy_give me the historical informqtion ~;mjLdomain name r:.eg.is1r,gtto_lJl
9. What is an original certified copy?
10. What's the effective date of a trademark?
11.I;x.pJairLwhaiYou mean by "representation regar(RI19..c::t.~liY~IY-,-"
12. Whatc::t._o~$ "identLc._aLl'Jle"an?
13. Who can submit a complaint?
14. What should the complainant do if its notice letter was returned by the postal service?
15. Where should I send my documents in support of my complaint?
16. '[_a_domain name registrant has a trademark that is identical to the whole domain
na.rn~ including the top-level. will they be allowed cOntinued use of the domain name?
17. When can a domain name registrant get a free name?
18. vvi1L~_~twQI~_SoLY1Lo.n~_lake..aW-ID'Jh~_dom~lrLna_m~Lr~gl$Jr~Jjon~nc::t.-9JYejtJQthe
trade_marK9wfler1
19. When will the domain name registration be placed on "Hold"?
20. What happens after the domain name registration is placed on "Hold"? When will the
"H91c::t.~'_b.eJ:e...rnQYEtd? How are di$Q.ute,$ reSOlved?
21. Itmy_c::t.omajn_nameLe.gj§tration is on "Hold..~c::t.oJ_ stiUjlJ~Y_eJQ_pay._tbeJegi$tIatiQlJand
r.e::regi~tr~tion fees?
22. What happens if a disputed domain name registration is deleted?
23. IsSect.IoILj1tcontLl}gentJJp'ofLS~.ct19nS_a.Jtl'l(:t9?
24. QO_~$~eMt.OJk ~iQLYJion,§~~!c::t.e by foreign cgurt QLd_ersl
25. What kind of court order would Network Solutions comply with?
26. If a lawsuit is filed. will the domain name registration be placed on "Hold"
immediately?
General
1. If the registrant isn't using the domain name registration, shouldn't it be made
available to someone who wants to use it?
There is no "use" requirement for domain names. We suggest you contact the domain
name registrant to discuss the disposition of a domain name registration.
2. The contact information in WHOIS isn't valid. Do you have any additional
information?
The domain name registrant provides the information in the WHOIS database, and is
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responsible for its accuracy. We do not have any additional information.
3. Can you let me know when a domain name will be deleted for non-payment?
Payment information is confidential. We suggest that you check Network Solutions'
database frequently if you are waiting for a domain name to become available.
4. Can I be next in line if the domain name registration is deleted?
No. Registrations are accepted on a ''first come, first served" basis. Once the domain
name is available, you may submit a Domain Name Registration Agreement for it.
o
5. A vendor registered my domain name in its own name, then promised to transfer
it back to me. That hasn't happened yet. Can you help?
We cannot enforce third party agreements, and suggest that you consult with an attorney.
6. How do I dispute a domain name registered under a top-level country code?
Network Solutions only administers its Dispute Policy for domain names in the COM,
NET, ORG and EDU top-level domains. You should contact the administrator of the
specific country code top-level domain for information. The Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority maintains a list of contact information for each country code top-level domain.
We recommend you visit this site to obtain contact information specific to your dispute.
7. I want to change my domain name registration to another one. Can you switch
my payment?
Each domain name registration is unique. The registration fee cannot be transferred from
one domain name registration to another. If you would like to register another domain
name, you will be invoiced for the registration fee.
8. Has anyone else complained about this domain name registration?
Would you give me the historical information on a domain name registration?
F - 51
Registration information is confidential, and will be supplied only to the domain name
registrant or its attorney.
Section 8
9. What is an original certified copy?
An original certified copy is a special type of copy available from the government agency
that issued the trademark. It is not your original trademark registration.
e
10. What's the effective date of a trademark?
The Policy refers to a trademark's "effective date" because of the varied nature of
effective dates for trademark registrations. When Network Solutions receives a trademark
in support of a complaint, we research to determine the effective date of a trademark
based on the accepted practices of the trademark's country of origin. For example, the
effective date of a United States trademark registration is the earlier of the filing date or
the first use date.
11. Explain what you mean by "representation regarding delivery."
We require the complainant to tell us how the notice was delivered to the mailing address,
and why he thinks it was received. We do not accept notices delivered via facsimile or
email.
12. What does "identical" mean?
We compare the trademark to the second-level domain name, in other words, not
including the .COM, .NET or .ORG. We do not accept trademarks incorporating any
design elements. If you would like us to compare a specific trademark to a domain name,
you may fax the trademark registration with your request to the Business Affairs Office at
(703) 742-8706.
o
13. Who can submit a complaint?
F - 52
j
-;1
I
d---j,~;'.
~
~
:I
al•
If:P
I
,"
~'
I
1
-,[cor·
~'f"
I
i:{;'
I
J
I
:,
iI
J
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r•
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
The trademark owner, its attorney, or its sole, exclusive licensee or its attorney, must
write the notice letter to the domain name registrant and the cover letter to Network
Solutions. We cannot accept complaints from Internet Service Providers or other agents
of the trademark owner.
14. What should the complainant do if its notice letter was returned by the postal
service?
The complainant should send its documents and a photocopy of the returned envelope to
Network Solutions, Inc.
15. Where should I send my documents in support of my complaint?
You may submit your documents to Network Solutions, Inc., Attn: Business Affairs Office,
505 Huntmar Park Drive, Herndon, VA 20170-5139.
Section 9
16. If a domain name registrant has a trademark that is identical to the whole
domain name, including the top-level, will they be allowed continued use of the
domain name?
No. If Section 9 is applied, the domain name registrant must supply a trademark that is
identical to the second-level domain name, just as the complainant did. If the disputed
domain name registration is EXAMPLE.COM, the complainant's trademark must be for
the word "EXAMPLE." The domain name registrant must also supply a trademark for
"EXAMPLE" for continued use of the domain name registration; we would not accept the
registrant's trademark for "EXAMPLE.COM."
o
17. When can a domain name registrant get a free name?
If and when we do decide to apply Section 9, we will not take action without giving the
domain name registrant written notice, and providing him with thirty-seven days from the
date of the letter to respond. If the domain name registrant chooses another domain
name registration in response to our letter, and has paid the registration fee for the
disputed domain name, we will waive the registration fee for the new domain name.
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18. Will Network Solutions take away the domain name registration and give it to
the trademark owner?
If Section 9 is applied, we will not take action without giving the domain name registrant
written notice, and providing him with thirty-seven days from the date of the letter to
respond. This may lead to the domain name being placed on "Hold," but it does not
provide for an automatic transfer of the domain name registrant to the complainant.
19. When will the domain name registration be placed on "Hold"?
The domain name registration can be placed on "Hold" if the registrant doesn't respond to
our dispute notification letter, if the registrant chooses the "Hold" option of our letter, or at
the end of the simultaneous use period.
o
20. What happens after the domain name registration is placed on "Hold"? When
will the "Hold" be removed? How are disputes resolved?
The domain name will remain on "Hold" until Network Solutions receives a resolution to
the dispute, in the form of one of the following:
1) a bilateral agreement signed by both parties to the dispute,
2) an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, or an arbiter,
3) a written request from the trademark owner withdrawing the complaint,
4) a transfer of the domain name from the registrant to the trademark owner,
5) a deletion request from the domain name registrant, or
6) deletion of the domain name for non-payment of the registration fee.
21. If my domain name registration is on "Hold," do I still have to pay the
registration and re-registration fees?
Yes.
22. What happens if a disputed domain name registration is deleted?
Network Solutions will give the complainant an opportunity to register the domain name
F - 54
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only if Section 9 has been applied.
Section 10
23. Is Section 10 contingent upon Sections 8 and 9?
No.
24. Does Network Solutions abide by foreign court orders?
Section 10 of the Policy applies to any court of competent jurisdiction in the United States
or abroad.
25. What kind of court order would Network Solutions comply with?
We will abide by temporary or final court orders directing the disposition of the domain
name registration if the registrant is a party to the suit. The order must specify the action
to be taken regarding a specific domain name registration. The domain name specified in
the court order must include the top-level COM, NET or ORG. We cannot enforce any
other terms of a court order.
26. If a lawsuit is filed, will the domain name registration be placed on "Hold"
immediately?
Network Solutions maintains the status quo ante of the domain name registration when
we receive notice of litigation. If the domain name is active, it will remain active. If the
domain name is on "Hold," it will remain on "Hold."
o
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Chapter 4. Follow the RFCs: The Development of the Domain Name
System
4.1 Introduction: The Origins of the Internet
4.2 Jon Postel, the Czar Who Wears Multiple Hats
4.3 Requests for Comment (RFCs)
4.4 DNS Chronology: Follow the RFCs
4.5 Governance and Control Issues (1946-1993)
4.6 Assigned Numbers Terminology
4.7 Assigned Numbers (starting 1971)
4.8 Network Addresses
4.8.1 8-Bit Network Addresses (1974 to 1981)
4.8.2 32-Bit Network Addresses (1981)
4.9 Domain Naming Convention (1982)
4.10 Resource Records (1983)
4.11 Name Servers, Resolvers, Domain Name Space, Zones, and
Domain Authority (1983)
F - 58
j
I
II
I
I··;····~'~,.~<.
I
I,•......
T
I
I
J
Itl
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r..
t
r
r
r
r
4.12 The .COM, .ORG, .NET, .GOV, .EDU, and .MIL Top Level
Domains (1984) .
4.13 SRI Network Information Center (NIC) (1984)
4.14 Defense Data Network Information Center (SRI-NIC) (1987)
4.15 NIC Handle and WHOIS (1987)
4.16 Organizations Active in Internet Standards Matters (1988)
4.17 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (lANA)
4.17.1 lANA: "A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma"
(1988)
4.17.2 Internet Standards Activity (1993)
4.17.3 Authority by Announcement (1994)
4.18 RFC "Numbers" File Sizes (1972-1994)
4.19 High-Performance Computing Act (December 9,1991)
4.20 National Science Foundation
4.20.1 Transfer Registration Activity to GSI (1991)
4.20.2 Fund USC-lSI to Operate .US Top-Level Domain (1992)
4.20.3 Transfer Registration Activity to NSI (1993)
4.21 Chronology of Organization Creation (1946-1993)
Chapter 5. Introduction to Internet Registries, InterNIC Policies, and
NSF/NSI Agreements
5.1 The Internet Registries
5.2 Introduction to Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) Policies &endash; "A
Lightning Rod for Lawsuits"
5.3 Original NSI Domain Dispute Policy (July 28, 1995)
5.3.1 Recommended Section Titles for July 28, 1995 Version
5.3.2 Right to Use Name
5.3.3 Disclaimer: Waiver of NSI Liability
5.3.4 Trademark Challenges
5.3.5 Domain Names That are Covered by the Policy
5.3.6 Binding Arbitration
5.3.7 "Hold" Status
5.4 Fee Policy for Registration of Domain Names (September 14, 1995)
5.5 NSI Domain Dispute Policy - Revision 01 (November 23, 1995)
5.5.1 Recommended Section Titles for Revision 01
5.5.2 Eliminate the Word, Resolution
5.5.3 Specify the .COM, .ORG, .GOV, .EDU, and .NET Domains
5.5.4 Indemnify NSI, NSF, lANA, lAB, and ISOC
5.5.5 Arbitration Panel
5.5.6 Trademark Challenges
5.5.7 What is Identical?
5.5.8 "Hold" Status
5.5.9 The Crossover Effect
5.5.10 Indemnification Agreement
5.6 NSI Domain Dispute Policy - Revision 02 (September 9, 1996)
5.6.1 Revision 02 Section Titles
5.6.2 Revision 02 Changes
5.6.3 Secret Proceedings
5.6.4 Special Relief
5.7 NSI Domain Dispute Policy - Revision 03 (February 25,1998)
5.8 Lame Delegation Policy - not yet implemented (announced February
13, 1996)
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5.9 Follow the Money; The Bankroller: NSF -National Science
Foundation
5.9.1 The Ante: Cooperative Agreement No. NCR-9218742
(January 1993)
5.9.2 Additional Chips: Amendments 1. 3 and 5 (1994-1995)
5.9.3 The Jackpot: Amendment 4 (September 1995)
5.10 Office of the Inspector General Report: The Administration of
Internet Addresses (February 1997)
5.11 Network Solutions. Inc. Initial Public Offering (July 3. 1997)
5.12 Other Registries
5.12.1 Australia (AUNIC)
5.12.2 France (French Network Information Center- NIC France)
5.12.3 United Kingdom (Nominet UK)
5.12.4 Canada (CA Net)
5.12.5 China (China Internet Network Information Center-
CNNIC)
5.12.6 Japan (Japanese Network Information Center - JPNIC)
5.12.7 Switzerland and Lichtenstein (Swiss Academic and
Research Network - SWITCH)
5.12.8 Comparative Intemational TLD Registration Fees
Chapter 6. Domain Registration and Modification
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Who May File for a Domain?
6.3 The InterNlC Web Site
6.3.1 The Search Engine for Registration Services
6.3.2 WHOIS: How to Find Information About Domains and Sites.
Part I
6.3.3 Overview of the Registration Process
6.3.4 InterNIC Policies and Processes
6.4 Domain Name Registration: The Difficult, Easy and the Important
Items
6.4.1 Domain Name Registration Templates: Web and Text
Versions
6.4.2 Domain Name Template Blank Version 3.5
6.4.3 Example: Completed Version 3.5 Template
6.4.4 NIC Handle
6.4.5 The Difficult .
6.4.6 The Easy .
6.4.7 ... and the Important
6.4.8 Primary and Secondary Name Servers
6.4.9 Guardian Authentication
6.4.10 Domain Name and Organization Using Domain Name
6.4.11 Administrative, Technical, and Billing Contacts
6.4.12 Other Registration Templates
6.4.13 Registration and Renewal Fees
6.4.14 Modify, Transfer or Delete Registration
6.4.15 A Dozen Tips to Simplify Processing
6.5 Registration-Related Tools
6.5.1 WHOIS: How to Find Information About Domains and Sites.
Part II
6.5.2 The Registration Services Home Page
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6.5.3 Help Desk
6.5.4 Registration Tracking System
6.5.5 FTP Archive
6.5.6 InterNIC-hosted Mailing Lists (Listservs)
6.5.7 Server DigitallD for Internet Service Providers
6.5.8 Referral Whois (RWhois)
6.6 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
6.6.1 How Many Domain Names Can a Corporation Register?
6.6.2 Our Organization Name is Already Registered to Someone
Else. What Can We Do?
6.6.3 Can I Register the Same Name in More Than One Top
level Domain?
6.6.4 If Another Company Has a Trademark for the Name We
Want, But it is used for a Different Class of Goods, Can We
Register the Name?
6.6.5 Can a Foreign Company Register a .COM Domain?
6.6.6 Should the ISP Register as Administrative Contact for a
Client's Domain?
6.6.7 What Happens to the .COM Registration Fee After the NSI
Agreement Terminates?
6.6.8 Can the Organization Listed in Section 3 of the Domain
Registration Agreement be Changed?
6.6.9 Can Anybody Submit a Request to Change My Domain
Record if I Don't use PGP or Choose an Encrypted Password?
6.6.10 How Will I be Billed by InterNIC?
6.6.11 Who Receives the Maintenance Billing?
6.6.12 What Happens if I Do Not Pay?
6.6.13 What Happens if a Domain Name lapses?
6.6.14 Is the Registration/Maintenance Fee Taxable?
6.6.15 Can I take My Name if I Change Service Providers?
6.6.16 How Do We Notify InterNIC of a Domain Registration
Change, or Do We Bother?
6.6.17 My OriginallSP Was Bought Out. What Do I Do Next?
6.6.18 Do You accept domain name record modifications via fax?
6.6.19 How Do You Transfer a Domain Name?
Chapter 7. Basic Principles of Trademark Law
7.1 The lanham Act of 1946
7.2 Trademark Registration
7.3 Trademark Infringement
7.4 Trademark Dilution
7.5 Internet Trademark Issues
7.6 International Coordination
7.6.1 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
7.6.2 The Paris Convention
7.6.3 The Madrid Agreement and Madrid Protocol
7.6.4 The Nice Agreement
7.6.5 The Lisbon Agreement
7.6.6 The Vienna Agreement
7.6.7 The Nairobi Treaty
7.6.8 The Treaty of European Union
7.6.9 Trademark law Treaty
7.6.10 The Uruguay Round and the World Trade Ora~nizatlQI!
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7.6.11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)
7.6.12 International Trademark Association (INTA)
Chapter 8. Domain Name Collisions
8.1 KAPLAN.COM: Arch-Rival's Ruse
Kaplan Educational Center, ltd. v. Princeton Review
Management Corp. (filed March 9, 1994)
8.2 MTV.COM: The Curry Chronicles
MTV Networks v. Adam Curry - Memorandum and Order
(October 28,1994)
8.3 MCDONAlDS.COM Mac Attack
Joshua Quittner/McDonalds Corp. (October 1994)
8.4 BOB.COM and NOT-BOB.COM: Strange Bedfellows
Bob AntiaiMicrosoft Corp. (May 1995)
8.5 BBB.ORG: A Famous Identifier
Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Mark Sioo - (filed May
9,1995)
8.6 INTER-LAW.COM: Almost Identical
Jeff Liebling, dba The 'lectric law Library v. Interlaw ltd., et. al.
(filed February 15,1996)
8.7 JURIS.COM: Safety Net
The Comp Examiner Agency. inc. dba 25th Century Internet
Publishers v. Juris. Inc. - Preliminary Injunction (April 26, 1996;
corrected May 22, 1996)
8.8 CANDYLAND.COM: Club love Meets Milton Bradley
Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group. Ltd. - Preliminary
.!niunction (February 9, 1996)
8.9 PETA.ORG: Acrimony Over an Acronym
People Eating Tasty AnimaislPeople for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (March 1996)
8.10 AVON.COM: Federal Dilution
Avon Products, Inc. v. Carnetta Wong Associates (filed February
2, 1996)
8.11 INSET.COM: Personal Jurisdiction
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set. Inc. - Denial of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss (April 17, 1996)
8.12 CYBERGOlD: Purposeful Availment
Mantz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc. - Memorandum and Order (August
19, 1996)
8.13 ESQWIRE.COM: Phonetically Similar
Hearst Corp. v. Ari Goldberger - Complaint (May 15, 1996)
Report and Recommendation (February 26, 1997)
8.14 CARDSERVICE.COM: Permanent Injunction
Cardservice International. Inc. v. Webster R. McGee and WRM &
Associates - Memorandum, Order and Permanent Injunction
(January 16, 1997)
8.15 ZIPPO.COM: Remote Transactions
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com - Summons and Complaint
(November 18, 1996)
Memorandum Opinion (January 16, 1997)
8.16 GATEWAY.COM: Famous, Not First
g.§teway 2000, Inc. v. Gatew~Y..-c.om. Inc.~_ntL81~J]J~.,j;;I~9g_:
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Order (February 6, 1997)
8.17 PLANNEDPARENTHOOD.COM: Confusion Likely
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Richard Buc~b~
Catholic Radio - Opinion and Order (March 24, 1997)
8.18 PRINCE.COM: Battle Royale
Prince PLC v. Prince Sports Group - High Court Opinion (July 31,
1997)
8.19 Other Disputes
Chapter 9. Caught in the Crossfire: Challenges to NSI
9.1 Domain Registrants vs. NSI
9.1.1 ROADRUNNER.COM: Leading the Charge
Roadrunner Computer Systems. Inc. v. Network Solutions.
Inc. - Complaint (March 26, 1996)
Declaration in Support of Preliminary Injunction (March 26,
1996)
Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction (March
26,1996)
Amended Complaint (April 15, 1996)
NSI Answer and Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief (April
25,1996)
Stipulated Order Dismissing Preliminary Injunction as
Moot (May 21,1996)
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary JUdgment (June 3, 1996)
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (June 14,
1996)
Roadrunner Computer Systems, Inc. v. Network SQlutio-D-S..
Inc. (June 21,1996)
9.1.2 DCI.COM: No Executive Privilege
Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting. Inc. and Network
Solutions, Inc. - Complaint (May 8,1996)
Report and Recommendation (January 31,1997)
9.1.3 TV.COM: Reverse Name Hijacking
Philip L. Giacalone v. Network Solutions. Inc. and Ty, Inc. -
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (May 30, 1996)
Order for Preliminary Injunction (June 13, 1996)
9.1.4 CLUE.COM: Mismatched Opponents
Clue Computing. Inc. v. Network Solutions. Inc.-
Complaint (June 12, 1996)
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (June 12, 1996)
Complaint for Interpleader (June 21, 1966)
Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Motion to Dismiss (JUly
22,1996)
Motion to Dismiss Interpleader Complaint (July 22, 1996)
Order of Dismissal (October 29, 1996)
Hasbro. Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. - CQ!TIP~jnt (January
10,1997)
Hasbro. Inc. v. Clue Computing - Memorandum and_QIdJ~I
(September 30, 1997)
9.1.5 DISC.COM: Choice Initials
Dynamic Information Systems Corp. v. Network SQJyliQI]§,
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In. - Docket. (filed June 24,1996)
9.1.6 REGIS.COM: The Usual Suspects
Regis McKenna. Inc. v. Regis Com. - Docket (filed JUly 9,
1996)
9.1.7 JUNO.COM: Half a Million Accounts
Juno Online Services v. Juno Lighting. Inc. - Memorandum
Opinion and Order (September 29, 1997)
9.1.8 PIKE.COM: Double Jeopardy
Peter Pike v. Network Solutions. Inc. and Floyd S. Pike
Electrical Contractor. Inc. - Complaint (November 25,
1996)
FSPEC Answer. Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
(February 13, 1997)
9.1.9 The Tunisian Gambit
9.1.10 REALWORLD.COM: Ex-Parte Decisions
Database Consusltants. Inc. v. Network Solutions. Inc. -
Complaint (March 18, 1997)
Stipulation of Dismissal (April 23, 1997)
9.2 Trademark Owners vs. NSI
9.2.1 KNOWLEDGENET.COM: Ghosts of Domains Past
Knowledgenet. Inc. v. David L. Boone. NSl.lnc. and
Digital Express Group - Amended Complaint (December
12, 1994)
9.2.2 FRYS.COM: Default Judgment
Fry's Electronics v. Octave Systems. Inc. - Docket (filed
July 12, 1995)
9.2.3 PRESTONE.COM: Speedy Resolution
Prestone Products Corp.. v. Maynerd Collision &
Autobody, Inc. - Docket (March 5, 1996)
9.2.4 PANAVISION.COM: Targeting California
Panavision IntI., L.P. v. Dennis Toeppen, et. al. - Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Quash (September 19,
1996)
Order Granting and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (November 5, 1996)
Order Granting NSl's Motion to Dismiss (November 27,
1996)
9.2.5 MIKASA.COM: Sports and Saucers
American Commercial, Inc. v. Sports & Leisure Inti, Inc.
(filed July 25, 1996)
9.2.6 PORSCHE.COM: Car Cachet
Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Chen (filed July 26,
1996)
9.2.7 EMPRESSTRAVEL.COM: Franchisee Face-Off
Empress Travel and Travel Impressions. Ltd. v. Stephen
Kaufman, Traveler's Choice Inc. and Network Solutions,
Inc. (May 22, 1997)
9.2.8 SKUNKWORKS.COM: A Stink About Tortfeasors
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc. and
Does 1-20 (October 22,1996)
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Pardially Dismiss
Plaintiff's Claims and Related Relief (March 19, 1997)
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
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9.2.9 ACADEMYAWARD.COM: Goodwill in Achievements
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network
Solutions, Inc. and Does 1-50 (filed August 26, 1997)
Chapter 10. Bigfoot Letters and Brickbats
10.1 Trademark Muscle
10.2 Network Solutions' Clout
10.3 A Square Peg
Chapter 11. Squatters, Speculators, Cybergluttony and Ostrichmeat
11.1 Domain Resale
11.2 What's It Worth?
11.3 Squatters and Grabbers
11.4 Super Cybergluttony
Chapter 12. Gone CyBerserk
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12.2 Cyberverbosity
12.3 The CyberSaver.lnternational Business Machines
Chapter 13. Alterweb - A Parallel Universe
13.1 Rough Consensus and Running Code
13.2 Resolving Alternate TLDs
13.3 AlterNIC, an Experimental Registry
13.4 The Republic of IAHC
13.4.1 Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level
Domains
13.4.2 What is the gTLD-MoU?
13.4.3 What is the Intent of the gTLD-MoU
13.4.4 How Can We Participate?
13.4.5 A Self-RegUlatory Framework
13.4.6 Seven New gTLDs
13.4.7 Globally Distributed Competitive Registrars
13.4.8 Signatories to the gTLD-MoU
13.4.9 Criticism ofthe gTLD-MoU
13.5 Other Open Market Models
13.5.1 eONS - Enhanced Domain Name System
13.5.2 uDNS - Universal Domain Name System
13.5.3 Image Online Design: Rival Registry Sues lANA
13.5.4 PG Media v. NSI: No Borders
13.5.5 Root Server Confederations
13.6 Examples of Root and Name Server Files (June 1997)
13.6.1 Alternate Top-Level Name Servers
13.6.2 Why the Concern Over Alternate Top-Level Domain
Names (TLDs)?
13.6.3 db_root.bin - A1ternic
13.4.4 db_cache.bin - A1terNIC
13.6.5 udns.cache - uDNS
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Trademark Examination of Domain Names
Internet domain names have generated a number ofquestions that directly pertain to trademark law.
For the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the question most commonly faced is whether a tenn
which is a domain name can also be registered as a trademark.
The quick answer is that an Internet domain name that is used to identify and distinguish the goods
and/or services ofone person, from the goods and/or services ofothers, and to indicate the source of
the goods and/or services may be registered as a trademark in the PTO. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
Trademark applications for Internet domain names usually seek registration ofservice marks. Lately,
the PTO has received an increasing number ofapplications to register Internet domain names.
In order to register an Internet domain name, an applicant must show that it offers services via the
Internet. Further, specimens submitted in support of the application to show use of the mark must
show use of the Internet domain name as a source identifier. The use ofan Internet domain name as a
mere directional reference, similar to use ofa telephone number or business address on stationery,
business cards, or advertisements, is not use ofthe name as a source identifier. See In re Advertising
& Marketing Development, Inc., 821 F.2d 614,620,2 USPQ2d 2010,2014 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("It is
not enough for the applicant to be a provider ofservices; the applicant also must have used the mark
to identify the named services for which registration is sought"). Also, providing "a service which is
nonnally 'expected or routine' in connection with the sale ofone's own goods is not a registrable
service." In re Dr Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508,509,5 USPQ2d 1207, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1987). By analogy
with the registration of trade names, the more distinctive the presentation of the Internet domain
name and the further it is physically removed from other infonnational data appearing on the
specimen, the more likely the name will be perceived to function as a service mark. See In re Antenna
Specialists Co., 408 F.2d 1052, 161 USPQ 284 (CCPA 1969).
Recently, the PTO has clarified how it administratively classifies services associated with the World
Wide Web. "Identification and Classification of Certain Computer Related Goods and Services,"
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/domain/domcl.html.
The PTO uses the phrases "connection" provider, "access" provider, and "content" provider to
differentiate and classify services rendered via the Internet. An entity providing the technical
connection needed for communication is a "connection" provider--a service classified in Class 38
(Telecommunications). The closely-related service rendered by entities such as America Online®,
CompuServe®, or Prodigy® is an "access" provider--a service classified in Class 42 (Computer
Service). An "access" provider furnishes "multiple-user access to a global computer infonnation
network."
Most applicants will be "content" providers who furnish infonnation via the Internet, i.e., offer the
service of providing infonnation. In such cases, the service offered is an infonnation service
classifiable according to the infonnation provided, e.g., aservice that offers business infonnation is
classified in Class 35, a service that offers financial infonnation is classified in Class 36, and a
service that offers building construction, repair or maintenance infonnation is classified in Class 37.
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/domain/tmdomain.htm
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However. all "content" providers do not offer registerable services vis-a-vis an Internet domain name.
For example, Internet domain name locations that simply contain advertisements or other infonnation
nonnally expected or routine in promoting an entity's goods or services are not registerable services.
Therefore, Internet domain names must meet the same requirements for registration as all trademarks
and service marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. Ifa domain name does meet these requirements, it will
be registered.
Please Send Comments and Suggestions Regarding this Web Server to www@oiolleer.uspto.gov
Last Modified: 16 January 1998
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IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
OF CERTAIN COMPUTER RELATED
GOODS AND SERVICES
Class 9:
Pre-recorded software on CD-ROMs, diskettes, magnetic tapes, etc. is in Class 9. The description
must provide an indication of the subject matter or function of the software and the subject matter or
function indication must be detailed and specific. Very broad statements of function such as
"computer programs for business use" are not acceptable.
Class 9:
"Computer software [specify the function of the programs, e.g., for use in data base management, for
use as a spreadsheet, for word processing, etc.] that is downloaded from a remote computer site" is
classified in Class 9.*
* NOTE: This is a change in classification policy. Previously, "downloadable computer software"
was being classified in International Class 42. After a review ofthis policy, the PTO has decided to
classify downloadable software in Class 9 with other software. The placement ofdownloadable
software in International Class 9 is consistent with the practice in a number ofother countries.
Class 16:
Only hard copy publications, e.g., printed magazines and books, are considered to be Class 16
goods.*
* NOTE: Magazines or books that are downloadable from a computer network are not considered to
be "hard goods" and they are classified in International Class 42 rather than Class 16. The service is
defined as providing the publications on a global computer network and the subject matter of the
publications must be specified. If an entire magazine or other publication is presented at a web site,
the computer service ofproviding that publication electronically is considered to be the primary
service involved in this activity. The service being provided is that ofmaking available magazines,
books and/or other publications via a computer. Appropriate language for these services would be:
"Computer services, namely, providing on-line [indicate specific nature ofthe publication] in the
field of [indicate subject matter of the publication]" in Class 42. As with Class 16 publications, the
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/domain/domcl.html
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subject matter ofthe publication does not effect the classification ofthis service.
Classes 35, 36, 37, 39, 40 & 41:
Any activity consisting ofa service that ordinarily falls in these classes (e.g. computer games. various
financial transactions, etc.) that also happens to be provided by means ofa global computer network,
is classified in the class where the underlying service is classified. For example, banking services are
in Class 36 whether provided in a bank or on-line by means ofa global computer network. Similarly.
the service ofproviding information by means ofa global computer network is classified in the class
of the information subject. Entities who offer these services by computer are considered "content
providers," that is, they provide the information or substantive content for a web site and/or home
page. A recitation ofservices for these specific content providers should read "providing information
in the field of... by means ofa global computer network". The service would be classified by the
class ofthe subject matter ofthe information. Ifan entity provides information in a wide variety of
fields, this must be reflected in the identification and the service may be classified in Class 42 (e.g.•
providing information in a wide variety offields by means ofa global computer information
network.) Please note that the term "access" should be reserved for use in recitations for network
service providers, such as, America OnLine®, Prodigy® and CompuServe®. The PTO considers the
use ofthe term "access" by a content provider to be inaccurate because it causes confusion with the
service provider activities.
These guidelines also apply to activities in Classes 38 and 42, however, the comments below also
apply to Classes 38 and 42.
Class 38:
The service ofproviding telecommunications connections to a global computer network is classified
in Class 38. These services are purely telecommunications "connections" such as those provided by
AT&T®, MCI® or other telecommunications providers. It is ONLY the technical means by which
one computer can communicate with another. The telecommunications provider does NOT provide
the computer hardware that stores and processes the data; it provides the means by which data is
transferred. This service connects the user to the "link provider" (see Class 42 discussion below) or
theweb site itself.
Class 42:
The service ofproviding multiple-user access to a global computer information network for the
transfer and dissemination ofa wide range ofinformation is classified in International Class 42.
This language covers those services provided by entities such as America OnLine®, Prodigy® and
CompuServe®. They provide the computer service (often using the telecommunications services of
other entities as described above in Class 38) that enable computer users to access data bases and
home pages ofothers. These entities are considered "link providers" in that they provide the
computer/server connection required for computer users to access a content provider. The word
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"access" should be limited to these services and should not be used in describing the service ofa
content provider.
NOTE: A single entity may provide one or more of the services described above. However, each
service must be properly identified and classified.
General comment:
The tenn "Internet" is still the subject ofa proceeding at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
Therefore, this tenn should not be used in identifying any goods or services connected with a global
computer infonnation network. Language such as "global computer infonnation network" or a
substantive equivalent should be used instead ofthe tenn "Internet."
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TAX ISSUES ARISING OUT OF E-COMMERCE
AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES
Bill E. Webb
Director of Electronic Commerce (Ohio Valley Region)
Ernst & Young
Cincinnati, Ohio
Copyright 1999, Bill E. Webb. All Rights Reserved.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND EMERGING ISSUES
IN ON-LINE SALES AND LICENSING
Open, Click Or Download:
What Have You Agreed To? The Possibilities Seem Endless
Stephen J. Davidson
Scott J. Bergs
Leonard, Street and Deinard, P.A.
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Copyright 1999, Stephen J. Davidson and Scott J. Bergs. All Rights Reserved.
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INTRODUCTION
The Internet provides a seemingly limitless target audience for those who post
information and/or conduct business online. Reaching this expansive prospect base while
maintaining control over online products and business risks, however, creates challenges not
always apparent to unsophisticated entrants into the online arena. While posting material on the
Internet may not make it fair game for anyone to simply downloaCl and use as they wish, the
scope of intellectual property protection available for online offerings, and the potential liability
of their offerors is very unclear.
This article does not purport to address all of the commercial implications of online
enterprise, but rather merely serves to illuminate some of the emerging issues and, hopefully,
stimulate thought about others. Because intellectual property rights (and copyright, trade secret
and trademark rights, in particular) are among the most common concerns, this article will focus
on that. In the text to follow, the authors will review some of the primary protections available
for online works and their respective limitations, review how the courts have addressed various
approaches to contract formation, and anticipate some of the legal issues that may be confronted
as the number and manner of online informational and business transactions increase.
PROTECTIONS IMPLICIT IN ONLINE WORKS
Copyrigl,t
Online works, like any work, will be afforded some protection automatically upon being
created. The Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. et seq., protects "works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
H - 1
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."1 Therefore, to be covered by the act, a work must be (1) an original work of
authorship, and (2) fixed in a tangible medium. Online works can, and routinely do, meet these
criteria.
To be an "original work of authorship," an item must be composed of some original
expression beyond basic ideas, procedures, processes, systems, etc.2 Here the analysis is the
same for online as for traditional works; to the extent that the information being posted online
has some creativity and is not just a basic idea, the creative expression is potentially protectible.3
A work is "fixed in a tangible medium" under the Copyright Act "when its embodiment
in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otheIWise communicated for a period of more than a transitory duration."· Works stored on a
disk or a hard drive have been consistently held to be sufficiently fixed and thereby covered by
the Copyright Act.5 In order to be posted on a Web site or other media on the Internet,
information must be saved in the host computer's memory. When this happens, the information
is sufficiently "fixed" to be protected under the Copyright Act.6
The Copyright Act only provides protection for the "owner" of a copyrighe Ownership
of a copyright "vests initially in the author or authors" but "may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law.,,8 The owner has the exclusive right to
exercise or license all of the rights granted by the Act.9 These rights include the right to: (1)
reproduce the work, (2) make derivative works, (3) distribute copies of the work, and (4) display
the work publicly.10
A violation of these rights constitutes infringement, actionable by the owner. In the
context of online materials, however, what constitutes a violation of these rights is far from
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clear. The most basic example is browsing. When a copyrighted work is posted on a Web site
by the owner, presumably the owner wants the work to be downloaded by end users. This
desirable downloading, however, may constitute a violation of the owner's exclusive rights, the
right to reproduction, right to display the work publicly, and others.
The right to reproduction may be violated several times during the downloading of a
work. 11 Perhaps the area of greatest concern is the information residing in the RAM12 of the
computer downloading the information. The question of whether information stored in RAM is
"fixed" for Copyright purposes, has been addressed by the courts on several occasions yielding
varying determinations.13 The majority view of those courts having considered the question
appears to be that absent some other consideration, the storage of complete files representing
copyrighted works in the RAM of the computer downloading does constitute a "fixation" and
thus an illegal copying of the work if not authorized by the copyright owner.1. This often does
not result in a liability for infringement, however, because of the doctrines of fair use and
implied license. In fact, it appears obvious that the mere act of downloading a file posted on a
Web site should not expose the user to liability. Presumably, the only reason to post information
is to enable other people to download it.
An implied license is merely a recognition by the court that, absent a written license
agreement required to transfer the interest of a copyright owner under the Copyright Act, certain
conduct by the copyright owner should bar it from suing another for copyright infringement. An
implied license is created where (1) a person requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator
makes and delivers the work requested, and (3) the licensor/creator intends that the
licensee/requester will copy and/or distribute the work. IS
H-3
An online transaction could easily satisfy these elements. For example, the browsing
user makes a request, by entering a search query or linking to the URL of a Web site. The host
party then provides access to the copyrighted work and allows it to be downloaded. In this
context, it would be difficult to argue that the copyright owner, who placed the information
online, did not intend for the user to copy the work, at least to their RAM or that of their Internet
seIVice provider ("ISP").
The ambiguity arises when considering the scope of the implied license.16 Does an
online implied license allow unlimited non-commercial copying? How about distributing or
selling copies? The answers to these questions will be very fact specific and perhaps
inconsistent as the courts begin to evaluate these transactions.
Additional difficulties arise where the party posting the copyrighted work is not the
owner, but instead, a third-party who lacks authorization from the copyright owner. In this
context, the party posting the work has likely infringed the copyright, but what about the party
who downloads it? Because intent is not required to establish copyright infringement,17 these
parties may technically be infringing the copyright as well.
Browsing may also violate reproduction rights when the user's computer caches18 the
downloaded file. This process creates a copy of the work that remains stored or "fixed" for an
indefInite period of time. Thus, similar to RAM storage, this arguably violates the rights of the
copyright owner.
Not all apparent violations of the copyright owner's exclusive rights create liability for
infringement. The Copyright Act expressly limits the owner's exclusive rights in several ways.19
The limitations contained in sections 117, 109 and 107 of the Act are especially applicable to
online works.
H-4
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Necessary Computer Copies
Section 117 provides that the owner of a copy of a computer software program may
make another copy without infringing so long as the additional copy is either essential to the
utilization of the program or is for archival purposes only.2O This exception raises some
interesting questions in the online context. Who is an owner? When someone downloads
software legally posted on the Internet, without paying for it, do they own a copy of it? If not,
then arguably, the first copy they make to their hard drive infringes the copyright and is not
excepted by § 117. Certainly, a downloaded file must be "copied" into RAM to be viewed; but
is a hard drive or floppy disk copy "essential" to the utilization of the program?
First Sale
The first sale doctrine of § 109 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109, cuts off the
distribution rights as to a specific copy of a work upon the first sale of that copy. The buyer may
sell or otherwise distribute that copy so long as they do not retain any duplicate, for example, on
their hard drive. If, however, the transmission of software over the Internet is not a "sale" then
does the "buyer" have the right to sell or give the copy away? 21
Fair Use
Section 107 of the Act provides that no infringement occurs where the use alleged is a
"fair use . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."n The Act outlines four non-
exclusive factors to be considered in the determination ofwhether a particular act constitutes fair
H-5
use: (1) the commercial vs. nonprofit use of the work,' (2) the nature of the copyrighted work
itself, (3) the substantiality of the portion used compared to the work as a whole, and (4) the
effect the use has on the market for the copyrighted work.23 This forth factor is frequently cited
as being the most important.24
There is authority for the proposition that when one violates one of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights but it has no negative affect on the market for the work, no liability exists.2S
Where, however, the infringing work diminishes the existing or expected market of the
copyrighted work, the tendency is to treat the use may as not a "fair use.,,26 While these
principles appear well settled the extreme ends of the spectrum, it is unclear what happens to
those activities in the middle of this spectrum. The court decisions are very fact specific and
divided.
For example, in Playboy Enterprises. Inc. v. Frena, the defendant operated a BBS where
paid subscribers posted erotic pictures.27 When pictures taken from the plaintiff's magazine
were posted and downloaded, the plaintiff's sued the BBS operator for copyright infringement.
The court found that the defendant's action constituted infringement and was not fair use
because the defendant solicited the postings, and they resulted in damage to the plaintiff's
market for its magazine.28
The court in Religious Tech. Ctc. v. Netcom On-line Commun. Svc., Inc. denied
summary judgment, holding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to the defendant BBS
operator's fair use of the infringing material because the effect of the infringing material on the
market was unclear.29 The court suggested, however, that the use was fair in part because, even
thought the defendant gained financially from the operation of the BBS, it received "no direct
financial benefit from the acts of infringement.,,3o The court differentiated the case from
H-6
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Playboy by emphasizing that unlike the defendant in Playboy, Netcom did not directly benefit
from the infringing materials because it did not solicit the posting of infringing works but
instead merely acted as a conduit.31
The Netcom court's attempt to differentiate its facts from those in Playboy evidences the
ambiguity in this area of the law. The factual differences highlighted by the court are tenuous at
best. Contrary to the court's suggestion in Netcom, the Playboy court did not base its holding on
the direct relationship between the defendant's solicitation of infringing works and the fmancial
gain by the defendant. In fact, the court made no mention of such a specific solicitation. The
Playboy defendant did not even appear to know that any of the material was infringing. Yet, the
court stated that "[ilt does not matter that Defendant . . . may have been unaware of the
copyright infringement. Intent to infringe is not needed ...."32 The divergent holdings in these
two cases evidenced the need for further clarity in this area.
DigitalMillennium Copyright Act 0(1998
Congress attempted to clear some of the ambiguity surrounding copyright in the realm of
the Internet by passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998). This statute expressly limits infringement liability for ISPs33 for
"copying" by storing information in the RAM of their servers during online transmissions,
among other things. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mai Systems, Inc. v. Peak
Communications appears to be overruled on that point. This protection is only available if an
ISP does not modify the content of the information requested by the user, adopts a policy to drop
users who transmit infringing works, does not control what or to whom the information goes,
and only stores the information for a reasonable time.34
H-7
The Act also protects ISPs from liability due to cashing. Again, this protection is only
available if certain steps are taken. An ISP must not modify the content of the information, must
not interfere with the posting party's "hit" tracking technology, must limit users access
according to the posting party's password or other security requirements, and must remove any
unauthorized material promptly when notified.35 The act does not address cashing at the user
level.
Finally, the Act protects ISPs from infringement liability for materials posted on the ISPs
Web site by a user. To qualify for protection, the ISP must not know that infringing material
resides in its site, must not directly fmancially benefit from the infringing activity, and must take
the information down promptly upon notification of infringement. This appears to codify the
Netcom holding, however, no defmition of "directly financially benefit" is provided in the Act.
The controversy between the Playboy and Netcom decisions, therefore, may not be effectively
resolved by the Act.
While the statute may provide some protection for ISPs, its does not clarify the
protection afforded to the copyright owner against infringement by parties other than an ISP.
The Act also fails to defme copying. Therefore, other than the specific exceptions outlined for
ISPs, any "copies" made by online users may be infringing.
Other Protections
In addition to copyright, online information may also be protected by the trademark and
trade secret laws.36 The scope of these protections for online materials is no more clear than that
afforded by copyright. Trademark law, like copyright law, does not require a showing of intent
to establish infringement, but generally does require a showing that the specific allegedly
H-8
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infringing use is likely to cause confusion as to the source or quality of the goods or services.37
Therefore, a user probably does not infringe a legally posted trademark just by downloading to
browse. If the user, however, uploaded and posted the mark somewhere else, infringement may
occur if the use of the mark could confuse the public about who the mark belongs to. A few
cases have dealt with this issue in the context of linking and framing; however, none have
reached fmal judgment.38
Linking allows a user to go directly from one Web site to another, unrelated site simply
by clicking on a "link" provided by the original site. Conversely, in framing, part of the material
created by the original site remain on the user's screen while material from a separate site is
displayed within the image generated by the original site. With either practice, the second site
being accessed is often an interior page of a Web site that does not contain identifying marks.
As a result, the goods or services of the trademark owner may appear to belong to the operator
of the Web site using framing or initiating the link, thus causing the likelihood for consumer
confusion or dilution of the trademark.39
The scope of protection afforded by trade secret law or specifically the Economic
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 et seq., is likewise uncertain. Very few cases have been
brought under the Act, and traditional state trade secret law has not often been raised in the
context of online materials. One court, however, considered the effect of posting trade secret
information on a Web site. The court stated that if the information posted were specific enough,
it would destroy the protection otherwise afforded this information because it is no longer
secret.40 As more information is transmitted online, various questions about trade secret
protection arise. How secure must an Internet connection be to adequately protect the secret
H-9
nature of information being transmitted? What actions by a defendant will constitute the
unlawful acquisition of such secret information if it is being transmitted online?
Certainly, some protections are available for online materials. The present and future
scope of these protections is, however, quite unclear.
EXPANDING PROTECTION OF ONLINE WORKS BY CONTRACT
Shrink-Wrap Licenses
Software developers and publishers have long sought to expand the implicit protections
afforded to software programs by imposing additional terms on end users by contract, usually in
the form of a license agreement. In the mass market context, these license agreements came to
be known as "shrink-wrap" licenses because they initially were included on the outside of the
software package under a layer of shrink-wrap plastic. Until recently, those few cases examined
the enforceability of shrink wrap licenses resulted in holding them invalid on contract formation
grounds.4! Arguably, the holdings in those cases relieved purchasers of any duty to affmnatively
search for and read the license terms and elect either to object or be bound by them. The tide
turned markedly in favor of software producers, however, when the Seventh Circuit in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg upheld the enforceability of such bundled "contracts."42
In ProCD, the court held that the shrink-wrap agreement enclosed in the software
package were assented to and therefore were enforceable.43 Judge Easterbrook writing for the
court, justified the decision on two grounds and two provisions of the UCC First, he stated that
the seller or licensor in a transaction has the power to condition acceptance on certain conduct by
the buyer. He found that ProCD had done that by including a provision in the license agreement
H - 10
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that stated that using the software constituted acceptance of the terms.44 The second VCC
provision cited in support of the court's holding was 2-606. This section states that "[a] buyer
accepts goods . . . when, after an opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective
rejection.U4S The court reasoned that the defendant had an opportunity to review the license, was
aware of the contract terms and failed to object, thereby accepting the them.
The court's decision appeared to be conditioned on the .explicit notice of the contract
terms provided to the buyer.46 However, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, a subsequent case before the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook again upheld a bundled contract despite the complete lack of
notice on the outside of the package or on the user's screen during operation.41 However, in
Gateway, the court did note that the buyer knew when ordering the product by phone that some
sort of contract likely would be included in the transaction. The court reasoned that because of
this knowledge, the buyer could be bound by any terms not expressly rejected!8
The Ninth Circuit appears to have followed that lead in Micro Star v. Formgen. Inc!9 In
Micro Star, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that an injunction against the
defendant's sale of its game software was appropriate because the software was a derivative
work that violated plaintiff's copyright.so The plaintiff had created a computer game that allowed
and encouraged users to create new advanced levels of the game and to post them on the Internet
so others could use them. The defendant downloaded and copied these new, user-made versions
to CDs and resold them. The court distinguished the user's lawful use from the illegal use by the
defendant, stating that the users were granted a written license while the defendant was not.SI
The defendant argued that the user's written license was invalid, but that plaintiffs granted an
implied license when they encouraged the creation of the derivative works. The defendant
H-ll
further argued that this implied license extinguished plaintiff's rights to the user made derivative
works.
The court rejected this argument, stating that users were prohibited by the license
agreement from selling the user-made versions and that this prohibition evidenced the plaintiff's
intent to preserve its exclusive right to commercially distribute these works. The court did not
mention what, if any, notice of these license terms was given to the users. The defendant, who
received no actual notice, was held bound by the restrictive terms.52 In other words, the
defendant did exactly what the plaintiff hoped online users would do; it downloaded the
authorized derivative works made by the users. In so doing, it had no notice of any restrictions
placed on this authorized and encouraged behavior. Yet, the court enforced rights against the
defendant based on the unknown contractual restriction.53 These cases suggest that the burden
may now be on the buyer/user to seek out the terms on which digital products are offered or risk
being bound by default, at least to the extent of terms that are not unconscionable or otherwise
illegal.54
The doctrine of unconscionability is designed to avoid oppression or unfair surprise.
Therefore, to the extent that license agreements contain one sided terms, they may be held
entirely or partially unenforceable. Traditional concepts of unconscionability will likely be
helpful in determining what is oppressive in online contracts. These historical concepts may,
however, be less helpful in determining what creates unfair surprise online. An unsuspecting
buyer may be more likely to be lured into a contract online without knowing what terms are
included in a hyperlink set of terms and conditions than if the same terms were contained on the
face of a box or even on a piece of paper in the box. These conceptual differences between
H - 12
J
J
J
J
J
I
.I
J
J
J
J
J
:;1:.
]
I
J,..
j.~,..':t~
;:1•
a
J
r
r
r
r
r,.
~
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
I
r
tangible shrink-wrap licenses and online "click-wrap" licenses have not, to date, prevented the
latter from being enforced.
Qick-Wrap Licenses
While no court has directly addressed the enforceability of click-wrap agreements, at
least two cases suggest that such agreements will be enforced.55 In Compuserv. Inc. v.
Patterson, the court held that by typing "agree" on an online registration form, the defendant had
agreed to be bound by the terms of the shareware license that was displayed on the screen. The
formation of the contract, however, was not the primary issue in the case. Instead, the court
stated that a contract had been formed in the context of a discussion of whether the defendant
was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio, where the plaintiff's computer and operation
resided.56
In Hotmail Com. v. VanS Money Pie. Inc., the court granted an injunction preventing the
defendant, a user of the plaintiff's Internet e-mail product, from sending "spam"S7 messages.
The defendant registered online and received several of the plaintiff's e-mail boxes. The terms
of the online license agreement prohibited sending spam or obscene messages. The court
granted the plaintiff's requested injunction, finding that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on its
breach of contract claim because the defendant had agreed to abide by the terms of the
agreement by using the e-mail boxes and had breached the contract by violating its terms.S8
According to these cases, click-wrap agreements, like shrink-wraps before them, appear
to be enforceable even where notice of the terms is minimal. While the enforceability of such
agreements may still be limited by the statute of frauds, unconscionability and other doctrines,
H-13
the application of these principles to online materials creates some unique problems even beyond
the ambiguities present in shrink-wrap licenses.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY ONLINE LICENSE
AGREEMENTS AND NOTICES
Notice Of The Existence OfLicense Terms
As discussed above, the cases fmding shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements
enforceable state or suggest that the defendant was (or should have been) aware that at least
some form of contract would be involved in the transaction. This, however raises at least as
many questions as it answers. For example, what type of notice (if any) is sufficient to inform a
buyer/user what contract terms will apply?
ProCD printed a notice on the box, informing buyers that additional terms were
contained inside. Is notice prior to purchase necessary? Gateway suggests not, but what
happens if the buyer claims to have had no idea that any additional terms would be included?
Moreover, what facts would justify such a contention by an online buyer? Could an online
buyer claim that he/she had no notice of additional terms where the terms are identified only on
an interior page of a Web site, accessed by an inconspicuous link located at the bottom of an
initial Web page that requires scrolling in order to fmd it? What if the link to the notice is in
extra small type? Even if these tiny "notices" are sufficient under the ProeD standard, do they
constitute unfair surprise and thus become unconscionable? Do they meet the legal requirement
that certain notices be "conspicuous" if the language of the deeply linked contract is conspicuous
but the link to it is not?
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If the trend (if it can be called a trend) toward enforcing all license agreements continues,
then online software providers are likely to make notices smaller and less conspicuous to
minimize the possibility that buyers will refuse to buy as a result of them. What will the courts
do when the extreme becomes absurd and a notice is limited to a linked CO or no notice
whatsoever is provided?
LayeredAnd Embedded Notices AndAgreements
Unlike paper transactions, where anyone looking through the contents of a box has a
reasonable chance of stumbling over bundled contract forms, where transaction terms are located
in different places on a single Web site (or perhaps even linked to different sites), the reasonable
buyer/user may not notice them or have reason to search them out. It is becoming common for
Web pages to contain links to a sets of "terms and conditions," sometimes as inconspicuous as
the highlighted word "documents" or "software" appearing at he bottom of the page. Is the
buyer/user expected to know that these are in fact links to purported contract terms? Must they
look for more than one? If there are links to multiple statements of terms, are they bound by all?
Where more than one set of contract terms or restrictions are present or accessible on a
given site, the terms of multiple sets of terms often conflict with one another or at least create
ambiguities. This may be the result of poor drafting or simply referencing incompatible
provisions, sometimes contained in documents from different sources with different purposes or
different interests at stake. When this occurs, which terms will be enforceable? The most
restrictive? The least restrictive? Will the entire agreement be unenforceable?
What if one notice is listed on the first page viewed by a buyer but additional terms are
listed on a page accessible only after "agreeing" to purchase? The battle of the forms analysis
H - 15
under uee § 2-207 may exclude such layered notices. Under the uee analysis, additional
terms offered by the accepting party are treated as offers in a consumer transaction. Where both
parties are merchants, the terms are included in the agreement unless they materially alter the
agreement.59 In the context of online transactions, who is the offeror and who is the acceptor?
Are terms in an "additional" copyright notice material to the agreement as a whole? How about
restrictions on the use of trademarks or purported agreements not to challenge the enforceability
of the agreement or restrictions on the buyer/licensee's ability to take specified actions unrelated
to the transaction? Disclaimers of warranties are often included in copyright provisions on a
web page. Does this placement provide adequate notice to the user? Are disclaimers material to
the online agreement?60
The uee warranty disclaimer provisions may prove yet another source of contention
between online sellers and buyers. Section 2-316 states that a seller may disclaim certain
warranties, provided that the disclaimer is "conspicuous." The conspicuous requirement is
typically met by using larger type, bold letters, and/ or all capital letters. In a tangible
agreement, the use of distinguishing typeface justifiably fulfills the purpose of the uee - i.e.,
section, to give the buyer fair notice of this important disclaimer. In online agreements,
however, disclaimers are often found on interior pages of a Web site that are only accessible
through a link from the main page or perhaps even by multiple links through multiple pages or
even multiple sites. These links are frequently small and/or located at the bottom of a long page
of material requiring the buyer/user to scroll down to even see it and/or expressed in ways that
do not necessarily suggest they lead to a contract at all. Are these linked disclaimers
conspicuous? Do the truly fulfill the purpose of uee § 2-316 to give the buyer/user notice of
the disclaimer?
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Contract Terms Transfen'ed From Physical To Electronic Licenses
Another recent phenomenon that has caught the authors' attention is the surprisingly
common occurrence of license or other contract terms that appear to have been ported from one
context to another without much thought about whether they make sense in the new context. For
example, the authors have seen provisions in online "click on" licenses purport to take effect
upon opening the package. What package is opened in this context and when? How far will the
courts be willing to go to interpret such language to render the "agreement" enforceable in an
online transaction? Another example is a statement in the opening pages of printed books
purporting to impose restrictions on the buyer, including prohibition of "decompilation of the
contents." How is a tangible book decompiled? While the courts seem to be tempting license
drafters to expand the scope of the license provisions, care must be taken to remain in the bounds
of the possible, if not the fair and reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The digital revolution has arrived, and the evolution toward electronic commerce is
growing at an exponential rate. As more products are offered and more goods sold online, the
relative legal rights and obligations of the parties to such transactions will be called increasingly
into question. Both the practices of online merchants and others who offer information or other
material over the Internet, and the law that governs their rights and liabilities, needs to evolve
just as quickly in ways that make practical sense. Recent decisions upholding the enforceability
of bundled and electronic agreements portend broad enforcement of bundled or linked terms, at
H - 17
least insofar as is necessary to reasonably protect intellectual property rights, but it is too early to
tell how that will be balance against the courts' willingness to find such agreements
unenforceable when necessary to protect the rights of injured consumers. Perhaps proposed new
Dee Article 2B will provide more certainty. Perhaps we need to await more court decisions to
illuminate the path to justice in the digital age. Perhaps both. In the meantime, however, the
authors suggest that commercial parties in particular who venture into the online arena need to
give more thought to how they will establish and define their legal relationships in enforceable
ways.
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NEGOTIATION OF SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENTS
AND RELATED AGREEMENTS
(Or' More Than You Ever Wanted To Know
About Software License Agreements)
The vast majority of businesses throughout the world employ some form of software in
their daily activities. To remain competitive, businesses are purchasing expensive, sometimes
specially tailored, software to enable them to become more efficient, to automate entire
departments, to conduct e-commerce and to otherwise conduct business in a more efficient and
productive manner. As this move toward computerization progressed, the software industry
gained a slight edge in the marketplace. Businesses were sometimes reluctant to give the proper
attention to the software purchasing and contract negotiation process. Often businesses
delegated these tasks to technology administrators who were capable of evaluating the software
product, but who may not have been aware of the long term business plans of their company and
who were generally not skilled in negotiating software contracts. At the time, many software
providers took advantage of this situation. Now, finally, top level executives are waking up to
the significance of technology in the modem business world and are better at allocating the
proper resources, time and money to major software acquisitions. Even better, in-house counsel
and outside counsel have been invited to serve as a part of the software acquisition team.
This article was prepared primarily for the benefit of counsel who represent companies in
purchasing software, but should also be helpful to lawyers representing software providers. The
goal is not to "win" or to receive an unfair advantage, but to negotiate a contract that is fair and
reasonable for both sides. This article is meant to provide a broad overview on the issues that
regularly arise in connection with the negotiation of software license agreements, and is divided
into three segments, the first relating to pre-contract planning, the second discussing the actual
contract negotiation process and likely terms of the contract, and the third addressing negotiation
tactics and tips.
In this article, the term "user" refers to a business that is proposing to acquire software,
and the terms "software provider" and "provider" refer to the software vendor.
I. Pre-Contract Planning.
Unfortunately, as counsel, you are often called in at the eleventh hour when many of the
deal terms have been finalized, and you are assigned what clients typically think of as the
administerial task of dotting the i's and crossing the 1's. As outside counsel, there is often little
you can do about this situation, because you probably are unaware that one or more of your
clients are contemplating the purchase of expensive software. To the extent you become aware
of a proposed acquisition, however, there are some steps you can take early in the process to
minimize negotiating conflicts and maximize negotiating leverage.
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A. Put Your Team Together.
Step one in the process is to put the team together w40 will make the acqUisItion
decision. Most companies now form an internal team to take on the project, but do not include
legal counsel, who can be much more helpful on the back-end if plugged in on the front-end.
Your team should include a technology expert, who can be in-house or, as is becoming more
common, an independent contractor who specializes in assisting third parties in purchasing
complicated software, a decision-maker, a user of the software, and legal counsel.
B. Do Your Homework.
Although it seems to be an obvious point, many companies rush the acquisition process
due to a real or artificial deadline and do not thoroughly research their options. In addition to
doing research and comparing providers, the company needs to check references, and if
possible, spend time with other companies who have purchased the software and are in the midst
of using it in their businesses.
..
I...
J
c. IfAppropriate, Send Out A Request For Proposal.
Depending on the money to be spent on a software package and the resources of the
company, it is often helpful to issue a Request for Proposal that sets out the needs of the user
and the proposed specifications of the software, and that can further include a form agreement.
The advantages to this approach are enormous. First, it forces both parties to the transaction to
be very specific up front about the software, which reduces conflicts on the back-end. It also
creates an environment of competition. A company responding to an RFP does not know
whether others are responding, and the mere issuance of an RFP causes participants to assume
that there is competition. Finally, it can otherwise maximize the user's negotiating leverage.
One requirement of an RFP can be that negotiations be based on the form agreement included
with the RFP. Further, to the extent the software provider tries to waffle on a particular software
specification or obligation, the user can refer back to the RFP, which may very well indicate that
the software provider earlier agreed to that particular specification or obligation.
J
To the extent a user does not offer its own form as a starting point for negotiations, it is
important to obtain a copy of the agreement as early as possible in the process to allow for the
negotiation and resolution of differing positions sooner rather than later. This helps avoid having
the deal killed due to objectionable contract provisions. No lawyer wants to be blamed for
killing a deal for a client, especially when the client is not convinced of the seriousness of the
point of conflict.
D.
E.
Obtain Software Provider's Form Agreement As Early As Possible.
Assess the Balance of Power.
..
J
This step is often taken subconsciously, but it is helpful for the counsel involved to
consciously evaluate the answers to the following questions: How desperate is the user for the
software? What is user's time table? How many providers are there of the software in question?
What monies are to be spent? If the user is happy with the software, could there be additional
1-2
-
I
.J
r
r
,.,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
purchases of goods and services from the software provider? Finally, what is the general
demand for the program and the relative size of the negotiating parties? These questions should
have been answered early on, but to the extent counsel is being brought in late in the game,
answers to the aforementioned questions help counsel assess the negotiating leverage of the
client.
II. Software License Agreement Negotiation
Set forth below is a discussion of sixteen key provisions of a software license agreement
and a separate discussion on some of the so-called "boilerplate" provisions of a license
agreement.
A. Specifications.
Setting out the standards and desired requirements of the software program is one of the
most important aspects, if not the most important aspect, of the entire software contract process.
Unfortunately, it is too often the case that the marketing representative for the software company
talks to the marketing representative for the buyer, and it is not until both parties have invested a
significant amount of time in the process that someone with the technical expertise actually
articulates the software needs of the user. Sometimes there are published specifications, which
the technical specialist representing the user should carefully review. Where there are no
published specifications or where sl?ecifications beyond that which are published are needed by
the user, these specifications must be set out very carefully. If the specifications for the software
are sufficiently comprehensive, there are generally very few problems implementing the
agreement. As part of the specifications, users who must have compatibility with other programs
should reference such other programs and the compatibility requirement. Some users must have
software written in certain programming languages; some users must have certain documentation
for different levels of users within the organization and so on. This should all be included in the
specifications for the software. If the user attracted the software company through an RFP, the
user may be able to rely upon the detail set out in the RFP to describe its software needs.
B. License Grant.
The actual license grant in the agreement is typically couched in terms of a perpetual
license that mayor may not include improvements and/or modifications to this particular version
of the software and that mayor may not include source code.
Software has traditionally been licensed rather than sold outright so that the software
provider has more control over the use of the software. If sold outright, the "first sale doctrine"
under the Federal Copyright Act would allow the owner of a copy of the software to resell the
copy and would give the owner broad rights with respect to its use of the copy. A license
agreement enables the software provider to forbid or limit transfers and modifications to the
software and to otherwise restrict the manner in which the software is used.
With respect to source code, naturally a user would prefer that the license include the
underlying source code for the program. Typically, the software provider does not want to allow
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access to the source code. This is a negotiable point, although it is not unusual for a user not to
receive a license to the source code as a part of the user's software acquisition. Different
situations give rise to different levels of need for source code access. In cases where the user
does not receive access to the source code as a part of its license, then the user should consider
whether a source code escrow would provide the user adequate protection and address the user's
source code access concerns.
As an aside, the case and statutory law on reverse engineering by no means gives
software users the green light to reverse engineer licensed software. The seminal case on the
matter, SegaEnterprises, Ltd v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993), holds that reverse
engineering for the purpose of making computer games compatible with certain machines is fair
use of the copyright where the reverse engineering was the only way to gain access to the
"unprotected ideas" and "functional elements" of the computer program.
c. Warranties.
As is true with almost all contracts, there are express warranties and possibly some
implied warranties in software license agreements. The following is a typical express warranty:
"This Software is free from significant programming errors and conforms to the specifications
set out in Annex A to this Agreement [and to the other criteria set out in the materials attached to
Annex A.]" The express warranty emphasizes the importance of having appropriate
specifications to the success of the transaction. A user might also attach marketing or other
materials provided by the software provider (e.g., manuals and documentation) to the agreement
to attempt to hold the software provider to the promises set out in those materials.
An additional warranty that should be provided is a warranty with respect to ancillary
services. In almost all cases, the software provider will perform some services, such as
installation, support, or maintenance, in connection with the software. An appropriate
performance warranty is as follows: "Provider will perform services in a workman-like manner,
according to standards of care and diligence and a level of skill, knowledge and judgment
normally provided by [national] [regional] companies in the industry."
There are also implied warranties that might apply to a software license agreement. The
two most relevant implied warranties include the warranty of merchantability (found in the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") at 2-314) and the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose (found at 2-315 of the UCC). The warranty of merchantability provides that goods must
be fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. The warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose provides that when the seller knows of a particular purpose for which the
goods are to be used, and the buyer is relying upon the seller's skill or judgment, then there is
implied warranty that the goods will be fit for such particular purpose. Both of these warranties
could be helpful to a user in a software license context, especially if the user has failed to
adequately express its software needs and requirements in the agreement. It is not crystal clear
that the sale of software through a software license is a sale of goods to which the Uniform
Commercial Code would apply; however, the courts appear to be leaning in favor of software
licenses being goods under the Uniform Commercial Code. (See, Advent Systems Ltd v. Unisys
Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3 rd Cir. 1991)). As an aside, the proposed new Uniform Computer
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Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") would provide a body of statutory law that would
apply to software licensing, however, it is difficult to predict when or if the new proposed
UCITA will be adopted by The National Conference for Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
or by any state.
Another appropriate and timely representation for a software license agreement is a
representation relating to the year 2000 compliance of the software. A sample representation is
as follows:
All Software and any updates, patches and fixes to the same shall
(1) properly execute with all date data, whether from years in the
same century or in different centuries, by yielding correct results in
arithmetic operations, comparisons, sorting of date fields and
otherwise, and (2) not abnormally cease to execute or return an
erroneous error message due to date-related processing.
D. Delivery, Installation, and Training.
Finally, a software provider should make the standard representations and warranties that
the provider has title to the software and that the software does not infringe any third party
intellectual property rights.
These terms are negotiable depending on the software and the level of provider
involvement necessary to get the program up and running. One issue that commonly arises is
whether the cost of installment and/or training is included in or is in addition to the then-
negotiated purchase price. To the extent a user needs delivery, installation and/or training as of
particular date, this should be set out in the agreement. The user's expectations with respect to
training should also be clearly expressed in the agreement.
r
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Most license agreements prohibit modifications to the code or at a minimum cause any
express warranties to terminate upon modification of the code. It is useful for a user to negotiate
the ability to make certain minor modifications. Had users who wanted to engage in year 2000
self-help remediation negotiated such modification rights, those users would continue to be in
good standing under their license agreements following the implementation of year 2000
changes. If a user cannot anticipate a situation where it would need the right to modify its code,
one approach is to negotiate the right to make modifications as necessary to enable the program
to function as intended by the parties. When modifications are not forbidden but cause the
warranty to be compromised, the user should propose that the warranty remain intact (1) if the
software provider approved the modification, (2) if modification does not affect the part of the
program with respect to which warranty is being relied upon; or (3) if the user can remove the
modification and such modification and removal do not otherwise compromise the program.
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F. Acceptance Testing.
The accepted testing clause seems to be missing from many software license agreements,
and it is critical to a user who is paying significant amounts for a unique software program.
Following installation and user training, the user should have a period of time to test the
program, and the agreement should provide options for the user should program fail the
acceptance test. Those options include the requirement that the provider correct the program for
no additional charge, with the user then having the right to retest. The user should also ultimately
be able to terminate the agreement andreceive a refund of amounts paid if the program continues
to fail the acceptance test.
One issue relating to testing is determining whether the program has passed the test. One
option that is not popular with software providers is for the program test to be satisfactory to the
user. A common middle ground is for the parties to agree that the program has passed the test if
it performs in accordance with the agreed upon specifications. If the user has been careful
enough to negotiate these carefully and to test thoroughly, the user should be adequately
protected.
j
G. Warranty Period.
!
!
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The express warranty typically starts following the acceptance of the program by the user
and continues for a period of time, which time period is negotiable. The time period for a
warranty generally runs from 30 days to one year.
H. Fulfillment of Warranty.
If during the warranty period, the software fails to perform in accordance with the terms
of the license agreement, then the software provider should be obligated to "promptly" correct
any such defects at its own expense. If the software is not made compliant within a reasonable
time, the user should have the right to terminate the agreement and receive a full or pro-rated
refund, depending on the circumstances involved. To the extent a user has concerns about the
ability of a provider to perform (in which case one may wonder why the provider was hired), the
software user may demand a performance bond on behalf of the provider that would offer the
user some added protection.
I. Support.
Even if the software provider has conducted training, users' employees and staff will
have questions and issues that will later arise as a part of the actual use of the system. Some
software providers have pre-established time periods during which they will be accessible by
phone, but this is sometimes negotiable. Depending on the system being installed, the user may
also want to negotiate for access to after-hours support; on-site support and may want to specify
minimum response times.
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K. Payment Structure.
In any case, a user may want to specifically address the provider's obligations with
respect to maintenance, including the manner in which the maintenance will be implemented and
procedures used to deal with emergency situations.
Maintenance is often covered by a separate agreement with separate consideration. In its
most basic form, it is merely an extension of the warranty period, meaning the software
provider's obligation is to maintain the program so that it operates in accordance with the
original specifications and in accordance with other warranties (such as the Y2K warranty)
during the term of the maintenance agreement. To sell a maintenance package, however,
software providers may add features, and users should know that additional features, such as
enhancements and/or upgrades, are often negotiable at a free or reduced cost as a part of the
maintenance package. A software license may already contain an obligation that the software
provider forward for free improvements to the particular version of software that is licensed
(improvements meaning changes that increase efficiency and effectiveness of the basic program
but do not change functions or create new ones), so the maintenance agreement, or maintenance
sections of the license agreement, may be an appropriate place to negotiate for other added
benefits.
r
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Typically, the license fee is presented as a lump sum payment, which the software
provider wants paid up front, and the user wants to pay as late in the game as possible. To the
extent possible, the user should hold back the bulk of the payment at least until the software has
been tested and accepted. Some users may have the negotiation leverage to space out payments
over a period of years, but in most cases the latest time that a payment for the software can be
made is at the time of acceptance.
L. Copies of Software and Documentation.
Some software is priced based on the number of individual users of the software, and
therefore the license agreement already specifically addresses the number of copies the user may
make of both the program and the instructional materials or other documentation supporting the
program. The right to make copies should be specifically addressed in some manner in the
agreement. Otherwise, the presumption is that no copying is permitted. Of course, the user
would prefer a provision allowing the user to make as many copies as necessary to satisfy the
user's internal needs. If that approach is not agreeable to a software provider, then a reasonable
number of copying allowances should be negotiated, taking into consideration that the user will
need one or more backup copies for the user's in-house backup efforts, and the user may also
have a third-party contract with a disaster recovery company for which copies of the programs
may be necessary.
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M. Confidentiality.
There is typically an obligation in a license agreement that the user maintain the
confidentiality of the software and other materials licensed, especially when access to source
code has been provided. This is standard and appropriate, but the user needs to ensure that its
reasonable use of the program is not unduly restricted by this provision. Employees and other
representatives will use the program, and third parties may need access to the program, and these
circumstances should be specifically addressed in the agreement. Also, users may employ a
third-party disaster recovery company where copies of programs and information of the user are
stored and maintained at a third-party location, which situation should be specifically provided
for in the agreement. Finally, the user may have confidential information to which the software
provider may have access in connection with the provision of installation and other services, and,
therefore, it is often appropriate for the confidentiality provision to be mutual.
I...
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N. Software Escrow.
If the user does not obtain access to the software source code as a part of the license, and
the user has paid a significant price for such software, obviously the user will have concerns
about the ability to preserve the usefulness of the software for the long term. A separate article
could be written on software escrow agreements alone; however, this section will the focus only
on the most critical provision of a source code escrow agreement, which is the provision that
triggers the release of the code. The following are possible triggering events for the release of
the source code to the user:
1. The software provider's inability during the warranty period to correct any
malfunction, defect or nonconformity that prevents the software from performing in accordance
with agreed-to specifications;
,
j
...
3. The sale of the software provider or of substantially all of its assets, or some other
change in control of the software provider; and
2.
4.
provider.
The software provider's inability to fulfill its maintenance obligations;
The insolvency, bankruptcy or other similar occurrences affecting the software
•
I..
Paragraphs 2 and 4 are fairly common in source code escrow agreements. The other two
paragraphs are negotiable and the ability to include these provisions in the escrow agreement
depends on the particular circumstances of the parties.
Most escrow agreements outline a detailed procedure that a user must follow to trigger
the release of the source code and further provide a procedure allowing for the challenge of the
release by the software provider. If challenged by the provider, the dispute is typically
automatically referred to arbitration or some other dispute resolution procedure for resolution.
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Banks can serve as escrow agents, but many banks are unfamiliar with the practice of
escrowing source code. There are a growing number of escrow firms that deal primarily in
software, including Lincoln-Parry Associates, Inc. at www.softescrow.com; Data Securities
International, Inc. at www.dsiescrow.com;andFortKnoxEscrowServices.Inc.at
www.fortknoxescrow.com. Many of these firms have their own escrow agreements that a user
and software provider must modify to suit their needs.
O. Termination.
The license agreement should contain standard language allowing for a termination after
a notification of breach by the non-breaching party and the passage of a reasonable period of
time to cure the breach. A user might also want to include as a default under the agreement the
repeated occurrence of problems causing downtime, even if the problems have ultimately been
remediated each time. For example, a user may want to be able to declare a default under the
agreement if within a six-month period the system malfunctions to a degree that it disrupts
business for more than a specified period of time or more than a specified number of times.
Most agreements include bankruptcy and similar events as a basis for terminating a license
agreement. Further, the breach of a maintenance agreement might trigger a breach of a license
agreement and vice versa.
If the software provider is a talented but a relatively new start-up company, the user
might consider requiring the provider to post a performance bond to better ensure the completion
of the project.
What happens upon termination should be carefully outlined out in the agreement. Does
the user receive a full or prorated refund? Does the termination trigger a release of the source
code from escrow? Can the user retain the software and engage in self-help or employ a third
party to modify it so that it is usable? The user should think through the most likely termination
scenarios and address them in the agreement.
In the current environment, users may have the technological capability to correct
problems in house or may have access to outside expertise. To the extent a user has or can hire
this capability, it should specifically negotiate for the right to correct the software through self or
third party help. If this option is not specifically provided for in the agreement, the presumption
is that the user has no right, directly or indirectly, to modify or correct the software, even when
the provider is not able to correct the problem.
The software provider should indemnify a user for any loss or expense arising out of any
claims of infringement of third-party intellectual property rights. In most cases, this clearly is
the responsibility of the provider, and indemnification in this case should not be limited. Further,
the software provider should indemnify a user for any damages caused to person or property in
relation to the negligence or other acts of any software provider employee or agent who accesses
user's property to install or maintain the software or provide training. To the extent a user
accesses the provider's property, then this indemnification should go both ways. Finally, both
r
r
r
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P. Indemnification.
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parties should indemnify the other for breaches relating to the obligation of each party to
maintain the confidentiality of the other party's confidential information.
However, with respect to indemnification due to the inadequate or failed performance of
the software, many licensors demand that certain limits apply, such as a limit on consequential
damages and a limit in damage amount to the amount paid for the software. These provisions are
becoming more common, and the argument supporting these provisions is that software
development is not a precise science and it is difficult to know in advance the full ramifications
of a certain software code. A software provider will argue that it is the user's responsibility to
test the program thoroughly, while protecting its existing programs and data, before going live
with any software program. This argument has merit; however, to the extent a user has the
negotiation leverage to obtain more protection, or a higher dollar threshold limitation, it should
certainly pursue such protections.
Other common limitations include a contractual statute of limitations, typically of one
year. Without the contractual statute of limitations, a statute of limitations of four to fifteen
years may apply. Finally, many providers limit the user's remedy upon nonperformance of
software to a repair or a replacement of the software. This, of course, is not as desirable as a
refund, and does not address the situation where the software can not be corrected, so users
should review license agreements carefully for this type of limitation.
Most of the limitations discussed above, have been held enforceable in one context or
another. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3rd 1997 (7th Cir.1996) for a case addressing the
enforceability of limitations on consequential damages and on remedies. Also, please refer to
NMP Corp. v. Parametric Technology Corp., 958 F.Supp. 1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997) for a
discussion on the enforceability of warranty periods and remedy limitations. Finally, an article
by Deborah Kemp entitled "Mass Marketed Software: The Legality of the Form License
Agreement," 48 LA. L. REv. (1987), discusses the enforceability of various provisions in the
shrink-wrap context. If such provisions are enforceable in a shrink-wrap context, it would be
difficult to argue that they would not be enforceable in the case of a negotiated license
agreement.
Counsel should keep in mind, however, that the year 2000 litigation may rewrite some of
the prior law and may provide new rules regarding or the enforceability of damage, warranty and
remedy limitations.
Q. Boilerplate.
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It is unfortunate that standard legal provisions are given the title of "boilerplate" because oJ
often those provisions offer the client some very important protections. This section of the article
briefly discusses some of these so-called "boilerplate" provisions and highlights those provisions i
that should be considered for inclusion in software license agreements for the protection of one ..
or both parties.
1. Force Majeure. Most providers will insist on a force majeure clause in the J
license agreement, which excuses the non-performance of providers in certain circumstances.
J
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From a user's perspective, the list of force majeure events should be reviewed carefully to ensure
that all listed events are applicable and appropriate, and further a user should include a clause
allowing termination even if the event is not the fault of the provider if the force majeure event
lasts over a certain period oftime, such as 30 days.
2. Insurance. It may be to the user's benefit to require that the software provider
have certain insurance, especially if the software provider will be sending its employees or
representatives on-site to user's location. In addition, the user may be able to negotiate an
indemnification amount in the case of the malfunction of the program up to the amount of
insurance coverage, and that amount could specifically override any damage limitation. In
addition, it is appropriate in some cases for the user to request to be added as an additional
insured to the provider's policy.
3. Merger Clause. From the software provider's perspective, the merger clause is a
very important provision. In some cases, the absence of this provision can be beneficial to the
user. This provision takes away any pre-agreement representations, warranties, statements and
other promises and "merges" those out of existence, with the agreement being the final statement
ofunderstanding between the parties.
4. Applicable Law. Typically, the software provider will insist that the law of its
state apply to the agreement, and the argument supporting this request is the provider's need for
consistency. The provider may sell computer software in all of the United States and maybe
throughout the world, and it needs a consistent application of law to its agreement. In most
circumstances, this is not an unreasonable position; however, a user with significant leverage
may be able to insist that the law of its state govern the agreement.
5. No Assignment. Software providers generally insist that the software program be
non-assignable. The user may want to carve out certain exceptions to that non-assignment
restriction, such as in the case of a sale of substantially all of user's assets or the line of business
to which the software applies. Further, the user may want the right to shift the software to a
related company, in case there is a reorganization of the company. Additionally, in cases where
the user has significant negotiating leverage, it may want to negotiate for certain rights upon the
sale of the software provider, such as the release of source code from escrow if the successor
company cannot perform under the license and/or maintenance agreements.
6. Jurisdiction. The software provider will usually propose that the user submit to
the jurisdiction of the software provider's home state. To the extent the user cannot win this
negotiation point, the user may want to insist on mandatory and/or permissive mediation or
arbitration.
7. Taxes, Waiver and Severability. .The Taxes, Wavier and Severability
provisions are fairly standard in a license agreement. The Taxes provision typically provides that
the user is responsible for sales or use taxes, which is appropriate. The Waiver provision
generally provides that any act of waiver by one party does not enable the beneficiary to assume
that future acts of noncompliance will be waived. The Severability clause provides that if a
particular provision of the agreement is not enforceable, it will be reduced or removed from the
agreement to allow the remainder of the agreement to be enforceable. This provision should be
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carefully drafted and perhaps limited to provide that to the extent the elimination or reduction of
the provision frustrates the essential purpose of the agreement, then the entire agreement will be
considered null and void.
R. Other Agreements.
The other agreements that have a relationship to a software license agreement include a
maintenance agreement, a software escrow agreement, a support agreement and a software
development agreement. While this article does not allow for a full discussion of each of those
agreements, many of the principles discussed earlier can be applied to a negotiation of these
agreements. With respect to the software development agreement in particular, the user and the
provider will likely negotiate a detailed schedule ofwork allowing for acceptance testing and the
making of payments as certain pre-agreed to milestones are timely achieved.
ill. Negotiating Tips and Tricks.
A. Form Agreement. One of the best ways to obtain negotiating leverage in a
software license context is the method earlier mentioned ofusing a Request for Proposal that sets
out a user's form agreement. This communicates to the software provider that it is in a
competitive environment and that it must use the RFP as a basis for negotiation.
B. The Big Rush. As in many contexts that require a negotiation of price and other
aspects of a transaction, the party selling goods routinely employs a rush tactic. The software
provider may claim that it is about to allocate resources elsewhere that otherwise would be
allocated to the user, or the provider impresses upon the user that the user must promptly
purchase the software to ensure that the user is on the cutting edge of its business, and so on.
Users and their counsel should recognize this "hurry up and buy" tactic for what it is and take all
the time necessary to negotiate an appropriate agreement and purchase appropriate software. On
the other hand, sometimes the user really is behind the eight ball, and this situation compromises
the negotiating leverage of the user.
C. Everyone Else Has Signed This Agreement. One of the most common statements
made by a software provider is that every other user has signed its form agreement. There may
be some cases where this is true, since software providers have had an advantage over users in
this cutting edge field for various reasons. Furthermore, if evidence can be presented that the
signing parties included large nationwide companies, then a user may assign some creditability
to this statement. However, in most cases, either the statement is untrue or the buyers of the
software did not involve their lawyers in the agreement negotiation process. In any case, each
user has different concerns and needs that must be addressed and that require a certain amount of
tailoring of an agreement.
D. The Stalemate. Sometimes it appears impossible that the parties will be able to
move beyond a particular point of disagreement. In such cases, it is imperative that counsel be
able to explain the full ramifications and meaning of a particular provision to a client and to draw
out from the client the client's particular concerns, so that those can be directly addressed.
Counsel should use the same principals when dealing with the other side, however, this is much
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more difficult because parties are accustomed to concealing their true motives and desires in the
contract negotiation process for fear of giving up some leverage. Getting to the bottom of a
problem sometimes involves talking directly with the decision makers of the parties and/or
getting these decision makers together. Fortunately, more often than not, when the true concerns
of a party are sincerely expressed, the parties and their counsel find some way, through
additional insurance, a performance bond, a software escrow, or some other means, to resolve the
disagreement and move on.
IV. Conclusion.
In conclusion, hopefully, this article has provided a broad overview of software license
agreements and some helpful tips for negotiating those agreements. For additional information
and guidance, I highly recommend the Allen & Davis treatise on computer contracts entitled
"Computer Contracting: A User's Guide With Forms and Strategies," published by Prentice
Hall.
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Introduction
"A whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive may be
its usages. Courts in the end must say what is required..." The T.l. Hooper,
60 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1932)(an opinion by Learned Hand).
For the ill-fated T.l. Hooper, it was whether or not to equip the tugboat with radio
receivers to warn ofapproaching storms. In today' s business environment, it is the decision
of what technology to use. One of the most powerful tools available to today's business
person (and lawyer) is the Internet, but since its birth and subsequent explosion into the
mainstream, the Internet has created a tempest oflegal debate. Ofall the issues spawned in
the tumult, perhaps those closest to the day-to-day life ofa practicing attorney are the issues
ofethics, confidentiality, and privilege. Clients have always expected speed and accuracy,
but now as more people and businesses communicate electronically, these expectations have
radically changed. To meet a client's expectations, now lawyers must be able to
communicate using e-mail and the Internet. However, there are a number of choices to be
made in the protection ofa client's privacy and confidentiality. This paper will explore some
ofthe practical issues ofusing the Internet and examine how the practical needs ofattorneys
and the demands of their clients can collide with confidentiality, privilege, and ethics.
K(a) - 1
By now, most people know that the Internet is a global network of interconnected
computers. Many people also know that the Internet is the descendant of the ARPAnet (an
acronym for Advanced Research Projects Agency). The Internet sends information through
multiple computers, using variable routing. The "routing" computers choose the most
efficient path (which may not be a straight line) to send the information based on amounts
oftraffic and other variables. This has the advantage ofachieving speed while maintaining
the maximum reliability, enabling the Internet to function even while portions ofthe network
are malfunctioning. This design is the product ofthe ARPAnet's emphasis on maintaining
communications even in the event ofa nuclear attack. The downside ofthe Internet's design
is that information passes through several hands before reaching its destination. On the way,
it can be intercepted.
After a brief introduction describing the dangers and benefits of the Internet, this
discussion will examine the attorney-client privilege and how the courts are likely to
approach the issue of waiver when communicating on the Internet or with e-mail. Part II
discusses privilege and confidentiality issues and the ethics ofon-line legal advice. On-line
advertising and solicitation issues are tackled in Part III.
Part I. Sniffers. Snoopers. Hackers. and Crackers.
All information is susceptible to theft. A letter can be opened, a phone line tapped,
a cell or cordless phone transmission received, a safe cracked. The difficulty posed by
Internet and e-mail communication is that no one is really sure how frequently interception
K(a) - 2
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occurs. Thus without all the facts, many observers with an eye to maintaining privilege and
confidentiality look for analogies in the law rather than in the facts. The most obvious and
noted analogy is that those mediums ofcommunication considered sufficiently "secure" to
maintain privileges are illegal to intercept.J Since 1986, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA") has made the interception ofelectronic communications illegal. The
ECPA also makes information gathered in violation of its provisions inadmissible as
evidence.2 However, this analogy does not truly address the ethical issues ofmaintaining a
client's confidentiality and it remains to be seen how the courts will decide the issue.
The benefits of e-mail and the Internet are substantial.3 First there is speed. From
the earliest days ofthe Internet, the U.S. Postal Service has been referred to as "snail mail,""'
and the name fits. The cost of sending information is also substantially less with e-mail.
One page via snail mail is the cost ofa first-class stamp; for about the same price, you can
send 100 pages via e-mail.5 In terms ofstorage space requirements, there is no comparison
between digital storage of information and the storage ofthousands ofpages ofdocuments.
I See ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual of Professional Conduct, Current Reports, vol. 14,256, (June 12, 1998) citing District of Columbia Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 281 (February 12,1998, released May, 15, 1998);
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515.
3 The Intemet is more than a communication device, it is a powerful source of information, sometimes even for the adverse party. See
Stevens R. Miller, Tracking Down E-mail Evidence, New York Law Journal May 18, 1998, available at http://ljx.comlsecuritynetiarticles
10518ernailev.html. For an excellent article on search engines for use by attorneys, see Hon. Jefferson Lankford, Internet Browser
search Engines, http://azbar.org/ArizonaAttomey/July98n-98d4.asp.
4 Robert L. Jones, Client Confidentiality: A Lawyer's Duties with Regard to Internet E-mail, August 16, 1995, http://www.kuesterlaw.com
/netethicslbjones.htrn#content21.
5 1d.
K(a) - 3
Further, information in digital form can be more easily searched, accessed, and reproduced.
Using e-mail is decidedly more efficient simply because the marginal time-cost of sending
a message to multiple recipients is minimal by comparison to regular mail.
The Internet also holds opportunities for visibility and marketing. A 1997 survey
conducted by the ABA found that 51 percent oflarge firms have home pages and 60 percent
ofthe remainder have plans to make one.6 A companion survey ofsmall firms found that 64
percent used the Internet- up from 38 percent the year before.
Despite its benefits, the use ofthe Internet and e-mail holds hidden dangers. To the
ends ofknowing the enemy, a brief but by no means exhaustive description of e-mail and
Internet security issues is in order. There are several names for Internet eavesdroppers,
thieves, and spies. The most commonly used name is "hacker" which generally refers to
persons intensely interested in complex computer systems who may break into a computer
system for a thrill ride through its files. "Crackers" are a more malevolent breed ofhackers
who deliberately damage or modify existing systems. Not only are these persons a threat
to the security of e-mail while it travels through the electronic no-man's-land that is the
Internet, but they may attempt to breach the security of a firm's own network.
Internet e-mail has been likened to a postcard or a calion a party line.7 E-mail
messages share several intermediate computers as they travel through the network to reach
their destinations. Another enemy ofInternet and network security are called "sniffers" who
6 ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports, vol. 14, 237 (May 27, 1998).
7 Robert l. Jones, Client Confidentiality: A Lawyer's Duties with Regard to Internet E-mail. August 16, 1995. http://www.kuester1aw.com
Inetethics Ibjones.htm#content21.
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capture the information as it passes through the intermediate computers. When computers
are connected using common "ethernet" connections, e-mail is broken down into "packets"
of information. Each packet has a label on it called a "header" telling the intermediate
routing computers where to send it, where it is from, and other information to help it on its
way. Following the header, the body of the packet consists of a portion of the e-mail
message in plain text. When the packets reach their destination, they are reassembled.
Sniffer software intercepts messages, and can even be programmed to use the address labels
to capture messages to or from a certain machine or machines.8 Intercepted packets ofdata .
stored on the sniffer's drive can be reassembled. Then the sniffer can do whatever he pleases
with your message: send it on, alter it, or simply delete it. Unless encryption is used to code
the message, the sniffer's reassembled data is in readable text form just as it was sent.9
An often overlooked threat is the internal one. Like the outside hacker or cracker
attack on a computer network, technical support staff and unscrupulous Internet service
providers can access e-mail from within. However, some of these activities are incidental
to the service they provide. JO Though internal firm security is outside the scope ofthis paper,
it is important to protect the computers from which e-mail comes ifInternet e-mail security
is to have any real meaning.JJ A confidentiality agreement should be signed by all persons
having access to a law firm's computers who are not a part of the firm.
sid.
9 The packet is in readable text form unless enaypted.
10 Jones, note 6, supra.
II For a discussion of firewalls, see Firawall FAQ, http://www.v-one.comlpubslfw-faqlfaq.htm; Thinking about Flrewalls,
ftp:/Icoasl.cs.purdue.edulpubldoclfirewalls; Routers and Firewalls, ftp:/lftp.livingston.comlpubllivingstonlfirewalllfirewall-1.1.ps.z.
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Another dangerous con game is called "spoofing." In spoofing, the victim is tricked
into thinking that he or she is in one Internet site or network, but is actually in another. The
attacker tricks the victim into making a mistaken decision that compromises his or her
system's security.J2 This can include a situation in which the victim (attorney) believes that
he is in contact with the client (spoofer). Some security measures only lead to a false sense
ofsecurity where the spoofer is concerned. For example, ifthe user employs a "secure" Web
access (using software with a Secure Sockets Layer) in the false environment, everything will
look normal. /J In fact, the user does have a secure link, only not to where he thinks he is.
In sum, whatever they are called, these various misanthropes can steal your e-mail, intercept
your litigation strategy, thumb through your confidential files, and generally wreak havoc on
all digitally stored information.
The bottom line is that the Internet is not secure. We cannot verify all users to make
sure that they are not spoofers and we cannot protect every bit of information traveling on
the Web. But, we can use encryption. It is not a cure-all to the dangers of the Internet, but
it can substantially ensure that e-mail will not be altered or destroyed as it travels through the
network.U In simple terms, encryption codes messages so that they cannot be read without
a password. Should a hacker attempt to read an encrypted file, all he will see is gibberish
12 See Albert Barsocchini's article on spoofing at http://www.ljx.comltechlasked/articl12.htm. Another excellent article is found at
http://ftp.cs.princeton.edulsiplpublspoofing.html.
l3/d.
14 Jones, note 6, supra.
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(unless he can break the code).J-' Sniffer software cannot read it, and even the header
(addresses) can be encrypted to make sniffing completely impractical.
Part II. Attorney-Client Privilege and E-mail.
A number of writers on the subject suggest that the place to begin in examining
privilege is in the criminal law./6 In the area of ethics opinions, the most influential
legislation concerning on-line communication is the federal Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA). /7 Though this lawmakes the interceptionofelectronic messages illegal
and unlawfully intercepted messages inadmissible, the effects ofthis legislation have gone
far beyond evidence issues. As mentioned above, many courts and ethics committees rely
on this law to justify the holding that there is in fact a reasonable expectation ofprivacy in
the Internet. Thus, this law impacts the area of ethics and confidentiality as well.
The law ofprivilege is diverse. In federal courts, where state law supplies the rule
ofdecision, the state's law ofprivilege governs. Otherwise, federal courts are to apply their
common law.J8 There are two fundamental bases for not finding that a communication is
privileged. The first is that there was no expectation of confidentiality in the first place,
JS For an example of encrypted text see http://www.mindspring.comJ-bobjonestpgpsampl.htm; Depending upon the complexity of the
code, breaking it could takes hours to centuries.
16 Joan C. Rogers, Ethics. Malpractice Concerns Cloud E-mail. On-line Advice, ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct.
Current Reports, vol. 12 (March 6, 1996); Albert Gidari, Privilege and Confidentiality in Cyberspace. http://www.perkinscoie.com
/resourcelecommlpriv.htm.
17 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 et seq.
18 Fed. R. Evid. 501.
K(a) -7
which can hinge on the type ofcommunication used. Secondly, the privilege can be waived,
even inadvertently. Many courts conflate these two theories, but in the context ofe-mail the
difference is important.
Ofany number ofways in which an unintended person can gain access to an e-mail
message, the two most likely are a violation ofthe ECPA, or an inadvertent disclosure by the
attorney.or client. When evidentiary issues are the only concern, a violation ofECPA makes
the communication inadmissible.19 But, the mere use ofthe Internet may amount to a finding
of non-confidentiality, defeating a claim of privilege before it begins. In the case of
inadvertent disclosure, the evidence mayor may not be admissible depending on the
jurisdiction.
Confidentiality On-line.
The initial finding of privilege requires confidentiality, which means that the
communication must not be disclosed to or made in the presence of third persons. Thus, a
conversation between an attorney and client in a crowded room, or among friends can result
in a finding that the communication was not privileged. In the context of e-mail and the
Internet, the question becomes "is the Internet confidential in the first place?" This is
19 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515. It is interesting to note that Wigmore advocated the view that privileges should not preclude testimony by
eavesdroppers. This view assens that those communications that the law of privileges are intended to protect are not discouraged by an
unknown eavesdropper. See Lawson, KENn1CKY EviDENCE LAw HANDBOOK. wI. 3, §5.05 citing 7 Wigmore, EviDENCE IN TRIALS AT CoMMON
LAw 633 (McNaughton rev. 1961). However, this argument is not as convincing where the Internet is concerned. The Internet is often
the most efficient way to communicate, but the possibility of unknown "electronic eavesdroppers" could and does have a serious chilling
effect on its use.
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determined by the existence of "a reasonable expectation ofprivacy." Again however, the
difficulty in determining how much information is snooped, sniffed, and intercepted makes
this determination anyone's guess. This leads to the issue of where the burden lies for
establishing the privilege. Without accurate information concerning security, how can the
reasonable expectation of privacy be established. Fortunately, the ECPA answers this
question in large part by making illegally intercepted communications inadmissible.20 This
is in accord with other authority to the effect that stolen documents retain their privileged
status.22
There is some judicial guidance on the subject ofe-mail expectations in the context
of internal networks and for semi-public commercial networks.21 In both instances, a
reasonable expectation ofprivacy was found to protect the communication. However, the
use of Internet e-mail,whichisdecidedly less secure, remains an undecided issue. An
analogous medium in terms of security is the cellular phone. In a private action brought
under the ECPA for the interception of a cellular phone conversation between an attorney
and his client, a federal court found no violation ofthe ECPA.22 Though this was a private
action and the court did not reach the waiver issue, the court's reasoning (that there was no
expectation ofconfidentiality) indicates that waiver would have been found or alternatively
that the privilege never would have attached. However, the court emphasized the fact that
20 18 U.S.CA § 2515.
21 U.S. v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 903 F.Supp. 803 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (a CERCLA case in which e-mail records were subject to
discovery only after an inadvertent waiver); U.S. v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (USAF Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (semi-private commercial network
such as America Online, or CompuServe).
22 Edwards v. Bardwell, 632, F.Supp. 584 (M.D.La. 1986).
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cell phones use radio waves broadcast in all directions; this is an important factual difference
between a cell phone and the Internet.
Because confidentiality must be maintained continuously to maintain the attorney-
client privilege, the same "expectation ofprivacy" question is asked when determining ifthe
later use of the Internet is a waiver of the privilege. Here, the ECPA does not give a direct
answer. However, in ethics opinions it has become particularly influential. Most
jurisdictions now state that encryption is unnecessary, and the Internet is expected to be
private. However, some bar associations strongly suggest encryption, and most agree that
it is necessary in the case ofespecially sensitive documents. The recent trend is toward not
requiring any sort ofprotection when using e-mail.23
Ofcourse, every client thinks that his or her confidentiality is ofcrucial importance.
Those states noted as adhering to the minority rule requiring encryption to avoid a breach of
confidentiality include: Colorado, Iowa, and North Carolina.24 In these states however,
informed written consent ofthe client can waive this requirement. However, it is unclear if
this sort of waiver of the· requirement would also amount to a waiver of privilege or an
acknowledgment ofnon-confidentiality.
Inadvertence:
The inadvertent e-mailing ofprivileged materials to an adverse party will likely be
governed by the same law as any other inadvertent disclosure. Though the law varies
23 ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct. Current Reports, vol. 14. 256 (June 10. 1998).
24 ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct. Current Reports, vol. 13.316 (October 15. 1997).
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significantly by jurisdiction, there are three major schools of thought on the issue of
inadvertent waiver: the lenient approach, the middle-of-the-road (Hydraflow), and the strict
approach.25 The lenient approach applies the theory that waiver must be knowingly made.26
Since the client holds the privilege, it is inequitable to waive his privilege through the
carelessness ofhis attorney.
The strict approach has the benefit of avoiding litigation of the issue by a strict
adherence to the principle that inadvertent waiver is effective as to the document actually
revealed as well as all related documents.27 The justification of this theory is that the
importance of the document is determined by the care used to protect it.
The middle approach assesses five factors to determine the presence or absence of
a waiver. The factors are: the reasonableness of the precautions taken, the number of
inadvertent disclosures, the extent ofthe disclosures, the promptness ofremedial measures,
and the overriding interest ofjustice.28 At the court's discretion, the waiver, iffound, may
be extended to the related but unrevealed documents.29
In most states, the lawyer is expected to refrain from examining materials if they
clearly appear to be intended for another.30 The ABA further warns that though the attorney
2S Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1996).
26 1d..
27 In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
28 Gray. at 1484.
29 1d.
30 ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual of Professional Conduct, Opinion E-374 (Kentucky), Nov. 19951001:3905,41. See a/soABAlBNA
Lawyer's Manual of Professional Conduct, Opinion 90 (Colorado), 1001:1902, Nov. 14, 1992.34
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should not be disciplined for use pursuant to a bona fide good faith beliefthat the privilege
has been waived, he or she risks exclusion of the evidence as well as disqualification.31
Some issues are best avoided. Waiver through inadvertence is one ofthem. So many
attorneys find it advisable to obtain informed client consent to use e-mail even in those
jurisdictions in which it is not required. There are difficulties in even this simple solution.
First, it is unresolved if this waiver amounts to a waiver ofprivilege, particularly in those
minority states requiring written consent. Secondly, there may be a continuing duty to update
the client as to changes in the law. Since the law is uncertain and changing this could prove
burdensome. A confidentiality cover sheet on all e-mail, much like what is standard on fax
transmissions is another option, though it mayor may not be effective to avoid a waiver in
the accidental disclosure situation. Encryption is another option, but it too has costs. There
are some monetary costs in its purchase and time costs in its use. Also, a warning to those
attorneys who travel abroad with their laptop computer - traveling out ofthe country with a
laptop equipped with encryption software may be illegal.3Z
The following is a brief description of four representative states' approaches to
Internet communication. Note the irony that some authorities state that especially sensitive
materials may require encryption. This in essence bases the finding ofconfidentiality on the
content of the message, not the context in which it is made.
31 /d.
32 Codes and code-breaking were crucial to our victory in World War II. and now encryption products are still classified as "munitions."
See George N. Grammas and Usa M. Solir, Traveling with e L8ptop May Land You in Trouble, The National Law Journal C01 (Feb. 2,
1998) available at http://www.ljx.comlsecurityneUarticles.0202laptop.html. See elsa, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 and 22 CPR § 123.1. 22 U.S.C. §
2778(c) provides for criminal sanctions for a willful violation of the expon laws and regulations.
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ARIZONA:33
The Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of Profession~Conduct has strongly
cautioned attorneys of the dangers of Internet use.34 A confidentiality statement at a
minimum is required. This should read similarly to the standard fax cover sheet. Encryption
is also mentioned as a possible opinion, but it is not required.
KENTUCKy:35
Kentucky has recently adopted what might be called the majority rule except that
Ethic Op E-403 strongly favors Illinois Opinion 96-10 (1997) and incorporates it as an
appendix. This Illinois opinion analogizes the Internet to land-based telephone
communications, to the point of stating "a home page is the functional equivalent of a
'yellow pages' entry." Though this means that e-mail need not be encrypted except in
"unusual circumstances," it may overstate the security of the Internet.36
33 See ABAIBNA Lawyers' manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports, vol. 13, 125 (May 14,1997), for a synopsis of Arizona
State Bar Committee on Rule of Professional Conduct, Opinion 97-Q4, (April 7, 1997).
34/d.
BKy. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. E-403.
36 This analogy does have the interesting effect of tuming an impersonal, even anonymous chat room conversation into a telephone call.
This strongly suggests the formation of an attomey-client relationship. The Illinois opinion states that participation in an on-line service
involving the giving of "personalized legal advice" leads to the recipient becoming the attomey's client.
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PENNSYLVANIA:37
An attorney must take appropriate measures to guard the confidentiality ofthe client.
Extraordinary measures are not required for ordinary messages. Tighter security is required
only when the circumstances demand it, encryption is not required for most communications.
The attorney fulfills his or her obligations if the client consents after being informed ofthe
risks by the attorney.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:38
The District of Columbia attorney is not required to encrypt e-mail to comply with
Model Rule 1.6 governing confidentiality. Citing the fact that the balance ofauthorities find
the e-mail is acceptable and the ECPA, the D.C. Ethics Committee finds that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the Internet. Thus, encryption is unnecessary except
in the presence of "special factors" which require it. These factors would include
extraordinary sensitivity ofthe materials or other circumstances demanding higher security.
37 Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Responsibility 97-130 (Sept. 26.1997). acknowledging the lack of consensus on the
dangers of unencrypted e-mail.
38 ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual ofProfessional Conduct, Current Repons, vol. 14.256, (June 12. 1998) citing District ofColumbia Bar Legal Ethics
Comm.,Op. 281 (Febnwy 12. 1998. released May. IS. 1998).
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Part III. Advertising and Solicitation.
The consensus on Internet advertising is that it must conform to the applicable rules
regarding the use of public media.39 The rules vary by jurisdiction, but there are some key
considerations to consider before advertising on the Internet or giving on-line advice.
First, avoid the unauthorized practice of law. The Internet makes distance
unimportant, and in the process attorneys may forget that they are not licensed everywhere.
A strong disclaimer clearly identifying the license limitations ofa firm should be used on any
web page.40 Whatever is said regarding areas ofpractice and licensing must also conform
to the Rules and any mandatory disclosures must be made.4/ A related consideration is that
the rules regarding solicitation. Recently, a massive e-mail solicitation lead to the suspension
of a Tennessee attorney.42 However, in at least one instance, an unsolicited posting on
Internet news groups advertising for two immigration attorneys went unpunished.42
Another consideration is that an on-line contact can lead to the inadvertent formation
39 See ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports, vol. 13, 125, discussing Az. State Bar Comm. on Rules of
Prof. Conduct, Op.. 97.Q4 (April 7, 1997); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Responsibility, Informal Op. 96-17 (May 3,
1996), 1996 WL 928126; See also, Jefferey R. Kuester, Altomey Sites Can Avoid VIOlations of Ethics Rules, 18 Special to the Nat') L.
J. B11, (August 12, 1996) available at http://www.computerbar.orglnetethicslnlj.htm.
40 See Pa. Op. 96-17,/d. For sample disclaimers visit; http;//www.brobeck.com(Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison); or http://www.anderson
kill .com (Anderson, Kill &Olick).
41 See ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports, YOI. 12,314 (Sept. 18, 1996) discussing Iowa Supreme
Ct Brc! of Prof. Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 96-1 (Aug. 29,1996).
42 Joan C. Rogers, How do Advertising Rules Apply to Lawyers on the 'Net, ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,
Current Reports, YOI. 12, 37. Unsolicited advertising is a breach of on-line etiquette, called netiquette.
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ofan attorney client relationship with all its attendant duties and responsibilities. This can
lead to malpractice liability. It should also be noted that attorney client privilege can attach
to prospective clients as well as actual ones.43 This can pose difficulties in the anonymous
on-line world. Some ethics committees advise that before answering questions in a chat
room an attorney should inquire if the recipient is represented.44
There are some ethics opinions permitting lawyer referral services so long as they are
not misleading.4s Further, links between a client's home page and the attorney's are
permissible so long as the attorney did not ask for it and the client is not compensated for it.46
An attorney or law fIrm may list clients on its own web page so long as it obtains prior
written consent.47
Part IV. Conclusion.
Traditional rules on advertising and solicitation can answer most of the questions
associated with web pages, e-mail soliciting, and on-line referral services. But answers are
43 Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, (Ky. 1997) citing Ky. R. Evid. 503(a)(1).
44 Peter Krakaur, the Ethics of Giving Casual Legal Advice On-line, The Internet Newsletter, hltp:llwww.ljx.comlnewsletterslintemet
45 ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Condud, Current Reports, vol. 13,42 (March 5,1997); Note however, that for-profrt
referrSl services are not permitted: ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Condud, Ethics Opinions 1991-1995,1001-3901,
Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. E-344 (March 1991); other slates require that the referral service be approved, Slate Bar of
Arizona, Bar Comm. on Rules of Prof. Condud, Op. 98-03, (January 1998).
46 ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Condud, Current Reports, vol. 13, 235, (Aug. 6, 1997) discussing Cincinnati Bar Ass.
Ethics and Prof. Responsibility Comm., Op. 96-97-01.
47/d.
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not so easy concerning the use of the Internet as a communications tool. This lack of
concrete answers makes the most frequently asked question"should I encrypt?" Because the
mere use ofInternet e-mail may lead to a waiver of the attorney client privilege on matters
involved in the on-line communication, one is well advised to inform clients ofthe dangers
and at the very least offer the option of encryption. Though opinions vary on the issue of
whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the Internet, and
whether or not there is an ethical duty to protect a client's confidence with encryption,
attorneys owe it to their clients to minimize the risks of litigating additional issues.
Encryption can prevent the inadvertent disclosure problem; it can avoid disputes over
privilege; it can minimize the risks ofspoofing. On the whole, saving the time and expense
of litigation and giving clients additional security may simply make encryption the best
option.
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INTERNET/E-MAIL PRIVACY ISSUES;
ENCRYPTION; ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE
CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
Presented By:
David J. Beyer
Chief Division Counsel
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Louisville, Kentucky
J. Introduction
The tremendous expansion in the use of computers, E-mail, and the Internet by
individuals, businesses, governmental entities has created a plethora of complex legal
issues for lawyers, courts and law enforcement agencies who seek to apply existing
statutory and caselaw to rapidly changing technology. Congress has been in the
forefront of enacting laws to address many of the emerging issues. The courts are
beginning to define the hazy contours of this embryotic area of the law. Meanwhile
legal scholars, privacy rights advocates and law enforcement agencies have begun to
grapple with the competing interests of public safety and privacy of electronic
communications.
II. Privacy and U.S. Constitutional Protections
A. Generally
1. Right of Privacy not specifically mentioned
2. Found within the penumbras See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)
3. Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy
to some degree. The question in each case is whether that
K(b) - 1
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C.
.1
..J
interference violates a command of the United States Constitution. ..J
First Amendment - Imposes limitations upon govemmental abridgment of
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. NAACP v. State
of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
Third Amendment - Prohibition against the unconsented peacetime
quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of privacy from
D.
govemmental intrusion. Katz v. U.S. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)
Fourth Amendment - "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated...."
.J
.J
1.
2.
3.
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of govemmental intrusion,
but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. at 350
Fourth Amendment protects those items or areas where a
reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) exists. Katz
REP does not extent to areas a person knowingly opens to public
access. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)
J
.1..
a. Computer "banner" inviting all but law enforcement agents to
use a system is unlikely to be considered sufficient to create
REP;
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b. .cf Consent - Business computer network banner that states
information on system is not considered private and use of
system constitutes consent of system operator to review any
information on the system. See Bumpers v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968)
E. Fifth Amendment - Reflects the Constitution's concern for the right of
each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. See
Tehan v. United States ex reI. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966)
III. Privacy and Statutory Protections
A. Privacy Protection Act - 42 U.S.C. §2000aa
1. Result of Supreme Court decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978) - Use of search warrant permitted on both non-
suspect third parties and the media.
2. Purpose of statute is to limit searches for materials held by persons
involved in First Amendment activities who are themselves not
suspected of participation in criminal activity.
3. Not to limit ability of law enforcement to search for and seize
materials held by those suspected of committing crimes.
See S. Rep. No. 874, 96th Congo 2d Sess. 4 (1980)
B. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 (Title III) -18 U.S.C. 2510 - 2522
1. Generally prohibits the interception of wire, oral or electronic
communications unless one party to communication provides
consent.
K(b) - 3
2. Applies to communications in transit - not applicable stored to
communications.
,J
3. Government must obtain court order to intercept.
a. Requires showing of probable cause that:
(1) Crime has been, is being, or is about to be
committed:
(2) Facility being used to discuss same; and
(3) Other investigative techniques have been tried and
failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed or too
dangerous. See 18 U.S.C. 2518
J
J
~
.J
J
C. Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices -18 U.S.C. 3121 - 3127
1.
2.
3.
Pen Register - Records electronic impulses produced when phone
is dialed.
Trap and Trace - Captures incoming electronic impulses which
identify originating number of person calling.
Both require court order authorizing installation upon showing of
relevancy to ongoing criminal investigation.
,
J
D. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications -18 U.S.C. 2701 - 2711
1. Prohibits public electronic communication services and public
remote computing services from disclosing contents of any
Exceptions -
communication maintained by the service.
2.
a. May disclose to addressee or intended recipient; or
K(b) - 4
.J
..
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1 Government may request court to permit delayed notice.
b.
1030 (a)(1) - Prohibits knowingly accessing a computer without
authorization or exceeding authorization and obtaining national
defense or foreign relation information [1 st offense - 10 years;
2nd offense - 20 years].
1030 (a)(2) - Prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without
3.
4.
2.
b. Consent of originator or addressee.
Governmental Access -18 U.S.C. 2703
a. Contents of electronic communication in electronic storage
(1) 180 days or less - Search warrant (probable cause)
(2) More than 180 days -
(a) Search warrant - no notice required
(b) Subpoena - notice required1
(c) Court order - notice required
Contents of electronic communication in a remote computing
service - Same as a.(2) above.
Congress did not intend for "intercept" in Federal Wiretap Act to
apply to "electronic communication" when those communications
are in "electronic storage." Steve Jackson Games. Inc. v. United
States Secret Service, 36 F. 3d 457 (1994)
Computer Crimes
A. Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers -18 U.S.C.
1030
1.
IV.
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authorization or exceeding authorization and obtaining information
from:
a. A financial institution;
J
j
J
b.
c.
Department or Agency of United States; or
Any computer if conduct involved interstate communication
[1 st offense -1 year, but if for commercial advantage or
private gain, then 5 years; 2nd offense - 10 years].
I
.J
3. 1030 (a)4 - Prohibits knowingly and with the intent to defraud,
accessing a computer without authorization or exceedingly
authorization and by such conduct obtains anything with value of
$5,000 or more [1 st offense - 5 years; 2nd offense -10 years].
J
J
J
4. 1030(a)(5) - Prohibits knowingly causing the transmission of a
program, code or command which causes damage to a computer
[1 st offense up to 5 years; 2nd offense - 10 years]. J
5.
6.
1030(a)(6) - Prohibits trafficking in password or other information
through which a computer may be accessed [1 st offense - 1 year;
2nd offense - 10 years].
1030(a)(7) - Prohibits transmitting in interstate commerce any
threat to cause damage to a computer with the intent to extort
[1 st offense - 5 years; 2nd offense - 10 years].
i
oJ
j
J
J
B. Fraud by Wire -18 U.S.C. 1343
1. Prohibits devising a scheme to defraud or for obtaining property by
means of false pretenses and transmiting or causing to be
K(b) - 6
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transmitted any communication in interstate commerce for the
purpose of executing the scheme [Penalty fine + 5 years; if scheme
involves financial institution - up to 30 years and $1 million fine].
C. Internet and Sexual Exploitation of Children - 18 U.S.C. 2251
1. Prohibit inducing or coercing a minor to be transported in interstate
commerce with the intent to engage in sexual conduct for the
purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct [1 st offense
10-20 years; 2nd offense 15-30 years; 3rd offense 30 - life; if death
results - death penalty may be imposed].
D. Material Involving Sexual Exploitation of Children -18 U.S.C. 2252
1. Prohibits person from knowingly transporting in interstate
commerce, including by computer, any visual depiction involving
the use of a minor enaging in sexual conduct [1 st offense up to 15
years; if prior convictions, then no less than 5 years up to 30 years].
E. Trafficking in Copies of Computer Programs -18 U.S.C. 2318
1. Prohibits knowingly trafficking via interstate commerce in a copy of
a computer program or documentation or packaging for a computer
program [5 years + fine].
Encryption Issues
A. Balancing of Interest
1. Commercial and personal privacy interest
2. Public Safety and National Security
B. Need for encryption
K(b) - 7
E. Pending Legislation
C.
D.
Maintaining status quo
Recent examples J
VI. Additional resources .J
A.
B.
C.
"Computer Crimes," 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev 409 (1997)
"Old Wine in New Bottles: Cyberspace and the Criminal Law", 41 Jun B.
B.J. 12 (1994)
"Computer Crime," 45 Emory L.J. 931 (1996)
J
J
I
;...
D. "Computer Crime; Law Enforcement's Shift from a Corporeal Environment
to the Intangible, Electronic World of Cyberspace,· 41 Fed. B. News & J.
489, 494 (1994)
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Ethical Issues Raised by the Use ofE-mail in the Practice of Law in
Kentucky
Kurt X. Metzmeier
University of Kentucky College of Law
May 7, 1999
Why Use E-mail?
• More efficient than a fonn letter
• Provides more documentation than a phone call
• Clients will increasingly demand that lawyers use e-mail keep them abreast of their
cases.
Client Confidentiality: Issues
• Encryption
• Inadvertent Disclosure
• Malicious or Negligent Disclosure by Non-lawyer Assistants
Encryption
• Not required (KBA E-403) "unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security
measures"
Encryption
• Should be considered for highly sensitive communications
• PGP -- Difficult to configure
• Encryption ofattached documents easier solution
• Microsoft Word & Corel Word Perfect [see Appendix TIl]
Inadvertent Disclosure
• Mis-addressed e-mail far more serious likelihood than interception
• Prevention:
• Avoid vague "nicknames"
• Use warning/disclaimer
Inadvertent Disclosure: Sample Warning Disclaimer [See Appendix ll.l]
This e-mail message, together with any attachments, is intended only for the personal and
confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client
communication and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that
any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited.
If you have received this message in error, please notify us immediately ... and delete the
message from your computer.
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Disclosure by Nonlawyer Assistants
• Computer security experts agree that the most serious risk for disclosure of
confidential communications is through employee misconduct
• The most famous disclosure ofclient information in Kentucky, the Brown &
Williamson case, occurred this way (though without computers)
Disclosure by Nonlawyer Assistants
• KRPC 5.3 requires that lawyers supervising nonlawyers "employed or retained by or
associated with" a law practice have "in effect measures giving reasonable assurance"
that these employees uphold the KRPC.
• Supervising attorneys have an ethical obligation to assure that computing and
networking stafT are trained as to the obligations of the KRPC, especially those
relating to client communications
Disclosure by Nonlawyer Assistants: Preventative measures for nonlawyer
employees including information systems stafT
• Employee orientation
• Employee manuals [Appendix 11.2]
• Computer use policies (for all employees) [Appendix 1l.3]
Disclosure by Nonlawyer Assistants: Preventative measures for contract employees
and consultants
• Choosing reputable consultants with strong references
• Contraetuallanguage incorporating confidentiality assurances
Solicitation & Advertising
• "Unless the lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to direct
messages to a specific recipient [in which case the rules governing..solicitation would
apply] only the general rules governing communications regarding a lawyer's services
and advertising [KRPCs 7.10, 7.20, and the so-called advertising rules set forth at
KRPCs 7.01-7.08] should apply... " (KBAE-403)
Solicitation Issues
• Mass mailings (Spam)
• Lawyer participation in listservs
• Lawyer participation in "chat rooms"
Spam
• Unsolicited commercial e-mail
• Disliked by both e-mail users and Internet Service Providers (ISP's)
• CompuServe has successfully sued commercial e-mailers under theory that they
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abused computer facilities owned by the ISP
Spam & the KRPC
Shapero v. KBA, 486 US 466 (1986)
• KRPC 7.30 bars all solicitation when
• (2)(a) client makes desire known that he or she does not want it
• (2)(b) it involves coercion, duress or harassment
• (3) Written solicitation must follow 7.10 advertising rules
• By using what the Internet community considers in an abusive and harassive means
of communications, legal services solicitation by spam appears to fall outside the
spirit of the KRPC as "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice."
(KRPC 8.4(e».
• Tennessee in In Re Canter, No. 95-831-0-H (2-25-1997) suspended an attorney for
one year under this theory, citing DR 1-102(A)(5), which is analogous to KRPC
8.4(e). But see NYSBA Ethics Opinion 709 (9-16-1998).
Listservs
• Listserv is a server that distributes e-mails to. all list members
• Members post public messages to entire list
• Only limited anonymity
• Very valuable toolfor keeping up on breaking developments
Listservs
• The participation of lawyers on listservs raise a number of issues:
• Solicitation
• Inadvertent creation of an attorney-client relationship
• Unauthorized practice of law (in jurisdictions where they are not licensed)
Listservs: Solicitation
• KRPC 7.02(1)(t) states that: "Any communication by a lawyer to third parties that is
published or broadcast by a third party who is not in any way controlled by the
lawyer, and for which publication or broadcast the lawyer pays no consideration, shall .
be exempt from all the provisions of these Rules except Rule 7.10 [barring "false,
deceptive or misleading" information]."
• The participation by lawyers on listservs maintained by third parties is consistent with
KRPC 7.02(1)(t) and KBA opinions regarding appearances by lawyers on radio and
TV programs (KBA E-50, E-270).
Listservs: Establishment of an Attorney-Client Relations
• Will tum on what the "client" reasonably perceives
• Lawyers should be wary of seeming to respond to specific questions
Listservs: Avoiding the Establishment of an Attorney-Client Relations
• Include disclaimer in signature line [Appendix ll.4]
L - 3
• Lawyers should avoid going "off-list" to discuss specific problems
• Seek out "lawyer's only lists"
• Avoid lists where non-lawyers tend to trade in bad legal advice
Chat Rooms
• Forums for anonymous, real-time discussion
• Regularly exercised option to take public discussions private
• Hosted by users ISP (traditionally AOL strength) or by free websites like Yahoo!
• While none ofthe published state opinions on the use ofe-mail specifically bar
attorney's from participating (as lawyers) in chat rooms, the atmosphere ofanonymity
and privacy intensifies the dangers suggested for listserv participation.
Suggested Reading
• Peter Krakaur's www.legalethies.eom
• Paul D. Shaw, Managing Legal and Security Risks in Computing (1998)
• David J. leove, Computer Crime: A Crime Fighters Handbook (1995)
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Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix ill:
Appendix IV:
Appendix V:
KBAE-403
Sample Forms
Password Protection Of Microsoft Word
And Corel Word Perfect Documents
Kurt Metzmeier & Shawn Esposito, How to Avoid
Losing Your License on the Information
Superhighway: Ethical Issues Raised by the Use ofthe
Internet in The Practice ofLaw
(Kentucky Bench & Bar, Spring 1998)
Web-Site Listing - Addendum To Metzmeier &
Esposito, How to Avoid Losing Your License on
the Information Superhighway: Ethical Issues
Raised by the Use ofthe Internet in the Practice
OfLaw (Kentucky Bench & Bar, Spring 1998)
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APPENDIX I KBA E-403
KBAE-403
Question 1:
Maya lawyer use electronic mail services including the Internet to communicate with
clients without encryption?
Answer:
Yes, unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures.
Question 2:
Is the creation and use by a lawyer ofan Internet "web site" containing information about
the lawyer and the lawyer's services that may be accessed by Internet users, including
prospective clients, a communication falling within KRPCs 7.09 [Prohibited Solicitation]
or 7.30 [Direct Contact With Prospective Client]?
Answer:
Qualified No. Unless the lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to direct
messages to a specific recipient [in which case the rules governin!tsolicitation would
apply] only the general rules governing communications regarding a lawyer's services
and advertising [KRPCs 7.10, 7.20, and the so-called advertising rules set forth at KRPCs
7.01-7.08] should apply to a lawyer's "web-site" on the Internet.
References: Illinois Op. 96- 10 (1997); Kurt Metzmeier & Shaun Esposito, How to Avoid
Losing Your License on the Information Superhighway: Ethical Issues Raised by the Use
of the Internet in The Practice ofLaw (Kentucky Bench & Bar, Spring 1998).
OPINION
Despite widespread use of the Internet, the Committee has received few inquiries
regarding its use. Still, the Committee is of the view that this opinion should be issued to
provide some guidance and some comfort. The subject is addressed in a recent article
cited in the references, which is available from the UK Law Library, and which has been
submitted for publication in the Bench & Bar.
The Committee finds persuasive the comprehensive and thoughtful opinion ofthe Illinois
State Bar Association, ISBA Advisory Opinion No. 96-10, excerpts ofwhich we attach as
an Appendix.
APPENDIX
ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ISBA Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct
Opinion No. 96-10
May 16, 1997
Topic: Electronic communications; confidentiality of client information; advertising and
solicitation.
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Digest: Lawyers may use electronic mail services, including the Internet, without
encryption to communicate with clients unless unusual circumstances require enhanced
security measures. The creation and use by a lawyer ofan Internet "web site" containing
information about the lawyer and the lawyers services that may be accessed by Internet
users, including prospective clients, is not "communication directed to a specific
recipient" within the meaning of the rules, and therefore only the general rules governing
communications concerning a lawyer's services and advertising should apply to a lawyer
"web site" on the Internet. Ifa lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to
direct messages to specific recipients, then the rules regarding solicitation would apply.
Ref.: Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rules 1.6, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4
ISBA Opinion Nos. 90-07 and 94-11
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC §251O, et seq.
QUESTIONS
The Committee has received various inquiries regarding ethical issues raised by use of
electronic means ofcommunication, including electronic mail and the "Internet," by
lawyers. These inquiries usually involve two general areas ofconcern. The first is
whether electronic mail may be used to communicate with clients regarding client matters
in view ofa lawyer's duty under the ethics rules to maintain the confidentiality ofclient
information. The second is whether the creation and use ofa "web site" and other forms
ofcontract with prospective clients may be conducted by lawyers on the Internet, and if
so, whether the rules regarding "in person" solicitation should apply to such contact.
Because of the technical nature of the discussion, the Committee will use the following
commonly accepted definitions in this opinion. The Internet is a super network of
computers that links together individual computers and computer networks located at
academic, commercial, government and military sites worldwide, generally by ordinary
local telephone lines and long-distance transmission facilities. Communications between
computers or individual networks on the Internet are achieved throughout he use of
standard, nonproprietary protocols.
Electronic mail, commonly known as e-mail, is an electronic message that is sent from
one computer to another, usually through a host computer on a network. E-mail messages
can be sent through a private or local area network (within a single firm or organization),
through an electronic mail service (such as America Online, CompuServ or MCI Mail),
over the Internet, or through any combination ofthese methods.
A bulletin board service (sometimes called a "BBS") is an electronic bulletin board on a
network where electronic messages may be posted and browsed by users or delivered to
e-mail boxes. A "newsgroup" is a type ofbulletin board service in which users can
exchange information on a particular subject. A "chat" group is a simultaneous or "real
time" bulletin board or newsgroup among users who send their questions or comments
over the Internet.
The World Wide Web is that part of the Internet consisting of computer files written in a
particular format (the "HTML" format) that includes "hyperlinks" (text or symbols that
the user may click on to switch immediately to the item identified) as well as graphics
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and sound, to enable the creation of complex messages. A "horne page" is a computer file
containing text and graphics in the HTML format usually continuing information about
its owner, which can be obtained over the Internet and viewed by transmitting it from the
owner's computer to the user's terminal. A "web site" is a set ofcomputer files containing
text and graphics in the HTML format and organized around a central horne page.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC §2510, et seq. (the "ECPA"), is the
federal codification ofthe intrusion arm ofthe common law tort of invasion ofprivacy
applied to electronic communication and provides criminal and civil penalties for its
violation. The ECPA is actually the 1986 revision ofthe federal wiretap statute originally
enacted in 1968, but the term ECPA is now commonly used to refer to the entire statute,
as amended.
OPINION
The first issue, whether a lawyer may use electronic mail services including the Internet
to communicate with clients, arises out of a lawyer's duty to protect confidential client
information. Rule 1.6(a) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct provides that "...a
lawyer shall not, during or after termination of the professional relationship with the
client, use or reveal a confidence or secret of the client known to the lawyer unless the
client consents after disclosure." AS the Terminology provisions ofthe Rules state, the
information a lawyer must protect includes information covered by the lawyer-client
privilege (a "confidence") as well as information that the client wishes to be held
inviolate or the revelation ofwhich would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client (a
"secret").
The duty to maintain the confidentiality ofclient information implies the duty to use
methods ofcommunication with clients that provide reasonable assurance that messages
will be and remain confidential. For that reason, the Committee concluded in Opinion
No. 90-07 (November 1990) that a lawyer should not use cordless or other mobile
telephones that were easily susceptible to interception when discussing confidential client
matters. The Committee also opined that a lawyer conversing with a client over a
cordless or mobile telephone should advise the client of the risk ofthe loss of
confidentiality.
With the increased use ofelectronic mail, particularly electronic mail transmitted over the
Internet, have come suggestions that electronic messages are not sufficiently secure to be
used by lawyers communicating with clients. At least two state ethics opinions have
concluded that because it is possible for Internet or other electronic mail service
providers to intercept electronic mail service providers to intercept electronic mail
messages, lawyers should not use electronic mail for "sensitive" client communications
unless the messages were encrypted or the client expressly consented to "non-secure"
communication. South Carolina Bar Advisory Opinion 94-27 (January 1995); Iowa
Supreme Court Board ofProfessional Ethics and Conduct Opinion 96-1 (August 29,
1996). After reviewing much ofthe available literature on this issue, the Committee
disagrees with these opinions.
L-9
Among the numerous recent articles regarding a lawyer's use ofelectronic mail, the
Committee found three to be particularly useful and informative. These are: Joan C.
Rogers, "Malpractice Concerns Cloud E-Mail, On-Line Advice," ABAIBNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct (March 6, 1996); Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam,
"High-Tech Ethics and Malpractice Issues," 1996 Symposium Issue of the Professional
Lawyer, p. 51 (1996); David Hricik, "Confidentiality and Privilege in High-Tech
Communications," 8 Professional Lawyer, p. 1 (February 1997). From these and other
authorities, there is a clear consensus on two critical points. First, although interception of
electronic messages is possible, it is certainly no less difficult than intercepting an
ordinary telephone call. Second, intercepting an electronic mail message is illegal under
the ECPA.
Courts and ethics committees have uniformly held that persons using ordinary telephones
for confidential communications have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy. The three
common types ofelectronic mail messages appear no less secure. For example, electronic
messages that are carried on a local area or private network may only be accessed from
within the organization owning the network. Such messages would therefore clearly
appear subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Other electronic messages are carried by commercial electronic mail services or networks
such as America Online, CompuServ or MCI Mail. Typically, these services transmit e-
mail messages from one subscriber's computer to another computer "mailbox" over a
proprietary telephone network. Typically, the computer mailboxes involved are
password-protected. Because it is possible for dishonest or careless personnel of the mail
service provider to intercept or misdirect a message, this form ofelectronic mail is
arguably less secure than messages sent over a private network. AS a practical matter,
however, any ordinary telephone call may also be intercepted or misdirected by dishonest
or careless employees of the telephone service provider. Again, this possibility has not
compromised the reasonable expectation of privacy ofordinary telephone users. The
result should be the same for electronic mail service subscribers.
The third type ofelectronic mail, that carried on the Internet, typically travels in another
fashion. Rather than moving directly from the sender's host computer to the recipient's
host computer, Internet messages are usually broken into separate "packets" ofdata that
are transmitted individually and then re-assembled into a complete message at the
recipient's host computer. Along the way, the packets travel through, and may be stored
temporarily in, one or more other computers (called "routers") operated by third parties
(usually called an "internet service provider" or "ISP") that help distribute electronic mail
over the Internet.
Unlike a cordless cellular telephone message, for example, an Internet e-mail is not
broadcast over the open air waves, but through ordinary telephone lines and the
intermediate computers. When an Internet message is transmitted over an ordinary
telephone line, it is subject to the same protections and difficulties of interception as an
ordinary telephone call. To intercept an Internet communication while it is in transit over
telephone lines requires an illegal wiretap.
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Consequently, the real distinction between an Internet electronic message and an ordinary
telephone call is that Internet messages may be temporarily stored in, and so can be
accessed through, a router maintained by an ISP. It is possible that an employee ofan ISP
(as part of the maintenance of the router) could lawfully monitor the router and thereby
read part or all ofa confidential message. As in the case of telephone and proprietary
electronic mail providers, it is also possible for dishonest employees ofan ISP to
intercept messages unlawfully. The Committee does not believe that the opportunity for
illegal interception by personnel ofan ISP makes it unreasonable to expect privacy of the
message.
As noted above, it is also clear that unauthorized interception of an Internet message is a
violation of the ECPA, which was amended in 1986 to extend the criminal wiretapping
laws to cover Internet transmissions. As part of the 1986 amendments, Congress also
treated the issue of privilege in 18 USCA §2517(4), as follows:
No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in
accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions ofthis chapter shall lose its privileged
character.
This provision demonstrates that Congress intended that Internet messages should be
considered privileged communications just as ordinary telephone calls.
In summary, the Committee concludes that because (1) the expectation of privacy for
electronic mail is no less reasonable than the expectation of privacy for ordinary
telephone calls, and (2) the unauthorized interception ofan electronic message subject to
the ECPA is illegal, a lawyer does not violate Rule 1.6 by communicating with a client
using electronic mail services, including the Internet, without encryption. Nor is it
necessary, as some commentators have suggested, to seek specific client consent to the
use ofunencrypted e-mail. The Committee recognizes that there may be unusual
circumstances involving an extraordinarily sensitive matter that might require enhanced
security measures like encryption. These situations would, however, be of the nature that
ordinary telephones and other normal means ofcommunication would also be deemed
inadequate.
With respect to the second general issue, the extent to which a lawyer may use Internet
web site to communicate with clients and prospective clients, the Committee believes that
the existing Rules ofProfessional Conduct governing advertising, solicitation and
communication concerning a lawyer's services provide adequate and appropriate
guidance to a lawyer using the Internet. For example, the Committee views an Internet
home page as the electronic equivalent ofa telephone directory "yellow pages" entry and
other material included in the web site to be the functional equivalent of the firm
brochures and similar materials that lawyers commonly prepare for clients and
prospective clients. An Internet user who has gained access to a lawyer's home page, like
a yellow pages user, has chosen to view the lawyer's message from all the messages
available in that medium. Under these circumstances, such materials are not a
"communication directed to a specific recipient" that would implicate Rule 7.3 and its
provisions governing direct contact with prospective clients. Thus, with respect to a web
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site, Rule 7.1, prohibiting false or misleading statements concerning a lawyer's services,
and Rule 7.2, regulating advertising in the public media, are sufficient to guide lawyers
and to protect the public.
On the other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic bulletin board, chat group, or
similar service, may implicate Rule 7.3, which governs solicitation, the direct contact
with prospective clients. The Committee does not believe that merely posting general
comments on a bulletin board or chat group should be considered solicitation. However,
ofa lawyer seeks to initiate an unrequested contact with a specific person or group as a
result ofparticipation in a bulletin board or chat group, then the lawyer would be subject
to the requirements ofRule 7.3. For example, if the lawyer sends unrequested electronic
messages (including messages in response to inquiries posted in chat groups) to a
targeted person or group, the messages should be plainly identified as advertising
material.
Finally, lawyers participating in chat groups or other on-line services that could involve
offering personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be connected to the service
should be mindful that the recipients ofsuch advise are the lawyer's clients, with the
benefits and burdens ofthat relationship. In Opinion No. 94-11 (November 1994), the
Committee addressed an analogous situation arising out ofa "call-in" legal advice service
as follows:
The committee believes that callers to the legal advice service are clients of the law firm
who are entitled to the protection of clients afforded by the Rules ofProfessional
Conduct. However, it does not appear that either the law firm or the cellular telephone
service makes any effort to determine the identity ofthe callers and check for potential
conflicts of interest prior to the time that the callers' questions are asked and the legal
advice is given. (Presumably the callers' identities are revealed after the advice is
rendered through the billing process. Ifthe cellular telephone company handles the
billing for the law firm, this procedure may also violate client confidences. See ISBA
Opinion No. 93-04) Under these circumstances, it would be possible for the law firm to
give legal advice to callers whose interest are directly adverse to other firm clients,
including other callers, in violation ofRule 1.7(a), or whose interests are materially
adverse to the firm's former clients, including other callers, concerning the same or a
substantially related matter, in violation ofRule 1.9
Lawyers participating in similar activity over the Internet would be subject to the same
concerns expressed in Opinion No. 94-11.
For these reasons, the Committee believes that Illinois lawyers may appropriately make
use of the Internet in serving and communicating with clients and prospective clients
subject to the existing rules governing confidentiality, advertising and solicitation.
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APPENDIX II SAMPLE FORMS
II-I. Confidentiality Warning Disclaimer for E-mail Signature
This e-mail message, together with any attachments, is intended only for the personal and
confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client
communication and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that
any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying ofthis message is strictly prohibited.
Ifyou have received this message in error, please notify us immediately by telephone
(555-555-5555) or by return e-mail and delete the message, along with any attachments,
from your computer. Thank you.
11-2. Sample Warning to Computing Staff
The Rules ofProfessional Responsibility that bind all practicing lawyers in Kentucky
make attorneys responsible for ensuring that these rules ofethical conduct are followed
by the "non-lawyers" they employ. Therefore, Gates, Jobs & Ellison warns all employees
upon their hiring that the willful violation ofany ethical rule is grounds for immediate
termination and that the firm will not rule out criminal or civil remedies for serious
violations.
The most relevant of these rules is the rule barring the disclosure ofany "client
information," even information that would not be considered confidential to the
layperson. The Kentucky Bar Association's Committee on Ethics has advised that even
the unauthorized disclosure ofthe names ofcurrent and former clients violates this
ethical trust.* Therefore, it is the firm policy ofGates, Jobs & Ellison to immediately
terminate any employee who intentionally discloses any client information to persons not
authorized to receive such information. It is the responsibility of the network
administrators, desktop support specialists and all other computing personnel to not only
personally adhere to this policy, but to ensure that all reasonable security measures are in
place to ensure that client information is not disclosed. .
*A widely used treatise oflegal ethics notes that the "general obligation" under Rule 1.6 "gives rise to a
number of duties." Charles W. Wolfrant. Modem Legal Ethics §6.7.5 (1986). Among these duties is a duty
"to see that the client's interest in full confidentiality of infonnation is adequately protected.... The lawyer's
files should be confidentially maintained. and nonlawyer employees should be instructed, and periodically
reminded, to keep all office matters strictly confidential." Generally, all client communications, even those
that are not "confidences," fall under this general obligation. See, KBA E-253 (1981) (committee advised
that even the very existence ofan attorney-client relationship should be held confidential).
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II-3. Sample Computer Use Policy
Preface
To protect the integrity ofthe computer system against unauthorized or improper use and
to protect authorized users from the effects ofunauthorized or improper usage ofthe
system, the law firm ofGates, Jobs & Ellison reserves the rights to limit or restrict any
account holder's usage, and to inspect or remove any data, file, or system resources which
may undermine the authorized use of that system, without notice to the user. The Firm
also reserves the right to periodically check the system and any other rights necessary to
protect the Firm's computer facilities.
Users of the Firm's facilities are required to comply with the Computer Use Policy, and
by using the system, the user agrees to cOmply with and be subject to the Policy and these
Conditions ofUse. Serious violations of the Policy by nonlawyer employees are subject
to immediate termination. Attorney-employees are also subject to dismissal or severance
of the partnership relationship.
The Firm reserves the right to amend this statement at any time with or without notice.
Computer Use Policy
1. You must use only those computer accounts, files or directories that have been
authorized for your use. The unauthorized use ofanother's account, files or directories,
as well as the providing offalse or misleading information for the purpose ofobtaining
access to computing facilities, is strictly prohibited and may be regarded as grounds for
immediate termination ofemployment.
2. You may not authorize anyone to use your account for any reason. You are
responsible for all usage on your account(s). You must take all reasonable precautions,
including password maintenance and file protection measures, to prevent use ofyour
accounts by unauthorized persons.
3. You must use your accounts only for the purposes for which they were authorized.
Firm accounts must not be used for private consulting or any other commercial use
without prior approval from the Managing Attorney. You must not use your accounts for
unlawful purposes, such as the installation of fraudulently or illegally obtained software.
4. You must not access or copy files that belong to another account without prior
authorization from the account holder. All requests for access to files or directories
should go through the Managing Attorney who will request the Network Administrator to
make such changes. Files may not be taken to other sites without permission from the
managing attorney. Improper use or disclosure of client files is grounds for
immediate discharge.
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Position
Name
ll-4. Disclaimer for E-mail Signature for Use on Law-Related Listservs
Date
Supervising
Attorney
Employee Computing Account Agreement
5. You must not use the system irresponsibly, or needlessly affect the work ofothers.
This includes transmitting or making accessible offensive, annoying or harassing
material; intentionally damaging the system; intentionally damaging information not
belonging to you; or intentionally misusing system resources or allowing misuse of
system resources by others.
Failure to comply with the above guidelines, or the unauthorized or illegitimate use of
Gates, Jobs & Ellison's computing facilities or resources, shall constitute a violation of
policy and will subject the violator to disciplinary action, including the possibility of
immediate termination.
6. You are responsible for reporting to the Network Administrator any violation of
these guidelines by another individual, especially any violation that may compromise
client information. You are also encouraged to report any information relating to a flaw
in, or bypass of, computer facilities security.
I have read the Computer Use Policy. I agree to follow the rules contained
in this Policy. I understand that if I violate the rules~ I may face disciplinary
action~ including immediate termination.
Signature _
This email expresses only the generalized personal opinion ofthe writer and is not meant
to be construed as legal advice. Nothing in this message is to be construed as creating a
lawyer-client relationship. The views expressed are mine alone and are not be ascribed to
the firm ofHue, Due and Lue.
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APPENDIX III PASSWORD PROTECTION OF MICROSOFT WORD
AND COREL WORD PERFECT
To assign a password to a Word Perfect 5.0, 5.1,6.0,6.1, 7.0,8.0 file,
1 Click File, Save As.
2 Specify the file you want to password-protect.
3 Make sure the file format is Corel WordPerfect S or later.
4 Click Password protect, then click Save.
S Type the password you want to use, then click OK.
6 Retype the password, then click OK.
To Require a password to open a Word file,
1 Open the document.
2 On the File menu, click Save As.
3 Click Options.
4 In the Password to open box, type a password, and then click OK.
S In the Reenter password to open box, type the password again, and then click OK.
6 Click Save.
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APPENDIX IV KENTUCKY BENCH & BAR ARTICLE, SPRING 1998
(Reprinted With Permission From The Kentucky Bar Association)
How to Avoid Losing your License
On The Information
Ethical Issues Raised by the Use of the Internet
in the Practice of Law
by Kurt Metzmeier and Shoun Esposito
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The last three years have seen arevolution in the way thatAmericans communicate with
each other, entertain themselves, and
research purchases and services.
Millions ofAmericans have learned
how to negotiate the expanding
byways ofthe information superhigh-
way. One of the most popular uses of
the network ofcomputers, collectively
known as the Internet, is the transfer
ofwritten messages. Electronic mail,
or email, is increasingly employed in
the practice of law by small and large
firms alike. A recent survey by the
ABA's legal technology research
center showed that 64% of respond-
ing small law firms reported using the
Internet in 1997, up from 38%just
one year earlier. t Some 54% of the
respondents used email to communi-
cate with colleagues, and 41%
employed the Internet to communi-
cate with clients.
Almost as popular as email is the
use of the world-wide web.2 The·
same ABA study found that most
large firms have invested in Internet
development: A majority ofthe larger
firms had firm web pages; 60% of
those who did not have pages planned
to create one in the near future.) The
ubiquitous web address has become
as essential to American business as
the toll-free number and the yellow
page ad. The challenge for attorneys
is to incorporate these new communi-
cation technologies into their practices
without compromising the interests of
their clients or falling afoul ofthe
rules ofprofessional ethics.
Using Email in tlte Practice of
Law
The increasing use ofemail by law
firms, as well as lingering doubts over
the security of the Internet, has raised
questions about whether the responsi-
bility oflawyers to protect the confi-
dentiality ofclient information is being
unwittingly violated by the use of
email to communicate with clients.4
Although the Kentucky bar has not
yet visited the issue, the initial ethics
opinions from other states have been
mixed. Advisory boards in Iowa and
South Carolina concluded early on
that either encryption or the explicit
consent of the client would be re-
quired to shield an attorney from
ethics liability. The Illinois bar. on the
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other hand, has taken the position that,
because the likelihood ofthe intercep-
tion ofemail is comparable to tradi-
tional communications and is heavily
prohibited by federal law, no special
protections are required. The split
between these ethics advisory
committees can, to a large degree, be
explained by the varying degree of
understanding that these bodies have
ofthe technical processes involved in
electronic communication over the
Internet.
The increased usc ofemail
listservs and discussion groups has
caused commentators to question
whether the participation ofattorneys
in these forums is a form ofadvertis-
ing, or ifit is more analogous to the
participation oflawyers in public
interest programs broadcast on radio
and television.
How Email on tlte Internet
Works
The Internet is, at its most basic
level, a loosely interwoven network of
computers connected by telephone
lines that. by use ofa variety of
accepted rules, or protocols, can be
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used to exchange information. It was
reportedly designed by the defense
establishment to withstand a nuclear
war on the idea that an open network
of computers, each able to pick up the
tasks ofanother, would be better able
to adapt to the loss ofcomponent
parts than a closed network.S The
transfer of messages from one
computer account owner to another
was one of the earliest uses of the
Internet.
One relevant characteristic of
email over the Internet is that the path
ofa particular piece ofemail is
unpredictable. Instead ofbeing
transferred whole from the sender to
the recipient, each email document is
broken up by the sender's host
computer into small "packets" ofdata,
each roughly the size ofa paragraph.
Each packet is then sent out onto the
Internet and passed from computer to
computer in a path determined by
which computer is least busy at that
millisecond. The packets are then
reassembled by the recipient's host
computer where the message remains
until accessed and deleted by the
recipient.6 The architecture of the
Internet makes it extremely difficult
to intercept a particular piece ofemail
while the packets are on their journey.
In fact, the majority ofInternet email
security breaches occur 110t on the
Internet itself: but rather when a
hacker gains access to the recipient's
host computer or when a system
administrator abuses his or her
legitimate access rights. Tampering
with electronic mail is a federal
offense under the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act and anyone
who violates the ECPA risks both
criminal and civil sanctions.7
Protecting Client Confidentiality
Neither Rule 1.6 of the. Rules of
Professional Conduct adopted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, nor the
official Comments, explicitly provide
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guidance on the technical means used
by lawyers to communicate \vith
clients and share confidential client
information with colleagues. The
teJ.."t ofRule 1.6 itselfindicates only
that "A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representa-
tion ofa client unless the client
consents after consultation . . . " By
implication, the rule has been found to
impose a responsibility on an attorney
to prevent the inadvertent publication
ofclient information,8 but there are
currently no formal or informal ABA
opinions or Kentucky formal ethics
opinions that discuss the issue of
email confidentiality. For guidance,
the Kentucky lawyer must tum to the
admittedly mixed message conveyed
by the advisory bodies ofother states
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that have examined the issue.
One of the first state ethics bodies
to take up the issue of the ethics of
email communication was the South
Carolina bar. In a 1995 opinion, the
South Carolina Ethics Advisory
Committee determined that "the
confidentiality requirements ofRule
1.6 are implicated by any confidential
communication which occurs across
electronic media, absent e"-"press
\vaiver by the client.''9 The commit-
tee found what it believed was a
cogent analogy to email communica-
tions in cellular telephony and noted
three state ethics advisory opinions
barring the use ofcellular telephones
to communicate confidential client
information without that client's
consent. to Ignoring the possibility that
perhaps another wire-based means of
communications, like ordinary tele-
phony, was more analogous than the
cellular technology, which broadcasts
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signals over the air, the advisory
committee found:
"Thus, it is the opinion ofthe
committee that unless cer-
tainty can be pbtained
regarding the confidentiality
ofcommU1\ications via
electronic media. that repre-
sentation ofa client, or
communication with a client,
via electronic media. may
violate Rule 1.6, absent an
express waiver by the
client."II
The South Carolina opinion was
followed in May 16, 1996 by a formal
opinion ofthe ethics committee of the
Iowa bar association that advised that:
"Pure inter-exchange of information
or legal information with clients [need
not conform to advertising rules], but
sensitive material must be encrypted
to avoid violation ofDR4-IOI ... "12
Apparently the ruling was later found
to be too restrictive and was slightly
revised three months later in an
August 29, 1996 opinion:
"[I]fsensitive material is to
be transmitted via e-mail, the .
lawyer must have written .
acknowledgment by client of
$e risk ofthe violation of
Rule 4-10I [i.e. client confi-
dentiality] and obtain consent
for the communication via
Internet or non-secure
Intranet or other forms of
proprietary networks. Other-
wise the communication must
be encrypted or protected by
a password/firewall or other
generally accepted equivalent
security system. Opinion 95-
30 is rescinded."I'
The Iowa body did not go into its
rationale in requiring either encryption
or explicit consent. but it was no doubt
influenced by the perception that
email communication was somehow
less safe than traditional forms of
communication such as fax, tele-
phone, courier and ordinary mail. The
implicit assumption ofthe South
Carolina and Iowa opinions was that
email communication is inherently so
unsafe as to require an assurance of
"certainty" regarding confidentiality
not required for other means of
communication. Under this theory,
only encryption or explicit waiver
could satisfY Rule 1.6.
In stark contrast with the initial
response of the South Carolina and
Iowa ethics bodies (both ofwhich.
later revised their opinions), the Illinois
State Bar Association, in an intelligent
and well-reasoned advisory opinion,
found that attorneys may communi-
cate with clients using ordinary,
unencrypted email, unless unusual
circumstances dictated otherwise. '4
The Illinois committee began its
opinion by noting the implied duty of
lawyers to prevent the inadvertent
publication ofconfidential client
information, and recalled its opinion
barring the transmission ofclient
secrets over cordless and mobile
telephones because of the suscepti-
bility ofthat medium to interception.
It then briefly discussed the opinions
of the Iowa and South Carolina
bodies, but decided those opinions
were in error. The committee noted
that "courts and ethics committees
have uniformly held that persons using
ordinary phones for confidential
communications have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The three
common types ofelectronic mail
messages appear no less secure."IS
The committee then examined three
common types ofemail, finding them
more analogous to wire-based
telephony than over the air cellular
and wireless technologies. The
committee admitted that dishonest
persons could intercept email at a host
machine, but that same type of threat
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could occur using ordinary telephonic
communication, and that, in each
case, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Actl6 made criminal such
activities: "The committee does not
believe that the possibility for illegal
interception by the personnel ofan
ISP (Internet Service Provider)
makes it unreasonable to expect
privacy of the message."17 The
Illinois committee thus found:
"In summary, the Committee
concludes that because (1)
the expectation ofprivacy for
electronic mail is no less
reasonable than the expecta-
tion ofprivacy for ordinary
telephone calls, and (2) the
unauthorized interception of
an electronic message subject
to the ECPA is illegal, a
lawyer does not violate Rule
1.6 by communicating with a
client using electronic mail
services, including the
Internet, without encryption.
Nor is it necessary, as some
commentators have sug-
gested, to seek specific client
consent to the use of
unencrypted email. The
committee recognizes that
there may be unusual circum-
stances involving an extraor-
dinarily sensitive matter that
might require enhanced
security measures like
encryption. These situations
would, however, be ofthe
nature that ordinary tele-
phones and other normal
means ofcommunication
would also be deemed
inadequate."18
Since the Illinois decision, those
state ethics bodies examining the
issue ofclient communications via
electronic mail have generally avoided
requiring encryption or written
waivers in all circumstances.19
Recently, both Iowa and South
Carolina have revised their previous
opinions to allow greater freedom for
unencrypted emaiPo Iowa shifted
ground slightly to require a written
waiver from the client, but South
Carolina turned fidl4:ircle recognizing
a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in email communications that satisfied
Rule 1.6.21 North Dakota, the latest
state to take up the issue, refused to
require encryption for "routine
matters with clients, and/or other
lawyers jointly representing c1ients."22
So, Should a Kentucky Lawyer
Avoid Email?
Although it is clear that recent
decisions by ethics committees in
other states indicate a strong trend
toward the view that routine email
communications are as safe as other
ways attomeys maintain contact with
clients, the absence ofa state advi-
sory opinion leaves a lawyer in
Kentucky that chooses to use email
with the legitimate fear that he or she
will be second-guessed down the
road. Some attorneys have decided
to avoid the issue by refusing to use
email, but the prevalence ofemail use
makes this a short-term solution for
most lawyers. Increasingly, potential
clients will expect and, in many cases
demand, the opportunity to communi-
cate with their lawyer by email.
Attorney's Liability Assurance
Society (ALAS), a large attorney
malpractice insurance firm, has
carefully examined the issue and
perhaps otTers the soundest course.
The ALAS insists that it is not
necessary for its insured attorneys to
encrypt ordinary client communica-
tions over the Internet to protect
confidences. Nonetheless, it urges its
clients to use "great caution" because
ofthe possibility that courts and ethics
committees "will be tempted to
bypass a careful analysis" and hold
that unencrypted email "either violates
ethics rules or waives the [attorney-
client] privilege."n Until the KBA
otTers any guidance on email commu-
nication, the prudent lawyer wishing
to use email to communicate with his
client should seek the client's written
consent and perhaps investigate one
ofthe email packages that includes
encryption. Fortunately, several easy-
to-use email packages with encryption
capabilities are now beginning to enter
the market.24
Solicitation by Email
Persons using email often sub-
scribe to interactive discussion groups
and listservs. Listservs or discussion
groups are independently organized
electronic forums where participants
"post" email messages concerning the
discussion topic around which the
Iistserv or group has been organized.
The participation by attorneys in
public electronic forums may impli-
cate ethics rules concerning adver-
tisement and solicitation, especially
when the topic ofdiscussion explicitly
involves legal issues. The Kentucky
Rules ofProfessional Conduct
regulate the way a Kentucky lawyer
can broadcast information about his or
her practice to the general public.
There are specific rules concerning
advertisements, direct and indirect
solicitation, professional cards,
telephone listings, announcements,
signs, and letterheads. There is no
discussion ofthe participation of
lawyers on electronic discussion
groups or listservs. However, Rule
7.02 which defines an advertisement,
also notes exceptions to the advertis-
ing rules that are relevant to the
activities oflawyers on listservs and
online discussion groups. Rule
7.02(I )(f) states that:
"Any communication by a
lawyer to third parties that is
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published or broadcast by a
third party who is not in any
way controlled by the lawyer,
and for which publication or
broadcast the lawyer pays no
consideration, shall be exempt
from all the provisions of
these Rules except Rule 7. I0
[Rule 7.10 bars "false,
deceptive or misleading
communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's
service"]."
The rule seems to indicate that
ordinary postings by an attorney to a
listserv or discussion group would not
be su~ject to advertising and solicita-
tion rules so long as the group was
independent of the lawyer and the
lawyer not pay to post his message.
However, ifthe posting did not flow
from the topic of the group and/or
explicitly solicited clients, this narrow
exemption would likely not apply.
Four KBA formal ethics opinions
relating to other media seem to
support this theory. In Opinion KBA
E-50, the committee said an attorney
could appear on a commercially
sponsored radio program in a "public
service context" to discuss legal
problems involved in real estate
transactions. In Opinion KBA E-78,
an attorney was allowed to write a
series of articles for a local newspa-
per discussing probate and estate law.
In 1975, a local bar association was
allowed to place a series ofarticles in
newspapers on legal issues by
Opinion KBA E-Il O. Finally, Opinion
KBA E-270 allowed a local bar
association to sponsor a television
show and allowed lawyers to partici-
pate. A number of states have also
explicitly allowed the participation of
attorneys in email discussion groups,
so long as their participation does not
cross over from discussion to solicita-
tion,2s but others have found it to be
subject to rules regulating advertise-
ments. 26
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A few additional cautionary notes
for attorneys using email. When
using Iistservs and other electronic
forums. lawyers need to be cautious
that their replies are made publicly to
the Iistserv. not privately to individuals.
Answering questions "off-list" could
inadvertently establish an attorney-
client relationship or lead to a charge
that the attorney is practicing law in a
state where he or she is not licensed.
Also. attorneys should take every
means to ensure that email is properly
addressed. Finally. lawyers must take
care that their firm's technical support
stafF' and email service provider are
competent and trustworthy.
Advertising on the World-Wide
Web
An information explosion in the last
few years has changed the Internet
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from a scholarly back road to a major
marketplace for information. ideas
and products. The web provides the
opportunity for those using it to obtain
graphically rich and visually appealing
information with the click ofa mouse.
A major part of the web now deals
with the marketing ofproducts and
services. Businesses ranging from
auto dealers to book sellers have set
up staIls on the information superhigh-
way. Given these marketing opportu-
nities, it is not surprising that lawyers
have begun to promote themselves
and market their services in this new
marketplace.2I The marketing of
lawyers' services qaturally raises
questions ofthe propriety oflawyer
advertising and the ethical questions
inherent in such activity. Kentucky's
rules on lawyer advertising make no
specific reference to the web, but a
number ofother states have issued
rules regarding this issue that may be
instructive.
Basic Mechanics ofthe Web
Information on the web is provided
through specific locations on the
Internet known as home pages.
Attorneys using the web for market-
ing will have a home page with a
unique address. That address, known
as an URL (Uniform Resource
Locator) follows a standard naming
convention that typically begins with
http://www. and includes the name of
the host computer and ends with a
three-letter code that indicates
whether the site is educational,
governmental or commercial. Infor-
mation consumers view these home
pages through the use ofa web
browser, such as Netscape Navigator
or Microsoft Internet Explorer. An
interested person might reach the site
by typing a known URL directly into
the browser, or by "hyper linking" to it
by clicking on a link to that site in
another home page. Several web
search engines also provide access to
specific pages in response to a search
query entered by the person seeking
information. On a web browser the
pages display in a graphical mode
providing colorful packaging for the
information conveyed. The underly-
ing program language for a web page,
Hypertext Markup Language
(HTML) looks like gibberish to most
web users, but provides a wealth of
information about the home page
creator's desired audience.
Attorney Web Pages As
Advertising
Kentucky provides no specific
guidance on whether attorney home
pages fall under the general rules of
attorney advertising. An examination
ofthe rules dealing with lawyer
advertising would seem to include this
type ofcommunication within their
scope. Concerning applicability ofthe
rules, Kentucky Rule of Professional
. Conduct 7.01 states that the rule
"shall apply to advertisements related
to or concerning legal services ... "
Under the definitions provided in Rule
7.02, "advertise or advertisement
means to furnish any written, printed
or broadcast information or any other
communication containing an
attorney's name or other identifying
information" [with certain excep-
tions]. These provisions seem to
strongly imply that Kentucky's rules
cover web-based marketing. Few
states' rules provide explicit mention
of the web- or computer-based
activities, but the ethics committees of
a number of state bars have provided
guidance through ethics opinions or
commentaries.29
Reporting Requirements As
Applied to Web Advertising
Kentucky Rule ofProfessional
Conduct 7.05 provides the procedural
mechanism required ofall attorneys
wishing to advertise. In particular,
section 7.05(l)(b) requires that
"simultaneously with the publication of
any advertisement under this subsec-
tion, the attorney shall mail to the
Commission ... a copy of the
advertisement, or ifby radio or
television, a fair and accurate repre-
sentation of the advertisement plus a
typed transcript of the words spoken.
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... A list ofall persons or firms or
groups to whom the advertising has
been sent shall be maintained in the
principal office in Kentucky ofthe
advertising lawyer or firm for a period
of two (2) years ... "
Just what is required of a Ken-
tucky attorney using the web is not
clear from this rule. Would a notifi-
cation ofthe home page's address (its
URL) be enough? What about a
printed copy ofthe home page? And,
ifso, how much ofthe home page-
the opening screen, or every screen?
Some law firms provide a wealth of
information on various topics, and
providing copies ofall this material
could become burdensome for both
the attorney and the Commission.
Nearly every home page provides
links to other sites maintained by third
parties. Would hard copies of these
sites also be necessary? Web pages
require constant updating and chang-
ing. Are Kentucky attorneys under a
continuing duty to disclose any
changes to the web page by providing
additional hard copies ofthe whole
web site or just the changes? Do any
changes trigger the reporting require- .
ment or just material ones, and ifso,
what is a material change?
While Kentucky has remained
silent on these points, other states
have offered some guidance to
attorneys attempting to comply with
these type of requirements. Florida's
Bar Ethics Department advised that a
hard copy must be filed with the
department, as well as a statement
explaining when and where it will
appear.JO Although Florida provides
some guidance with this bit ofadvice,
it still provides little insight into the
amount ofmaterial that must be filed.
And, the advice seems to be ignorant
of how the web is used. Any web
user anywhere could view the page
with the click ofa mouse. It would
be impossible for an attorney to know
who will view the page. Texas has
provided more guidance on the
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amount ofmaterial to be filed, limiting
it to the first page viewed and any
subsequent screens primarily dealing
with client solicitation.31 Iowa has
also provided that the first screen and
biographical screens must contain
required disclostires.32 Recently, the
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee advised attorneys
to keep copies ofall pages ofthe web
site (not just the initial home page) for
the required two year period.33
Recognizing that web pages are
frequently updated, the Committee
approved the retention ofelectronic
rather than hard copies of the
changes to web pages. The North
Carolina Bar's Ethics Committee, also
recognizing the frequency ofweb
page updates, requires hard copies be
retained only ofany "material
changes in format or content" to the
original pages.34
Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw
on the World-Wide Web
By its very nature, the web spans
the globe; it is, after all, the world-
wide web. Thus, persons anywhere
in this country or around the world
might access a given home page.
This raises troublesome questions for
both the advertising attorney and the
bar's governing ethical body. Which
state's ethical rules apply: the
attorney's home state, or any state
where someone can access the home
page?3S Must an attorney licensed in
more than one state meet require-
ments in all states in which the
attorney is licensed? And for those
states where the attorney is not
licensed, does contact with potential
clients in those states resulting from
web pages give rise to unauthorized
practice of law problems?36
Although no reported cases deal
specifically with attorney web adver-
tising, conflicting decisions have been
issued by courts concerningjurisdic-
tional issues related to web pages.37
Many commentators believe that
attorneys should list those jurisdictions
in which they are admitted to practice,
in order to avoid any confusion and to
remain consistent with those ethical
rules requiring the avoidance offalse,
deceptive or misleading communica-
tions (see Kentucky Rule ofProfes-
sional Conduct 7.10). Cautious
attorneys will at a minimum provide
disclaimers about the limits oftheir
practice and provide information
about states in which they are li-
censed to practice. At minimum,
attorneys should be certain to comply
with the requirements for each state
in which they are licensed.38 Finally,
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some commentators suggest that the
conflicting state rules are so confus-
ing, some national standards need to
be developed.39
Web Pages As Solicitation
For the most part, states examining
the topic consider web home pages
with proper disclaimers to be akin to
advertising rather than solicitation.40
Solicitation rules are much stricter
than those governing advertising (see
Kentucky Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.30). By their nature, web
pages are viewed only when someone
purposely chooses to seek out and
view them. This makes a charge of
improper solicitation very unlikely.
Some commentators, though, have
noted that with developing technology,
such as interactive web pages,
concerns about solicitation might
grow.4t Even noW; some have raised
concerns about banner advertising
(where a firm or company ad will
appear, unsolicited., on a web search
engine's page following entry ofa
research query). Additionally, web
page creators can put keywords in
fields used by Web search engines to
determine whether a given site
matches the search query entered by
the user. Some web page designers
"pack" this field with every possible
relevant term, many duplicated or
triplicated to increase possible hits. If
a lawyer uses these tactics this could
be held to border on solicitation
depending upon the index terms used
and how accurately they reflect the
contents of the home page.42
While existing ethical rules in
Kentucky may seem to cover attor-
neys' activities on the web, the
questions raised here, and the activi-
ties ofthe bar governing authorities in
several other states, suggest the need
for clarification ofexactly how these
rules apply to web activities. To craft
meaningful new rules or commentar-
ies on existing rules, the bar's govern-
ing authority must consult those who
are knowledgeable about the work-
ings ofthe web. Ifrule drafting in the
area is left to persons without an
understanding ofhow the web works,
more rather than less confusion will
likely result.43
Conclusion
The information superhighway may
be fraught with dangers for attorneys,
particularly those who are apt to skirt
the rules. Unwary lawyers may risk
losing their license for inadvertently
betraying client confidences, by
soliciting clients on listservs and in
chat rooms, or by passing over
unclear ethical lines with a flashy web
page. Despite these road hazards,
attorneys wiII find that in the very
near future a web page will be as
essential as a shingle and a yellow
page listing, and that clients will insist
on using email to communicate with
their lawyer, just as they use it to
manage their businesses and to stay in
touch with their kids. •
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APPENDIX V WEB-SITE LISTING
Appendix to "How to Keep Your License on the Information Super-Highway"
prepared by Shaun Esposito, Reference & Electronic Information Service Librarian, University of
Kentucky College of Law Library
Articles Related to Attorney Web Pages & Internet Use
Advertising on the Net, The Young Lawyer, <htt.p:/Iwww.abanet.orglyldfu'Vjulyad.html>
(points out ethical questions raised by attorney internet use and provides links to relevant sites)
Fisher, Vance A. Practicing Law on The Internet: The Virtual Law Firm
<http://209.69.6.126/--wpofflmichbarN19AA02.htm> (well footnoted exploration of ethical
dilemmas of the internet law firm)
Hankins, Mark. Ambulance Chasers on the Internet: Regulation ofAttorney Web Pages,
1 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 3, <http://journal.law.ufl.edul-techlaw/l/hankins.html> (l996)(practitioner
offers extensive analysis of ethical considerations for attorney web pages)
Kennedy, Dennis M. Marketing Your Legal Practice on the Internet: Successful, Safe and
Ethical Ways to Use the Internet to Market and Promote Your Practice While Staying Within the
Ethical Boundariesfor Practicing Law, <htt.p:/lwww.bamsl.orglinet/dkmarkOl.htm> (outline
of seminar on topic presented to St. Louis Bar Association, extensive discussion of technologies
and legal issues involved)
Kennedy, John B. Legal Advertising and Ethics On the World Wide Web,
<htt.p:/fwww.ljx.com/intemetl0127webethics.html> (Law Journal Extra article provides
citation to numerous articles and bar rules)
Kennedy, Dennis M. Hanging Out Your Shingle on the World Wide Web: Promoting Your
Practice in a Digital Era <http://members.aoLcomldmk58/slbjart.html> (a general "how to"
column on setting up a firm web page, includes links to legal ethics sites in the footnotes)
Kennedy, Dennis M. The Practice ofLaw in a Digital Era,
<htt.p:/Imembers.aol.com/dmk58/praclaw.html> (provides and extensive list of links to sites
dealing with ethical issues related to the internet)
Lanctot, Catherine J. and James Edward Maule. The Internet -- Hip Or Hype? Legal Ethics and
the Internet <http://www.law.vill.edu/vcilplMacCrate/mclellanctot.htm> (two Villanova
professors discuss ethical issues related to internet advertising; also provides sample disclaimers
for use on attorney web pages)
Legal Websites: Creation, Marketing, Disintermediatioll and Ethics in Web Counsel Notes,
<http://www.pli.edu/arts/pliethc9.htm> (part of a summary outline of a PLI course on web
creation and marketing, this section addresses ethical considerations)
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Luce, Charles F. Jr., Ethics In Attorney Advertising & Solicitation,
<http://www.mgovg.comlethics/lladvert.htm> (in general discussion on attorney advertising
includes extensive consideration of internet advertising)
Luce, Charles F. Jr., On Legal Ethics and the Practice ofLaw,
<http://www.meoye.comlethics/index.html> (general discussion of ethical issues by long-time
Colorado practitioner, includes discussion of internet based ethical problems)
Maher, Stephen T. The Practical Professor: Legal Ethics in Cyberspace,
<http://www.usual.comlarticle9.htm> (provides a list of points to consider in determining
whether to advertise on the internet)
Marsh, Stephen R. Web Site Designfor Small Firms: A Primer,
<http://www.colleeehilLcomlilp-newslmarsh.html> (a straightforward how to guide for setting
up a web page, this article includes references to relevant ethics materials)
Morgan, Laura W. Ethics Spotlight: Attorney Malpractice for Web Site Content,
<http://divorcenet.comlfamlaw/famlaw-ethics03-99.html> (examines possible malpractice
complications for attorneys with web sites)
Orsinger, Richard R. Cyber Hazards: Legal & Ethical Pitfalls in Using the Internet,
<htt.p:/Iwww.txdirect.netlusers/rrichardlhazard.htm> (this article, prepared for a CLE
presentation, examines ethical issues including advertising and unauthorized practice of law)
Pruner, Mark. The Internet and the Practice ofLaw, 19 Pace L. Rev. 69 (l998)(examines use of
web by law firms and considers ethical implications involved)
Rappaport Jordan, Attorney Advertising on the Internet,
<http://www.law.miami.edul-froomkinlseminar/papers/rappaport.htm> (law student
seminar paper explores ethical issues involved and provides extensive citations to other
materials)
Read, T.K. Pushing the Advertising Envelope: Building Bill Boards In The Sky Along The
Information Superhighway, <http://www.computerbar.orglnetethiclread.htm> (copiously
footnoted examination of mechanics of and issues involved in internet advertising)
Rogers, Joan C. How Do Advertising Rules Apply to Lawyers on the <Net?
<http://www.bna.com/prodhomelbus/mopc_adnew.html> (from ABAIBNA Manual on
Professional Conduct, this article reviews issues raised by net advertising and summarizes
general trends in state bar ethics rulings on the topic)
Welch, Mark J. Creating a Lawyer's Web Site; Results ofMy Web Site,
http://www.markwelch.comlprobate_results.htm> (good explanation of nuts and bolts of
putting up a web site, includes discussion of ethical problems)
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Sample Law Firm Web Pages From Kentucky and Beyond
Becker Law Office <http://www.beckerlaw.com!>
Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love <http://www.bowlesrice.com!>
Bricker & Eckler <http://www.bricker.com/welcome.htm> (Ohio firm, an early web page
developer and award-winning web site)
Brown, Todd & Heyburn <htt.p:/Iwww.bth-pllc.com!>
Bryan Gowin <http://www.bryangowin.coml>
Dinsmore & Shohl <htt.p:/lwww.dinshohl.com/index.cfm>
Faegre & Benson <http://www.faegre.com/> (web site award-winning Midwest multi-state
firm)
Frost & Jacobs <http://www.frojac.com!>
Goldberg & Simpson <htt.p:/!www.gsatty.comfwelcome.html>
Jewell & Lemke <htt.p:/fwww.bluegrdss.net/-mcUjewelem.html>
LexTech's List of Top Ten Law Firm Web Sites
<htt.p:l!www.lexfechinc.com/toptenlfirms.html> (includes Kentucky's own Brown, Todd &
Heyburn)
Miller, Griffin & Marks <http://www.kentuckylaw.com/mgm.html>
Poston, Seifried & Schloemer, <htt.p:/Iwww.nkymall.com/ps&slawl>
Publishing Law Center <http://www.publaw.coml> (informational/advertising page dealing
with legal issues in the publishing industry)
Stites & Harbison <http://www.stites.com/>
Stout Law Office <http://www.stoutlaw.com!>
McAdam's Home Page <http://members.aol.comffAMCADAM3/lawyer.html>
Siskind Susser & Haas <http://www.visalaw.coml>(atruewebpioneer.this immigration law
firm has been cited many times as an example of an effective web page producer)
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Taft, Stettinius & Hollister <http://www.taftlaw.com/overview/>
Watson, Farley & Williams <http://www.wfw.coml> (multi-national international law firm with
award-winning web site)
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